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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the realm of the interpersonal: broadly, those linguistic 
phenomena involved in the negotiation of social relations and the expression of personal 
attitudes and feelings. The initial contention is that this realm has been consistently 
marginalised not only within linguistic theory, but more broadly within western culture, for 
cultural and ideological reasons whose implications extend into the bases of classical linguistic 
theory. Chapter 1 spells out the grounds for this contention and is followed by two further 
chapters, constituting Part I: Language and Social Relations. Chapter 2 identifies and critiques 
the range of ways in which the interpersonal has been conventionally interpreted: as style, as 
formality, as politeness, as power and solidarity, as the expressive, etc. This chapter concludes 
with an argument for the need for a stratified model of language in order to deal adequately 
with these phenomena. Chapter 3 proposes such a model, based on the systemic-functional 
approach to language as social semiotic. The register category tenor within this model is 
extended to provide a model of social relations as a semiotic system. The basis for the 
identification of the three tenor dimensions, power, distance and affect, is the identification of 
three modes of deployment or realisation of the interpersonal resources of English in everyday 
discourse: reciprocity, proliferation and amplification.  
Parts II and III turn their attention to one significant issue in the negotiation of social relations: 
address. The focus is explicitly on Australian English, but there is considerable evidence that 
most if not all of the forms discussed in Part II occur in other varieties of English, especially 
British and American, and that some at least of the practices discussed in Part III involve the 
same patterns of social relations with respect to the tenor dimensions of power, distance and 
affect.  
Because most varieties of contemporary English do not have a set of options for second-person 
pronominal address, as is the case in many of the world's languages, English speakers use 
names and other nominal forms which need to be described. Part II is descriptive in orientation, 
providing an account of the grammar of VOCATION in English, including a detailed description 
of the nominal forms used.  Chapter 4 investigates the identification and functions of vocatives, 
and includes empirical investigations of vocative position in clauses and vocative incidence in 
relation to speech function or speech act choices. Chapter 5 presents an account of the grammar 
of English name forms, organised as a paradigmatic system. This chapter incorporates an 
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account of the processes used to produce the various name-forms used in address, including 
truncation, reduplication and suffixation. Chapter 6 consists of an account of non-name forms 
of address, organised in terms of the systemic-functional account of nominal group structure. 
This chapter deals with single-word non-name forms of address and the range of nominal 
group structures used particularly to communicate attitude, both positive and negative.  
Part III is ethnographic in orientation. It describes some aspects of the use of the forms 
described in Part II in contemporary address practice in Australia and interprets such practice 
using the model of social relations as semiotic system presented in Part I. The major focuses of 
attention is on address practice in relation to the negotiation of gender relations, with some 
comment on generational relations of adults with children, on class relations and on ethnic 
relations in nation with a diverse population officially committed to a policy of a 
multiculturalism. Part III functions simultaneously as a coda for this thesis, and a prologue for 
the kind of ethnographic study that the project was originally intended to be, but which could 
not be conducted in the absence of an adequate linguistically-based model of social relations 
and an adequate description of the resources available for address in English.  
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Notational Conventions  
 
Systemic networks 
The networks appearing in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 below employ standard systemic 
notational conventions:  
[ = a or b  
{ = a and b  
where a and b are features sharing a common entry condition (which may be single or 
multiple). Each such set of features comprises a SYSTEM and each feature, either alone 
or in combination with other features, may constitute the entry condition for further 
systems. A set of interrelated systems constitutes a system network.  
] = a or b  
} = a and b 
where a and b are features functioning either disjunctively or in combination as the  
entry conditions for further systems within a network. System networks are normally 
identified by an 'address', which labels them by name, by rank, by stratum and (if 
appropriate) by communicative plane.  
 
Orthographic representation of morphological forms  
Conventional orthography has been used in Chapter 5, in preference to phonetic 
notation, for representing the range of suffixes constituting diminutive or hypocoristic 
forms of personal names, since they are discussed as morphological rather than 
phonological phenomena. Likewise, name forms containing a string of such items will 
be represented in a conventionalised orthography.   
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A Note on Style  
 
Certain linguistic choices have been made in this thesis for which it seems appropriate 
to preface some explanation, since they are not conventionally found in a thesis. Such 
choices include the intermittent use of gradable forms such as modals, rather than the 
binary/polar forms 'it is/it isn't' so, and the consistent use of the pronoun I  referring to 
the writer, rather than we  or the avoidance of any implication of human 
agency/responsibility by resorting to the (agent-deleted) passive.  
The use of modality reflects the speculative nature of much that is contained in this 
thesis, an appropriate choice indicating that 'knowledge' is not final but always partial 
and contingent. The use of I  acknowledges part of the contingency of that 'knowledge': 
I, in all the specificity of my multiple social identities, am responsible for its 
production.  
I could have made a simple decision to avoid such forms, i.e. to make other choices and 
conform entirely to the conventional expectations for thesis style. But that would have 
been to play a double game: to write a thesis about the interpersonal and how it has 
been marginalised while eschewing the use of interpersonal forms, thereby 
contributing, albeit in a small way, to maintaining that marginalisation.  
In a world which did not so rigidly separate mind and body, reason and emotion, the 
cognitive and the affective, such an explanation would hardly be necessary. But we do 
not inhabit such a world. Yet.   
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PART I: LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 
2 
 
One 
Linguistic legitimacy: the case of the interpersonal 
 
 
Il est, selon nous, dangereux d'établir d'avance une distinction entre des éléments 
grammaticaux d'un côté et certains autres qu'on appelle extra-grammaticaux, de 
l'autre, entre un langage intellectuel et un langage affectif. Les éléments dits extra-
grammaticaux ou affectifs peuvent en effet obéir aux règles grammaticales, en 
partie peut-être à des règles grammaticales qu'on n'a pas encore réussi à dégager. 
(Hjelmslev 1928: 240, cited from Stankiewicz 1964: 241) 
 
This thesis takes as its starting point a range of linguistic phenomena which have 
not always been paid adequate attention descriptively and/or theoretically, looked 
at from the perspective of a systemic-functional model of language as social 
semiotic. From this perspective, the phenomena in question are identifiable as 
related in terms of both structure and meaning, or function in context, under the 
general label of the interpersonal. They include: the organisation of conversation in 
terms of speech or conversational roles, including the relation of congruence or 
incongruence between speech function (speech act) choices, such as Statement or 
Command, and the grammatical (mood) choices which realise them; a range of 
aspects of lexical choice, including terms of address, slang, swearing and 
attitudinal lexis; and a range of 'expressive' phonological features, such as 
lengthening, speech rate, voice quality, pitch range in intonation contours and 
loudness or intensity, coding what has variously been referred to as 'the expressive' 
or 'the emotive' (feeling, emotion, evaluation or affect). 
Many of these features have, of course, been identified as significant in the 
negotiation of social relations. See the influential work of Brown & Levinson on 
politeness (Brown & Levinson 1978); the literature on language and gender (v. 
Thorne, Kramarae & Henley 1983 for an extensive annotated bibliography and 
McConnell-Ginet 1988 for a recent overview); and the now extensive literature on 
address, following in the footsteps of the pioneering work of Roger Brown and his 
colleagues (Gilman & Brown 1958, Brown & Gilman 1960; Brown & Ford 1964. 
See Philipsen & Huspek 1985 and Braun, Köhz & Schubert 1986 for recent 
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bibliographies). While such features have been recognised, and their social 
significance acknowledged, however, this has frequently been on terms which 
either ignore the place of this work within a theory of language, or else which 
simultaneously acknowledge its significance and marginalise it by maintaining a 
rigorous boundary between the realms of 'syntax' and 'pragmatics', or 'linguistics' 
and 'sociolinguistics'.  
Other interpersonal features have been identified as primarily personal, rather than 
interpersonal, under such labels as 'the expressive' or 'the emotive'.  Central here 
are various 'expressive' aspects of phonology (stress, intensity, lengthening, etc.), 
of morphology (especially diminutive and augmentative affixation), and of lexis 
(slang, personal names, attitudinal lexis). Such features have not uncommonly 
been assigned a very marginal status indeed, if they have not been totally excluded 
as properly 'linguistic'.  Concerning names, for example, Hudson suggests that, as 
the main markers of power and solidarity in English, they  
might fairly be described as peripheral to the system of English as a whole, in the 
sense that proper names used as vocatives . . . could be handled in a separate 
section of the grammar with little or no consequence for any other parts of it. 
(Hudson 1980: 125)  
And Markey makes a more far-reaching claim regarding their linguistic status, 
questioning whether names ought even to be regarded as linguistic items insofar as 
they  
do not share the developmental properties of 'normal' grammatical items . . . (and) 
are peripheral to concerns which lie at the core of the theoretical investigation of 
language. (Markey 1982: 141) 
From a much more sympathetic perspective, Edward Stankiewicz, in a paper 
which describes a range of expressive phenomena in a number of European 
languages, notes that what he calls 'the emotive function'  
… and its peculiarities are still the least studied in linguistic works, despite 
repeated attempts on the part of some linguists to lift them from the limbo of 
grammatical appendices, footnotes or lists of exceptions. (Stankiewicz 1964: 240) 
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He sees part of the cause of this neglect as a tendency  
to confuse the instinctive nature of 'sound-gestures' with what can properly be 
considered as the linguistic dimension of 'expressiveness' or of the emotive 
function. (p.239) 
i.e. a failure to distinguish adequately between  
an 'emotional' plane, which reveals itself in a variety of articulated or non-
articulated 'forms' of a symptomatic nature, that is through signals which are 
inextricably bound to the situation which evokes them and which they evoke, and 
the 'emotive' plane, which is rendered through situationally independent, arbitrary 
symbols. (p.240)  
He also suggests an historical basis for contemporary attitudes, going back to the 
'neo-idealist' response to nineteenth-century Neogrammarianism:  
The mistrust of the phenomenon called 'emotive language' can also be explained 
by the exaggerated attention it received in some linguistic quarters, which treated it 
as a panacea for all the shortcomings of nineteenth century linguistics.   
He goes on to give the following account:   
The stylistic approach to emotive or 'expressive' language received a notable 
impetus with the crisis of the neogrammarian method. . . . The indictment of the 
deterministic and naturalistic program of the Neo-grammarians took a variety of 
directions in the work of the so-called 'neo-idealistic' students of language . . . All 
of them proclaimed the supremacy of individual innovation, the importance of 
psychological forces in the development of language, and the primacy of emotion 
over the 'intellectual', mechanical aspect of language and over the 'blindness' of the 
phonetic laws.  … The rejection of the neogrammarian method was accompanied 
by an interest in those areas of grammar which seemed to 'leak'; i.e., in individual 
deviations from the norm, in substandard speech, in poetic language, in stylistics. 
All these areas of language were supposed to provide evidence for the superiority 
of emotive and subjective language over cognitive and objective language. Despite 
the undeniable merits of these scholars in accumulating stylistic and occasionally 
linguistic material pertaining to emotive language, the theoretical premises and 
philosophical mystique of the linguistic 'expressionists' must be considered wrong-
headed from a modern point of view. The neo-idealists . . . ignored or blurred the 
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difference between language and speech, code and message, or, in de Saussure's 
terms, 'langue' and 'parole', directing the attention only to the latter.  
The methodological impressionism of the neo-idealistic school, together with a 
programmatic insistence on the primacy and non-systematic character of emotion 
in the functioning and history of language, have actually stood in the way of 
recognising emotive language as a legitimate area of linguistic research. Its 
treatment as a kind of 'contre-grammaire', and its identification with individual 
deviations, were self-defeating for linguistics as a science. The harmfulness of this 
approach was voiced early by Hjelmslev: 'Il est, selon nous, dangereux d'etablir 
d'avance une distinction entre des elements grammaticaux d'un cote et certains 
autres qu'on appelle extra-grammaticaux de l'autre, entre un langage intellectuel et 
un langage affectif. Les elements dits extra-grammaticaux ou affectifs peuvent en 
effet obeir aux regles grammaticales, en partie peut-etre a des regles grammaticales 
qu'on n'a pas encore reussi a degager.' ([Hjelmslev 1928]: 240)   
To the opponents of the neogrammarian method, 'stylistics' seemed the road to the 
'life' of language, to its quivering essence, but, in effect, they did not abandon the 
main tenets of the Neogrammarians: their historicism which viewed language only 
in a state of flux, their psychologism which recognized as 'real' only the speech of 
the individual, and the atomistic approach to linguistic facts. The question of 
emotive language was, in fact, posited not with relation to linguistic systems, but 
from the point of view of contextual variation, of the possibilities of the message. 
However, the expressive resources of the message must be distinguished from the 
expressive devices of the code, even if these do interact both synchronically and 
diachronically. The confusion of these two dimensions has not been avoided even 
by some structural linguists, who are inclined to treat all emotive phenomena as a 
problem of parole , rather than of langue .  (Stankiewicz 1964: 240-242) 
The contemporary marginalising of interpersonal features is hardly surprising 
given the negative value given to the emotions, the realm of feeling, in 
contemporary western culture and the primacy of the referential within linguistics 
itself. The effects have been unfortunate, most significantly in imposing arbitrary 
limits on notions of 'language' as a human  phenomenon and of 'linguistics' as the 
study of that phenomenon. An arbitrary separation of the two faces of language - 
as code and as social practice, as system and process - has been fostered, with 
serious consequences for the adequacy of accounts of the code itself, long the 
primary focus of attention within linguistics. If, as Stankiewicz notes, the neo-
idealists of the early twentieth century 'ignored or blurred the difference' between 
langue and parole, by focusing too exclusively on parole, then much of later 
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twentieth century linguistics has gone the other way, exaggerating the difference 
between them by valuing the cognitive at the expense of the emotive.  
In terms of ontogony, it seems clear that expressive and interactive meanings 
emerge earlier than cognitive meanings (in the sense of the referential or 
representational). Infants develop repertoires of signs for expressing interest, 
pleasure, displeasure and a desire for interaction itself, as well as for getting people 
to do things for them, well before they start using language more referentially by 
learning 'words' as 'labels'. The forms of these signs, at this proto-language stage,  
are not yet those of the adult language system that the child has yet to acquire, but 
they can be shown to be both meaningful (i.e. functional in context) and systematic 
(i.e. able to be mapped into sets of options organised paradigmatically). They 
certainly form the basis for the range of aspects of interpersonal meaning that the 
child later comes to be able to code simultaneously with representational or 
experiential meaning, by using the tri-stratal organisation of the adult linguistic 
system to map the structures realising interpersonal meaning onto the structures 
realising representational and textual meaning, thereby producing a single, multi-
functional output. (See Halliday 1975, Painter 1984 for detailed accounts). 
 
1.1 Assumptions underlying marginalisation of the interpersonal 
What, then, are the assumptions underpinning those models of language which 
have marginalised interpersonal structures and meanings? There are two 
interconnected aspects of such an exploration, one looking more narrowly at 
attitudes and beliefs focussed specifically on language; the other looking more 
broadly at ideological aspects of western epistemology, in particular the habit of 
dichotomising critiqued so pungently by Derrida (1976, 1978), with its 
concomitant privileging of one term and dismissal of the other, and by the ideology 
of individualism.  
In terms of thinking about language, the central issues would seem to be:  
(i) a too-exclusive focus on system at the expense of process (deriving from 
uncritical reliance on dichotomies such as langue/parole, 
competence/performance), one of the consequences of this imbalance being 
(ii) the 'primacy attributed to referential meaning in the western 
positivist/empiricist tradition' (Quinn & Holland 1987:14);  
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(iii) constituency-based notions of linguistic structure which allow no room for 
alternative kinds of structure;  
(iv) assumptions about the unpredictability/lack of systematicity of interpersonal 
features, deriving from privileging the categorical at the expense of the 
probabilistic.  
Saussure's distinction between langue  and parole  lies behind both the 
contemporary focus on system, as well as the separation of competence from 
performance and  ultimately syntax from pragmatics. If one understands the 
langue/parole  distinction as a dichotomy, then the twentieth-century tendency has 
been to choose to focus attention on one or other of the terms and, in making that 
choice, implicitly to evaluate them in relation to one another. If linguistics is 
defined as the study of langue , then it is hardly surprising that parole  becomes  
'simply the evidence that you use and then throw away' (Halliday 1987: 603). 
Halliday, with Firth, finds little use for such dichotomies as langue/parole  (and 
competence/ performance ) (Halliday 1974). In a recent interview with Paul 
Thibault, he makes it clear that he wishes to value both terms, though the terms he 
prefers to use are not langue/parole  but the Hjelmslevian system  and process , or 
system  and text :  
M.A.K.H.: . . . I would see text as instantiation of the system; the two must be 
mutually determining. Hjelmslev says that you could, in principle, have a system 
without process - a system without it generating any text, but you couldn't have the 
process without the system; he presents it as a one-way determination. I prefer to 
think of these as a single complex phenomenon: the system only 'exists' as a 
potential for the process, and the process is the actualization of that potential. 
Since this is a language  potential, the 'process' takes the form of what we call text.  
P.J.T.: The Saussurean discussion of this relation has tended to disjoin system 
from text so that the ontological status of the system is privileged. The systemic-
functional model, as well as the earlier work of Firth and Hjelmslev, has quite a 
different view of this relation. The systemic-functional model is oriented to both 
'meaning' and 'text'. Can you explain this relation? 
M.A.K.H.: I've always felt that it was rather a distraction in Saussure that he 
defined linguistics as the study of la langue, with parole being simply the evidence 
that you use and then throw away. I don't see it that way. Firth, of course, was at 
the other end of the scale, in that for him the phenomenon was the text. He wasn't 
interested in the potential, but rather, as I think I put it on one of my papers, in the 
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generalized actual, so that it was the typical texts that he was interested in. Firth 
tended to privilege the text as against the system. I don't want to privilege either. 
(Halliday 1987: 603)  
If, on the other hand, one treats the relationship between pairs of terms such as 
langue/parole  as dialectic rather than dichotomous, then one has to pay attention 
to both system and its instantiation in particular contexts, or, to look at the relation 
from the other direction, attend to actual instances of 'languaging' in the real world 
as both the only guarantee of the existence of any system but also as themselves 
affecting, and ultimately changing,  the system. (And note that ultimately one has 
to pluralise 'system', or be trapped by one's own reified terminology in a way that 
has a great deal in common with nineteenth-century notions of 'nation' and 'people': 
a particular 'language', with its 'system, is just as much a fiction as a nation is an 
'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) - both are dreams or fantasies of desired 
unity in the face of actual diversity).  
Chomsky's reformulation of langue/parole as competence/performance not only 
involves a similar dichotomous view of the relation between system and process 
but also a strong emphasis on the cognitive, which he is quite explicit about 
(Chomsky 1965: Chapter 1. V. Chomsky 1988 for a recent restatement). What isn't 
always understood is what has been lost by such an orientation, i.e. a concern for 
not only the affective/expressive but also, ironically, the very social as against 
individual orientation to language that was one of the values of Saussure's 
langue/parole  distinction. Langue  was what we all shared as speakers, where 
parole  was the individual use of that resource. What Chomsky does, with his 
cognitive orientation, is to tie the notion of system to the individual, albeit an 
individual who embodies the specifically human cognitive capacities evolved by 
the species. What this does, of course, is to side-step the whole question of the 
social. And to ensure, because of the hegemony of Chomskian linguistics from the 
1960s, that when linguists wanted to get back to the social (as increasingly they 
have from the 1970s), there is a built-in hierarchy which gives priority to the 
cognitive and individual over the interpersonal and social.   
Prioritising the cognitive has a long history in western ideas about language. 
Various commentators - almost invariably, however, from within those traditions 
or approaches to language with an interest in the social -  have noted the 
preoccupation with the cognitive, referential, representational function of 
language: language representing and hence controlling the world. Waugh (1985: 
144), speaking of Jakobson's set of language functions (Jakobson 1960), notes that  
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… the referential function seems to be that function which is the unmarked one in 
the system of six … As evidence of the unmarked nature of the referential 
function, we may cite the fact that in many linguistic and philosophical studies of 
language, the referential function has been said to be the only  function of 
language, or, if (some of) the other functions have been discerned, they have been 
declared to be 'deviant' or 'unusual' or needing special consideration. And even in 
our parlance about language, the referential function is spoken of as 'ordinary 
language'.  
It is possible, however, to see the cognitive as constituting the 'central core' of 
language, and yet still to make a strong case for the inadequacy of a purely 
cognitivist orientation to language:   
The linguist's primary concern with the cognitive elements of language is not 
surprising, because they constitute its central core. Yet even though the expressive 
elements are generally less apparent than the cognitive units, it would be deceptive 
to think that the former constitute a shapeless, subterranean stream buried under 
the structure of language. Absence of adequate descriptions is, as we know, not 
always determined by inaccessibility of empirical data; it is often the result of 
disinterest or of inadequacy of prevailing theories. And so long as linguists do 
insist on either/or solutions, or on a reductionism of all elements of language to a 
single cognitive level, they are bound to ignore those phenomena which do not fit 
their constructs, or to force the facts into ready-made schemes. (Stankiewicz 1964: 
247) 
Within the neo-Firthian tradition, Ellis notes 'the excessively referential conception 
of extra-linguistic components' in contrasting Firth's own emphasis on the 
importance of context (Ellis 1966: 89-90 (footnote 6)) and Halliday identifies the 
firm commitment of linguists 'in the psycho-philosophical tradition' to language as 
'an ideational system' (Halliday 1979: 71).  
Among those working within pragmatics, Levinson, having referred to work on the 
'functions of speech', notes the utility of this work in reminding us that 
contrary to the preoccupations of many philosophers and a great many 
semanticists, language is used to convey more than the propositional content of 
what is said.  
and several pages later is more explicit in acknowledging 
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the philosophical and linguistic bias (no doubt reflected in this book) towards what 
Bühler (1934) called the representational , and Jakobson (1960) the referential, 
function of language. (Levinson 1983: 42, 46) 
Leech, in the earlier version of his work on the tact maxim (Leech 
1980), though interestingly not in the later version (1983), takes 
up a related issue in seeing Austin's How to Do Things with Words  
as  
a milestone because it offered to release linguistic philosophy from the age-long 
tyrrany of its preoccupation with the truth and falsehood of propositions. (Leech 
1980: 79)  
But despite the very clear acceptance in the earlier version of different but parallel 
kinds of meanings, in the later version, in fact, he insists on a hierarchy, 
privileging the representational as more centrally linguistic (and seriously 
misrepresenting Halliday's work in the process).  
Behind this widespread cognitively-oriented conception of language, shared by 
linguist and lay-person alike, would seem to be two pairs of ideological 
dichotomies of profound importance to western epistemology: the dichotomy of 
'objective' and 'subjective' and that of 'reason' and 'emotion'. In both cases, the first 
term is highly valued and the second devalued. Both of these pairs of terms have 
had obvious significance as epistemological preconditions for the development of 
the physical sciences in the west, but have been invoked in other, social, areas of 
control, particularly in relation to the subordination of women (Lloyd 1984, 
Poynton 1985/90: 18-19).   
These linked notions, of the objective and the rational, have undoubtedly served 
the interests of western expansionist capitalism extremely well, by, on the one 
hand, assuming the value of control (by force, by knowledge, by language itself) 
and, on the other hand, by devaluing not only those uses of language directed 
towards the social but those people who habitually use and value the interpersonal, 
those who apparently talk 'for talk's sake' rather than for 'getting things done'. The 
dichotomy implied between talk 'for talk's sake' and talk for 'getting things done' is, 
of course, a false dichotomy: talk always is a mode of 'getting things done', a mode 
of action, where what 'gets done' through the ongoing conduct of everyday social 
relations is the production/re-production of both social structure itself and of 
individual social subjects, socially situated. But in the ideological world of 
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conservative political values, where it is convenient to privilege the individual at 
the expense of the social, that is a most inconvenient insight.  
The primary groups whose linguistic practices have been systematically devalued 
by attitudes which assume the validity of such a dichotomy, between talk 'for talk's 
sake' and talk for 'getting things done', have been so-called 'primitive' peoples, 
those in whose societies a central role of language lies in its interactive role and its 
role in ritual and myth. Such attitudes proved disastrous for the Aboriginal people 
of Australia after European settlement, particularly when linked with the politically 
convenient nineteenth-century doctrine of 'terra nullius', asserting that because the 
Aborigines had not made their mark on the land in ways that were recognisable to 
European eyes as settlement and use that therefore they had no claim to ownership 
of the land. What struck European eyes most forcibly was the poverty of 
Aboriginal material culture; what they were unable to understand, even to conceive 
of, was the possibility that  
almost all of the human creative energy of a culture over tens of thousands of years 
old had been invested in the development of the society's spiritual, intellectual, and 
social life. (Sutton 1988: ix)  
Within non-Aboriginal Australian society, and western societies generally, it has 
been women and children whose selves and whose language have been 
marginalised and devalued. Children, because however significant the 
representational must come to be for them if they are to be taken seriously as adult 
human beings, it is not 'one of the earliest [functions of language] to come into 
prominence' and 'it does not become a dominant function until a much later stage 
in the development towards maturity.' (Halliday 1973:16). If indeed, as Halliday 
goes on to note, in an oblique reference to the hegemony of representational 
notions of language, it ever does become the dominant function rather than the 
dominant model of language for anyone. Women and women's language have been 
devalued because competence in interactive genres, emphasising the interpersonal, 
is what they have been expected to demonstrate. Men's linguistic competence, on 
the other hand, has been expected to be in language as performance, as display, 
involving a significant focus on the representational, whether in the form of story-
telling or the presentation of 'facts' (Maltz & Borker 1982, Poynton 1985/90: 27-8). 
And such linguistic behaviour does have a high value in our culture.  
A third reason for the marginalisation of the interpersonal is the long-standing  
assumption shared by many who have had a serious concern with language, 
particularly philosophers and linguists influenced by philosophy, that there is only 
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one kind of linguistic structure: constituency structure. Hjelmslev, in the quotation 
heading this introduction, makes clear the possibility that 'affective elements' in 
language could well be subject to kinds of grammatical rules which have yet to be 
identified or described. Halliday (1979) has made a significant contribution to such 
an enterprise by distinguishing between three kinds of grammatical structure, 
coding three kinds of distinguishable semantic function. He distinguishes between:  
(i) constituency structure, realising experiential meanings ('meaning in the 
reflective mode'); (ii) prosodic structure, realising interpersonal meanings 
('meaning in the active mode'); and (iii) culminative structure, realising textual 
meanings (meaning enabling 'the other two kinds [of meaning to] take on relevance 
to some real context').  
Halliday makes the following comment concerning differences in the attention 
paid to these different kinds of structure: 
If we consider the major traditions in linguistic thought, we find, not at all 
surprisingly perhaps, that those in the psycho-philosophical tradition, who are 
firmly committed to language as an ideational system, have usually worked with 
constituency models of structure: American structuralist and transformationalist 
theories, for example. By contrast, linguists in the socio-anthropological tradition, 
like Firth, who are interested in speech functions and stress the interpersonal 
aspect of language, have tended to develop prosodic models. Those in the literary 
tradition, concerned primarily with texture and text structure, have developed 
models of a periodic kind: the structure of the paragraph (topic sentences, etc.), 
generic structures of various kinds, and of course the whole theory of metrics. 
(Halliday 1979: 71-3) 
He goes on to make explicit reference to the not-dissimilar notions of 'Pike's 
(1959) important insight into language as particle, wave & field' and to note that:   
Although Pike did not conceive of these in quite the same way, it seems very clear 
that this is what we have here:  
constituent (experiential) structures   are particulate 
prosodic (interpersonal)    ,,           ,,    field-like 
periodic (textual)    ,,           ,,   wave-like 
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I will not elaborate on the periodic (textual) type of structure here, since it is of no 
further direct relevance to this thesis, but will give a brief, introductory 
characterisation of the prosodic type of structure, characteristic of interpersonal 
meaning, in comparison with the constituency structure of experiential meaning.   
Consider a possible utterance, perhaps said on the telephone as a prelude to 
terminating a conversation: 
1.  Someone is knocking at the door  
The experiential content of this utterance consists of Actor someone , Material 
Process is knocking , Circumstance: Location on my door . (See Halliday 1985, 
Chapter 5 for a detailed account of the functional categories participant, process 
and circumstance in the experiential, or representational, structure of the clause). A 
representation of structure in constituency terms, bracketing the structural 
components as follows, seems perfectly appropriate:  
(Someone) ((is) (knocking)) ((at) ((the) (door))) 
But what about the following possible utterance, perhaps produced by the anxious 
and deferential student who was knocking at the door?  
2. I was wondering if you could possibly spare me a few minutes, could you 
please ? 
Here, the experiential content is not only less straightforward to discern (e.g. what 
does one do about was wondering ?), but the whole utterance is suffused with a set 
of interrelated features  with the basic meaning of maybe , i.e. modality of 
probability, the social function of which in a sentence like this is to signal 
politeness or deference. The relevant features of the clause are: 
- modal auxiliary (could )  
- modalised tag (could you ) 
- modal adjunct (possibly ) 
- 'distant' tense choice: present in past, was wondering . (Compare other 
possible choices: the polite but less deferential present, wonder , or the more 
distant and hence more deferential past in past, had been wondering . (See 
Halliday 1985: 177-184 for this system of tense description) 
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- grammatical metaphor (I was wondering  is not in fact the alpha clause of a 
hypotactic clause complex, which is what it looks like at first glance, but a 
metaphorical way of realising modality, i.e. it means simply maybe . The tag, 
repeating the mood element of what looked like the beta (dependent) clause, 
makes it clear that the subject of the whole clause is you  not I . (v. Halliday 
1985: Chapter 10).  
Added to these grammatical features, one should also include as relevant to the 
interpersonal impact the lexical choice of spare  as Predicator in the verbal group 
(implying that the speaker recognises that this is an imposition and that the 
addressee is a busy person), the politeness marker please , and the massively 
incongruent relationship between the mood (tagged and modalised declarative) and 
the speech function Command (i.e. demand goods and services. A congruently 
realised Command would use imperative mood. See Halliday 1985, Chapter 4).   
These features are spread throughout the clause, several 'layers' thick (because the 
scope of modal choices is the whole clause not a single localised part of it), the 
reiteration of the fundamental interpersonal meaning of modality functioning like a 
prosody over the entire clause. (Part II below will explore this phenomenon in 
more detail, extending the discussion from clause to group and word rank). The 
amount of repetition or reiteration (indicative of the strength or amplitude of the 
prosody) may not be precisely predictable from one relevant context to another, 
but the actual linguistic choices implicated (the systems 'at risk') certainly are.  
Now consider a third example, involving the expression of attitude (the use of 
'expressive' or 'emotive' language):  
3. //1+ Jesus those /filthy /bastards /fucking /thrashed us//  
(Such a wording could have various phonological realisations. The intonation 
markings indicate one such possible realisation, with only one point of tonic 
prominence, on thrash - , a wide tone 1 (falling), and no specific indication of what 
might be going on in the pre-tonic (which could be low level - making a very 
marked contrast with the high fall on thrash - , or rising).  One obvious alternative 
is for Jesus  to constitute a single tone group, with the tonic on the first syllable Je 
- and the vowel considerably lengthened. See Halliday 1970 for details of the 
notation employed here). 
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Again there is a cluster of relevant realisations which function together to realise 
the strong attitude involved here: 
- attitudinal lexis (filthy , bastards , thrash ) 
- swearwords (fucking  as intensifier) 
- thematised expletive (Jesus ) 
- exaggerated intonation contour 
- other appropriate phonological features: intensity, rhythm, vowel lengthening 
(especially on Jesus ), possibly voice quality. 
Again, the choices implicated (the systems 'at risk') are predictable: in the case of 
attitude, they will be primarily phonological and lexical, in contrast with modality, 
which is realised grammatically. These two examples are intended to provide an 
illustration of what is meant by referring to interpersonal structure as prosodic. 
Suggestive analogies come from the fields of music and painting: Halliday would 
seem to have had both in mind in referring to interpersonal meaning as 'strung 
throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring.' (Halliday 1979: 66). He 
goes on to say that 'the rationale behind this mode of realization' is that 
interpersonal meaning 'is the speaker's ongoing intrusion into the speech situation' 
and that 'The essence of the meaning potential of this part of the semantic system is 
that most of the options are associated with the act of meaning as a whole.' (p.67).  
Alongside the objections to interpersonal features as lacking in structure, because 
they are not analysable in terms of constituency, are assessments of them as 
unpredictable and hence not properly linguistic, i.e. part of the linguistic system.  
Robin Lakoff points out that  
Interpersonal behaviour is frequently regarded as unpredictable and spontaneous. 
We do not feel that we are following rules or even a preordained pattern in the 
way we talk to others, move, respond emotionally, work, think. (Lakoff 1979: 53) 
Lakoff is one of an increasing number of linguists interested in interpersonal 
phenomena, but the way she deals with this area is to make an unnecessary 
distinction between the linguistic and the stylistic, thereby contributing to 
perpetuating a view of the interpersonal as ultimately non-linguistic because 
outside the system, i.e. non-rule governed. Lakoff certainly doesn't want to say that 
it is thereby uninteresting - on the contrary, she wants  
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to construct a predictive system of rules for style, to establish for style something 
analogous to what linguists construct for language in the form of a grammar. 
(Lakoff 1979: 54)  
But making this kind of dichotomy between 'language' and 'style' certainly doesn't 
help to legitimise the study of the interpersonal as far as 'hard-core' cognitivist, 
langue -focused linguists are concerned. (See 2.1.2 below for a critique of 
approaches to the interpersonal in terms of style).  
The kind of rules needed for such an enterprise as Lakoff's, however, are not 
categorical but, rather, probabilistic - it is this which leads to the assessment of 
unpredictability. For many linguists, however, only the categorical is linguistically 
interesting, the probabilistic being dismissed as  'merely statistical' (Labov 1972a: 
71). There is not only a clear bias in such views towards (linguistic) system as 
against process, but a very different kind of conception of both the nature of the 
system itself and the relation between system and process from that of the 
systemic-functional model.  
In this model, system itself is modeled paradigmatically, i.e. as sets of options 
arranged in networks of related and/or dependent options. Each set of options, or 
(sub)system, is represented with its own entry condition/s, and the individual terms 
or features of each system have an inherent weighting or probability.  
. . . the linguistic system as a system of paradigmatic oppositions is a system of 
possibilities. Choosing a particular feature in a system means what it does because 
of the features that were not chosen but could have been chosen. This is the 
qualitative aspect of the system, the system of 'either/or' relations. But the system 
is not only a system of possibilities, it is also a system of probabilities … The 
choice of a particular feature also means what it does against the background of 
what are more likely and less likely choices. What is said is not only interpreted 
against a background of what could have been said but was not; it is also 
interpreted against the background of expectancies, against the background of 
what was more likely and what was less likely to be said. The grammar of a 
language is not only the grammar of what is possible but also the grammar of what 
is probable. (Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 8-9).  
Instantiation in process/text of such a paradigmatically-conceived linguistic system 
is necessarily probabilistic, because it is context-dependent: this is as true for 
experiential structures as for interpersonal and textual structures. (See Nesbitt & 
Plum 1988: 10-11 for a summary account of the notion of probabilistic realisation 
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of context in language). Models of the system in essentially syntagmatic terms, i.e. 
as structures and rules about structures, and particularly context-independent 
models, give a greater significance to the categorical and necessarily see the 
probabilistic as indicating an inadequacy in the model itself.  
At the same time as the presumed unpredictability of the interpersonal is one of the 
features seen as appropriately excluding it from consideration as properly 
linguistic, it is precisely this which ensures that the interpersonal (or, more 
accurately, the personal) is kept safe from the control of 'rules', which have been 
seen as denying autonomy and creativity. Lakoff (1979: 53) does not accept that 
the existence of implicit rules does in fact deny autonomy and creativity, but in so 
stating her position she makes clear that these are important values for her, as for 
many other linguists working  in the American tradition.  Part of the context for 
seeing it as necessary to assert the value of autonomy and creativity was 
presumably a reaction to the behaviourism which Chomsky criticised so 
trenchantly (Chomsky 1959), but part of it is also an uncritical acceptance of 
individualist ideology, a continuation of the Romantic individualism of the 
nineteenth century, and its particular early twentieth-century manifestation within 
linguistics, the neo-idealist emphasis on the personal referred to above.  
The ideology of individualism in western society is strongly committed to notions 
of creativity, autonomy and free-will - notions which have not, it seems, been seen 
as antithetical to the attempt to see linguistic 'competence' as rule-governed  but 
which for long largely precluded investigation of linguistic 'performance', 
particularly those aspects of it concerned with interpersonal meaning. But a 
cognitively-oriented notion of linguistic creativity, certainly when Chomsky was 
first dealing with this notion, seems to be little more than a combinatorial 
potential: 
Although it was well understood that linguistic processes are in some sense 
'creative,' the technical devices for expressing a system of recursive processes were 
simply not available until much more recently. In fact, a real understanding of how 
a language can (in Humboldt's words) 'make infinite use of finite means' has 
developed only within the last thirty years, in the course of studies in the 
foundations of mathematics. Now that these insights are readily available it is 
possible to return to the problems that were raised, but not solved, in traditional 
linguistic theory, and to attempt an explicit formulation of the 'creative' processes 
of language.There is, in short, no longer a technical barrier to the full-scale study 
of generative grammars. (Chomsky 1965: 8).  
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A combinatorial potential, moreover, which is merely a  
means for expressing indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in 
an indefinite range of new situations  (p.6). 
i.e. which maintains a rigid separation between language as expression and 
something else ('thoughts' in this case) which it is expressing. Such a perspective 
on the content/expression relation is quite antithetical to the views of Hjelmslev 
(1961) and those working within the systemic-functional model, where content and 
expression are both aspects of language itself, not one 'inside' and the other 
'outside' language. (See Reddy 1979  on the pervasiveness in everyday language of 
forms of expression embodying what Reddy calls the 'conduit metaphor' - language 
seen as 'carrying' something else).  
Which is not to say that the combinatorial potential of language is not of the 
utmost significance, even for the very notion of 'the individual' that is seen as 
potentially threatened by any notion of 'rules' for social behaviour. People are, to a 
large extent, formed as individuals by what they do, including most significantly 
what they say, rather than simply 'being' who they are in some pure metaphysical 
sense. 'The individual' can be seen as an artifact of the particularity of the linguistic 
choices made by one person, choices both identifying and constituting them as a 
particular socio-historical entity. For those concerned about the apparent 
'determinism' of such an account, with its apparent throwback to behaviourist ways 
of thinking about language, the individual so constructed is certainly unique: the 
combinatorial potential of the inherent probabilistic weightings of the system 
combined with the specificity of the linguistic demands made by the individual's 
personal history generates massive variability of forms and meanings. Our 
experience of ourselves as singular and unitary can then be seen as an artifact of 
the self-reflexive capacity of language. (See the quotation from Benveniste below).  
 
1.2 Language, the individual and the social 
I now want to turn my attention to the systemic-functional notion of the 
interpersonal, incorporating as it does both the interactive and the personal, the 
social and the individual. There are two problematic, and interrelated, issues that 
need to be discussed. The first is the question of the relation between the individual 
and the social; the second is the question of the affective, the realm of feeling, 
emotion, passion, which seems irreducibly personal/individual at first glance (and 
having little to do with any self-respecting notion of linguistic system), but which 
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employs resources from the linguistic system, resources which are moreover 
structured in similar ways to the more overtly 'social', i.e. interactive, resources.   
I certainly take very seriously Halliday's view that  
… the whole question of the relationship between the individual and language has 
to be seen as embedded in the social structure. (Halliday 1974: 117)  
The linguistic system itself is inherently social - it is jointly produced, a shared 
resource (there would not only  be no possibility, but no point, in a single human 
producing a language in social isolation). So too is the process of instantiation in 
text a social phenomenon; for all forms of text, however innovative, are built on 
pre-existing types of text, which are socially learned not only as types of text but 
as meaningful forms of social action (Martin 1985).  
The fundamental grammatical unit, the clause, is likewise a social act. Halliday 
makes the point that  
an 'act' of speaking is something that might more appropriately be called an 
'interact': it is an exchange …  (Halliday 1985: 68)   
and the basis for that exchange is the structural organisation of the clause from an 
interpersonal perspective, by means of the system of mood. 
… our traditional approach to grammar is not nearly as one-sidedly oriented 
towards the ideational function as sometimes seems to be assumed. For instance, 
the whole of the mood system in grammar, the distinction between indicative and 
imperative and, within indicative, between declarative and interrogative - this 
whole area of grammar has nothing whatever to do with the ideational component. 
It is not referential at all; it is purely interpersonal, concerned with the social-
interactional function of language. It is the speaker taking on a certain role in the 
speech situation. This has been built into our interpretation of grammar, and I see 
no reason for departing from this and treating the social meaning of language as 
some kind of optional extra. (Halliday 1974: 97) 
Mood options in the grammar make possible the organisation of the clause in  
ways that are conventionally understood to constitute  propositions (information-
oriented moves) or proposals (action-oriented moves), which are then open to 
negotiation.   
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One can only interact with others as an 'I' to the 'you' of other/s, however, and this 
has profound consequences. At the most literal level, 'I' signals the performer of a 
speech/conversation role (in fact, is constitutive of that performance), and is 
simultaneously 'this I', on this particular occasion, but also 'any speaker', from the 
viewpoint of the system rather than the text.  At a more profound level, 'I' spoken 
as separate from 'you' seems a necessary condition for the development of the 
capacity of a speaker to posit themself as an individual, a self, a subject. 
Benveniste elaborates this in the following terms: 
It is in and through language that man [sic] constitutes himself as a subject , 
because language alone establishes the concept of 'ego' in reality, in its  reality 
which is that of the being.  
The 'subjectivity' we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker to posit 
himself as 'subject.' It is defined not by the feeling which everyone experiences of 
being himself (this feeling, to the degree that it can be taken note of, is only a 
reflection) but as the psychic unity that transcends the totality of the actual 
experiences it assembles and that makes the permanence of the consciousness. 
Now we hold that that 'subjectivity', whether it is placed in phenomenology or in 
psychology, is only the emergence in the being of a fundamental property of 
language. 'Ego' is he who says  'ego'. That is where we see the foundation of 
'subjectivity', which is determined by the linguistic status of 'person.'  
Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use I  only 
when I am speaking to someone who will be a you  in my address. It is this 
condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally I  
becomes you  in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as I . 
Here we see a principle whose consequences are to spread out in all directions. 
Language is possible only because each speaker sets himself up as a subject  by 
referring to himself as I  in his discourse. Because of this, I  posits another person, 
the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to 'me,' becomes my echo to 
whom I say you  and who says you  to me. This polarity of persons is the 
fundamental condition in language, of which the process of communication, in 
which we share, is only a mere pragmatic consequence. It is a polarity, moreover, 
very peculiar in itself, as it offers a type of opposition whose equivalent is 
encountered nowhere else outside of language. This polarity does not mean either 
equality or symmetry: 'ego' always has a position of transcendence with regard to 
you . Nevertheless, neither of the terms can be conceived of without the other; they 
are complementary, although according to an 'interior/exterior' opposition, and, at 
21 
 
the same time, they are reversible. If we seek a parallel to this, we will not find it. 
The condition of man in language is unique.  
And so the old antinomies of 'I' and 'the other,' of the individual and society, fall. It 
is a duality which it is illegitimate and erroneous to reduce to a single primordial 
term, whether this unique term be the 'I,' which must be established in the 
individual's own consciousness in order to become accessible to that of the fellow 
human being, or whether it be, on the contrary, society, which as a totality would 
preexist the individual and from which the individual could only be disengaged 
gradually, in proportion to his acquisition of self-consciousness. It is in a dialectic 
reality that will incorporate the two terms and define them by mutual relationship 
that the linguistic basis of subjectivity is discovered. (Benveniste 1958/71: 224-5).  
The 'I' who speaks is always an historically specific 'I', however; an 'I' who speaks 
with, at the very least, a gender, class, racial/ethnic and  generational specificity . 
All these aspects of social identity are not simply given, but are socially 
constructed in a complex of (i) culturally learned forms of interaction, (ii) 
structures of knowledge formed by the habitual forms of representation available 
to and utilised by the individual speaker, and (iii) structures of feeling concerning 
those structures of knowledge and interaction. The 'I' who speaks has, furthermore, 
a unique personal history, again with consequences for structures of feeling, 
knowledge and interaction and the relationships between them.  
The expressive/emotive dimension of language is simultaneously social, insofar as 
it is part of the system, language as resource, but individual insofar as it is not only 
spoken by individuals but also 'speaks' those individuals, i.e. it is part of the means 
by which the particularity of individuals as historically specific individual subjects 
is not only made manifest but also socially constructed. What is particularly 
important about these expressive/emotive features is that they constitute a key 
semiotic resource for both producing structures of feeling, experienced at the level 
of the individual, and also for attaching feelings to the socially-available forms of 
interaction and forms of representation. The attachment of feeling to representation 
is of particular importance for the circulation of ideologies, because it involves a 
virtual physical attachment of people to beliefs and values, thereby ensuring fierce 
commitment to those beliefs and values and resistance to attempts to 'take them 
away' by means of argument. The practice in contemporary polemical discourse of 
bolstering the legitimacy of arguments in support of one's own point of view by 
calling them  'rational' and delegitimising those of one's opponents by referring to 
them as  'emotional' doesn't help to clarify the complicated issues involved here.   
1.3 The representational and the social 
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Western culture has a long history of valuing  'reason' and the 'rational' to the 
detriment of the 'emotional', with those apprenticed to the various fields of 
legitimated knowledge being conventionally required to suppress any evidence of 
'personal feeling' in the name of 'objectivity'. What are regarded as inappropriate 
displays of feeling or emotion have been rigorously excluded from the highly 
prestigious forms of expository and descriptive discourse, especially scientific and 
philosophical discourse, i.e. those forms of speech and writing which are 
concerned with ideas, theories, understanding the material and social world we 
inhabit. This attempted exclusion of the affective has meant in practice the 
exclusion of overtly attitudinal lexis and of both the first-person pronoun 'I' and 
instances and narratives deriving from the personal experience of that 'I' ('the 
anecdotal'), as distinct from the scientific persona of that 'I' (which in theory is 
indistinguishable from the scientific persona of any other 'I'. This is presumably 
why the first person plural we  is permissible: the text-producer is always 
presumed to speak not on their own behalf but as a representative, 'objective' voice. 
Note the discrepancy, however, between the legitimising of the individual in 
conservative political discourse and the refusal to grant it legitimacy in scientific 
discourse - politics can be seen to be about 'interests' but the west clings to a notion 
of science as about 'truth' rather than 'interests'). Current work in semiotic, feminist 
and critical theory (e.g. Belsey 1980) has made abundantly plain that all producers 
of all texts are both themselves positioned (by their gender, class etc. affiliations, 
and by the very discourses they are articulating) and also attempt to position their 
listeners/readers as compliant, i.e. to regard that positioning as entirely 
uncontentious and unproblematic with respect to both the experiential content of 
the text and the implicit social relationship between producer and receiver of text.    
The systematic exclusion of the first-person singular pronoun, attitudinal lexis and 
the anecdotal does anything but guarantee that 'scientific' texts are suitably 
'objective', however, since these are only the most overt markers of 'feeling' and 
the 'personal'. Even the most innocuous-seeming representations need to be 
understood to be just that: representations, employing a wealth of grammatical 
resources to obscure that fact. This is the territory of what Whorf (1956) called 
'cryptotypes' and Halliday (1985) calls 'grammatical metaphor'. The effect of such 
grammatical patterns is to de-problematise the representations involved, both in 
terms of the objective/subjective dichotomy (where 'I can organise this data into 
three categories' becomes 'There are three categories') and in terms of the 
disguising of ideology/evaluation (where 'I think this is the way things ought to be' 
becomes 'Our children's futures depend on the maintenance of the traditional 
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values of honesty, integrity and the freedom of the individual', to give a rather 
crude example).  
What all this has refused to see (probably a historically necessary refusal, if 
western control over the external world - with its dubious benefits as well as its 
undoubted gains - was to be achieved as it has been) is that linguistic 
representations of the world are not the kind of value-free representations that 
many thought they were and ought to be, that representations to a significant 
degree are simply that: representations, constructions, indicative just as much of 
what people think the world should be like as of how it actually is.  
The structural continuity of expressive/emotive features at various linguistic levels 
is a crucial issue in building towards an understanding of the individual/social 
nexus in all its ramifications. As long as the quintessential expressive/emotive 
features were seen as phonological (and both outside the purview of segmental 
approaches to phonology and, by definition, 'meaningless' - i.e. non-referential), it 
was possible to maintain the fiction that these were purely individually expressive 
(only really, of course, by not asking the question of how come these supposedly 
'individual' manifestations were systematic within particular languages, or by 
blurring the boundary between involuntary 'noises', such as snorts, and more 
systematic features). It was even possible to be extraordinarily reluctant to admit 
that they existed at all as elements of the linguistic system, as in the case of 
phonaesthesia or sound-symbolism, that very theoretically inconvenient 
conjunction of phonological segments with the referential. (Jakobson 1978; 
Jakobson & Waugh 1979; Jespersen 1922/33; Sapir 1915/1951, 1929/51; Wescott 
1971, 1980). Once one admits the essential continuity of the phonological with the 
morphological (or with an intermediate morphophonemic level), much less with 
the lexical, then the way is open to acknowledging the interconnection of the 
'expressive' with the representational. It is lexis that is the real key, looking both 
ways: 'down' to the personal by means of attitudinal/evaluative items, 'up' to the 
social in terms of the representational which is simultaneously referential and 
ideological.  
Phenomena like insult/abuse (Labov 1972b; Leach 1964; Mitchell-Kernan 1972; 
Murray 1979,1983; Winslow 1969) and slang (Wescott 1976, 1980) are well 
understood within linguistics to be social, not simply individual - even when 
'social' is interpreted to mean 'anti-social', i.e. acting in the interests of a minority 
group rather than mainstream society. What does not appear to be as well 
understood is that such affectively-loaded linguistic phenomena simultaneously 
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function to code social attitudes and values and to attach individuals to the social 
order constituted by that set of attitudes and values. (The question of the relation of 
abuse/insult to social values and the social order is dealt with in Chapter 6).  
I do not intend to make the question of the relation of language to feeling/the 
emotions/the passions a central focus of this thesis, but it is important to identify it 
as a significant issue demanding attention. One obvious future direction is to 
develop connections between linguistics and psychoanalytic theory that go beyond 
the kind of linguistic analysis of therapy sessions of Labov & Fanshel (1977), 
however locally revealing these may be, or which, from the psychoanalytical side, 
approach the linguistic from too general a perspective, eschewing any serious 
consideration of the nature and implications of empirical data (e.g. Kristeva 1980, 
1984). The work of the group of people, predominantly based in Sydney, drawing 
on the systemic-functional model of language in work they call simply social 
semiotics (e.g. Kress 1985/90, forthcoming; Kress & Threadgold, forthcoming; 
Lemke 1988, forthcoming a, b; Poynton 1985/90; Poynton & van Leeuwen, in 
prep.; Thibault 1986; Threadgold 1986, 1988, forthcoming), has been notable for 
the multiple connections being made with work in semiotic, critical, feminist and 
social theory. Psychoanalytic theory needs to be added to this repertoire for any 
serious exploration of the interconnections between language, the individual and 
the social.   
What this thesis does do is to explore precisely the structural continuity of 
expressive/emotive features at various linguistic levels identified above as a crucial 
issue in building towards an adequate understanding of the individual/social nexus. 
That is the task of Part II. I have not attempted to cover all linguistic levels, but 
have focused on group and word rank within the lexico-grammatical stratum. The 
choice of this focus was dictated by the original decision to work on address, as a 
significant social practice which deploys interpersonal resources of the linguistic 
system which have been inadequately described or in some cases completely 
ignored in the linguistic literature. This central grammatical section is preceded by 
a model for a semiotics of social relations, i.e. the set of options concerning social 
relations, conceived of as a semiotic system, which underlies and is realised in the 
deployment of the interpersonal resources of the language and which is 
simultaneously constituted by those linguistic choices. The final section consists of 
a preliminary exploration of  the articulation of the interpersonal linguistic 
resources available for address with the semiotic options for the organisation of 
social relations in a late twentieth-century English-speaking society. I have called 
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this section 'ethnographic': I could very well have called it, as I did in a previous 
publication (Poynton 1985/90), 'the politics of address'.  
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Two 
Interpreting the interpersonal 
 
 
The autonomy of the verbal symbolic system appears to be restricted to the formal 
levels alone and it may be that an adequate semantic theory presupposes an 
adequate theory to account for the nature of contact between the formal linguistic 
and the extra-linguistic phenomena. The nature of this contact is not exhausted by 
such isolated notions as those of 'reference', 'representation' or 'naming'. The 
onomastic function is certainly basic to language; it is perhaps also necessary for 
other functions that language has. In view of our present state of knowledge, this 
particular type of relationship between language and non-language is perhaps also 
the easiest to handle. None the less, there is more to this rather neglected area of 
language study. Language is used to live, just as social structure is used to live. 
This introduces a complexity in the description of language and argues for a 
weakening of boundaries between various systems for communication. The 
exhaustive description of language is an ideal, which may perhaps never be 
achieved, but there will certainly be much less  chance of its being achieved if 
language is separated from the living of life totally. The semantic structure of 
language is not absolutely unrelated to the total meaning structure available to a 
community. Hence, meanings in language cannot be described adequately by 
remaining enclosed within the formal symbolic system of language. (Hasan 1973: 
287) 
 
The interpersonal may have been marginalised within linguistics, but it has of 
course not been totally ignored. The first task of this chapter will be to discuss a 
number of key terms used in attempting to explicate interpersonal phenomena, and 
the adequacy of such approaches. Problems raised by the use of such terms as 
'formal', 'polite', 'colloquial', 'slang', to refer, frequently ambiguously, to linguistic 
items and/or to the social/semiotic factors relevant to the choice of linguistic items 
(more unambiguously referred to by such terms as 'power', 'solidarity' and 'social 
distance'), will be used as the basis of an argument for the necessity of a stratified 
approach. Such an approach would distinguish features of the linguistic code itself 
27 
 
from higher level semiotic systems determining and being themselves constituted 
by linguistic choices.  
The stratified model of systemic-functional linguistics will be used as the 
theoretical framework for this thesis. The version used is based on the work of 
M.A.K. Halliday as developed by the Register Working Group at the University of 
Sydney from the early 1980s, under the leadership of J.R. Martin.    
A number of key terms have been used as descriptive and quasi-explanatory tools 
by those interested in the interpersonal aspects of non-representational language. 
These terms can be roughly grouped into two sets, depending on whether the focus 
is on language itself or on the social and/or psychological factors presumed to 
underlie and correlate with or determine the linguistic choices.   
The first set of terms is concerned broadly with 'levels' or 'styles' of language and 
includes terms such as 'formal', 'vernacular', 'colloquial', 'slang', 'vulgarism', 
frequently though not exclusively characterising lexis. The second set focusses 
broadly on what is what is usually presented, within the linguistic literature, as 
'outside' or extrinsic to language and correlating with or determining linguistic 
choices, and includes terms such as 'formality', 'politeness', 'power', 'solidarity', 
'social distance'. The nature of these categories, and what is implied in their use 
about the nature of the relationship between the linguistic and the social, will be 
explored in this section.  
 
2.1 Identifying interpersonal phenomena 
A range of linguistic phenomena have been seen as concerned with the negotiation 
of the social and/or the personal. Lexis, categorised in various ways, is perhaps 
most commonly referred to. There has been a long tradition in lexicography of 
categorising lexical items in terms of various kinds of social origin (e.g. dialect 
with respect to regional variation, colloquialism with respect to relaxed everyday 
speech, slang  with respect to the social bonding of peer groups), categorisations 
which all too often blurred the boundaries between social origin and social 
acceptability. Though contemporary lexicographical practice largely eschews the 
use of the more value-laden terms, reflecting a change in orientation from 
prescription to description, both the terms and the attitudes attached to them live on 
in widespread general usage. The operation of covert as well as overt prestige 
norms, as well as the social functionality of 'officially' stigmatised forms of 
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language, operate however to ensure the lively continuity of at least some such 
forms (e.g. slang and urban dialect forms).  
Slang and swearing are particular targets for such stigmatising, because they are 
seen as forms of resistance to legitimated authority: to parents, on the part of 
adolescents, and to the political and cultural control of the dominant classes, on the 
part of the working class. The issue is seen not simply as a matter of social 
unacceptability but as potential subversion, particularly when unacceptable 
linguistic behaviour (along with other 'anti-social' behaviour with respect to dress, 
sexuality, etc.) is exhibited publically by members of urban underclasses such as 
unemployed black or immigrant youth. One would expect linguists to have a 
greater understanding of the solidary, as well as the oppositional, function of slang 
in creating and maintaining social cohesion; and to the extent that the issue is dealt 
with explicitly in the linguistic literature, this is indeed so (e.g. Adelman 1976, on 
the solidary function of slang among adolescents).   
Other lexical categories such as the technical and what I shall call the 'learned 
Latinate' on the one hand and  the attitudinal on the other are also relevant to the 
social and/or personal, but raise somewhat different questions. Whereas it is 
commonly those who are in positions of authority or influence who object to slang 
and swearing in the language of those they see themselves as having authority over 
or responsibility for, it is precisely those not in such positions who are made 
uncomfortable by the technical and  the 'learned Latinate', even if they do not 
overtly object to it. They see the use of such lexis as excluding them from 
knowledge and, in some cases, from the possibility of real participation in 
significant social institutions such as the law. And while one does not want in any 
way to reinforce ways of thinking about language that see it as merely a kind of 
clothing of thought, which is always capable of being expressed in other ways 
(what Reddy calls the 'conduit metaphor' view of language), it is important to 
understand the social effects of the exclusion of certain categories of people from 
access to certain kinds of language: not merely words, but 'ways of speaking' that 
incorporate both habitual grammatical and textual  patternings: what have been 
variously called, from different theoretical perspectives, 'cryptotypes' (Whorf 
1956), 'ways with words' (Heath 1983) or 'coding orientations' (Bernstein 1971, 
1973, 1975).    
In the case of the attitudinal we have another phenomenon which is used for 
political purposes by the powerful, as new apprentices to powerful public 
institutions and the codified knowledges associated with those institutions are 
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trained to habits of 'rational' linguistic practice (which excludes the overtly 
attitudinal, 'emotive language', as illegitimate), habits which include discrediting 
the arguments of oppositional voices by claiming them to be 'emotional' and 
'irrational'. Such a tactic is typically used by dominant voices who see the 
hegemonic discourses they speak as obvious, self-evident, true - commonsense, in 
other words, while oppositional discourses are 'emotive', 'irrational' and 
'ideological'. What such voices never acknowledge (and current popular views of 
language make it impossible for them to do so) is that all discourses include not 
only representations (the experiential component), which always necessarily code a 
point of view, but also take up an evaluative position towards those 
representations/that point of view, whether this is coded overtly (through lexis) or 
more covertly (through grammatical choices). (See Poynton, in press).  
With respect to address forms, another special kind of lexical category, it has 
always been clear that choice of address form is inherently social. The constitutive 
function of choice of address form in the negotiation of social relations, in 
conjunction with other appropriate linguistic forms, is less clearly understood, 
however, than is the case for slang. Using a specific address form, like using slang 
rather than vernacular, may not simply reflect pre-existing social relations between 
speaker and addressee but may be a significant move (within a complex 
configuration of interpersonal phenomena) towards re-affirming or re-constituting 
those relations in particular terms; or may, in fact, be constructing or constituting 
them anew. Such a constitutive role for language involves a rather different kind of 
relationship between the linguistic and the social than seeing them as separate, 
albeit correlatable, categories.  
Other linguistic phenomena seen as relevant and dealt with in varying degrees of 
detail in the linguistic literature include: indirect speech acts (speech function 
choices and their variant grammatical forms); modality/hedges (where the 
interactive meaning can be understood as deference and the personal meaning as 
hesitation, diffidence or politeness); politeness markers; morpholological and 
morphophonemic diminutive and augmentative forms;  phonetic variants 
(sociolinguistic variables) and other phonological features (e.g. elision/assimilation 
in allegro speech); and intonation. Beyond language,  laughter (seen as an indicator 
of style-shift by Labov), kinesics and proxemics are also relevant and interact in 
complex and interesting ways with linguistic phenomena. This thesis will not 
attempt to deal with non-linguistic phenomena, but a comprehensive account of the 
operation of language in the negotiation of social relations will need to take them 
into account. (See McInnes 1988 for innovative work on the interaction of 
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linguistic and kinesic/proxemic codes in dramatic rehearsal and performance). 
There is also that range of phenomena, especially phonological and 
morphophonemic features, dealt with under the heading of 'emotive' language (e.g. 
Stankiewicz 1964, Werner 1955). These will be treated in 2.1.7 below. 
One of the most comprehensive inventories of linguistic phenomena relevant to the 
social is that of Brown & Levinson (1978), who discuss what they refer to as 
'politeness strategies', a total of 40 in all, a number of them covering a range of 
linguistic realisations. The phenomena they refer to include joking, gossiping, the 
use of 'in-group identity markers' (such as jargon, slang, contraction and ellipsis), 
indirect speech acts, hedges (including prosodic and kinesic), replacement by 
indefinites or pluralisation of 1st and 2nd person singular pronouns. Such an 
inventory ranges widely, from genre to phonology, and furthermore takes account 
of the kinds of information included or excluded from the utterance, i.e. the 
representational aspect of the clause. It does not, however, shed a great deal of 
light on the motivation for these and only these particular aspects of language 
being implicated except implicitly, in a highly tautological way: 'they're implicated 
because this is the role they play'.  
Brown & Levinson's citing of parallel data from several unrelated language 
families is used as evidence for a basically cognitivist explanation, i.e. one 
extrinsic to language. While there is undoubtedly room for extrinsic motivation in 
any kind of explanation of such phenomena, it is much more dubious whether such 
motivation should be seen in purely cognitive terms. (See 2.5 below for a more 
detailed critique of Brown & Levinson). The systemic-functional model, with its 
functional approach to language form, is concerned with both extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation, the intrinsic motivation deriving from the internal organisation 
of language itself, in ways which shed considerably more light on the relationship 
between the linguistic and the social. Halliday's functional analysis of language in 
terms of 'metafunctions' ('principles of organization and modularity internal to the 
semantic and grammatical systems' of language'  (Matthiessen 1989: 15)) 
simultaneously links linguistic forms and meanings in a theoretically motivated 
way, and at the same time the metafunctions  'also explain how the semantic relates 
upwards, to context' (ibid), i.e. connect with a relevant extrinsic motivation.  
Such an approach to language pays explicit attention to the paradigmatic   (i.e. 
what can potentially be said in relation to what is actually said), as well as to the 
syntagmatic, as well as going beyond the clause to consider the text as the basic 
semantic unit. These two issues, of the paradigmatic and of text, are closely 
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related: it is only through the actualisation of the potential of the linguistic system 
through process, or text, that the system can be said to exist (though paradoxically 
only to be subject to the constant possibility of change as the value of terms within 
sub-systems of the whole are renegotiated in and through text). The whole question 
of what might have been said in relation to what was said would seem crucial to 
any investigation of style (whether literary or sociolinguistic): a largely 
syntagmatic approach to language, resulting simply in lists or inventories, would 
not seem to be particularly revealing, especially in relation to text. And it is text as 
actualised potential, particularly though not exclusively interactive text, that is the 
central site for the negotiation of social relations. This is not to deny the role of 
phonological, lexical, grammatical and conversational/discourse features but rather 
to focus attention on the overall configurations of features characterising a text.  
 
2.2 The interpersonal as style 
The notion of style, which across various of its uses subsumes such terms as 
'formal/informal', 'polite', 'colloquial', 'casual', 'intimate', would seem to be the most 
widely used general term with reference to interpersonal phenomena. The first 
difficulty with this term is that it is by no means used in comparable ways. Joos 
(1959, 1962), and others writing for a general or undergraduate audience (e.g. 
Brook 1979, Ann Zwicky 1981) use it in a fairly impressionistic way to distinguish 
between levels of formality. (Joos' categories of style were labelled 'frozen', 
'formal', 'consultative', 'casual', and 'intimate').  Other proposals for what are 
effectively scales of formality (albeit sometimes referred to as 'styles') come from 
British, especially neo-Firthian, linguists. Catford (1965) distinguishes between 
'formal'/ 'colloquial'/'intimate' and also a cline with 'formal' & 'informal' as the 
endpoints; and, using the notion of register, Halliday, McIntosh & Strevens (1964) 
distinguish between 'colloquial' and 'formal' and also between 'casual', 'intimate' 
and 'deferential' styles of discourse. More recently, in the same neo-Firthian 
tradition but from Canada, Gregory & Carroll (1978) speak of two scales for the 
register category 'tenor' (formerly Halliday et al.'s 'style'): one a cline with extreme 
values 'extreme degrees of formality' and 'extreme degrees of informality' and the 
other contrasting 'familiarity' with 'formality'. Crystal notes that a 'conception of 
'style' in terms of 'vertical' formality level is found in many [sociolinguistic] 
studies' (Crystal 1980: 337) and the use of the term 'level' in a similar sense to 
'style' within stylistics and sociolinguistics (Crystal 1980: 208).  
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Rather less germane is Labov's (1972a) use of 'contextual styles' to refer to patterns 
of distribution of phonological variables correlating with the manipulation of 
situational factors producing varying degrees of attention to speech. Labov's 
original five categories ('casual', 'formal', 'reading-passage', 'word-list', 'minimal 
pair') can be extended so as to take account of the differing degrees of attention 
demanded by written compared with spoken language (v. Johnston 1985). And it is 
certainly possible to offer a richer analysis of the nature of the situational variables 
Labov and others following him (e.g. Trudgill (1974) on British English) were 
manipulating. (See Plum 1988). Since the focus of this kind of sociolinguistic 
investigation has been on the correlation of linguistic features with questions of 
social class (e.g. the department store survey) and social identity (e.g. the Martha's 
Vineyard study), rather than on the negotiation of social relations, there seems little 
point in further exploring this approach here.   
Crystal & Davy (1969) make the broadest use of the term 'style' to refer to 
situationally-distinctive varieties of language. In their model, the term is basically 
equivalent to the systemic-functional 'register' (though they reject the equivalence). 
Within this more global notion of 'style', the subcategory concerning 'the social 
relationship existing between the user and his [sic] interlocutors'  (p.82) is called 
'status'. Status deals with 
'the systematic linguistic variations which correspond with variations in the relative 
social standing of the participants in any act of communication, regardless of their 
exact locality.  …  The semantic field which may be subsumed under the label 
'status' is of course complex: it involves a whole range of factors related to contacts 
between people from different positions on a social scale - factors intuitively 
associated with such notions as formality, informality, respect, politeness, 
deference, intimacy, kinship relations, business relations, and hierarchic relations 
in general. A number of areas may be clearly distinguished within the dimension of 
status in any language, various kinds of formal and informal language being 
perhaps the most noticeable (though one must be careful to distinguish between 
formality in a stylistic sense, and the grammatical category of formality which 
occurs in, say, Japanese, where social status is reflected paradigmatically through 
many of the forms of the language). (Crystal & Davy 1969: 74)  
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They go on to criticise Joos' postulation of five degrees of formality as 'premature':  
Exactly how many categories of status there are awaits elucidation. Joos has 
postulated five degrees of formality in this connection (namely 'frozen', 'formal', 
'consultative', 'casual', and 'intimate'), but we feel this to be premature. It is likely 
that a scale of formality exists, but the number of linguistic terms along the scale, 
and the nature of the polarities, are still matters for speculation. Utterances may be 
found which seem to fit neatly into the above five slots; but these are far 
outnumbered by utterances which do not. (ibid.).    
Apart from the imprecision of the term 'style' itself (the major reason for Gregory's 
1967 proposal to substitute the term 'tenor' in the systemic-functional model), a 
major problem with those approaches concerned with a scale of formality is that 
they tend to treat styles as relatively discrete 'blocks' of language where the 
relevant linguistic features are not described (or predicted) in sufficient breadth or 
detail and only one relevant dimension (social distance) of that aspect of the 
situation concerned with the relationship between interactants is taken into 
account. (Formality as social distance will be dealt with in the next section).  
What this produces is a somewhat monolithic notion of 'stylistic' variation, where 
the totality of the features present distinguishes one 'style' from another in  relation 
to its appropriate use in different situations. The problems with this kind of 
approach are (i) the configuration of variables is seen as a totality, i.e. as dependent 
(lock-step) rather than as (relatively) independent, and in terms of discrete sets of 
options rather than as continua or clines; (ii) hence one is locked into a correlation 
or correspondence notion of the relationship between style and situation or context 
- by no means the only possible formulation; and (iii) styles tend to be seen as uni-
dimensional, when they are in fact multi-dimensional: just as more than one 
category operates simultaneously to produce a 'style' (in the broader sense) or 
'register', so more than one category is needed to characterise a 'style' (in the 
narrower sense) or tenor.   
There is also considerable variation in the kinds and range of linguistic phenomena 
attended to in distinguishing styles. Much of the less technical literature, aimed at a 
student or more general audience (e.g. Brook 1979) focusses largely or even 
exclusively on lexis. Ann Zwicky (1981) has a somewhat broader scope than usual 
for this kind of material, dealing with phonological and grammatical as well as 
lexical features, and also recognising that 'stylistic levels' are not in fact discrete. 
At the opposite extreme, Crystal & Davy propose a comprehensive inventory of 
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possible distinguishing features of styles that covers every kind of linguistic 
phenomenon at every linguistic level but fails to suggest any principle of selection 
of features relevant to different kinds of meanings, such as the systemic notion of 
metafunction. Without such an organising principle, one is effectively thrown on 
one's own interpretive resources and certainly no kind of prediction of features in 
relation to particular styles or registers is possible. Using the systemic notion of 
metafunction, major types of relevant linguistic features related to each major 
dimension of register are predictable, and this approach has the added strength of 
the notion of metafunction looking two ways: in to language and out towards 
context or situation. Before developing an account of this model, however, more 
ground needs to be cleared concerning the kinds of meaning interpersonal 
phenomena are negotiating. The next section will continue this investigation by 
taking a closer look at the notion of formality.  
 
2.3 The interpersonal as formality 
There is a long history in linguistics of the terms formal/formality being used as if 
they were quite transparent. The relevant entry in Crystal (1980) is illustrative: 
… formal is opposed to such terms as informal, 'intimate', 'familiar', etc., as part 
of a system of 'formality' of expression, referring to a level of language considered 
APPROPRIATE to socially formal situations. (Crystal 1980: 150)    
This tells us effectively nothing about either 'formal' language itself, nor about the 
'formal' situations in which it is supposed to be appropriate. Turning to the 
literature outside mainstream linguistics is somewhat more informative. Irvine 
(1979) and Atkinson (1982) shed considerable light on both, Irvine however being 
quite explicit in doubting the usefulness of the term as an analytic tool.   
Irvine sees formality as representing 'not just one, but several dimensions along 
which social occasions can vary' (p.784). She proposes a finer set of distinctions 
for what she refers to as the discourse and the situational aspects of formality 
discernible in the literature, identifying four aspects of formality: increased code 
structuring, code consistency (both within and across semiotic codes), the invoking 
of positional identities (public rather than private personas) and the emergence of a 
central situational focus (also referred to as 'centralisation').   
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As far as her code or discourse-related aspects of formality are concerned, the 
fundamental issues would seem to be predictability and consistency. She sees 
formality as leaving various amounts of room for 'creativity' but not for 'play' - 
formal situations may not necessarily be entirely formulaic and ritualised but they 
must be serious. (Irvine's category of increased code structuring has to be 
understood in the context of a particular model of linguistic structure: from the 
perspective of a systemic-functional grammar of choices, i.e. a paradigmatically-
organised account of language as a potential, the issue is one of 'different choices', 
rather than 'more rules' to get from underlying to surface structure). Irvine refers to 
a wide range of linguistic phenomena, at all levels, that are potentially involved, 
but there is no implication of any theoretical motivation for just those features 
being implicated., i.e. there is nothing paralleling the systemic notion of 
metafunction.     
Turning to the situational aspects of formality, the fundamental issues would seem 
to be the public nature of formal situations and the constraints on the behaviour of 
participants in such public situations, affecting not only the choices that must be 
made by central 'performers' but those that ought not to be made by more 
peripheral participants: where the former are expected to behave in relatively 
predictable ways, the latter may be expected to suspend usual social behaviours, 
e.g. not to engage in side-sequences.  
Coming from a different direction again (ethnomethodology rather than 
anthropological linguistics), Atkinson (1982) sheds further light both on the nature 
of formal situations and, in the process, on possible characteristics of formal (and 
by implication, informal) language. His starting point is with people's assessments 
of public multi-party situations, such as small claims tribunals, as relatively 
informal (compared with the formality of more conventional courtroom procedure). 
His general conclusion is that the assessment of formality is directly related to the 
extent of the departure of interaction from everyday conversational interaction. He 
extends his conclusions to 'encounters which take place in institutional settings 
and/or between professional and lay persons, such as doctor and patient, lawyer 
and client, policeman and suspect, teacher and pupil, interviewer and interviewee, 
seller and buyer, etc.' (Atkinson 1982: 110).  Atkinson's focus is on the 
management of conversational interaction, rather than on other kinds of linguistic 
features characterising 'formal' language. This is a valuable corrective, however, to 
linguistic treatments of this issue that all too often have not got beyond the level of 
lexis.  
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What the focus on interaction enables us to attend to is the question of the range 
and the kinds of options available to active participants (remembering that those 
not engaged in the central action may have no speaking rights at all). In terms of 
range, formal situations restrict the linguistic options available. Certain kinds of 
conversational moves are severely constrained or not available at all; and the more 
'formal' the situation, the greater the constraints on the form of interaction - 
compare the conduct of courtroom cross-examination with media political 
interviews and then with chat between friends. Topic choice in 'formal' situations is 
substantially restricted and hence so are the semantic fields of lexical choice. 
Lexical choice is further constrained in terms of dialect and/or sociolect, 
technicality, and attitude or emotive flavour. The general expectation is of 
standardised 'public' and emotively 'neutral' vocabulary, with experts permitted 
(and mostly expecting) to demonstrate their expertise through the use of 
appropriate vocabulary (usually characterised in terms of 'foreign', especially 
Graeco-Latin, origin and available largely to restricted groups through specialist 
training).  
At the opposite extreme from the constraints of talk in 'formal' situations is the 
openness and flexibility of everyday conversational interaction between people 
who know one another well. Though the comparative freedom from constraint of 
such interaction operates at all linguistic levels, it is the lexical category of slang 
which epitomises the contrast with the constraint of talk in 'formal' situations.  
Slang is characterised by its transience (rather than being standardised), by its 
attitudinal loading and by its morphophonemic characteristics (v. Wescott 1980) 
which partly derive from etymology and partly from being spoken forms. Slang is 
also characterised by its tendency to proliferate synonymous forms (in extreme 
contexts, giving rise to anti-languages (Halliday 1976b)). Such lexical proliferation 
does not lend itself to taxonomic arrays such as are deemed appropriate for the 
technical lexis of specialised fields of knowledge in institutional settings. Slang is 
not at all concerned with the constitution of knowledge, nor with 'public' 
institutional practice, but rather with private interactive practice where the affective 
is of more significance than the cognitive and where the desired 'institutional' 
outcome is the ongoing marking of a boundary between those who are 'inside' and 
those who are 'outside', not the achievement of a resolution to some problem.  
The issues of attitudinal loading and capability of taxonomic organisation with 
respect to lexis should alert us that lexis characterised as 'formal' is concerned not 
only with speakers' relations with one another but also with their relations with 
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objects, processes, knowledges - with the whole of what is going on, in the sense of 
what is being enacted, in the situation (in systemic-functional terms, with the 
register variable field). One could say that in 'formal' situations, social distance 
(which is what is at stake in personal terms) is a function of two other kinds of 
distance: the distance of participants from actual experience, along a cline of 
action-to-reflection, and the interactive distance between participants in terms of 
possibilities for feedback, on a cline of monologue-to-dialogue in the first instance. 
An investigation of the notion of 'formality', then, reveals it to be of considerable 
situational complexity.   
Finally, a further common characteristic of 'formal' situations, the lack of symmetry 
or reciprocity in the choices available to participants, should be mentioned.  
'Doctor and patient, lawyer and client, policeman and suspect, teacher and pupil, 
interviewer and interviewee, seller and buyer' do not have the same degree of 
control of the situation and this is manifested in the lack of parallelism in 
conversational moves available and in patterns of lexical choice, as well as in 
possible disparities in pronunciation and other phonological features (including 
fluency). Not only expertise, but class, gender and other bases for inequality in a 
society are clearly involved but this is another whole dimension of that dimension 
of situations concerned with social relations - that of power -  and will be treated in 
more detail in 2.6 below and particularly in Chapter 3.   
 
2.4 The interpersonal and social distance 
Social distance is widely recognised as a central dimension of social relations in 
everyday discourse, with its common metaphorical characterisation of social 
relations as a space with horizontal (and vertical) dimensions. The horizontal 
dimension is seen as concerned with social distance (get close to , keep one's 
distance , keep at arm's-length , be stand-offish , be approachable , encroach ) and 
the vertical with power relations (look down on/up to , etc.).  
Irvine suggests that social distance is often used to deal with that aspect of 
formality concerned with invoking positional identity (Irvine 1979: 778), a notion 
akin to sociological 'role'. The notion of social distance certainly demands some 
scrutiny, but it is by no means clear that positional identity or role per se  is the 
central issue. The formulaic and/or ritualised nature of much 'formal' interaction, 
contrasting markedly with what is seen as the spontaneity and comparative 
unpredictibility of casual conversation (Halliday & Plum 1985, Plum 1986), indeed 
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suggests that speakers are functioning as performers of roles in such situations (as 
'personae' rather than as 'persons'), in contrast with 'being themselves' in more 
casual interaction. What such a contrast fails to take account of is that forms of 
conversation learned at an early age become so naturalised that one can forget that 
they once had to be learned, just as new forms of spoken and written language have 
to be learned as one moves from the known and comfortable world of home and 
school to the less familiar and therefore more threatening public world. Because 
casual conversation is learned earlier, and therefore not only is more familiar but 
speakers are more affectively engaged with it, and in pleasurable ways, it can also 
be regarded as 'pure' or 'natural'. Such a view is, however, romantic delusion, 
hankering after an idealised social world as far distant from modern industrialised 
capitalism as it is possible to be, but hardly prepared to pay the costs of either 
material deprivation (the 'cost' paid by traditional Aboriginal society) or of 
significant lack of control over one's own life (the usual 'cost' of the security and 
closeness of being a child).  
Casual conversation can be so relatively unconstrained because it is in a sense 
'outside' regular social interaction - a kind of suspension of usual business 
(Halliday & Plum 1985). The point or goal of casual conversation is concerned 
with interaction itself rather than with any kind of 'successful' outcome 
distinguishable from the performance of the genre itself, as in say a service 
encounter. In other genres, people are either going to be judging you as successful 
or not, or something happens or is brought about by your successful performance; 
in casual conversation the performance itself is the point. In other words, the focus 
is interpersonal rather than experiential and hence the structure (generic or 
schematic structure, not grammatical structure) is not going to be constituency-
based but considerably more prosodic. Such structure is not primary (nor 
secondary, for that matter) but simply different.  
Quite apart from these linguistic considerations, notions such as 'being oneself' or 
'real self' are becoming more problematic in the light of recent work on the notion 
of subjectivity, which sees it as multiple, produced by participation in the multiple 
discourses speakers produce as social beings.  
A further relevant consideration is that the notion of role itself has been coming 
under increasing scrutiny within social theory (v. Pfohl 1975, Connell 1979, 
Edwards 1983), particularly under pressure from feminist work criticising sex role 
theory and from work on the intersection of subjectivity and discourse. (See 3.1.3 
below). From these points of view, 'roles' cannot preexist the discourses in which 
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speakers participate as social beings nor are they outside actual power relations.  
The situation with the use of role is analogous to the uses of the term class in the 
sociolinguistic literature, too often unproblematically identified with socio-
economic status (see Guy 1988 for a useful account of the issues). In both cases, 
linguists' use of these terms bears a rather closer relationship to everyday than to 
specialist usage within social theory.      
The notion of social distance does seem to be central to the question of formality, 
and ultimately of style in the sense of tenor, but an elaborated account is what is 
needed. The model presented in Chapter 3 moves in this direction, by proposing a 
dimension of social relations called distance which takes into account four kinds of 
factor: the frequency and extent of contact between interactants, whether the role 
relationship involved is uni- or multi-dimensional (Bott's uniplex/multiplex (Bott 
1971)) and whether the situation is task-oriented or person-oriented. This 
dimension has not been identified on purely a priori  grounds, however, but on the 
basis of patterns of linguistic choices made by speakers. The crucial issue as far as 
this dimension of social relations is concerned is the range and predictability of 
choices available to speakers - the phenomenon called proliferation below.  
 
2.5 The interpersonal as politeness 
Politeness is another term consistently used to refer both to certain kinds of 
interpersonal linguistic phenomena as well as to the nature of the social relations 
obtaining between interactants. Brown & Levinson (1979) give by far the most 
comprehensive account, both theoretically and descriptively. Their work has been 
widely read and extensively used as a model. The work incorporates an account of 
a wide range of linguistic phenomena concerned with politeness (across languages 
in three unrelated families), organised in a single explanatory framework which is 
fundamentally psychological and individualistic in orientation.  Within this 
framework, individuality is taken as a given, and the  needs of individuals have to 
be negotiated in relation to the needs of others. There is no sense of the individual 
person, or social subject, as a product of engagement in social interaction.  
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Central to Brown & Levinson's approach to social relations is the question of face, 
which they define as  
the public self-image that every [competent adult] member [of a society] wants to 
claim for himself [sic], consisting in two related aspects: 
(a) negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-
distraction - i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition 
(b) positive face: the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially 
including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed 
by interactants. (Brown & Levinson 1979: 66)   
They acknowledge other schema for modelling social relations, in particular the 
relevance of power and social distance, but see these as functions of the more basic 
need to preserve face, both positive and negative. There is a fundamental problem 
with this approach, however. Brown & Levinson simply assume the unproblematic 
prior existence of both the individual and of his [sic: the individual in this model is 
indisputably male] wants and needs. There is now a considerable body of theory 
arguing that it is the social which is prior, and that not only are both 'individuals' 
and their wants and needs socially constructed but that the very notion of a unitary 
individual or self, with a single set of wants, needs and desires, needs to be 
discarded.  
What is taking the place of the 'individual' of classic liberalism in new theoretical 
work is a more complex notion of persons being constituted in terms of multiple 
and shifting 'subjectivity' (i.e. capacity for acting as social subjects - both subjects 
of and subject to). Subjectivity is not in any sense to be taken as a given, but is 
seen as created in and through the active participation of persons in specific 
discourses operative in the societies of which they are members. 'Discourse' from 
this perspective has a far wider reference than merely conversational interaction or 
stretches of language considered as text. It can be most closely linked with 
ideology, considered not as some idea or set of closely related ideas but rather as a 
set of material practices, things people actually do (including say), which literally 
embody a way of viewing the world and which therefore work towards making the 
world the embodiment of that point of view. (On discourse in this sense see 
Foucault (1970, 1972), also Kress (1985/90) for an account that pays closer 
attention to linguistic processes in discourse. On the construction of subjectivity 
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see Althusser 1971, Belsey 1985, Henriques et al. 1984, Weedon 1987 and Lemke 
1988, for an account looking from the perspective of systemic theory).  
The question of the form of interaction in relation to its effects, then, is central. It is 
notable that traditional linguistic approaches to language use in terms of politeness 
and formality are inadequate in precisely this respect: both approaches tend to 
focus too much on the language of the individual speaker and fail to pay sufficient 
attention to the interactiveness of much of the language speakers actually engage 
with on a day-to-day basis. Characterising the speech of individual speakers on the 
basis of level of formality or of politeness is clearly possible,  but does not begin to 
come to terms with the interactiveness itself, much less what is being enacted by 
means of that interaction. Politeness is preferably seen not as in any sense primary 
but as in fact a gloss, a conveniently ideologised way of referring to practices 
which have far more to do with maintaining traditional power relations in a society 
- and, as a consequence, indeed with constituting persons as particular kinds of 
persons, i.e. superiors/subordinates or equals - than with simply allowing people 
space to be their liberal individual creative selves.  
 
2.6 The interpersonal and power/solidarity 
Another significant approach to language and social relations uses the notions of 
power and solidarity as its organising constructs. The sociolinguistic work using 
this approach originates in the work of Roger Brown and his colleagues on address 
and social or interpersonal relations (see Brown 1965: Chapter 2 (The Basic 
Dimensions of Interpersonal Relationship), Gilman & Brown 1958, Brown & 
Gilman 1960, Brown & Ford 1964). The significance of Brown et al.'s work was to 
demonstrate in the most elegant way the interrelationship of social and linguistic 
factors with respect to one tiny aspect of the linguistic system: the availability of 
alternate pronoun forms for direct address in most European (as in many other of 
the world's) languages. An additional strength of the classic Brown & Gilman 
(1960) paper, 'The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity', was its concern with 
historical as well as contemporary usage: diachrony has not been a major focus of 
post-Saussurean linguistics.  
It needs to be remembered that the aspect of the linguistic system investigated is 
directly relevant to the kind of model that will adequately account for one's 
findings. What Brown & Gilman concentrated on was two-valued systems of 
second-person pronouns, where there is a very simple pattern of alternative usage: 
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reciprocal or not reciprocal, with alternative forms being available where usage is 
reciprocal. This produces a set of three possibilities: T/V, T/T, V/V (where T = the 
so-called 'intimate' form, usually 2nd person singular, and V = the so-called 'polite' 
form, commonly but by no means exclusively 2nd person plural). What Brown & 
Gilman claimed was that non-reciprocal usage has declined and reciprocal usage 
increased, in relation to a shift in European society away from what they called a 
'power semantic', i.e. a basically hierarchically-organised mode of social relations, 
towards a 'solidarity semantic', i.e. a mode of social relations posited on equality, 
oriented less to the question of whether one is superior/equal/subordinate and more 
to how close/distant one is in relation to one's addressee. (It is worth noting that the 
terms used to refer to this distinction are oriented respectively to inequality (in the 
case of 'power') and closeness (in the case of 'solidarity'), revealing something 
perhaps of the ideological predispositions of the authors as well as the political and 
social changes they are discussing).  
The question of whether a linguistic item can be used symmetrically, or 
reciprocally, by interactants is indeed of critical importance for social relations. In 
Chapter 3, this issue will be dealt with as the principle of reciprocity, 
operationalising the dimension of social relations concerned with power. This 
dimension is concerned not only with inequality but also with equality, i.e. with all 
three possible 'positions' that can be taken up by one speaker with respect to 
another along the 'vertical' axis of social space: superior, equal, subordinate. Some 
of the territory of Brown & Gilman's solidarity dimension has thus been 
preempted, but there still remains the whole of the 'horizontal' axis: what has 
frequently been referred to as 'social distance' but will be referred to below simply 
as distance. Brown & Ford (1964), in a study of address that goes beyond 
pronominal forms, identified the fundamental principle of linguistic organisation 
related to this 'horizontal' axis when they pointed out that the number of available 
address terms increases the 'closer' people are to each other. This phenomenon 
could easily be seen as the principle of linguistic organisation parallel to 
reciprocity in relation to power, i.e. as the phenomenon of proliferation referred to 
in the discussion above of 'formality' and social distance. From one point of view, 
this is undoubtedly true: the number of choices or options for address does increase 
in direct proportion to decreases in social distance, i.e. increases in intimacy. 
However, if one takes into account the form of the items used, then a second 
meaning can be discerned. Address forms used between intimates tend to have an 
iterated or cumulative structure, and to co-occur with a variety of features 
traditionally characterised as expressive. Thus, not only might one address a loved 
one as Mikeypoodles  or Franglekins  (examples from messages for St Valentine's 
43 
 
Day in newspaper personal columns cited by Mühhäusler 1983) but the 
surrounding (spoken) discourse is likely to be multiply marked, especially 
phonologically, in ways conventionally regarded as affectionate towards the 
addressee. The principle of proliferation, relating to the horizontal dimension of 
social relations, is to be distinguished then from a third principle of linguistic 
organisation which will be called amplification.  This principle is related to a third 
dimension of social relations that will be referred to as affect. The issue of the 
affective or expressive will be taken up next.  
 
2.7 The interpersonal as the expressive  
In defining the term 'expressive use of language' as simply 'the manipulation of 
verbal material to convey information about one's emotional state' (1970: 153), 
Samarin shares a widely held view.  Such an unproblematic equation of the 
expressive in language with personal emotion cannot go unquestioned, however. 
When the relevant forms are phonological (involving, for example, marked choices 
of pitch variation, speech rate, lengthening and voice quality features) or 
morphological (such as diminutive and augmentative affixation), then the 'personal 
emotion' interpretation seems plausible - marginally less so in the case of 
diminutive forms, perhaps. It is less clear that 'personal emotion' is the only 
consideration in dealing with cultural phenomena such as address practices, 
including 'expressive' nicknames, insults and endearments (Hopper et al. 1981, 
Murray 1979, 1983, Winslow 1969, Morgan et al. 1979), ritual verbal contests, e.g. 
rapping or the dozens (Labov 1972b, Mitchell-Kernan 1972), joking relationships 
(Douglas 1975b), the widespread use of slang,  and literature (Langer 1955, Waugh 
1988). (See also Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's (1976) comprehensive bibliographic 
survey of speech play). Emotion or affective engagement is certainly involved in 
such practices, but the extent of the conventionalisation or ritualisation of the 
forms utilised for its realisation make it somewhat problematic to see such emotion 
as purely personal.  
When one considers further aspects of the meaning of an expressive utterance, the 
problems multiply. Phonological features are matters of linguistic substance, rather 
than linguistic form. They have to be considered in conjunction with the 'formal' 
meanings that they both realise and elaborate. One can't just identify the phonology 
or morphology as 'expressive' and cut this kind of meaning off from the other kinds 
that are being simultaneously realised, particularly from referential or 
representational meaning. If, for example, one looks at the kinds of meanings that 
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are typically the focus of insult, then it becomes clear that there is a considerable 
social investment involved: insults are used to maintain social boundaries, directed 
at ensuring either that outsiders remain outsiders or that those who are and wish to 
remain insiders  conform to normative expectations. (See Chapter 6 below). There 
are also practices which test social boundaries, and in testing them, sustain them:  
joking relationships in many societies have just this function. The use of otherwise 
offensive words (such as bastard , mongrel , cunt )  as forms of address among 
Australian males to signal camaraderie rather than hostility can be seen as yet 
another cultural form of such a joking relationship.   
Where some confusion arises is that this boundary marking or social enforcement 
work is done by individuals who frequently exhibit considerable originality in their 
verbal behaviour as well as considerable affective involvement. The affective 
involvement is readily comprehensible. Group members usually make a 
considerable emotional investment in being members of that particular group, and 
not another (or none), whatever the basis of commonality of the group (gender, 
age, neighbourhood, school, race or ethnicity, religion, occupation, workplace, 
hobby, sport etc.). The linguistic originality, particularly if this is exhibited in 
culturally highly-valued forms such as literature, needs to be seen not just in terms 
of an unproblematic notion of individual creativity but as speakers taking on the 
role of agents with respect to both the referential meanings being negotiated as 
well as to the social value of those meanings. Steedman (1982) makes this point 
elegantly in her interpretation of what three little working class girls writing a story 
called 'The Tidy House' were actually doing: she sees them as acting as 'agents of 
their own socialisation' as they actively recreate, make anew, the gender and class 
meanings that they were engaging with. In so doing, they made these meanings 
their own, ones which they both controlled (because they 'made' them) and were 
committed both to and by. The emotional investment involved in taking on such 
meanings can be seen as the anchoring of the psyche in the social: at one and the 
same time constituting the person both as 'individual', i.e. unique, and as social 
being. The notion of subjectivity referred to above is highly relevant here.  
The irony of such a personalised commitment is that in making ideological 
meanings anew people make them differently, however small the differences are, 
and hence possibilities for change (of both the language itself and of the ideologies 
being realised) are opened up. Such change is slow, however, and one of the 
factors ensuring its slowness is the phenomenon of amplification as the 
organisational or realisational principle of 'expressive' forms. Where the principles 
of reciprocity and proliferation apply to meanings, amplification applies to forms - 
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new forms which either displace the old or increase the range of alternatives 
available for the same meanings. Where new forms displace the old, e.g. the 
constant substitution of new slang terms for old, the newness of the form is part of 
what keeps the emotional investment in the old meanings high: these are forms that 
I/ we/our group has made. Where new forms increase the range of alternatives 
available, as in the proliferation of lexis with respect to ideologically sensitive 
aspects of the culture, e.g. gender, the opportunity to choose which is available to 
the individual speaker maintains the illusion of newness and difference and hence 
the possibility of personalised commitment. Such alternative forms can either be 
chosen among or iterated in order to augment the affective investment, e.g. 
alternative lexical items marking positive and negative attitude (a rotten or lousy or 
awful party  compared with a rotten lousy awful party ).  
As well as this kind of link between the expressive and the more overtly social, 
there are also interesting dependencies between the affective on the one hand and 
power and social distance on the other. This issue will not be explored here, but 
taken up in some detail in Chapter 3 below. It provides further evidence for 
treating the expressive as one aspect of interpersonal meaning rather than as 
something quite separate (as Fawcett 1980, Butler 1988 propose, within a systemic 
framework).  
One final issue needs to be addressed here, and that is the assertion that expressive 
meaning is uncontrolled or random, i.e. cannot be seen as part of the linguistic 
system. Stankiewicz (1964), as referred to in the preceding chapter, deals 
admirably with this question, distinguishing between those signals which are 
involuntary but may be considered to 'express' some internal state (e.g. yawns) and 
those which can be considered linguistic and therefore systematic. (It is probably 
also the case that a residual 'linguo-centrism' does not always take into account that 
bodily modalities of semiosis other than speech are also systematic). The question 
of speaker intention, raised in the quotation from Samarin cited above, is quite 
beside the point. Using the Saussurean dualism, expressive features  have tended to 
be treated as aspects of parole , rather than langue . Recasting that dualism as 
system/process or system/text puts considerable emphasis on the meaningfulness of 
the totality of what speakers produce in social situations. The interesting questions 
then become what the choices are in the multiplicity of systems which are drawn 
from in the construction of text and under what conditions particular choices are 
made.  
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2.8 An argument for stratification 
It is not only in relation to expressive language that an explicitly paradigmatic 
approach to language is called for. An understanding of what particular choices 
contrast with at their own level would seem of considerable importance in dealing 
with any meaning or form. But there is a further complication. The whole of 
Chapter 2 to this point has focussed on the question of what linguistic forms are 
used with what meanings in what situations, and what I have attempted to 
demonstrate is that much of the work dealing with the social aspect of situations 
and language has not only failed to make necessary terminological distinctions but 
has mostly failed to make a broad enough inventory of relevant phenomena. Brown 
& Levinson's (1979) account of politeness phenomena is certainly wideranging, 
but it lacks a paradigmatic dimension. Further, it makes no attempt to systematise 
the meanings assigned to the linguistic phenomena in some kind of motivated 
relationship with those phenomena, despite an explicit recognition of a social 
motivation for much of what they refer to as 'language structure':  
… the motivations that lie behind such usages are powerful enough to pass deep 
into language structure . In section 8.1 we draw together examples of how the 
encoding of the strategies addressed to such wants can become part of the 
grammar: as lexicalizations (sorry, sir ), as transformations (passivization, ellipsis, 
dubitative inflections, nominalization), and as phonetic (including prosodic) 
modifications (high pitch, hesitation phenomena, creaky voice). There we make the 
argument in a strong form: in general the abundance of syntactic and lexical 
apparatus in a grammar seems undermotivated by either systemic or cognitive 
distinctions and psychological processing factors. The other motivation is, grossly, 
social, and includes processes like face-risk minimization. (Brown & Levinson 
1979: 99)   
What seems to be called for is some kind of stratification which enables one to 
make two kinds of distinctions: firstly, a distinction between linguistic forms and 
their meaning or function (with it being clearly understood that there is no bi-
unique relation between these levels) and secondly, a distinction between those 
meanings/forms (considered now as strata of a single level of 'language') and a 
further situational or contextual level concerned with those key dimensions of 
social relations which determine and are themselves determined by the linguistic 
choices made. Thus terms like 'formal' and 'polite', if they are used at all, will be 
used to refer to phenomena at one level only and not at all three levels 
simultaneously, as can happen at present. This will mean, among other things, the 
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elaboration of distinctive technical vocabularies to name the features at each level, 
making the distinctions absolutely explicit.  
 One of the effects of such a strategy will be to focus attention on items at the rank 
of word and morpheme as interesting and meaningful in their own right, in terms 
which extend well beyond the referential, rather than simply being considered as 
pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of the clause as the sole significant semantico-
grammatical unit. What is being advocated is the kind of polysystemic approach to 
understanding how language means consistently advocated by J.R. Firth.  
So, for example, a lexical item instead of being characterised simply by means of 
ambiguous labels such as formal  or colloquial  or slang , can be described in terms 
of formal characteristics involving oppositions such as: Graeco-Latin vs. Anglo-
Saxon origin, general vs. field-specific, technical vs. non-technical, full form vs. 
hypochorism (and if the latter truncated vs. augmented - see Chapter 5 below for 
further delicacy), established form vs. new form, and in terms of the word class it 
belongs to (noun, verb, adjective, adverb etc.) and its relation to other word classes, 
e.g. whether it is a nominalised form. Thus, for example, a word such as 
environmentalist  would be characterised as of foreign, specifically Graeco-Latin, 
origin (see Thuan  1980 on the recognition and categorisation of foreignness in 
Australian English);  polysyllabic rather than monosyllabic structure (v. Jesperson 
1928/33 on the significance of monosyllabism in English, and Chapter 5 below); 
noun, marked by specific morphological elements as a nominalisation; new rather 
than well-established form. The contrast of this word in virtually all respects with 
the structure of the partially synonymous word greenie  makes it possible to 
understand more clearly why the former term is used with the meaning of 
'technicality' and the latter with the meaning 'attitudinal: pejorative' (assuming for 
the moment the existence of developed semantic networks including such features - 
networks only in their embryonic stages as yet). At this point, having characterised 
such items in structural and semantic terms, but from a paradigmatic as well as a 
syntagmatic perspective, one can then proceed to investigate the situational 
dimension.  
The commonest approach to stratification from the level of language to that of 
situation is in terms of pragmatics, conceived of as a separate stratum concerned 
with generating appropriate utterances, located beside the strata of syntax 
(concerned with generating grammatical sentences) and phonology (concerned 
with the articulation of those sentences). The problem with the pragmatics 
approach is that it still cannot provide a motivated and explicit account of how the 
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strata of pragmatics and syntax are actually related with respect to the 
interpersonal, the assertions of Butler (1988) to the contrary. Issues such as 
presupposition and implicature, which are seen as playing a significant role in the 
domain of pragmatics (Levinson 1983), do not seem particularly helpful for the 
kinds of linguistic phenomena I am concerned with. Nor do generalised maxims or 
principles such as Grice's Co-operativeness Principle (Grice 1975) or Leech's Tact 
Maxim (Leech 1983). The problem is that they offer nothing more sophisticated 
than lists and generalised principles by way of connecting the linguistic with the 
situational (or, as Leech puts the concern of pragmatics, 'the study of how 
utterances have meanings in situations' (Leech 1983: x)).  
As well as a stratified formalisation of system both of language and of situation 
with respect to language, one needs also to work towards methods of dealing with 
the configurations of choices that constitute text. This is always essential in 
attending to meaning, but particularly significant in dealing with interpersonal 
meaning negotiating social relations, insofar as interpersonal meaning is realised 
globally rather than locally and this is true not only for clauses but for texts. The 
basic claim of systemic-functional linguistics, outlined in the previous chapter, is 
that the mode of realisation of the interpersonal is not in terms of constituency, as 
in the case of representational meaning, but in terms of prosodies whose 'scope' is 
always more than purely local. Such prosodies may be manifested in overtly 
prosodic form, as in the intonation contours signalling the 'key' of an utterance 
(Halliday 1985, 8.9), or by what may appear to be discrete items such as terms of 
address, modal auxiliaries and adjuncts, attitudinal lexis.  Such apparently discrete 
items are best seen as localised manifestations of an ongoing process. In relation to 
negation and modality, this ongoing effect has been conventionally referred to as 
'scope': the term is useful, but needs to be understood as the effect of the overall 
interpersonal meaning that is being negotiated rather than as the effect of 
individual words as kinds of logical operators.  
Any adequate approach to the interpersonal needs to operate on several fronts. The 
way in from semantics (which is what this chapter is all about) is attractive - 
particularly so to non-linguists, because of the apparent transparency of labels such 
as 'formal', 'polite' etc. This approach does need to be counterbalanced by, on the 
one hand, some formalisation of that dimension of situations concerned with social 
relations (the task of the subsequent chapter) and on the other by a careful account 
of the relevant linguistic forms and the linguistic substance through which those 
forms are realised  (the task of Part II, with particular reference to forms used in 
address).  
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A further issue of considerable significance is working towards a more satisfactory 
way of conceptualising the interaction of the linguistic with the social than the 
notion of 'correlation', considering that it is precisely the area of the social that is 
literally constituted or constructed by the deployment of the various semiotic 
resources available to members of a culture. 'Society' does not exist outside of 
configurations of meaning-making practices on the part of those who identify 
themselves and are identified as belonging to it. From the theoretical perspective 
adopted here, not only does one need to consider text, rather than individual 
linguistic items as basic, but the starting point needs to be with interactive text: the 
basic social act is the exchange of meaning through text, and not individual acts of 
'meaning' in the form of words and sentences produced by speakers considered 
purely as individuals. Such an approach perceives all texts, even if monologic in 
form, as inherently interactive: in the parlance of contemporary semiotic and 
critical theory, all text necessarily positions 'readers' as 'subjects' of particular kinds 
if they are to be able to make sense of it (Belsey 1980). One may accept or reject 
the meanings being constructed, as a 'compliant' or a 'resisting' reader, but the 
interactiveness is inherent in the very construction of text.  
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Three 
Towards a semiotics of social relations 
 
Field, tenor and mode are not kinds of language use, nor are they simply components of the 
speech setting. They are a conceptual framework for representing the social context as the 
semiotic environment in which people exchange meanings. (Halliday 1978: 110)  
 
This chapter begins with an account of the development of a model of context of situation, 
or register, within systemic-functional linguistic theory, from its origins in the work of 
Malinowski and Firth through successive stages of conceptualisation (and changes in 
nomenclature) to recent attempts at systemic formalisation. It goes on to focus on the 
contextual category tenor, the category relevant to interpersonal meaning,  foregrounding 
certain problematic aspects of previous work. Two issues of particular importance are the 
use of 'social role' as central to tenor in the work of Halliday (1978, Halliday & Hasan 
1985/90) and the widespread adoption of Brown and Gilman's (1960) mapping of 
relational space in terms of two dimensions, power and solidarity.   
The chapter goes on to present a model of tenor, developed not on a priori  grounds but on 
the basis of the prior identification of the three independent realisational strategies 
deployed in the use of interpersonal forms. These realisational strategies of reciprocity, 
proliferation and amplification (introduced in the previous chapter) motivate the setting up 
of a model with three corresponding dimensions of social relations. As well as this 
intrinsic motivation, such an account accords well with work in social psychology on the 
basic dimensions of social relations.  
The chapter concludes with some observations on the constitutive function of the 
interpersonal resources deployed in the negotiation of social relations, constituting not 
merely distinguishable forms of social relations and ultimately the social order but, in the 
process, constituting individual speakers in terms of what Firth called 'personality' and 
might now be more appropriately called 'subjectivity'. This last section draws on recent 
work in social, semiotic, feminist and poststructuralist theory.  
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3.1  Tenor in systemic theory: issues and problems 
The category 'tenor' in systemic-functional theory derives from Firth's work on CONTEXT 
OF SITUATION, this latter term deriving ultimately from Malinowski (Malinowski 1923).  
Firth consistently characterised context of situation in terms of: 
1. The participants: persons, personalities and relevant features of these. 
 (a) The verbal action of the participants. 
 (b) The non-verbal action of the participants.  
2. The relevant objects and non-verbal and non-personal events. 
3. The effect of the verbal action. (Firth 1957/68: 177) 
In an earlier paper, Firth distinguishes his own use of the term from that of Malinowski 
who, according to Firth, saw context of situation as 'an ordered series of events considered 
as in rebus  ', i.e. as far too tied to the actuality of specific situations.  Firth's own view is 
that 
. . . 'context of situation' is best used as a suitable schematic construct to apply to language 
events, and that it is a group of related categories at a different level from grammatical 
categories but rather of the same abstract nature. A context of situation for linguistic work 
brings into relation the following categories: [the usual list follows]. (Firth 1950/ 1957: 182)  
In the later paper, he spells out a little more explicitly what he had in mind:  
The abstraction here called context of situation does not deal with mere 'sense' or with 
thoughts. It is not a description of the environment. It is a set of categories in ordered 
relations abstracted from the life of man in the flux of events, from personality in society. 
(Firth 1957/1968: 200) 
Firth was very well aware that what was needed to explore this territory in detail was a set 
of categories that had not yet been developed:  
No hard and fast lines can be drawn at present to form a strict classification for contexts of 
situation.   . . .   The technical language necessary for the description of contexts of situation 
is not developed nor is there any agreed method of classification.   . . .  It will be maintained 
here that linguistic analysis states the interrelations of elements of structure and sets up 
systems of 'terms' or 'units' and end-points of mutually determined interior relations. Such 
interior relations are set up in the context of situation between the following constituents:  
[the usual list follows].   
52 
 
No linguist has yet set up exhaustive systems of contexts of situation such that they could 
be considered mutually determined in function or meaning. There is some approximation to 
this, however, in Malinowski's Coral gardens and their magic , and here and there in 
special studies of contexts of personal address and reference, and of well-defined 
technological activities such as fishing or weaving or making war, and of rituals of various 
kinds.  
In classifying contexts of situation and in describing such contexts as wholes, a language of 
'shifted-terms', that is to say a vocabulary and phraseology of descriptive definition 
involving notional elements is probably unavoidable. It is, however, a clear scientific gain if 
such notional language only appears at this level and is rigidly excluded from all other 
levels such as the collocational, grammatical and phonological levels. (op. cit., 177)  
Later in the same paper, Firth comes a little closer to spelling out the kinds of 
considerations that would be involved:  
The description of the context of situation by stating the interior relations of the constituents 
or factors, may be followed by referring such contexts to a variety of known frameworks of 
a more general character such as (a) the economic, religious and other social structures of 
the societies of which the participants are members; (b) types of linguistic discourse such as 
monologue, choric language, narrative, recitation, explanation, exposition, etc.; (c) personal 
interchanges, e.g. mentioning especially the number, age and sex of the participants and 
noting speaker-listener, reader-writer and reader or writer contexts, including series of such 
exchanges; (d) types of speech function such as drills and orders, detailed direction and 
control of techniques of all kinds, social flattery, blessing, cursing, praise and blame, 
concealment and deception, social pressure and constraint, verbal contracts of all kinds, and 
phatic communion.  
Statements of contexts of situation may be presented in tabular form under headings 
selected from the above list. One method of tabulation would comprise ten entries as 
follows: (i) type of context of situation; (ii) type of speech function; (iii) the language text 
and language mechanism; (iv) the restricted language to which the text belongs; (v) the 
syntactical characteristics of the text (colligation); (vi) other linguistic features of the text 
and mechanism, including style and tempo; (vii) features of collocation; (viii) the creative 
effect or effective result; (ix) extended collocations and (x) memorial allusions, providing 
serial links with preceding or following situations. (op. cit., 178) 
Subsequent work on context of situation, and on what came to be called register (after 
Reid 1956) or diatypical variation (Gregory 1967), can be seen as providing the more 
detailed map of the terrain that Firth had began to explore. (See Hill 1958; McIntosh 1962; 
53 
 
Enkvist, Spencer & Gregory 1964; Halliday, McIntosh & Strevens 1964; Ellis 1965, 1966; 
Gregory 1967; Ellis & Ure 1969; Ure 1971; Halliday 1973; Hasan 1973; Ure & Ellis 1977; 
Halliday 1978; Gregory & Carroll 1978; Halliday & Hasan 1980, 1985/90). But the 
potential impact of much of the early work was undermined by a failure to agree on basic 
categories, much less on terminology. Even when substantial agreement was reached on 
the number and general nature of the basic categories, after Halliday, McIntosh & Strevens 
(1964), not only did the terminology still have to be finally settled but, more significantly, 
the categories themselves were for some time seen as associated with a relatively small 
array of relevant linguistic phenomena rather than being formally motivated by them, thus 
reinforcing suspicions outside the neo-Firthian tradition that what was being discussed was 
simply a version of 'crude contextualism', i.e. a naive one-to-one correspondence between 
language and what is outside language (which usually comes down to physical reality, i.e. 
the labelling function of language). Jean Ure's work on lexical density (Ure 1971), 
pioneering the detailed specification of register distinctions in terms of substantive 
linguistic differences, is a notable early exception, along with the work of Leech on 
advertising English and Huddleston et al. on scientific English (Leech 1966, Huddleston et 
al. 1968).  
  
3.1.1 Register as semantico-grammatical configurations 
Firth's somewhat intuitive categories were progressively refined under the label of 
REGISTER, producing eventually the three current register or contextual categories 
(sometimes also referred to as register or contextual variables): FIELD, TENOR and MODE. 
The term REGISTER has been central to the endeavour of developing the kind of abstract 
theoretical construct Firth saw as necessary. The term was originally used by Reid (1956). 
It was subsequently generally adopted by those working in the post-Firthian tradition to 
refer to the patterns of variation characterising texts appropriate to different situation 
types, and received its most rigorous and abstract treatment from Halliday, who defined it 
as: 
… the configurations of semantic resources that the member of a culture typically associates 
with a situation type (Halliday 1978: 111).  
(There is an even more recent chapter in the story of register, in which it is abstracted 
away to an even greater degree not only from the actualities of real situations but also from 
the linguistic plane itself, which will be outlined below).  
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What eventually came to be agreed on were three register, or contextual, categories known 
as FIELD, TENOR and MODE. These categories, as configurations of semantic resources, are 
seen as referring to three critical situational components: 
1. The FIELD OF DISCOURSE refers to what is happening, to the nature of the social action 
that is taking place: what is it that the participants are engaged in, in which the language 
figures as some essential component?  
2. The TENOR OF DISCOURSE refers to who is taking part, to the nature of the participants, 
their statuses and roles: what kinds of role relationships obtain among the participants, 
including permanent and temporary relationships of one kind or another, both the types of 
speech role that they are taking on in the dialogue and the whole cluster of socially 
significant relationships in which they are involved?  
3. The MODE OF DISCOURSE refers to what part the language is playing, what it is that the 
participants are expecting language to do for them in that situation: the symbolic 
organisation of the text, the status that it has, and its function in the context, including the 
channel (is it spoken or written or some combination of the two?) and also the rhetorical 
mode, what is being achieved by the text in terms of such categories as persuasive, 
expository, didactic, and the like. (Halliday & Hasan 1985/90: 12).  
Matthiessen sums up the register categories, neatly but more than a little contentiously 
with respect to seeing one dimension as more 'semiotic' than the others, as follows:  
Put very simply, field concerns natural reality, tenor social reality, and mode semiotic 
reality. (Matthiessen 1989: 15), 
At the same time as the register categories were being developed, however, Halliday was 
developing his account of language as organised in terms of a small number of semantic 
components, 'different kinds of "meaning potential" that relate to the most general 
functions that language has evolved to serve.' (Halliday 1979: 59). These components, or 
metafunctions, are motivated by the observation that in a paradigmatically-oriented 
account of language system, such as that developed within systemic-functional linguistics, 
options cluster in sets 'which exhibit strong interdependence internally and strong 
independence externally' (Plum 1988: 24). Plum goes on to explain how these sets of 
options, or system networks, are then seen as  
the major representation of an abstract metafunctional organisation of the linguistic system 
… The metafunctions themselves are referred to by Halliday by very general, semantically 
oriented, terms which reflect the basic thrust of the grammatical model as one with a 'rich 
semantax ' (Martin 1985: 249) rather than one favouring an autonomous syntax. The 
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metafunctions, with glosses added, and their major systemic reflections at clause rank, are 
outlined … below:  
 
                       ideational                      interpersonal          textual 
metafunctions   
            experiential       logical 
 
lexicogrammar     TRANSITIVITY         TAXIS MOOD         THEME &  
                                                    INFORMATION     
Gloss:   
EXPERIENTIAL      =    'language as representation of experience' 
LOGICAL        =    'language as natural logic' 
INTERPERSONAL   =    'language as interaction' 
TEXTUAL        =     'language as message'     
The concept of the metafunctional organisation of the linguistic system suggests a formal 
mechanism for relating choices at the levels of lexicogrammar and discourse semantics to 
choices at the level of context via an extension of the notion of choice or system in a 
technical sense. If it is the formalisation of language as a system of choices which permits 
the conceptualisation of the linguistic system itself as a 'set of possibilities' or meaning 
potential in the first instance, it is the meta-functional interpretation of language which 
creates the potential for relating language to its environment not only when considering it as 
abstract system but also as actualised structure or text. (Plum 1988: 24)  
The significance of the metafunctional hypothesis for linguistics is that, unlike many 
functional accounts of language which are essentially motivated by concerns which are 
external to language itself (see Halliday & Hasan 1985/90 for a review of functional 
theories), this approach is simultaneously motivated extrinsically and intrinsically, by 
considerations internal to the nature and organisation of language itself. The 
metafunctional organisation is not self-generating, however:   
The system of natural language can best be explained in the light of the social functions 
which language has evolved to serve. Language is as it is because of what it has to do. 
(Halliday 1976a: 17) 
Not only is language 'as it is because of what it has to do', but it continues to do 'what it 
has to do'. The metafunctional hypothesis aims to  
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be both extrinsic and extrinsic at the same time. It is designed to explain the internal nature 
of language in such a way as to relate it to its external environment. (Halliday 1974: 95)  
For an account of the relevant semantic resources 'at risk' we now turn to Halliday's 
multifunctional account of language, which distinguishes between experiential, logical, 
interpersonal and textual meaning, seen as 'the four components in the semantics of every 
language' (Halliday & Hasan 1985/90: 23). These components are the metafunctions. 
Halliday's metafunctional account of the organisation of language  makes available a 
previously unavailable specification of the relevant semantic resources 'at risk' relevant to 
the register categories. The metafunctional components are distinguished on the basis of 
their characteristic modes of realisation in terms of distinguishable types of structure 
(described in Chapter 1 above), as well as their semantico-communicative function. 
Halliday, in a key paper, gives the following extended account of the functional issues: 
The semantic system of a natural language is organized into a small number of distinct 
components, different kinds of 'meaning potential' that relate to the most general functions 
that language has evolved to serve. Here are the headings we shall use: 
          IDEATIONAL         INTERPERSONAL             TEXTUAL 
         EXPERIENTIAL LOGICAL 
The first of these is language as representation: the semantic system as expression of 
experience, including both experience of what is round about us in the outside world and 
experience of the world of consciousness that is inside us. This we are calling the ideational 
component. There are two subcategories: an experiential, where we represent experience 
'directly' in terms of happenings (actions, events, states, relations), entities that participate in 
these happenings (persons, animate and inanimate objects, institutions, abstractions) and 
circumstantial features (extent, location, time and space, cause, manner and so on); and a 
'logical', where we represent experience 'indirectly' in terms of certain fundamental logical 
relations in natural language - 'and', 'namely', 'says', 'is subcategorized as' etc. - which are 
not those of formal logic but rather are the ones from which the operations of formal logic 
are ultimately derived. These two, the logical and the experiential, together make up the 
ideational component in the semantic system: that of meaning in the reflective mode.  
The second main component, the interpersonal, is language as interaction: it is meaning in 
the active mode. Here the semantic system expresses the speaker's intrusion in the speech 
event: his [sic] attitudes, evaluations and judgments; his expectations and demands; and the 
nature of the exchange as he is setting it up - the role that he is taking on himself in the 
communication process, and the role, or rather the role choice, that he is assigning to the 
hearer. This component is therefore both speaker- and hearer-oriented; it is interpersonal - 
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what Hymes called 'socio-expressive' - and represents the speaker's own intrusion into the 
speech situation.  
All discourse involves an ongoing simultaneous selection of meanings from both these 
components, which are mapped into a single output in the realization process. But there is 
also a third component, which we are calling the 'textual', whereby the meanings of the 
other two kinds take on relevance to some real context. Here the semantic system enables 
the speaker to structure meaning as text, organizing each element as a piece of information 
and relating it significantly to what has gone before. If the ideational component is language 
as reflection (the speaker as observer of reality), and the interpersonal component is 
language as action (the speaker as intruder in reality), the textual component is language as 
relevance (the speaker as relating to the portion of reality that constitutes the speech 
situation, the context within which meanings are being exchanged). The textual component 
provides what in modern jargon we might refer to as the ecology of the text. (Halliday 
1979: 59-60).  
 
The final stage in what I will call the 'classical' account of register, is to explicitly relate 
the register categories to the relevant functionally-oriented semantico-grammatical 
components. The relation is seen as one of realisation, with the correspondences set out in 
the following diagram:  
 
Figure 3.1 Relation of text to context of situation (Halliday & Hasan 1985: 26, Fig.2.4) 
Matthiessen (1989), in an elegant overview of Halliday's work, does not use the term 
'realisation', but talks of the relation between the semantico-grammatical and the 
contextual categories in terms of 'projection', 'correspondence', 'determination' and 
'reflection': 
According to Halliday (e.g. 1978), each of the three metafunctions tends to serve to project 
one of the three different aspects of context; he sets out the following correspondencies as a 
working hypothesis: 
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field -- ideational 
tenor -- interpersonal 
mode -- textual 
That is to say, the field tends to determine ideational meanings, the tenor interpersonal ones, 
and the mode textual ones. For instance, the significant social action is reflected in the 
ideational resources of transitivity, whereas the tenor of the relations betwen speaker and 
listener is reflected in selections of mood and modality.' (Matthiessen 1989: 16-17).  
 
3.1.2 Register as connotative semiotic 
Turning now specifically to the elaboration of the register, or contextual, category of tenor, 
Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens (1964: 92), in their chapter 'The users and uses of 
language', identified 'the relations among the participants' as a linguistically-significant 
component of situations. (Cf. Firth's 'participants: persons, personalities and relevant 
features of these'). In a later publication Halliday glossed Firth's 'persons and  
personalities' as 'corresponding more or less to what sociologists would regard as the 
statuses and roles of the participants' (Halliday & Hasan 1985/90: 8). Halliday, McIntosh 
and Strevens used the term STYLE OF DISCOURSE to refer to what they regarded as a 
unitary dimension, involving a single cline with suggested intermediate positions of 
'casual', 'intimate' and 'deferential' between the endpoints of 'colloquial' and 'polite' (the 
term 'formal' was rejected 'because of its technical use in description'). In discussing 
relevant aspects of participant relations, Halliday et al. also mention degrees of 
permanence, ranging from the most temporary, 'those which are a feature of the immediate 
situations, as when the participants are at a party or have met on the train' through to 'the 
opposite extreme', 'relations such as that between parents and children', while in between 
are 'various socially defined relations, as between teacher and pupil or labour and 
management' (p.93).  
They go on to make clear that 'What participant relations are linguistically relevant, and 
how far these are distinctively reflected in the grammar and lexis, depends on the language 
concerned. Japanese, for example, tends to vary along this dimension very much more 
than English or Chinese' (p. 93). English, as we shall see, tends to grammaticalise rather 
than lexicalise its markers of social relations, thereby rendering them considerably less 
visible - cf. Whorf's notion of cryptotypes, patterns of grammatical choice characteristic of 
the language use of a particular culture, usually below the level of conscious awareness, 
which nevertheless organise the semantic space of that culture in characteristic ways 
(Whorf 1956).  
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The work of Halliday et al., with its three-way characterisation of register in terms of field 
(of discourse), mode (of discourse) and style (of discourse), became the basis of nearly all 
subsequent work on register. Though the terms FIELD and MODE have been retained, 
TENOR has come to be substituted for STYLE,  after a suggestion by Michael Gregory:  
TENOR is preferred to STYLE for obvious reasons. STYLE has had for a long time in literary 
and linguistic study a quite different application and inverted commas are hardly sufficient 
to set it apart. Even within variety differentiation it is used in two, possibly three, different 
senses. TENOR (in the Oxford English Dictionary sense of 'way of proceeding') is so little 
used nowadays except unambiguously in the discussion of music that it has some of the 
advantages of neutrality. (Gregory 1967: 195)   
Gregory in fact qualified his use of the term tenor, referring to PERSONAL TENOR 
distinguished from FUNCTIONAL TENOR, the latter concerned not with the participants in a 
speech situation but with rhetorical purpose. Part of what Gregory was attempting to deal 
with under the label 'functional tenor'  is now handled by those with whom my own work 
is most closely associated through the category GENRE. There is thus no longer any need 
for qualification of the term tenor.  The work done by members of the Register Working 
Group1 at the University of Sydney, especially  by J.R. Martin and Joan Rothery, in 
establishing genre as a separate level in language description above the level of register, 
has led to a rather different kind of model of the relationship between language and 
situation than the Hallidayan one on which it is based  (e.g. Martin 1985, Martin & 
Rothery 1980, 1981; Rothery 1990).  
The stratification of register and genre was necessitated by an increasing understanding of 
the ways in which a text proceeds in stages in working towards the achievement of some 
socially-recognisable purpose. These stages, or elements of schematic structure, are 
distinguishable in terms of characteristic configurations of lexico-grammatical choices - 
which already are understood to realise particular values of the register variables field, 
tenor and mode, thereby necessitating a model with three levels rather than the two posited 
by register theory to that point. Martin (1985), after Hjelmslev,  calls these levels 
'communicative planes' and refers to the two 'above' language as connotative semiotics, 
having no expression plane of their own but dependent upon language (or an alternative 
semiotic with its own expression plane) for their expression or realisation. At the same 
time as the connotative semiotic plane of genre was being distinguished from that of 
                                                 
1 The Register Working Group at the University of Sydney consisted of a number of honours and postgraduate 
research students working with J.R. Martin. The Working Group originally met regularly as a research seminar in 
the early 80s, and has now somewhat dispersed as members have graduated and taken up positions in various 
places. Original members of the Working Group were J.R. Martin, Christopher Nesbitt, Guenter Plum, Cate 
Poynton, Joan Rothery, Anne Thwaite and  Eija Ventola. Suzanne Eggins and Lynn Poulton were later 
associated with the group.  
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register, moves were being made by other members of the Register Working Group 
towards increasingly explicit formalisation of the contextual categories in terms of system 
networks, both developments leading (by different routes) to the same outcome: seeing the 
register categories as semiotic systems whose features can be selected from with the same 
kinds of freedom (and constraint) as can the choices in any other semiotic system. Treating 
the system networks for the register categories as meaning potentials gives one a stronger 
handle on seeing the relation between language and 'reality' as two-way: the linguistic 
choices actually made 'construct' or are constitutive of reality because of their realisational 
'relation' to the terms of the register systems, as of course the linguistic choices themselves 
are realisations of those terms. 
Martin (1985) uses the following 'stepped' diagram to model the relationship between what 
he calls (after Hjelmslev) the denotative semiotic of language itself and a set of 
connotative semiotics which are necessarily parasitic on a semiotic system such as 
language, with both content and expression planes, because they have no expression plane 
of their own:  
 
  
Figure 3.2 Language in relation to its connotative semiotics: register and genre (Martin 
1985: 250, Fig. 2). 
Later versions of Martin's model have a fourth plane, ideology, above the other three. 
Ventola's version includes the plane of ideology and is somewhat more informative:  
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Figure 3.3 The semiotic communication planes (Ventola 1987: 58, Fig.3.2) 
A significant effect of this kind of model is that register is now seen in some sense as 
equivalent to (context of) situation, but situation as a potential rather than as an actual. 
Such an interpretation is certainly in the Firthian spirit. For Halliday, register is a matter of 
the semantic and lexicogrammatical weightings consequent upon situational variation, i.e. 
situation and register are distinguished. This latter sense of register as a basically linguistic 
matter (at the level of what in Martin's model is the language stratum) has informed much 
systemic-functional work which uses the notion in ways which imply at least that a 
register is a situationally-specific type of text, a use of the term not very different from use 
outside the systemic framework (e.g. Ferguson 1983). Thus Halliday et al. (1964) can raise 
the question of differentiating 'registers' on the basis of style of discourse (where the more 
usual basis, especially outside systemic-functional linguistics, would be field):  
  
This dimension is unlikely ever to yield clearly defined, discrete registers. It is best treated 
as a cline, and various more delicate cuts have been suggested, with categories such as 
'casual', 'intimate' and deferential'. But until we know more about how the formal properties 
of language vary with style, such categories are arbitrary and provisional. (Halliday, 
McIntosh & Strevens 1964: 92-93).  
Martin sums up the difference between the model he and his colleagues in the Register 
Working Group have been developing and that of Halliday in the following table:  
Halliday (e.g. 1978) English Text  
CONTEXT OF SITUATION: REGISTER: 
 [as connotative semiotic] 
field field 
tenor tenor 
mode mode (excluding rhetorical mode) 
REDOUNDING WITH (i.e. symbolising, construing and construed by)  
LANGUAGE: LANGUAGE: 
semantics (register as meanings at risk) discourse semantics 
lexicogrammar lexicogrammar 
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phonology/graphology phonology/graphology 
Figure 3.4 The different place of register in the two models (Martin in press, Ch. 7 [1992: 
502, Table 7.2]). 
 
This relocation of register as semiotic potential has enormous advantages as far as tenor 
and the interpersonal are concerned, since it makes it easier to explain the constitutive role 
of language with respect to social relations.  Linguistic choices don't simply 'reflect', 
'mirror' or 'express' the  preexisting interpersonal 'realities' of situations but are constitutive 
of them, despite the existence of institutionalised forms of linguistic practice legitimising 
(but never totally determining) certain linguistic forms as culturally appropriate, especially 
with respect to such key aspects of social identity as gender, generation, class, 
race/ethnicity. Status by virtue of occupation, income, possessions, location of residence 
etc. can also be relevant, but people perform complicated 'calculations' about how to 
weight the various factors and also about how to present themselves in order to achieve 
particular goals. An extended example will illustrate.  A young male student wanting 
special consideration may attempt to charm an older female lecturer ('superior' with 
respect to two dimensions: generation and institutional standing), in an attempt to re-
constitute the situation in purely gender terms, either as a (hetero)sexual game intended to 
put the lecturer in the weaker position (males conventionally being the ones who charm 
females into giving them what they want) or to recast the generational and status 
differences into the more familiar (and more manipulable) relational type of mother-son. A 
woman in such a situation can respond in various ways to such an attempt to constitute the 
situation in terms more likely to have a favourable outcome for the student. She can 
simply respond as a female to a male being charming; she can respond to the charm but let 
him know that she understands the game he's playing. Or she can refuse to participate in 
such a game and insisting on playing the encounter as one between institutional superior 
and subordinate. The way an individual lecturer negotiates such a situation is not 
predetermined in any simple sense by any particular aspect of their social identity, and 
certainly not by any assumption that she will simply step into the speaking position made 
available as a function of that adopted by the student (where 'speaking position' is 
analogous to 'reading position' in current critical theory, (v. Belsey 1980, Moi 1985), 
referring to the subject position from whose perspective a text makes sense, and goes far 
beyond the relatively simple notion of 'speech role').  
 
3.1.3 The problem with social role 
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Early attempts to characterise tenor either situationally or linguistically made considerable 
use of the term 'formality' (critiqued in the previous chapter), and indeed a recent 
systemic-functional publication still does so (Benson and Greaves 1984). Halliday's work 
is notable for the absence of this term. The metafunctional conception of language led to a 
focus on MOOD as a key interpersonal system at clause rank and hence on speech role - 
which can readily be related to social role. I shall argue below that social role is best 
handled as a function of field, i.e. as an aspect of 'what's going on', with its institutional 
perspective. Speech role, however, taking us into what systemicists refer to as speech 
function (speech act defined according to grammatical criteria (Halliday 1985; Martin 
1981, in press) and beyond that into the more extensive negotiation of exchange structure 
(Berry 1981, a, b, c; Martin, in press), and is clearly of enormous relevance to the 
negotiation of social relations. (See Chapter 4 ).  
Halliday (1978) fairly consistently refers to tenor in terms of role relationships (or status 
and role relationships), which includes levels of formality as one particular instance, i.e. 
tenor itself can no longer be characterised in terms of familiarity, formality etc., but rather 
these are to be seen as realisations of tenor, an underlying variable. In characterising the 
tenor of various texts he presents, Halliday (1978) talks very specifically in terms of roles, 
e.g.  
- small child and parent interacting: child determining course of action (p.115);  
- re a Thurber story, two levels: 
 i)  writer and readers, writer adopting role as recounter (the relation of writer to 
audience) 
 ii) mate and mate (the relation of the characters in the story) (p.146);  
- equal and intimate: three young adult males; acquainted 
 - but with hierarchy in the situation (2 experts, 1 novice) 
 - leading to superior-inferior relationship (p. 226).  
In analysing a conversation from the film Talking Shop: demands on language 
(Appendix 1, 'The 'silver' text', to An Introduction to Functional Grammar, 1985), 
Halliday characterises tenor in general as referring to 'the statuses and role relationships: 
who is taking part in the interaction'. In this particular situation, an interaction between a 
young woman just starting work and the manageress of the silverware department of a 
large department store, Halliday characterises the tenor as follows: 
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Manageress and new salesgirl; a complex status relationship embodying (a) senior-junior, 
(b) expert-novice, (c) teacher-apprentice; with a fourth, personal relationship at a 
metaphorical level, (d) mother-daughter (p.370).  
These last two examples introduce terms like hierarchy, expert/novice, superior/inferior, 
senior/junior, which are considerably more general than the terms parent/child, 
mother/daughter, writer/reader, manageress/new salesgirl. Characterising participants as 
'male' or as 'young adult' lies somewhere in between these other two sets. It does not 
specify a unique institutional setting (field) in the same way as does characterising 
participants as parent/child (specifying the institution of the family), writer/reader 
(literature) or manageress/new salesgirl (retailing). It does, however, imply a range of 
possible institutional settings (work, family, education, specific field of entertainment 
etc.). Characterising the relationship of interactants using such terms as 'equal', 'intimate', 
'hierarchy', 'expert', 'novice' and 'superior-inferior' is at a different level of abstraction 
again, referring to forms of relationship which can occur in most kinds of institutional 
setting, regardless of whether participants are young or old, male or female, and while 
certainly not regardless of the most specific characterisation in terms of role, then at a 
level of generality at which it is possible to separate those aspects of what is said that are 
relevant to equality/inequality per se  and those which are more situationally specific.  The 
most specific terms seem to concern field, insofar as linguistic realisations with this degree 
of specificity will mainly be lexical and other aspects of what is said can be accounted for 
at a more abstract level of conceptualisation about social relations.  
What then is one to do with social role as an explanatory notion, where playing a role in 
relation to a complementary role, e.g. in parent/child, customer/service-provider dyads, 
can be seen as providing the relational basis from which interpersonal choices spring? The 
approach here will be to treat role in its specific (experiential) manifestations as a function 
of field, with implications for both the modelling and realisation of field - initially in terms 
of lexis, the most overt manifestation of field , but ultimately in terms of entire transitivity 
structures at the level of the clause and activity sequences at the level of text (Plum 1984; 
Martin, in press a). Social role may also be implicated in the unfolding, particularly the 
dynamic unfolding, of certain genres. Given that it seems likely that the relationship of 
field and genre will prove far more complex than current models allow for (an issue that 
will not be further explored in this work), the focus of what follows will be primarily on 
the appropriateness of relocating social role to field.  
The formalisation of field as a register category lags well behind that for the other 
variables, tenor and mode.  Field is not susceptible to the same kind of schematising or 
reduction to a set of underlying principles as tenor or mode because of the irreducible 
particularity of the multiplicity of fields existing in any society, even more so in a complex 
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modern society; a particularity and multiplicity registered most sensitively in the scope of 
the lexical resources of a language. Lexis is only the beginning, of course. If we consider 
field as a mode of doing/knowing in the world, involving specific forms of 
action/knowledge performed on and with specific kinds of objects, then in the process of 
participating in such a mode of doing/knowing one also constitutes oneself as a particular 
kind of actor/knower (or active subject), whose actions have material effects and whose 
knowledges are no less active as they are projected upon the world, as representations of 
that world, in the form of what one 'says', using the various semiotic modalities of one's 
culture. Translating this  process into more explicit grammatical terms, using the key 
clause rank experiential system of transitivity (both transitivity and its ergative 
reinterpretation, v. Halliday 1985: Chapter 5), one ought to see field in terms not only of 
the activity orientation (Process) and object orientation (Medium/Goal) proposed by Plum 
1984 but also in terms of 'subject'-orientation (Agent/Actor), i.e. incorporating the whole 
of the activity appropriate to that particular institutional setting. In this way it becomes 
easier to see social role as the sociological construct corresponding to both grammatical 
Agent/Actor and Medium/Goal (where this is a person) and, further, to the semiotic 
subject. The meanings, needless to say, are not the same.  
I shall exemplify from the field of education, involving two social roles, teacher and 
taught.2 Moving to the field of animal husbandry, sub-field domestic animals, one finds 
the roles of breeder, distributor/seller, owner, veterinarian, and a number of roles involving 
the provision of goods and services (e.g. grooming, supplying food) and, in the specific 
context of showing, the further roles of exhibitor, handler and judge. Within this subfield 
one also finds the process of teaching, sometimes in the context of obedience schools  (for 
dogs), but the activity is generally referred to as training  rather than teaching . By and 
large, the terms teaching  and teacher  are restricted to the field of human education in 
English-speaking cultures; it is conceivable that in a society where the difference between 
humans and other animals was not regarded as so great, one might not find such a lexical 
distinction. Likewise, in English, medical care of animals is provided by veterinarians, 
though the range of knowledge and skills required and the activities carried out in 
performing that role may in some cases differ very little from those of the doctor whose 
patients are human rather than animal. 
In other cases, where culturally sensitive distinctions are not involved, it is possible to use 
a superordinate term to refer to a role, focussing on what that role has in common with 
                                                 
2 Note that the same names are not given to these roles in sub-fields with different prestige: teacher  and pupil  
(sometimes student ) are appropriate for school settings but professor/lecturer/tutor  - student  are the terms 
used in tertiary settings (though individuals may characterise themselves as teachers  and their professional 
activity as teaching , presumably as an indication of their perception of the field of education as unitary and/or as 
a disclaimer of any particular prestige attaching to them as individuals, i.e. as an ideological statement).  
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similar roles in other institutional contexts rather than on what differentiates it. One 
example would be the term judge , which occurred above in the context of showing 
animals and which also occurs in the field of competitive sport (where one also finds the 
terms umpire and referee for specific sports) and competitions generally: assessing the 
relative merits of wines, petit point, advertising jingles, Miss Universe and Mr World 
contestants or potential Nobel Prize winners, as well as a more ill-defined role in the kind 
of 'competition' which involves merely sending in a coupon in order to win something, 
where one is told that 'No correspondence will be entered into with the judges'. 
This last use is about as far away as one could get from the judge of the law, but its use is 
perfectly comprehensible: the role that in the field of law necessitates impartial assessment 
of evidence, interpretation of a codified body of legislation and case-law, and decision-
making based on all of these, in the context of give-away competitions involves merely 
'deciding' (i.e. selecting) between entrants and doing so fairly. Using the term judge  
undoubtedly adds prestige to an activity that in essence is largely a lucky dip: the 
advertising industry takes itself far too seriously, however, to use a term like lucky-dip 
puller-outerer! 
An investigation of the use of superordinate versus taxonomically more specific terms for 
social roles would presumably reveal a great deal about the salience and prestige of the 
various institutions within a particular society. The fact that superordinate terms are often 
used to refer to roles in more general terms, the specific processes characteristically 
engaged in and the objects involved being field-specific (i.e. the lexical strings in which 
the word judge  appears would differ from field to field), points to the possibility of 
abstracting away from what I shall call the 'content' of such roles (which properly belongs 
in field) leaving a more general set of relational dimensions, or interpersonal modalities, 
within which speakers can occupy various positions. The dimensions proposed below are 
concerned with hierarchy, social distance and attitude/evaluation. It is these three 
dimensions which are realised by systems from the interpersonal metafunction and hence 
are proposed as properly constituting the register category tenor. These dimensions or 
modalities are generalisable across situations and are capable of being mapped as a 
semiotic resource. Such a model is, in principle, generalisable across all human societies. 
The typical positions occupied by speakers along such dimensions in a variety of situation 
types will no doubt vary: much cross-cultural miscommunication would seem to be 
interpretable as mismatches between expected and actual locations of speakers from 
different cultures. Even more variable will be the patterns of realisation: the 
metafunctional hypothesis predicts that all languages will be organised metafunctionally, 
but does not predict the form of those realisations. There is enormous potential here for 
empirical investigation: Christine Beal's work (Beal 1987 on conversation in French, work 
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in progress on cross-cultural communication in a French firm based in Australia) is 
pioneering this area, using the model of tenor I have been developing.   
One apparent difficulty with this approach is that there do seem to be interpersonal forms 
used in some fields, e.g. realisations of the key interpersonal clause-rank system MOOD, 
which seem predictable less on the basis of hierarchy and/or social distance (attitude is not 
implicated) than on the basis of field itself. A nice example is the fact that, while in many 
settings subordinates ask questions of superiors (regarded as experts) and superiors ask 
questions of subordinates (regarded as possessors of specific valued information), in both 
cases in order to obtain new information, in one particular kind of setting superiors 
(regarded as experts) regularly ask questions of subordinates in order to obtain information 
which they themselves already possess. The field involved in this latter case is, of course, 
education and the strategy described is characteristic of the process known as teaching (it 
is not, of course, the only strategy employed). In this case it would seem that speech 
function allocation and the MOOD choices realising speech function (assuming congruence 
for the moment) is being determined by field rather than tenor.  
One solution to this problem would be to regard basic exchange structure roles (i.e. 
primary/secondary knower/actor, Berry 1981a, b, c; Martin in press c. See Chapter 4 for an 
account) as preselected by field. To the extent that fields focus primarily on either 
knowledge or action and that some participants are experts and others novices, then one 
can predict not only which 'commodity' will be the object of negotiation but also who will 
occupy which exchange role (in relation to who has the primary responsibility for the 
knowledge/action which will subsequently be realised in exchange structure roles). 
Education is, par excellence, the field where knowledge is the commodity being 
exchanged. Thus teachers can be culturally (not merely situationally) defined as primary 
knowers and insofar as they themselves conceive of their role purely in terms of the 
transmission of knowledge then they will act in such a way as to give their pupils the 
opportunity to demonstrate that they too are 'knowers' but often with a very restricted 
scope: knowledge may only be constituted as 'proper' knowledge within the parameters 
laid down by a particular teacher. Such a routine, then, as the sequence of delayed primary 
knower/responding secondary knower/confirming primary knower moves is not only about 
knowledge but also about power: students typically tell teachers what they think teachers 
want to hear rather than simply what they themselves know or understand. Insofar as 
teachers conceive of their role as something other than mere transmitters of knowledge, 
they will act differently, e.g. by asking information-seeking questions which assume that 
their students are genuine primary knowers, subjects with real responsibility for their own 
knowledge.  
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Another approach to seeing social role as problematic in relation to social interaction is the 
scope for frustration of the expectations that such a construct legitimately arouses. Roles 
are defined independently of their occupants, in terms of institutional settings (fields) and 
institutionalised tasks (genres). There are undoubtedly expectations that individuals will 
enact those roles in terms of appropriate social (including linguistic) practice, and certainly 
sanctions can be invoked against individuals who fail to 'perform' in a socially acceptable 
manner, but it is not the case that the behaviour of an individual in a particular role can 
simply be predicted. People can perform a role in an idiosyncratic way, thereby of course 
creating doubts as to whether they are in fact playing the role, as in the case of parents or 
teachers who are not as authoritarian as others would like them to be; or they can refuse to 
take up the role, even though in a situation which apparently requires them to do so, as in 
the case of an employee who invited the boss to join them in the tea-room during working 
hours instead of getting on with the job. Such an employee might find themself out of a 
job very smartly, on the grounds of dereliction of duty and insubordination - i.e. failing to 
participate in appropriate activities for an employee (a matter of field) and acting 
inappropriately, i.e. without proper deference, towards the employer (a matter of tenor). 
In contemporary Australian society it is not the case, on the whole, that taking on a 
particular social role means also taking on a rigidly-prescribed code of behaviour, 
including linguistic behaviour, though one certainly meets individuals in various contexts 
who seem to be playing out their roles in a somewhat automatised way. Most people play 
out their roles in somewhat more flexible ways. We can see one instance of this in Text 1, 
a piece of mother-child interaction (courtesy of Clare Painter). The child is rocking on a 
chair:  
1  Mother: Don't do that. Move it away, if you want to rock it.  
2  Child: No.  
3  Mother: You'll go straight to your room if you bang my chair … 
4  Child:  I hit you with a teddy.  
5  Mother: Poor teddy! Teddy's crying. You hurt his head. He's got a head- 
6   ache now. He wants to be my teddy.  
7    Child: No  [taking teddy].  He hasn't got a tummyache. He's got a fat  
8  tummy. I want to see the water in there …   
At line 5 the mother, having issued two commands (line 1) and then a threat (line 3) to the 
child to get him to stop rocking on his chair, changes tack and takes up as a new topic the 
participant other than herself and the child himself in the child's retaliatory threat:  
 I hit you with a teddy 
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Suzanne Eggins (1990) has noted the strategy of promoting Medium to Agent as a 
mechanism for maintaining conversation. This is essentially the same strategy, in this case 
having the specific effect of distracting the child's attention from the two participants in 
the situation who are in conflict with one another and hence avoiding any further overt 
aggression from the child. It was perfectly open to the mother to pursue the confrontation 
over the chair: in Australian society, parents are legitimated as authority figures with 
respect to children to what seems at times an almost frightening extent (viz. the extent of 
child abuse and incest). This mother chose not to pursue the confrontation, but rather to 
pursue a more conciliatory approach which averted further conflict - and, if this is a 
habitual pattern, presumably reinforced previous 'lessons' to her child that outright 
confrontation is not the appropriate way to conduct social relations. 
Another familiar situation type involving legitimated as authority figures is the medical 
consultation. Some doctors play out the role of all-knowing minimally communicating 
reservoir of specialist knowledge/expertise to the hilt, but by no means all of them act in 
this way. Look at how the surgeon in Text 2 (courtesy of Joan Rothery) presents his 
diagnosis of appendicitis to his 11 year-old patient and his mother:  
Ah look, I don't think you can go past an appendix there. Just, you know, 
number one, he's got no pain just there and is sore there and I think he's just 
got something blocking the appendix and it's just giving him this constant 
pain and trouble, so seeing that you've had it for some time and seeing that 
he's been worse lately I think it certainly would be wise to think about 
having it done. Not a must but in view of the fact that it's giving him trouble.  
What is at issue in both conversations is the question of how power is to be negotiated - 
overtly, forcibly, insisting on one's rights (as parent, to control behaviour; as doctor, to 
control knowledge), or in a more conciliatory way. All social relations can be looked at in 
terms of power, along a cline or continuum that runs between equal and unequal, e.g. the 
relations of lovers, parent/child, classmates, teacher/student, friends, employer/employee, 
officer/services personnel. But clearly in our society few actual relationships are either (i) 
located at a particular point on the cline by definition, though clearly they will tend to lie 
towards one or the other end, or (ii) are unchangable, either over time or even in the course 
of a particular interaction.  
What all this suggests is that social role is by no means the straightforward construct it is 
sometimes assumed to be3  and that, if it is to be used at all, it makes much more sense to 
                                                 
3 Much of the contemporary critique of the notion of role has come from feminists resisting the conservative 
political implications of the notion of sex or gender role (v. Edwards 1983; also Pfohl 1975, Connell 1979).  
Contemporary feminist, and other, conceptions of the social construction of subjectivity are basically at variance 
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do so in terms of field than in terms of tenor. The perspective adopted here has 
undoubtedly been made accessible in part because of the development of a new 
perspective on the whole territory of language in relation to types of situation. Martin has 
noted (course materials, Linguistics III 1983) that 'making one's definition of tenor less 
role oriented, in the sense of having to specify say a buyer and seller in a purchase text' is 
one of the effects of setting up genre as an underlying semiotic. He notes that one of the 
further advantages of dealing with genre in this way is 'Making the register/metafunction 
hookup clearer: realisations of field, mode and tenor tend more neatly to skew 
probabilities in one or another metafunction'. It ought finally to be noted that it is 
undoubtedly true that my decision to abstract away from social role to more general 
dimensions of social relations that can be seen as underlying the operation of social roles 
in constituting the category of tenor has been substantially affected by the nature of the 
data I initially worked with.  There are relatively few 'role' terms of address in English, 
particularly in Australian English, and many of those that do exist are probably better 
interpreted either as titles (e.g. Nurse , Captain ) or, in the case of family kin names (e.g. 
Mum , Grandpa ), as special instances of personal names. In the absence of a repertoire of 
'role' terms of address, one is forced to look for more general properties of social relations. 
This proved merely a useful starting point, however, since other compelling reasons soon 
became evident for pursuing this direction.    
 
3.2 Modes of realisation of interpersonal resources    
Much of my previously published work on tenor spoke of the relation between tenor and 
the interpersonal as one of realisation but, whether it began with exploring data or with an 
exemplification of a model of tenor, handled the realisational relationship in a very 'top 
down' way, a way which resulted in giving a more substantial initiating role to the 'higher-
order' semiotic categories than to the linguistic forms involved in their constitution. The 
following quotation is illustrative:  
Each of the three tenor dimensions seems to activate somewhat different sets of linguistic 
choices and to do so with characteristic patterning of the realisations. Such patterning can 
be structural or interactional. For the power dimension, the characteristic realisational 
pattern is interactional, in terms of the extent of RECIPROCITY of the linguistic choices 
made. For the dimensions of contact and affect, the characteristic realisational patterns are 
structural, in terms of what we shall call the principles of PROLIFERATION and 
AMPLIFICATION. (Poynton 1985/90:79).  
                                                                                                                                                       
with the traditional notion of role, which implies the existence of social positions awaiting occupancy rather than 
seeing social positions as the product of mutual negotiation.  
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Systemic models of the interrelation of language and situation, via the notion of register or 
context of situation, have always been seen as theoretically bidirectional but in practice 
have tended to operate in a very 'top down' way, i.e. seeing context as determining 
language. Hasan & Martin note that  
… as Halliday has often argued, text affects context even as choices determined by context 
are realized in text. Once again Halliday's model at present falls short of his goals. 
Realization as usually modeled makes language subservient to context - directed from 
above. What one really wants is a model in which realizing a text feeds back into the 
system, with accumulated feedback leading or not leading to systemic change. Whorf gave 
language a more deterministic role in this process than most linguists. For Whorf language 
symbolized reality. This is a perspective Halliday would share. (Hasan & Martin, 1989: 8)  
My early model of tenor (e.g. Poynton 1984, 1985/90) was no exception to this less than 
realised bidirectionality. What were then referred to as modes of 'operationalising' the 
tenor subcategories will now more appropriately be referred to as realisational modes or 
strategies of the interpersonal, rather than simply of tenor, i.e. as both linguistic as well as 
contextual or situational phenomena. As two intimately related semiotic resources, the 
developmental relationship of key socio-relational categories to the interpersonal resources 
of the linguistic stratum is very much a chicken and egg matter: deciding 'which comes 
first' is an impossible task. There are many good reasons, particularly by building on the 
work of others, for using a 'top down' approach, i.e. motivating the tenor network 
extrinsically, from outside language; but the real strength of the systemic approach lies in 
its capacity to model the relationship between language and situation intrinsically, from 
within language. And here, again, starting with the investigation of address phenomena 
has proved fruitful.  
Roger Brown and his colleague Albert Gilman in their influential paper on pronominal 
address in European languages identified RECIPROCITY of usage (or the lack of it) as 
relevant to their 'power semantic' (Brown & Gilman 1960).  Brown and another colleague, 
Marguerite Ford, in a slightly later paper on address in American English, which 
necessarily paid attention to some of the variety of non-pronominal address forms 
available in the English language, identified an increase in the number of different forms 
used by a speaker to a particular addressee as an indication of the closeness of their 
relationship (Brown & Ford 1961/64). This observation formed the basis for my 
identification of a second interpersonal strategy, called PROLIFERATION. The third 
interpersonal strategy became apparent in the course of a detailed investigation of 
diminutive forms of proper names in English, part of the exploration of the resources for 
address in English. The phenomenon involved, called AMPLIFICATION, involved initially 
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the iteration of items from the morpheme and word ranks of the lexicogrammar in 
constituting words and groups used as vocatives (these being the ranks 'at risk' with 
respect to address), but amplification eventually came to be seen as operative at all levels 
of the rank scale with respect to interpersonal meanings. The iteration involves either 
straightforward repetition, as in instances of praise or reprimand such as you bad bad boy , 
you wonderful wonderful Mum , or iteration of function but not form, i.e. items 
functionally but not formally equivalent, as in a multiply-suffixed diminutive name such as 
Mikeypoodles . This name is analysed as consisting of the truncated personal name Mike  
plus a sequence of four diminutive suffixes, i.e. Mike  + -y  + -poo  + -(d)le  + -s (see 
Chapter 5 for a detailed account). All of these suffixes are capable of being directly 
attached to a name base, though there are phonological constraints restricting their actual 
occurrence, and none of them is easily distinguishable semantically.4 The cumulative 
effect of such iteration is the augmentation or intensification of a basic attitudinal stance, 
either positively or negatively oriented - intensifiers are a parallel resource, but lexical 
rather than grammatical.   
All three interpersonal strategies not only serve to locate the speaker in socio-relational 
space but also to specify an appropriate location for the addressee. This specification is 
achieved more directly with reciprocity than with either proliferation or amplification, 
because the organisation of conversation is particularly implicated.  The adoption of a 
speech role is in effect a demand that one's addressee will take on the complementary 
speech role (assuming for the moment a model of conversation organised in terms of 
adjacency pairs). In terms of a tri-stratal model of language, the level of discourse 
semantics is most 'at risk' in relation to reciprocity. For proliferation, the level most 'at risk' 
is lexicogrammar (though reaching up, in the form of ellipsis and substitution, to the 
discourse  stratum). For amplification, the level most 'at risk' is phonology (reaching up 
into lexicogrammar, especially morpheme and word ranks). Figure 3.5 sets out these 
proportions, identifying some of the central systems at each level (stratum and rank).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The meanings involved would of course be seen by many linguists as a matter of pragmatics rather than 
semantics. The systemic-functional category of the interpersonal retains such meanings within rather than 
outside the grammar. 
73 
 
STRATUM/RANK RECIPROCITY PROLIFERATION
 Discourse Conversational structure: 
 semantics turntaking, including length 
  of turn, interruption; role in 
  exchange; speech function choice.  
  Lexical cohesion: who controls 
  lexical strings (field/topic choice). 
  Reference: who refers to whom,  
  and to whose discourse, and how. 
  Homophora to include/exclude, 
  e.g. name-dropping.   
  Conjunction: who controls/ 
  reformulates internal conjunction.  
 Lexicogrammar:  
  Lexis Technical lexis, slang, jargon:  Antilanguages etc.
   ± reciprocal usage  (proliferation of forms)
  Grammar  
    Clause Mood: congruence/incongruence  Mood: range of types;
   of speech function realisation.  elliptical/complete. 
   Modulation/modality:  
   presence and extent 
   Vocation:  Vocation: 
   ± reciprocal usage, as also for: range of choice
    Nominal group - iterated nom. gp. structures;  Amplified & intensified 
forms.  Modification: extent and kind.   
    Word - morphological form;  Range of variants (inc. 
    truncated & suffixed 
forms) forms. Infixing of swearwords.  
 Phonology - accent, voice quality.  Elision/absence of 
elision/  Marked/unmarked choices of   
    
Figure 3.5 Summary of key modalities of interpersonal realization 
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3.2.1 Reciprocity 
This section will explore the scope for reciprocity in conversational discourse and the 
implications of this phenomenon for a linguistically based model of social relations. The 
obvious place to start mapping the scope for reciprocity is with the organisation of 
conversation itself, in terms of such features as: the speech roles or types of moves made 
by individual speakers in terms of exchange structure, speech function, and the 
grammatical forms (MOOD choices) realising these moves; how speakers are assigned 
speech roles (whether they are given or taken); interruptions and overlaps (location, 
frequency and response of participants); topic nomination and effective topic maintenance.  
Conversation can vary enormously in terms of reciprocity. For many speakers, the ideal is 
being able to 'say what you like', 'speak your mind' and 'be yourself' - a set of injunctions 
in the spirit of classic American liberal individualism (and of Grice's co-operativeness 
principle (Grice 1975), grounded in the same politico-philosophical tradition). For all 
participants to be able to achieve this ideal means that everyone has to be sensitive not 
only to their own 'rights', but also to those of the other conversationalists, with respect to 
all the aspects of conversational organisation listed above. Variations from this ideal range 
from the listener frustration of virtual monologue, one speaker taking the floor and maybe 
not even responding to the absence of back-channelling as an indication of the social 
unacceptability of their performance, to the chaos of everyone talking over the top of 
everyone else. Then there is a range of more planned face-to-face interaction, 'interviews' 
and 'consultations' of various kinds: the job interview, the political interview, the 
professional consultation, the clinical assessment, the therapy session. In all of these, the 
scope for reciprocity with respect to the conduct of the interaction is restricted; in some 
cases severely so. Restrictions may, of course, be contested. Contestation is common in 
some situations, e.g. by politicians who don't want to answer the questions being asked in 
a political interview, less common in others, e.g. by 'assertive' clients in professional 
consultations of various kinds. The restrictions exist because of the institutionalised 
inequality of the interactants with respect to the possession of expert knowledge/skill, an 
inequality which is further underlined by differences in income level and status.  
In all types of face-to-face spoken interaction there can be greater or less reciprocity and 
expectations vary depending, in the first instance, on the interaction type or genre 
involved. Thus an appropriate form of reciprocity in a conversation between friends is for 
both to have a free choice of topic nomination at some stage, introduced by something like 
'You know what?'  or 'Hey I just remembered'  or 'I've just had a thought'  (or maybe not 
even introduced at all). Such free choice is not appropriate in a medical consultation, 
however, where the doctor has the sole right to nominate topics; not an absolute right but a 
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restricted one, determined by field. A patient with a broken toe being asked detailed 
questions about their sexual life is entitled to regard this as unprofessional conduct, 
perhaps even sexual harassment. In a political interview, topic nomination rights are 
likewise restricted, resting almost entirely with the interviewer. A skilled political 
interviewee  will, of course, use a variety of tactics to avoid dealing with an 
'uncomfortable' topic. The interviewee can refuse to respond, though that is regarded as a 
marked choice. Alternatives are to transform an uncomfortable topic into a more 
'comfortable' one, to comment on a possible 'political' motivation in nominating that topic 
(i.e. one that supposedly advantages an opposing political party) or, a classic tactic of 
former Queensland Premier, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, 'reassure' the interviewer (and 
hence the listening audience) that there is no problem and that everything's under control 
but without giving any information. 'Don't you worry about that' was a trademark of 
Bjelke-Petersen's interviewing style.  
What can happen in this kind of interaction is that the unfolding of the interaction becomes 
an ongoing contest between interviewer and interviewee, with interviewers framing their 
questions in ways which imply a particular answer (i.e. effectively abrogating the role of 
primary knower) and interviewees counterclaiming the same role, as the ones who 'really' 
know. In other words, a kind of reciprocity is operating, but the effect is oppositional 
rather than cooperative. Where the cooperative reciprocity of casual conversation is seen 
as indicating a degree of equality between interactants, reciprocal contestation is about 
claims and counterclaims to authority and the outcome is a stalemate: political leaders are 
powerful but so are the star media interviewers, with respect to public opinion and 
ultimately the ballot box. So a kind of equality prevails. Both of these interactive contexts 
contrast with the job interview, one instance of institutionalised inequality, where the 
interviewee is in fact a supplicant (i.e. subordinate), must present themself as 
knowledgeable and competent (i.e. powerful) but must do so without taking over the 
conversational roles appropriate to the interviewers (i.e. not be too powerful).  
As types or genres of verbal interaction, these characterisations are identifiable but 
idealised. In practice, there is substantial variability in the conduct of all types of verbal 
interaction, even those which can be most ritualised. The co-ordinates of social relations, 
locating interactants in social space, are not pre-determined, though some people do relate 
to others with less flexibility and greater rigidity than others. Some police officers and 
school-teachers overtly flex their authority by their use of congruent Commands and 
impersonal forms of address ('Pull over, driver', 'Shut that door, boy' ) and by their total 
control of conversational space; some bureaucrats play a similar game (somewhat less 
overtly) by insisting on rigid observation of standard procedures; many men are still 
incapable of a conversation with a woman that is not directed at a possible sexual 
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outcome. In all these cases I would want to argue that what is at issue is not an attachment 
to a somewhat rigid conception of social (or sexual) role but rather the adoption of a 
particular subject position which both locates the speaker in a particular place in social 
space and simultaneously locates the addressee in a complementary position, one that is 
particularly difficult to contest without being seen to be 'difficult' - a perception which can 
have serious repercussions.    
The basic argument is that the co-ordinates of social relations are potentially up for 
(re)negotiation in each encounter, though the repertoire of subject positions people have 
constructed for themselves and had constructed for them, on the basis of their previous 
interactive and discursive histories, makes it more likely that some rather than other 
positions are more likely to be (re)occupied in subsequent interactions. Habit is hard to 
shake, particularly when the cumulative effect of such personal history is interpreted in 
terms of personality, personhood, the very self, in the still pervasive ideology of liberal 
individualism. An alternative interpretation is that one's experience of reciprocity (or the 
lack of it) constitutes a significant aspect of one's experience of power/lessness and is 
crucial to the construction of available subject positions. In an analagous way, one's 
experience of the expansion or contraction of the range of available semiotic resources 
(proliferation, dealt with in the next section) constitutes a significant aspect of one's 
experience of intimacy/social distance, a second critical dimension of social relations.   
The process of learning to occupy subject positions occurs across all semiotic modalities 
of a culture, since all forms of semiosis 'address' ('interpellate' in Althusserian terms 
(Althusser 1971)) or position subjects, but verbal interaction is a critical site because it 
involves  the simultaneous articulation of the discourses which form the ideological 
underpinning for the practices which the interaction is enacting and the enactment of those 
ideologically-based practices. The intersection of patriarchal or sexist discourses, 
concerning the identities of male and female and their appropriate relations, with the kinds 
of interactive practices which serve so effectively to silence many women (Poynton 1985) 
is a telling instance: the mapping of practice and discourse onto one another considerably 
increases their effectiveness, in part by making it even more difficult for people to 
understand what is going on.  
Apart from the organisation of conversation, there are two other overtly interpersonal 
phenomena where reciprocity or the lack of it is highly visible and readily interpretable: 
the overt expression of attitude or evaluation and the choice of type of term of address. 
Address alternatives include: full first name, diminutive form of first name, title plus last 
name, 'endearment', insult, 'inverted' form (an item which would be an insult if addressed 
to someone not known well). Address implicates choices at morpheme, word and 
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(nominal) group rank, while attitude may involve lexis only (as in 'purr' and 'snarl' words 
such as thrifty  compared with mean  or mingy ), and/or various phonological choices, 
including intonation contours realising KEY (Halliday 1970), voice quality, lengthening 
(especially of vowels) and distortions of normal rhythmic patterns. (The interrelationship 
between the tenor systems POWER and AFFECT, the systems relating to the phenomena 
reciprocity and amplification, will be discussed in 3.3 below).  
Reciprocity is also an issue with respect to such special lexical categories as slang, 
swearwords, technical (field-specific) lexis, formal (non-field-specific but 'learned') lexis 
and what Halliday (1976b) calls 'antilanguage', all of which have a strong attitudinal 
loading insofar as they can signal the membership of the speaker and the non-membership 
of the addressee in a restricted group of some kind. Adult reaction to teenage slang and 
student reaction to technical lexis are often of the same kind: resentment at being 
excluded, at being made an outsider, and a strong desire that such lexis should not be used, 
the implication being that difference would thereby simply disappear.   
Under certain circumstances reciprocity can also involve the question of whether speakers 
identify each other as speaking the same language variety (sociolect or dialect). Such 
identification may be lexical, in the case of regional dialects, but the more socially 
significant level seems to be phonological: 'accent'. 'Speaking the same language' can very 
effectively decrease social distance, for example when travelling in a foreign country; but 
dialectal and sociolectal differences within a society are more often perceived in terms of 
hierarchy and hence power.  
It also needs to be pointed out that, significant as conversational interaction is in the 
negotiation of power relations, considerations of power do not simply disappear when the 
genre used is monologic. 'Non-conversational' does not mean 'non-interactive': all forms of 
non-conversational text, from lectures, electoral speeches and sermons spoken to a present 
listening audience to newspaper reports and all forms of literature, written for an absent 
reading audience, 'address' or interpellate listeners, as subjects who are to occupy a 
particular subject position. Such non-conversational genres carry out this task the more 
coercively insofar as they leave no room for the listener/reader to overtly accept or refuse 
that position. By rendering one's audience silent by institutional custom ('the special 
privilege of the preacher, standing six feet above contradiction', in the words of one expert 
on preaching5) or oneself unable to hear any response, even if one were to be made, by 
virtue of the literal absence of the writers of written texts, producers of such texts occupy 
positions of considerable power. One might also add that the cumulative experience of 
                                                 
5 Reverend Professor Ian Pitt-Watson, Professor of Practical Theology at Fuller University, speaking on ABC 
Radio National, 23 October 1988.  
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such forms of interpellation in contemporary democratic capitalist societies must play a 
significant role in the construction of subjects positioned to hear, maybe to mutter and 
even do a bit of heckling, but not to feel that they have any significant degree of control 
over the larger affairs of politics and business. (See 3.4 below for a further account of 
tenor in monologic texts).  
 
3.2.2 Proliferation 
This section will explore the scope for proliferation in conversational discourse and the 
implications of this phenomenon for a linguistically based model of social relations. As 
indicated above, the primary linguistic stratum 'at risk' is lexicogrammar, though ellipsis 
and substitution phenomena are of some importance, and the phonological stratum and the 
communicative plane of genre are also implicated. The phenomenon of proliferation 
involves a double patterning: with some kinds of linguistic forms, the range of actual 
choices increases with intimacy and decreases with non-intimacy, while with other forms 
the pattern goes the other way, the range of choices decreasing with intimacy and 
increasing with non-intimacy.  
This account assumes a paradigmatic description of language as potential, as sets of 
choices, and claims that the range of actual (as distinct from potential) choices from 
relevant systems made by speakers varies as a function of intimacy. A second perspective 
on this phenomenon is in terms of predictability: i.e. the wider the range of choices 
available to a speaker, the less predictable their talk becomes. Predictability, however, 
involves two perspectives: where reciprocity can be assessed by both interactants and 
outside observers with roughly the same result (particularly allowing for repeated 
interaction over time), predictability will be assessed differently by outsiders and insiders, 
and both these are relevant. When interactants are not known to one another, the insider 
and outsider perspectives merge: one participates essentially as an outsider, on terms given 
by the culture. When interactants know each other intimately, these perspectives are 
sharply differentiated so that what may be utterly predictable to the insider (i.e. not only 
word for word, but with accompanying intonation, gesture, etc.) may be unpredictable to 
the outside observer. Thus when interactants are non-intimates (including not previously 
known to one another as the limiting case), topic choice, speech function and mood 
choices, terms of address and the scope of lexical choice (including the use of slang, 
jargon, technical lexis and  marked attitudinals other than conventional items indicating a 
positive disposition to the setting or other people present) will be more predictable than is 
the case when interactants are intimates. In the latter case, not only will whole systems 
rather than partial ones become available to speakers but additional systems not usually 
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part of a speakers repertoire (e.g. phonological systems: 'putting on accents')  may become 
a resource, along with various kinds of linguistic innovation, including lexical innovation,  
for exuberant linguistic play.  
Predictability thus operates with respect to the grammatical, the lexical, the phonological 
and certain aspects of the discourse semantic strata. Predictability is also relevant to the 
realisational patterns of the schematic structure of genres, where both the 'content' of 
particular stages and the unfolding dynamics of the genre vary in predictability as a 
function of intimacy/non-intimacy (see Ventola 1979 on variant schematic structure in 
casual encounters as a function of social distance). Not necessarily intimacy as a social 
fact, however, but intimacy as a semiotic construct. Thus doctor and patient may know one 
another well, and part of the identification of an interaction as one between people who do 
in fact know one another well will be the presence and/or location of elements of 
schematic structure that are not canonical as far as the identification of the medical 
consultation genre is concerned, e.g. elements of chat or casual conversation. In certain 
critical ways, however, the consultation will unfold as if the interactants were unknown to 
one another, turning its back as it were on one aspect of social reality in order to focus on a 
different reality, where the relationship between doctor and patient is necessarily 
impersonal rather than personal because of the basis of western medical practice in the 
'objectivity' of science.   
Key systems where the range of actual choices increases with intimacy and decreases with 
non-intimacy therefore include: topic choice (as a manifestation of field), speech function, 
MOOD (realising speech function), address forms, attitudinal systems. Conversation among 
intimates ranges freely among topics (the question of who initiates those topics being a 
matter of reciprocity), while among strangers topic choice can often be entirely predictable 
and even ritualised, as with 'the weather'. This is the quintessentially 'safe' topic in a range 
of safe topics dealing with perceptible aspects of the immediate material situation: the 
setting, other people present, food and/or entertainment if present. Such topics can be 
handled entirely formulaically or they can be used to reveal points of view on the part of 
the interactants, in which case topic choice may rapidly expand if interactants find one 
another compatible. Topic range then functions as both sign and cause of a re-location of 
interactants in social space along the axis of social distance.  
The range of MOOD choices as realisation of speech function choices will also tend to be 
greater among intimates than among non-intimates, especially among intimate equals 
(which is not as tautological as it may seem: parents and young children are intimates but 
hardly equals). Equals will tend to distribute speech function or conversational roles 
reciprocally, thereby increasing the range deployed by each speaker, unlike the skewed 
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distribution of unequals (e.g. in a professional consultation). Intimates are more likely to 
use a wider range of MOOD choices in realising particular speech function choices: 
'playing with the system' in showing greater sensitivity to the relational nuances of 
situations than non-intimates could be expected to show and also in simply playing, taking 
on roles for the sake of it. Thus the speech function choice Command, among non-
intimates, will tend to be realised by either an imperative (Brown & Levinson's 'bare on 
record') or by a modalised interrogative, depending on the power relations, whereas among 
intimates one can not only use either of these choices (depending on the context), but one 
can also use forms such as tagged imperatives and modalised, modulated and/or tagged 
declaratives. This is not to say that such mood options do not occur in interaction between 
non-intimates, simply that the overall probabilities of any of them occurring will be lower, 
and of the complete repertoire lower still. This is a claim that has as yet not been tested 
against an appropriately varied body of data, and two linked observations are called for 
about this prediction. Such data on probabilities is predicted to constitute a cline rather that 
falling into discrete categories and should be interpretable in terms of the multiplicity of 
positions that speakers can occupy on the social distance axis of social space: not merely 
as a reflection of what is but as a move towards the way they want things to be.  
Address provides the clearest example of proliferation, as the range of potential choices 
increases with intimacy but remains small with distance. Among strangers, no term of 
address at all may be used by speakers of English, unless the situation is what Ervin-Tripp 
(1971) calls 'status-marked', in which case the situationally-appropriate term of address 
may be used (Your Honour, Your Worship, Prime Minister) or the general status-marked 
terms Sir and Madam (the latter increasingly being displaced in Australia by Ma'am). This 
situation contrasts with that in many other languages where 'polite' public forms of address 
are available which do not carry any implication of the subordination of the user (as 
Sir/Madam  can). Between intimates, not only can the repertoire of 'ready-made' resources 
such as endearments and hypocoristic forms of given names (both personal and family 
name) be drawn on, but intimacy is often marked by the invention of nicknames specific to 
that relationship (Hopper et al. 1981). Not all speakers will avail themselves of all these 
resources: the extent to which they do so will be a significant factor in locating the 
relationship on an intimacy or social distance axis in hypothetical social space.   
A further significant area where actual choices may markedly increase among intimates is 
the repertoire of 'expressive' resources, involving language and other semiotic systems. 
This increased use of 'expressive' resources is partly a matter of intimates not masking 
affect as non-intimates are commonly expected to do: not only positive affect, involving 
the expression of love and attachment, but also negative affect, getting upset or angry and 
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shouting or swearing - including at other people. (The relation between intimacy and affect 
is discussed in 3.3 below).   
Turning now to the mirror-image pattern of proliferation, choices that decrease with 
intimacy and increase with non-intimacy, these are basically matters of decreasing or 
increasing the amount of redundancy. Thus the extent of ellipsis (especially Subject or 
Mood ellipsis when the Subject is the speaker in a declarative clause or the addressee in an 
interrogative, e.g. Saw so-and-so today ; Coming ; Find it? ), the use of pronouns whose 
referents are not retrievable from the text, the incidence of general words (stuff , thing , do 
) rather than field-specific lexis and the extent of elision and other phonological 'shortcuts' 
is greatest in conversation between intimates and least in conversation between non-
intimates. Intimates have shared knowledge and shared experience, including experience 
of what each other is likely to say, so the language used can afford to be less redundant. It 
is these kinds of context-dependent and minimally-redundant forms, along with slang and 
relaxed vernacular lexis, which have come to be seen as the quintessential forms of 
'informal' language, a categorisation which all too often has involved negative judgments 
of both the forms themselves and of their users in a literate society that has been taught to 
value the more invariant (because more standardised) forms of the written language more 
highly than the greater variability of speech.    
 
3.2.3 Amplification 
 
'That,' said her spouse, 'is a lie.' 
'It's the truth,' said she.  
'It's a dirty rotten stinking lousy bloody low filthy two-faced lie,' he amplified.  
  (Criena Rohan, Down by the Dockside).  
 
This section will explore the scope for amplification in conversational discourse and the 
implications of this phenomenon for a linguistically based model of social relations. As 
indicated earlier, the primary linguistic stratum 'at risk' is phonology, but the phenomenon 
involved 'reaches up' in an iconic fashion into lexicogrammar, so that 'saying it louder' at 
the phonological stratum becomes 'saying it stronger' or 'saying it again' at the 
lexicogrammatical. The ranks implicated are primarily morpheme, word and group ranks, 
especially involving the formation of forms of address; but amplified forms also occur at 
clause complex rank. These would normally be accounted for in a systemic description as 
forms of paratactic elaboration (v. Halliday 1985: Chapter 7).   
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The basis of amplification is not in fact linguistic at all but physical, involving the 
exaggeration of regular behavioural patterns with respect to one or more of a range of 
forms of physical behaviour such as facial expression, gesture, body stance, proxemic 
behaviour, rate of movement. This exaggeration can operate in two directions, so that 
behaviour can be 'larger' or 'smaller' than usual: smiles can be jaw-cracking and frowns 
thunderous, or the face can be almost entirely blank; the whole or part of the body can be 
moving rapidly and with sweeping gestures, or remain unnaturally still. This pattern of 
physical exaggeration, or AMPLIFICATION, spills over into the linguistic system, involving 
initially various physical aspects of speech itself, exaggerations of typical phonological 
behaviour such as:  
- speeding up or slowing down speech rate;  
- increasing or decreasing pitch range in intonation contours;  
- speaking louder or softer than usual;  
- flattening-out normal stress and rhythm-patterns;   
- lengthening speech sounds, especially vowels; 
- repeating speech sounds (alliteration and assonance).  
The most overt manifestations of this phenomenon on the lexicogrammatical stratum are 
what Martin (in press b) calls 'gradable systems' and Bolinger (1972) calls 'degree words'. 
Degree words of various kinds are very evidently amplifying phenomena, sitting midway 
between lexis and grammar in the sense that items like very  are lexicalised but are 
grammatical rather than lexical items. Martin investigates a range of gradable systems 
including modality and adjective comparison (the former lexicalised in form but 
grammatical in meaning and the latter a mixture of grammaticalised and lexicalised forms 
- compare big /bigger /biggest  with important /more important / most important ). There 
is a substantial linguistic literature on modality (v. Quirk et al. 1985 for selected 
references), but many of the other relevant phenomena are ignored in the linguistic 
literature, other than passing mention in introductory linguistics textbooks as curiosities, 
hardly meriting more serious consideration.  
Part of the problem (apart from the fact that the meaning involved is attitudinal or 
'expressive') is that amplification seems to occur only on the edges of the grammaticalised 
when it does get into the grammar. In terms of the rank scale, it only has specific reflexes 
in morphology, and in terms of the syntagmatic axis, its only structural reflex is repetition 
or iteration. Lexis is a far more readily identifiable attitudinal phenomenon, whether in the 
form of purely attitudinal items such as fantastic  and terrible  or items combining 
attitudinal and experiential content such as mob  (compared with crowd ) and annihilate  
(compared with beat ). But how does one handle swearing and other expletives? These are 
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phenomena that only occur in speech, often 'vulgar' speech at that, and they appear in all 
sorts of places in grammatical structure, behaving in many respects like adjuncts but going 
much further than any adjunct in their freedom of movement by even appearing as infixes 
(the only instances in English), e.g. kanga-bloody-roo . Citing such infixed forms purely 
as linguistic curiosities, as aberrant, misses the basic point that there are a variety of forms 
of amplification locatable at the intersection of the lexical and the grammatical, blurring 
these particular boundaries of the linguistic system in a rather analagous way to the way 
that the phenomenon of phonaesthesia even more embarrassingly blurs the boundary 
between the phonological and lexicogrammatical strata - thereby vindicating Firth's 
conviction that every level is meaning-making, and independently meaning-making.  
Returning to lexis, Martin includes graded attitudinal lexical sets among his 'gradable 
systems', but somewhat overstates his case by claiming a three-value grading for lexis 
when in fact lexical grading is more variable. The following sets are illustrative (more 
extensive sets can easily be put together from a perusal of Roget's Thesaurus):  
beat/ thrash/ decimate/annihilate   
pet/ dear / sweetheart / darling   
say/ shout/ yell/ scream   
OK/ good/ great/ terrific/ fantastic   
gathering/ crowd/ throng/ horde/ mob/ rabble   
This phenomenon of lexical grading essentially translates the literal amplification of the 
phonological stratum, 'saying it louder (or softer)',  into 'saying it more emphatically', 
producing lexical sets which differ from one another in the strength or degree of attitude 
involved. Such sets can be purely attitudinal,  as in OK … fantastic or combine attitudinal 
and experiential content, as in gathering … rabble  and beat … annihilate.  
More extensive lexical sets also occur in particular social contexts. Halliday (1976b) 
characterises what he calls anti-languages, the languages of marginalised subcultures such 
as criminals, in terms of lexical proliferation or over-lexicalisation. Wescott (1977) notes a 
similar tendency with respect to slang, a milder form of inclusive/exclusive linguistic 
behaviour, and Stanley (1977) documents the excess of pejorative lexis in English 
referring to women. Such lexical proliferation is clearly another form of essentially the 
same phenomenon of amplification, in a similar iconic relation to the literal amplification 
of the phonological stratum, 'saying it louder' being manifested lexically as 'saying it over 
and over again', with the basic meaning being 'I feel strongly about this'. The strong 
feeling can relate to an ideological position, as in the case of the over-lexicalisation of 
pejorative lexis referring to women, the essential negativeness of the female being 
something that needs constant reiteration in a patriarchal society, or it can be more a 
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matter of reinforcing solidary bonds within a group, either a stigmatised and excluded 
subculture such as criminals or somewhat less marginalised youth subcultures.   
It is this latter form of amplification, by means of repetition or reiteration, which operates 
as the fundamental grammatical form. It seems to be most evident in speech where, 
presumably, the availability of phonological realisations is more consonant with the 
simultaneous deployment of both lexical and grammatical resources. In writing, lexis 
seems to be the fundamental mode of realisation (though note that graphic resources such 
as font size and type, use of underlining, capitalisation, repetition of letters etc. can be 
employed as forms of amplification. Graffiti makes particular use of such resources, a 
simple example using repetition and capitalisation to admiringly refer to a set of named 
males as SOOOOOO GOODLOOKING). Grammatical amplification occurs at all ranks 
(clause, group, word, morpheme). The repetitions involved range from the repetition of 
attitudinal items in close proximity in a text, e.g. 
… it's a tremendous responsibility, a tremendous privilege, but there's a big 
job ahead of us … ah, I'm tremendously excited about the prospects for an 
open, honest and a progressive government … (Michael Field, newly 
appointed Premier of Tasmania, leading a Labor-Green coalition, speaking 
on The 7.30 Report, 28.6.89) 
Mr Bond is thrilled, Sothby's is thrilled, and of course the Getty Museum is 
delighted. (Sotheby's representative on the sale of Van Gogh's Irises, bought 
by Alan Bond in 1987 and sold in 1990 in tougher financial cimcumstances, 
speaking on PM (ABC Radio National)) 
to more overtly repetitive forms, involving iteration of either the same item 
or of a functionally equivalent item (these phenomena occurring at all ranks 
of the rank scale):  
Rank  Identity iteration  Functionally equivalent iteration 
clause We won, we won! We won! We beat them! We thrashed      
 them! 
group         the pig, the pig you pet, you dear, you absolute darling  
word a great great party a rotten lousy awful thing to do 
              really really awful absolutely fan-bloody-tastic 
morpheme Hypocoristic name-forms, with reiterated rather than repeated morphemes, seem 
to be the most elaborated forms in English, e.g. Franglekins  (Fran+(g)le+kin+s), 
Mikeypoodles (Mike+ y+poo+(d)le+s). The invented nonsense word 
supercalifragalisticexpialidocious  (from the film Mary Poppins) seems to utilise the same 
principle with a mixture of extant and invented morphemes.   
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Figure 3.6 Grammatical amplification, by rank and form of iteration 
There are, of course, available grammatical descriptions for iterated structures at clause 
and (nominal) group rank; but accounts of paratactic elaboration or of apposition or 
nominal group complexes have not, so far as I am aware, commented on the attitudinal 
uses of these structures.   
This subsection has used the terms 'attitude' and 'attitudinal', without either glossing these 
in any way or attempting to relate them overtly to a dimension of social relations in an 
analogous way to the relation between reciprocity and power and between proliferation 
and social distance/intimacy proposed in the previous subsections. The term ATTITUDE is 
used here to refer to any linguistic manifestation of what can be called, looking from two 
different perspectives, 'emotion' or 'evaluation'. 'Emotion' focusses more on the personal, 
on questions of internal affective states of speakers; 'evaluation' focusses more on 
questions of judgment, of assessment (as good/bad, right/wrong), and can be seen as less 
personal than social, deriving ultimately from attachment to particular beliefs, values, 
ideologies. The linguistic systems 'at risk' overlap at the level of lexis, which looks two 
ways: 'down' to the personal, 'up' to the social in terms of the evaluative and ultimately the 
ideological. In terms of linguistic realisations other than lexis, the ideological is 
manifested more in terms of clause rank grammar and certain aspects of discourse 
semantics, while the affective is manifested more in terms of grammatical ranks below the 
clause and in phonology.  Both attitude as emotion and attitude as evaluation are 
concerned with what will be identified in the following section as a third dimension of 
social relations, posited in part on the basis of the linguistic phenomena explored in this 
subsection and in part as a result of certain problems with Brown & Gilman's horizontal 
axis of social relations, their dimension of solidarity. There are certain peculiarities of this 
third dimension of tenor, not the least being its dependence on the other two dimensions. 
These will be discussed below.  
 
3.3 Modelling tenor as a systemic network  
The identification of the three realisational strategies of the interpersonal leads directly to 
modelling tenor in terms of three dimensions. These dimensions are to be understood as 
semiotic dimensions, i.e. not as categories which merely describe the actuality of social 
relations in particular situations but rather as the dimensions along which those relations 
are shaped in and through the process of choosing particular configurations of realisations 
from the range of operative semiotic systems, including the linguistic. In situations where 
people are interacting directly with one another, reading the configurations of forms 
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produced in such interaction as mere manifestations or expressions of pre-existing social 
relations is to misunderstand the relationship between forms of semiosis and the 
constitution of social relations. People do not speak in certain ways simply because they 
already are equal or unequal, intimate or distant, but rather people speaking in certain 
ways thereby constitute themselves and their interlocutors as equal or unequal, intimate or 
distant. Even in situations where certain semiotic forms are prescribed (or proscribed), as 
in interaction between military officers and their subordinates, it is only the compliance of 
the participants with these prescriptions that constitutes them as unequals in that situation. 
The phenomenon of impersonation is relevant here: dress as, act as and speak as a 
particular kind of person (military officer, cleric, even surgeon) and you will be taken as 
what you proclaim yourself to be - until such time as your lack of certification becomes 
known, that is.   
3.3.1 Representational issues 
The three dimensions of tenor are called POWER, DISTANCE and AFFECT in the network 
presented below. The end-points, or poles, of each dimension are modelled as a choice 
between features, using conventional systemic notation, e.g.  [equal] and [unequal] for the 
dimension of POWER. Since this form of systemic representation has developed for 
modelling paradigmatic systems in which choices are discrete, and often binary, it would 
not seem on the face of it to be especially suited to modelling clines or continua, which is 
clearly what is involved in modelling tenor. Several considerations are relevant here. First, 
is recent work by Martin & Matthiessen (1990) suggesting that conventional forms of 
systemic representation, to the extent that they can make the boundaries between some 
classes of phenomena too discrete, need to be complemented by other forms of 
representation. Martin & Matthiessen refer to such alternative forms as 'topological', in 
contrast to the 'typological' focus of conventional systemic representation. If what has up 
to now been considered standard systemic representation is going to come to be seen as 
requiring supplementary representation, then there is no good reason why new notational 
conventions should not be introduced into the networks themselves where this seems 
appropriate. An obvious notational modification would be the replacement of the 
conventional square bracket, with the meaning 'or', with a notational form more 
appropriate for the representation of a cline. The form adopted here is a 'broken' bracket, a 
square bracket with a break in the middle filled with dots.  
In the case of modelling tenor, maintaining some form of conventional systemic 
representation but employing new notational conventions does seem appropriate. A form 
of representation specifically developed for modelling choice seems particularly 
appropriate for the perspective adopted here on the forms of social relations as themselves 
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constituting a semiotic system, a system whose terms are subject to choice in an analogous 
way to the way in which the terms of those semiotic systems through which this system is 
manifested are themselves subject to choice. Such a parallelism in the conception of these 
systems, between choice on the plane of register and choice on the plane of language, 
especially the lexicogrammatical stratum of that plane, becomes a further motivation for 
maintaining some form of conventional systemic representation with respect to tenor.    
A further problem with the conventional form of systemic representation concerns 
realisation statements. In a linguistic network, features are not motivated arbitrarily but by 
the presence or absence of identifiable functions and by specific configurations of these, 
e.g. the absence, presence and order when present of the functions Subject and Finite as 
realisations of choices in the MOOD network. A specification of such (syntagmatic) 
functions is attached to each (paradigmatic) feature in the form of a realisation statement. 
The kind of realisation statement that can be attached to features in the tenor network 
proposed below is at a level of considerable generality, rather than the specificity 
characteristic of linguistic features, and will in the first instance consist of a specification 
of the relevant mode of realisation of interpersonal phenomena (i.e. in terms of reciprocity, 
proliferation or amplification). Such a statement will, however, contain within it an 
indication of the scope of the potential choices 'at risk' on the communicative plane of 
language because of the tendency of the three realisational modes to operate within 
specific linguistic 'territory' (see Figure 3.5 above). Thus, reciprocity (the realisational 
mode of the POWER dimension of tenor) operates most significantly with respect to 
systems on the stratum of discourse semantics, proliferation (the realisational mode of the 
DISTANCE dimension of tenor) operates most significantly with respect to systems on the 
lexicogrammatical stratum, and amplification (the realisational mode of the AFFECT 
dimension of tenor) operates most significantly with respect to systems on the 
phonological stratum.  
Such realisation will inevitably be probabilistic, as all register-to-language relations are  
(Nesbitt & Plum 1988). It will also be configurational, with a range of features rather than 
single items being implicated, and with interaction between the various choices making it 
more (or less) likely that some choices will be made once others have been made. It is 
certainly possible to make checklists, at varying degrees of delicacy, of features/choices 'at 
risk' in terms of tenor or social relations. Brown & Levinson 1978 is an exemplary 
example of such a list from a non-systemic perspective, Fawcett 1987 presented an outline 
of such a list from a systemic-functional perspective and my own work in this area has 
involved building up a comprehensive list of such features.     
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As yet there has been no substantial work on the interaction between, much less the 
interdependencies of, the items on such a list. For example, tenor is clearly relevant to the 
particular lexicogrammatical forms realising SPEECH FUNCTION. With respect to the 
MOOD choices realising the speech function Command, in Brown & Levinson's (1978) 
terms the most 'face-threatening' speech act, virtually the whole range of options is 
potentially available, from the most congruent (imperative) to the least congruent 
(declarative). The degree of congruence/incongruence is clearly significant in the 
negotiation of social relations, but there is no simple hierarchy. Not only is it the case that, 
for example, bare imperatives can be used both by superiors to inferiors and between 
equals, but even taking mood tag and ellipsis into account, much less the further 
interdependencies of the whole MOOD system with other clause-rank interpersonal systems 
such as VOCATION, POLARITY, MODALITY and MODULATION, to say nothing of KEY on 
the phonological stratum, massively complicates the possibility of any prediction. 
Speakers and listeners learn to interpret the social meanings of particular configurations of 
choices, but we do not as yet have any clear idea of how to weight even such highly 
grammatically-interrelated systems as these interpersonal systems.   
The notion of realisation itself is problematic, however, in relation to a model which is not 
'top-down' but bidirectional. Here, Martin's (in press c) suggestion of 'redounds with' as a 
more appropriate way of characterising the relation between the communicative planes of 
register and language seems appropriate, since it carries no implication of uni-
directionality as the term realisation can. Theorising the nature of the relation between 
communicative planes is of necessity a somewhat different matter from theorising the 
relation between strata on the language plane, where a directional notion of realisation, 
particularly relating language content to language expression, makes more sense.  
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3.3.2 Tenor modelled as a systemic network 
The simplest representation of tenor in the form of a systemic network is as follows:  
 
   -equal    
     
 POWER     
   reciprocity  
   -unequal   
      
     
     
   -intimate 
     
TENOR DISTANCE    
   proliferation    
   -distant 
 
    
   -positive 
   -marked   
   -negative 
 AFFECT      
  
   amplification  -unmarked 
 
Figure 3.7 Tenor: register plane (least delicate options)   
3.3.2.1 POWER 
The first dimension is called POWER.6  The end-points, or poles, of the POWER dimension 
are defined in terms of equality and inequality, relations that are constituted respectively in 
terms of the reciprocity or non-reciprocity of the relevant semiotic forms used by 
interactants. This distinction is modelled as a choice between the features [equal] and 
[unequal]. These are to be read as ideal or abstract forms of relations, rarely met in this 
ideal form in human social life. Grimshaw notes that 'Asymmetry appears to be the norm 
in social relationships and cases of true equality the limiting ones' (Grimshaw 1981: 286), 
suggesting that the terms of the power system are skewed rather than equiprobable, that 
social relations will generally incline towards inequality. Given that most societies are 
hierarchically organised, on one basis or another (v. Dumont, 1970), this is hardly 
surprising.  
                                                 
6  Martin prefers the term 'status', reserving 'power' for matters more directly concerned with the operation of 
ideologies.  'Power' is the term now generally used in the literature on language and social relations, after 
Brown & Gilman, however. Apart from this consideration, 'status' is a more ambiguous term, having a meaning 
close to 'role' in classic sociological theory and closer to 'social standing' in everyday discourse. There is a 
continuity between the kind of power exercised at the level of interpersonal relations and that operative at 
institutional levels of social organisation (v. Wrong 1979 on power as a relational term); that continuity needs 
to be emphasised by using the same term. 
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The fact of inequality, and the forms/mechanisms of such inequality at the micro level in 
human social interaction need, however, to be distinguished from the social bases of 
inequality at a more macro level, involving such key sites of difference as gender, class, 
race/ethnicity and generation. Forms of social structure systematically either privilege or 
discriminate against people on the basis of these perceived differences, the politics of 
difference significantly buttressed and in part constituted by racist, patriarchal, ageist and 
classist discourses. Experientially, such discourses are distinguishable;  but they are 
integrated with a common set of linguistic practices: interpersonal practices constructing 
positions of equality, dominance or subordination. It is the experience of occupying such 
positions which in turn plays a critical role in the construction of individual subjectivity, as 
the practices of power are reintegrated with racist, patriarchal, ageist, classist and other 
relevant discourses. The interactive organisation of social relations with respect to power 
(and respect to distance and affect) is achieved in basically similar ways whether one is 
dealing with relations of gender, class, race/ethnicity or generation. What will differ will 
be the frequency, purpose and institutional setting of such interaction. (Part III will explore 
some aspects of the social construction of these specific forms of social relations with 
respect to address forms and practices).  
3.3.2.2 DISTANCE 
The second tenor dimension is DISTANCE. The end-points, or poles, of the DISTANCE 
dimension are defined in terms of intimacy and distance, relations that are constituted in 
terms of the range (proliferation) of choices made (or available) from the relevant semiotic 
systems used by interactants. This distinction is modelled as a choice between the features 
[intimate] and [distant]. These too are to be read as ideal or abstract forms of relation. Just 
as the naming of the dimension of POWER implicitly reflects the tendency of human 
relations to be structured in terms of power, a relation of inequality, so the naming of this 
second dimension implicitly reflects the tendency of human relations to be structured in 
terms of distance rather than intimacy. Just as was the case with the negotiation of power, 
the negotiation of distance is also a dynamic process, not simply a function of roles and 
statuses. Through particular configurations of linguistic choices, interactants may lay 
claim to greater intimacy or distance than the actual circumstances of their relationship 
would predict: the used-car salesman lays claim to intimacy with a new client in the hope 
of thereby being in a better position to make a sale; the would-be Don Juan has a different 
goal in mind. Such claims may, of course,  meet with either acceptance or rejection, 
realised either overtly or covertly, and the nature of the consequent relationship will be 
constituted by the ongoing dynamics of what is claimed and how that claim is responded 
to.  
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What it is that is being invoked or laid claim to calls for some further examination, 
however. The commonest contrast of dimensions of social relations in the literature on 
address is between power and solidarity, after Brown & Gilman's classic paper,  'The 
pronouns of power and solidarity' (Brown and Gilman, 1960). This highly influential paper 
was based on the exploration of the uses of essentially a two-term system in a variety of 
European languages: the T pronoun of intimacy, and the V pronoun of politeness/distance. 
With such systems, there are only three possible patterns of usage: asymmetrical T - V, 
symmetrical T - T, symmetrical V - V. Brown & Gilman's argument is that there has been 
a basic shift in European culture from what they refer to as the power semantic, i.e. social 
relations perceived essentially in hierarchical terms, realised in asymmetrical patterns of 
address, to what they refer to as the solidarity semantic, i.e. social relations perceived 
essentially along a horizontal dimension, realised in symmetrical patterns of address. The 
difference between the two forms of symmetrical pronominal use, T - T and V - V, is to be 
read as the difference between greater and less solidarity. Brown & Ford, in their 1961 
paper,  are able to get closer to distinguishing these two dimensions on the basis of 
realisational differences because they are looking at address in American English which 
forces them to look beyond pronouns. They note an increase in the number of types of 
address in close relations, i.e. a form of proliferation.  
Brown & Gilman characterise solidarity in terms of relations of the kind 'attended the 
same school as', 'have the same parents as', 'practice the same profession as', suggesting 
that 'any sort of camaraderie resulting from a common task or common fate' (Brown & 
Gilman 1960: 261) can be identified as grounds for choosing the 'intimate' T form in 
contemporary Europe. Such camaraderie can be of a more permanent kind, as in the 
examples above, or purely situational, as in their mountaineering example:  
It seems that mountaineers above a certain critical altitude shift to the mutual T. We like to 
think that this is the point where their lives hang by a single thread. (ibid.)  
Such a characterisation of solidarity as the horizontal dimension of social relations blurs 
several kinds of necessary distinctions, however. Firstly, it blurs the distinction between 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions of social relations by treating reciprocity, the form 
of realisation appropriate to the vertical dimension, as operative on the horizontal 
dimension. Such a blurring of the difference between solidarity and equality is of 
considerable ideological significance in nations, such as Australia, where the prevalence of 
a discourse of egalitarianism makes it that much more difficult to perceive inequality at 
various levels of social organisation. Secondly, this  characterisation of solidarity 
privileges the solidary end of what is clearly a continuum or cline, with speakers 
perceiving their relation with an interlocutor as solidary seen as tending to use mutual T, 
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while those perceiving their relation with an interlocutor as non-solidary are seen as 
tending to use mutual V. Recent developments in epistemology are leading to greater 
wariness in the handling of binary distinctions, especially those where one term is defined 
merely as the absence of the other, rather than having its own value. The quintessential 
example is the contrast of female with male, where earlier characterisations of female as 
minus male, i.e. in terms of lack and absence, have been successfully resisted by feminist 
scholars. (Irigaray 1985, Jardine 1985).    
The third problematic aspect of Brown & Gilman's characterisation of solidarity is that it 
fails to distinguish an affective, or attitudinal, component from 'togetherness' or solidarity. 
This failure in large part is a consequence of the kind of data examined, but not 
distinguishing degrees of 'togetherness' or solidarity is also relevant: the kind of 
'togetherness' involved in having gone to the same school twenty years ago, or being co-
religionists, or sitting on the same committee, or being siblings, or living in the same 
street, or coming from the same town/country, or having shared anything else, is not all of 
the same kind. Not only can the affective loading of such likenesses be seen as differing in 
some kind of absolute way between these different kinds of relationship, it is sensitive to 
situation. Compare the emotional impact, and hence the affective loading, of meeting 
someone who lives in the same street on the train, at a concert, or at a committee meeting, 
with the impact of meeting a compatriot when one has been travelling and has not recently 
heard the familiar language or accent. The linguistic forms employed in such a situation 
are likely to be characterised not only by reciprocity and proliferation, but also by 
amplification, and many a friendship has emerged from such encounters, the realisational 
forms of the interaction having literally created a relationship characterised by equality, 
closeness and warmth.    
'Solidarity' then can be analysed as incorporating two distinguishable dimensions of social 
relations: a distance dimension and an affective (strength of feeling) dimension, where the 
attitude or affect may be directed not towards other people in a situation but towards the 
shared activity or a shared point of view. (The next subsection will discuss AFFECT as the 
third tenor dimension). Brown's work, as reported in various publications, certainly makes 
sense of the linguistic data he and his colleagues have attended to; it can also be seen as 
part of a tradition, within social psychology, which identifies two fundamental dimensions 
of social relations, summed up by the terms control and affiliation (Smith, 1985). There is, 
however, another body of work, at the boundaries of social psychology and 
communication theory, which posits three rather than two dimensions, dimensions which 
map quite closely onto the dimensions proposed here (v. Wish 1974,  Wish 1975, Wish 
1976, Wish, Deutsch & Kaplan 1976, Wish & Kaplan 1977). Other relevant work is that of 
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), whose semantic differential response dimensions, 
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as one would expect from a model based on linguistic responses, relate extremely well to 
the tenor dimensions proposed here.  
3.3.2.3 AFFECT 
The third tenor dimension is AFFECT. This system is different from the other two in that 
the first choice apparently allows one the option of 'opting out', with its initial choice 
between [marked] and [unmarked]. The choice is rather one of whether or not to display 
affect: the absence of overt realisation is a choice and is meaningful. This is the first of a 
number of features differentiating this tenor system from the other two. The differences 
arise principally from the fact that this dimension relates to the personal component of the 
interpersonal, whereas the other dimensions relate to the social. POWER and DISTANCE are 
relational: the interaction between the choices made by interactants ensures that relations 
along these two dimensions in a particular situation can always be located somewhere on 
the cline between [equal] and [unequal] with respect to POWER, and somewhere on the 
cline between [intimate] and [distant] with respect to DISTANCE. AFFECT will always be 
present, as the 'emotional charge' (interpretable variously as want or desire, ideological 
commitment, belief, the conviction that something matters or is of importance) which the 
individual speaker both brings to discourse, seen as both experiential and interpersonal, 
and produces as a reaction to discourse. (The textual metafunction, and the tenor feature 
mode, are being ignored here: an exploration of the interrelationship of affect and mode 
calls for considerable explication, and is another project again).  
AFFECT is, to a considerable extent, a function of POWER and DISTANCE, but because it is 
not relational will not always be realised. A speaker's choice of [marked] or [unmarked] 
affect does not implicitly position an addressee in the way that choices from either the 
POWER or DISTANCE systems position them, with that positioning either confirmed or 
resisted by the choices made in turn by the addressee.7 The choice of [unmarked] affect, 
then, is better read as the repression of its overt manifestation rather than as absence. In 
either case, one is talking about a neutralising phenomenon, which does not occur with 
respect to either of the other tenor systems. (See 3.4 below on the question of 'neutral 
tenor' in relation to written texts).  
The dependence of the AFFECT system on the other tenor systems was initially seen as a 
problem: why set up a third system at all if it is merely a function of the other two? The 
first reason for doing so was the identification of the phenomenon of amplification as a 
third mode of interpersonal realisation, which implies a third tenor dimension. The second 
                                                 
7  Affect is widely understood as an expression of the 'true' inner self, of personhood: the absence of even its 
most basic manifestations (in the form of attachment to persons, of reaction to circumstances which would 
normally produce pain) in Victor, the 'wild child' of Aveyron (Lane 1977), should give us pause for thought as 
to how 'natural' and 'unlearned' even our most basic emotions are. 
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reason was an increasing understanding that the organisation of social space certainly 
involved the intersection of two dimensions but that the person, self or subject located at 
any of the possible points of that intersection is not only in a sense a product or function of 
that intersection, but simultaneously with being so produced plays an active role (as agent 
not merely subject of/to) in the further negotiation of social space and hence the further 
production of its own conditions of being a subject/agent. The question of affect, read 
either as personal emotion or as evaluation from an ideological perspective (the two end 
up interrelated), is central to this complex two-way process insofar as it is simultaneously 
reactive and active, serving either to fix the subject at a particular point in social space or 
to motivate the rejection of that location and hence lead to further active negotiation. 
Affect attaches individual subjects to discourse, conceived of simultaneously as both 
interpersonal and experiential meaning. The focus here has been on the interpersonal 
aspects of discourse, but these ultimately are intertwined with the experiential as far as the 
social production of individual subjects is concerned.  
Returning now to the tenor network, the [unmarked] option for AFFECT arises because of 
the dependence of this system on the systems of POWER and DISTANCE. The dependence 
of AFFECT on POWER is such as to make the choice of [marked] affect more likely from 
both interactants when [equal] is chosen from the power system and to inhibit its choice by 
a subordinate, but not by a superior, when [unequal] is chosen. Where the relation between 
interactants is one of inequality, a superior is freer to choose to express attitude or 
evaluation towards topic, third party or addressee than is a subordinate. Realisation of 
affect is much more socially marked on the part of a subordinate than on the part of a 
superior. Subordinates are expected to behave deferentially, in ways which not only do not 
involve any overt indication of negative affect towards a superior but may inhibit the 
presentation of a personal point of view with respect to either topic or third parties. The 
fact that such an expectation is not always met in no way denies its social force.   
With respect to the interdependence of DISTANCE and AFFECT, there is a cross-dependency 
between [intimate] and [marked] affect, and between [distant] and [unmarked] affect. The 
clearest dependence is with respect to the [intimate] end of the DISTANCE cline. Intimate 
relations are expected to be characterised by positive affect in western cultures.  Grimshaw 
notes that 'there are relationships which are culturally defined as positive, e.g. certain kin 
relationships and the informal bonds of friendship' (Grimshaw 1981: 290). Such a claim of 
'relationships … culturally defined as positive' refers to an ideal, an expectation, a hope, all 
too often belied by actual practice - in a rather analogous way to cultural aspirations to 
relationships of true equality. At a rather literal level of experience countering expectation, 
antagonism between siblings is not uncommon. At a more semiotically, and culturally, 
significant level, in many western countries marriages are deemed to have irretrievably 
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broken down, i.e. to be no longer relationships, when there is a substantial shift from the 
culturally-expected [positive] to either [negative] or [unmarked] affect. The ideal 
contemporary western marriage is defined in terms of the combination of the tenor features 
[intimate], [equal] and [positive] affect; one measure of how unrealistic such an 
expectation may be, compounded of the ideological constructs of individualism and 
romantic love, is the current rate of separation and divorce.  It may be the case that in other 
societies the appropriate distance for such a relationship is located more towards the 
[distant] than towards the [intimate] end of the DISTANCE cline than is the case in western 
society, and maybe it is not necessarily associated as strongly with [equal] power or with 
[positive] affect.  
Further support for the interdependence of DISTANCE and AFFECT comes from empirical 
observations such as that of Argyle et al., who say that 'Liking results in more frequent 
interaction, especially more intimacy and helping. Status differences result in less frequent 
interaction, and choice of less-intimate situations.' (Argyle et al. 1981:125). Roger Brown's 
account of 'The Basic Dimensions of Interpersonal Relationship' (Brown 1965, Chapter 2) 
notes evidence for the same connection in the work of Heider (1958) and Homans (1950), 
neatly summarised in the aphoristic 
… similarity and proximity beget liking and interaction which in turn beget more similarity 
and proximity which beget additional liking and interaction … (Brown 1965: 77)  
Affect may be marked when [distant] is chosen, but is more likely to be directed towards 
the topic (especially if that is an area of common experience or in the 'public' domain) or 
towards third parties than towards the addressee. The consequence of marking affect with 
respect to topic can be either to close any initial distance between interlocutors, if they 
share the same attitude/evaluation, or to ensure that distance is maintained (if not the 
interaction terminated), if interlocutors do not share a point of view. Thus, the taxi-driver 
who favours passengers with strong views on immigration, politics or gender relations will 
be regarded by some as a soul-mate and a long-lost friend, and by others as someone they 
can't wait to see the back of and hope never to meet again.   
Affect can also be related to both other tenor systems simultaneously. One interesting 
example is a common parental control technique, involving a shift along the DISTANCE 
cline, from [intimate] towards [distant], realised through the use of more distant terms of 
address than those commonly used, e.g. full first name rather than a truncated or 
diminutive form. Interestingly, this strategy can be perceived by children in terms of 
affect, as in the case of the 4 year-old boy usually addressed as Robbie  whose astute 
metalinguistic comment on the meaning of Robert  was that 'Wobert means cwoss'.  It is 
interesting to speculate that, for young children,  affect may itself be the primary 
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dimension of social relations; that ontogenetically the other dimensions may be 
constructed on the basis of affect. Certainly much classic psychoanalytic theory seems to 
be based on such a proposition.  
Whatever the complex of factors relevant to its choice, once [marked] affect is selected, a 
dependent system offers a further choice between [positive] and [negative]. In both cases, 
a variety of lexicalised and grammatical forms exist side by side with what I earlier 
suggested were the more fundamental phonological and physical forms of realisation. 
Many lexicalised forms of realisation make the distinction between [positive] and 
[negative] overt, but the affective meaning of some of these is not always what it seems: 
the values can be reversed, especially negative forms used with positive meaning. This 
reversal has been particularly commented on with respect to the use by males of 
negatively-loaded words such as bastard  or mongrel  in friendly reference, or even 
address, to other males. One can only speculate on how pervasive this phenomenon might 
be: it is likely that the further 'up' the linguistic hierarchy one goes, the more games of this 
kind can be played, while the further away from language into physical behaviour one 
goes, the less room there is for games because physiological and sympathetic nervous 
system reflexes take over. Pleasure and pain are manifested first as physiology and then in 
overt bodily behaviour (facial expression, kinesic and proxemic systems, etc.); only later 
are they manifested in terms of more abstract semiotic systems, which however remain 
closely integrated with the more primary physiological and physical manifestations, since 
affect as emotion remains a matter of the body. The question of the forms of these non-
linguistic realisations of affect, including the degree of difference and the possibility of 
some kind of inversion or reversal of value, unfortunately has to remain beyond the scope 
of the present work.    
3.3.3 Tenor in monologic texts  
All of what has been said up to now about tenor has been predicated on text as dialogic, 
produced by people interacting directly with one another. What about monologic text, 
where an audience either does not or cannot respond? Can monologic text, in any of its 
forms, be seen as neutral, as outside or beyond the negotiation of social relations? 
Contemporary critical and social theory would maintain that all texts position or 
interpellate their listeners/readers, and do so with respect to power as well as with respect 
to the central ideological discourses framing those texts. If power is necessarily involved 
in the 'reading' of any kind of text, what about the other tenor dimensions? And are there 
differences between different kinds of monologic texts in terms of the ways in which they 
(attempt to) position their readers/listeners?  
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The notion of monologic text used here encompasses texts produced in both spoken and 
written medium, using various channels of communication: face-to-face (with its potential 
for both visual and aural feedback), television (no potential for either kind of feedback, 
other than from a studio audience, but communicating using both channels), radio (with a 
further restricted output, because of the absence of a visual channel), and various forms of 
written text (all of which necessitate varying degrees of delay before an audience even 
receives the text, and which have intended audiences ranging from one specified 
individual to anyone who happens to see or pick up the relevant publication). (v. Martin, 
1984 (draft) for distinctions).  
Some kinds of texts seem to more obviously position readers interpersonally than others: 
news and narrative position ideologically or discursively (e.g. Trew 1979, Davis 1987) but 
do not seem to overtly position interpersonally. Other texts more overtly position 
interpersonally, but may not be generally understood as positioning ideologically at all, 
e.g. textbooks, scientific and bureaucratic texts (the voices of the controllers of legitimated 
knowledge and legitimated action) (e.g. Hardaker 1982 on bureaucratic discourse). 
Advertising and political propaganda are seen as doing both (Williamson 1978, 
Vestergaard & Schroder 1985 on advertising). Where interpersonal positioning is 
perceived by audiences, this can be in terms of all three tenor systems, with POWER and 
DISTANCE interpreted directly in relation to the reader, and AFFECT in a variety of ways, 
ranging from the expression of personal feeling (e.g. in poetry) to attempts to manipulate 
audience response (e.g. in advertisements) when affect is marked, to appropriate 
objectivity when it is unmarked (e.g. in scientific text). Readers/listeners seem to be more 
conscious of the power dimension when they either feel themselves prevented from 
speaking (in a potentially interactive situation) or when they are made conscious of lack of 
experience, expertise or authority. Linguistic features of texts contributing to such 
consciousness include high levels of technical or field-specific lexis and extensive use of 
the speech function Command, including realisations as modulated declaratives. Topic, 
level of lexis (technical, vernacular, slang etc.) and extent of personalisation, especially in 
the choice of pronouns used either for address of reference, are particularly relevant to 
reader perception of DISTANCE. Personal letters generally make somewhat different 
choices of topic and level of lexis from those made in bureaucratic discourse: the extent of 
use of the pronouns you  and we/us  in recent Australian Federal Government policy 
documents (e.g. Commonwealth Green & White Papers on Education), for instance, can be 
interpreted as an attempt to somewhat offset the distancing effects of topic and lexical 
choice. (It also has ideological effects, particularly since such choices are regularly linked 
with a nationalist discourse by the recurrence of such combinations as we Australians ).  
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When listeners/readers perceive themselves as being entertained, the inherent non-
reciprocity of monologue does not seem to be an issue: it can be more socially acceptable 
not to be a good story-teller, for example, than not to have certain kinds of expert 
knowledge. Such social evaluations are dependent on situation, however. In particular, 
they are extraordinarily sensitive to field, considered from an institutional viewpoint, i.e. 
as not merely authorising certain ways of knowing but also authorising certain persons as 
persons who authoritatively know. (Cf. the discussion on locating social role in field rather 
than tenor in 3.1.3 above).  
Looking at tenor from the point of view of the linguistic choices its systems redound with, 
POWER is the tenor system inevitably skewed by any form of monologism because its key 
realisatory domain is at the level of conversational structure: the monologue inevitably 
positions addressees as non-equals, because it is inherently non-reciprocal. Some spoken 
forms of monologue call for minimal indications of interactiveness, in the form of 
audience backchannels, but once the audience is distanced electronically or gets beyond a 
certain size, or the setting becomes 'status-marked', much less when the medium becomes 
writing rather than speech, commonly the only markers of response - i.e. interactiveness - 
are affective phenomena such as laughter, vocalisations indicating disagreement or 
revulsion, and refusing to attend any longer: walking away, switching off, putting the book 
down. Theoretically, a reader may always reply to a written text, but only after varying 
lapses of time: letters to newspaper editors responding to a specific article or earlier letter 
appear very quickly (if they are going to appear at all) but readers may only meet other 
kinds of texts long after they were originally produced, and authors may be long dead.  
With respect to DISTANCE, because its central realisatory domain is lexicogrammar, it can 
be clearly realised in a monologic text but again the reader has only the options of 
accepting or rejecting the position made available: there is no possibility of negotiation.  
Things are more complicated with the AFFECT system. AFFECT loses much of its central 
realisatory domain of phonology in written form. This is ultimately not simply a matter of 
medium but of ideological conviction about the proper 'experiential distance' to maintain 
between self and the phenomena of the world. Along the second mode cline of action-to-
reflection, paralleling the dialogue-to-monologue scale that has so far been the focus of 
attention in this subsection (Martin 1984), more writing than speech will be found at the 
reflection end of the scale. This is culturally legitimised in terms of 'objectivity', 
particularly in relation to scientific discourse, which is expected to make an AFFECT choice 
of [unmarked]. AFFECT is not inherently unmarked in written text, however; merely 
marked in other ways. Attitudinal lexis and grammatical forms of amplification take on 
greater salience in written text, as do the evaluative components of genre (v. Rothery, 
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forthcoming; Rothery & Plum 1987). The kind of attitudinal lexis used depends on the 
genre: in the print media, advertisements for consumer products and by-lined columns 
expressing strong ideological points of view use overt attitudinal lexis most freely, while 
news and editorials make more use of covert attitudinal lexis - items such as mob , which 
combine experiential and attitudinal meaning, and 'objective' forms of interpersonal 
grammatical metaphor (Halliday 1985) which disguise the personal point of view.  
Two significant issues emerge from this discussion. The first is the significance of the 
interaction between the register variables tenor and mode for an understanding of tenor in 
relation to monologic texts, whether such texts are spoken or written. The second is the 
powerful sense of writing as a technology of control that emerges from even a superficial 
investigation of tenor in relation to writing. This work of necessity can pay only fleeting 
attention to the kinds of questions of reader/subject positioning dealt with in the 
contemporary literature on social/critical/semiotic theory, but the above comments suggest 
that further exploration of the intersection of the interpersonal with the experiential in 
terms of such positioning would prove fruitful.    
3.5 Locating subjects in social space: historical and cultural perspectives 
Given that location in social space is not simply given but, in speech at least, negotiated, it 
follows that preferred locations in social space for particular kinds of social relations are 
historically and culturally specific. This has enormous ramifications in terms of the 
constitution of people within a particular society as different kinds of subjects, on the basis 
of different practices pertaining to social categories such as race, gender, class and 
generation. It has equally important consequences in terms of cross-cultural 
understandings.  
It is possible to map long-term changes in preferred social locations, as was done in Brown 
& Gilman (1960), but shifts over much shorter periods of time can also be mapped, shifts 
of considerable significance in terms of class mobility or ethnic integration. For example, 
children of my generation in the upper working/lower middle class were not addressed by 
full names such as Catherine  and William  but as Cathy  and Bill . The Catherines  and 
Williams of the new middle class are now addressed as such by their upwardly mobile 
parents, themselves in some cases insisting on the use of full forms of their own given 
names to match their new social identities. For many women, this process is further 
motivated by a rejection of 'childish' forms of given names, seen as infantilising and hence 
trivialising them. Hence Pamela , Jennifer  and Valerie  take the place of Pam , Jenny  and 
Val . Such changes indicate that full forms of given names are being seen as class markers, 
certainly by the adults of the new middle class. There is evidence that their children are 
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also sensitive to the difference between full and 'shortened' forms, but it is difficult to 
ascertain the precise meaning the difference has for them.    
Full forms of given names are not simply class markers, however: they are a means of 
maintaining distance in social relations, along with other lexis conventionally referred to 
as formal (v. 2.1.3 above). In considering changes in marital address practices over several 
centuries, for example, one can note first a gradual shift towards increased intimacy, with 
the decline in Title + Last name as an option for middle class couples as the use of some 
form of given name became the norm. This new usage, however, turned out to be non-
reciprocal, i.e. manifesting inequality, since women have tended to be addressed by 
diminutive forms and men by full or truncated forms. This pattern of address is only 
recently being shifted again, as a consequence of the women's movement of the last 20 
years - but at the cost of increasing distance again.   
What is clear is that there is no way one can superimpose one such map on another, with 
respect to sub-groups within a single society, much less with respect to comparisons across 
nations/polities. And if one cannot do this, then what one is up for is accepting different 
options for subjectivity within and across different societies. From such a perspective, the 
multiculturalism that is official Australian Government policy, in a racially/ethnically 
diverse society, comes to seem much less mushy and romantic than some of its apologists 
present it as being, and considerably more challenging. The basis for a genuine politics of 
difference, within a society as diverse as that of contemporary Australia, has to lie in the 
recognition of real difference - differences in the constitution of persons as social beings. 
If some real understanding of this issue within this society can be developed, the 
implications extend far beyond the boundaries of Australia, into the realm of international 
relations.  
Work directed towards an understanding of people as constituted as different kinds of 
social beings has met with considerable opposition in some cases, e.g. the response to the 
work of Bernstein & his co-workers on language and class in Britain (Bernstein 1971, 
1973, 1975). Some of the negative reaction to this work can be attributed to the linguistic 
naivete of some of Bernstein's earlier work and to the even more naive interpretation and 
application of his work by others, but a response like that of Labov's 'The logic of non-
standard English' (Labov 1969/72) has to be seen as motivated by a rejection of any 
suggestion of there being real differences between people. Labov's response was that of 
classic American liberal individualism, on the positive side rejecting what was interpreted 
as a model of social identity locking people in to continuing inequality, but on the negative 
side seeing any attempt to explicate the role of linguistic practice in constructing social 
persons as purely deterministic.   
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The choice is not between a totally deterministic model of the formation of human subjects 
and a conception of individual 'personality' as present, in latent form, in every newborn 
child, merely awaiting the proper developmental sequence to show its 'real' nature and to 
play its role in determining the proper life course of the individual. The kind of model 
implied here is one which sees the formation of persons, as social subjects, as a function of 
interaction between the individual person and the social and biological ecosystem they are 
part of. Each such moment of interaction, however, affects not merely the individual 
person but also that same social and biological ecosystem. A model based on choice, on 
options, however abstract those choices/options may be, is a model which allows for the 
individual subject not merely being determined by but also playing a role in determining 
their own subjectivity, the subjectivity of those others they interact with and, ultimately, 
the very shape of the semiotic systems deployed in these processes.  
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PART II: THE GRAMMAR OF VOCATION IN ENGLISHÍ 
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Introduction 
 
The scope of Part II  
Where Part I was primarily theoretical in orientation, concluding with the presentation of a 
model of social relations as a semiotic system, Part II is primarily descriptive. Its major 
concern is with providing a detailed grammatical description of the resources in English 
for address. Address has long been regarded, by those exploring the complex dialectic of 
language and culture/society, as a particularly rich site for such exploration. The 
pioneering work of Brown & Gilman (1960), discussed in Part I, was followed by a steady 
stream of work by other scholars investigating aspects of address practice in various 
languages throughout the 60s and 70s, and into the 80s - Braun's monograph appeared in 
1988.   (V. Philipsen & Huspek, 1985 and Braun, Kohz & Schubert 1986 (in German) for 
relatively recent bibliographies). The primary focus of such studies has been on 
pronominal address, central to address practice in many of the world's languages but not a 
relevant consideration in most varieties of modern English, where the relevant forms are 
nominal rather than pronominal.  
This has led to a situation where studies of address practice, some incorporating some 
attention to forms of address, are far more widespread than studies which integrate a 
grammatical account of address forms with an account of address practice, even when the 
language at issue is English (e.g. Zwicky 1974). Apart from the obvious reason for such an 
imbalance, more languages having pronominal systems of address than not, a set of further 
considerations having to do with the linguistic status of nominal forms of address would 
seem to be relevant. These include:     
1. The looser integration of nominal forms of address in English into the structure of the 
clause. Pronominal forms of address are inevitably tightly integrated into the structure of 
the clause, appearing as arguments (participants, in systemic-functional terms) attached to 
the verb, sometimes literally attached as clitics. Nominal forms of address in English, 
however, appear as adjuncts, which not only have no fixed place in clause structure but are 
grammatically optional.  
2. The fact that many nominal forms of address in English are names (personal names, 
family names and nicknames). Names have traditionally been given a marginal status as a 
linguistic category - even more so when they are diminutive forms like Rosypops  and 
Mikeypoodles .  
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3. The fact that many nominal forms of address in English are attitudinal, including slang 
and non-polite forms, appearing either alone or as part of nominal groups (abusive and 
appreciative), whose internal structure is not adequately describable in traditional 
constituency terms. For all the reasons discussed in Chapter One, such a territory has not 
been seen by many linguists as worth exploring.  
Part II consists of just such an exploration. The position adopted here is that an adequate 
account of address practice has to incorporate an adequate account of the forms used in 
such practice, on the basis of the paradigmatic principle that the place of a term in a 
system is a significant aspect of the meaning of that term. We need to know what kind of 
lexicogrammatical resource speakers have at their disposal in making address choices in 
order to build up a more explicit understanding of the role of those choices in negotiating 
social relations. A model of language as social semiotic pays serious attention to linguistic 
form, while not seeing such attention as an end in itself, because linguistic form is 
regarded not as arbitrary but as shaped by the uses made of it.   
Part II then deals with the grammar of address forms, which will be handled as group and 
word rank structures, functioning as realisations of the clause-rank interpersonal system, 
VOCATION. The term address will be reserved for the actual deployment of vocative forms 
as kinds of linguistic practice. Such forms function as realisations of all three systems of 
tenor, providing thereby a particularly sensitive indicator of the social relations which are 
being constructed/negotiated in any particular context. Since vocatives are grammatically 
optional (though by no means interactively so), and since tenor is always realised 
configurationally - sometimes involving a choice from one system being played off against 
a choice from another, a study of address will by no means tell the whole story of what is 
happening concerning POWER, DISTANCE and AFFECT. It is the lexicogrammatical 
resource which is most explicitly directed at engaging with an interlocutor, however, and 
perhaps precisely because it is grammatically optional, it can be manoeuvred with great 
subtlety: it will be the task of Part III to explore some aspects of how that 
lexicogrammatical resource is in fact deployed among speakers of Australian English in 
the negotiation of social relations.  
Three kinds of issues will be dealt with in  Part II. Firstly, the system of VOCATION as a 
clause rank system, including the location of its realisations in the (syntagmatic) structure 
of the clause and the limits of its optionality, is discussed. Secondly, a range of discourse 
considerations involving vocatives will be investigated, including such matters as the 
correlation between speech function choice and the likelihood of vocative occurrence, 
whether vocatives can function independently as particular speech function choices, 
especially Call, and whether vocatives have any role to play in the structuring of discourse 
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in terms of units larger than the individual speech act or exchange, i.e. in terms of the 
schematic structure or staging of genre.  Thirdly, the actual forms of vocatives will be 
described. Many kinds of items functioning as vocatives seem relatively unproblematic 
and do not call for detailed grammatical description. Such items include formal terms of 
address (Ma'am , Madam , Sir ) and titles, whether everyday courtesy titles attached to 
family names (e.g. Ms Smith , Mr Jones ), occupational titles attached to family names or 
used on their own (e.g. Captain Brown , Matron ), or kin titles attached to personal names 
or used on their own (e.g. Mum , Uncle Bob ).  
Two kinds of vocative items do call for extended treatment, however: names and the kinds 
of attitudinal nominal groups commonly functioning as vocatives, particularly as insults. 
Names have certainly long been recognised as significant vocative forms in the literature 
on address in English, but there are no comprehensive grammatical descriptions: names 
would seem to have been presumed to have no grammar, as a marginal grammatical 
category. Attitudinal nominal groups, whether consisting of head alone or particularly 
modifier + head constructions, seem to have been rarely dealt with, but are of particular 
significance in any attempt to use the data of address practices to explore the construction 
of social relations in a particular society. The choice of head words, and the patterns of 
attitudinal modification characteristic of these forms, calls for detailed description.  
The overall structure of Part II is as follows. Chapter 4 focuses on VOCATION as a clause 
rank interpersonal system and on discourse considerations. It deals with the formalisation 
of this system as a system network, the identification and communicative roles of 
vocatives, the optionality of vocatives (because although grammaticality may not be at 
stake, social acceptability certainly can be) and the location and functions of vocatives as 
discourse markers. Chapters 5 & 6 provide what is in effect an account of interpersonal 
structure at word (Chapter 5) and group (Chapter 6) rank for English nominals.   
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 Data 
A grammatical study is not always expected to account for its data - a practice which has 
contributed not a little to the continued separation of system from process or text in 
linguistic theory. I want to pay attention to the sources of data for Part II for two reasons: 
i) because the grammatical account of forms of address in Part II is intimately linked to the 
account of address practices in Part III;  
ii) because the kinds of data needed for a comprehensive study of VOCATION come from 
sources not widely used in conventional linguistic description: they are spoken not written, 
they draw on private (even intimate) rather than public linguistic practice, they involve 
phenomena regarded as 'periphery' rather than 'core' in terms of linguistic description.  
The starting point for the investigation was native-speaker knowledge as a speaker of 
English, specifically Australian English, formalised initially as a set of 35 categories of 
vocative (Poynton 1981). This was initially augmented by information from interviews 
about family address patterns, using a detailed interview schedule. I did collect a certain 
amount of natural data, ranging from tape-recordings of casual peer interaction to verbatim 
written records of brief interactions (or parts of interactions) in which I was sometimes a 
participant and sometimes merely an observer. These interactions took place in a number 
of contexts: e.g. service encounters, casual peer interaction, parent/child interaction in both 
private and public situations.  
My students, in Linguistics at the University of Sydney and in Communication Studies at 
the South Australian College of Advanced Education: Magill Campus, provided 
invaluable data on patterns of address in families, among peer groups and in various work 
contexts both in class discussions of the topic and in their papers. Friends and colleagues 
likewise provided me with tokens of less common types of vocative, exemplary examples 
of address practices, as well as opinions based on their own experience of the validity of 
claims made by other informants or of hypotheses I had formed.  
And finally, for the more quantitative aspects of the study, concerning the positions in 
which vocatives occurred in clauses and the frequency of vocative occurrence in clauses 
playing different speech function roles, I drew on written texts in the form of 
contemporary Australian plays and novels, using relatively relaxed or colloquial forms of 
Australian English. The texts used were two contemporary Australian detective novels by 
Peter Corris, The Dying Trade (1980) and White Meat (1981); three Australian plays: 
Ray Lawler's The Summer of the Seventeenth Doll (1957), Dorothy Hewitt's This Old 
Man Comes Rolling Home (1976) and  David Williamson's Don's Party (1973); a comic 
107 
 
book designed for teenagers with reading problems, consisting solely of naturalistic 
conversation: Rick and Tina Amor's Sylvia (1976).      
Though the written texts used were naturalistic and authentically Australian in idiom, two 
kinds of comment are called for. Firstly, the situations and interactions occurring in this 
material in no way reflect the entire range of possible situations and interactions in 
contemporary Australian society. While there was some attempt to choose material which 
included a range of class, gender and generation relations, no attempt was made to control 
for institutional setting (most material involved primarily private interaction, often in 
domestic settings) or for interaction between those of differing ethnic or racial origin. Both 
of these are significant omissions, the first in terms of an adequate contextual theory of 
language as social semiotic, the second in terms of adequately representing a significant 
dimension of difference in contemporary Australian society.  
Secondly, not even the most naturalistic play provides an accurate representation of 
natural conversation (Burton 1980). It is not my intention to advance any such claim, 
particularly as far as the incidence of vocatives in discourse is concerned: it seems likely 
that dramatic texts have a higher overall incidence than natural conversation. It is likely 
also that certain vocative forms are over-represented in this material, particularly those 
whose significance the writers, along with other members of the speech community, are 
likely to be aware of. I would suggest, however, that such data does not seriously 
misrepresent any other discourse or clause aspect of vocatives, such features being below 
the threshhold of any conscious awareness and hence control.  
All forms cited will be authenticated in actual discourse, unless otherwise indicated.  
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Four 
Vocative identification, function, location & incidence 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the identification and function of vocatives, and includes empirical 
investigations of vocative position in clauses and vocative incidence in relation to speech 
function or speech act choices. This chapter can be seen as an elaboration of the account of 
vocatives found in Quirk et al. (1985). 4.1 identifies vocatives as nominal groups (noun 
phrases or adjective phrases elsewhere) and distinguishes nominal groups functioning as 
vocatives from other nominal groups referring to addressees in face-to-face interaction. 4.2 
explores the function of vocatives, starting with the distinction between vocatives as calls 
or summonses and as addresses (Zwicky 1974, Schegloff 1968). 4.3 & 4.4 are empirically 
based. 4.3 investigates the location of approximately 1500 vocatives in the clauses in 
which they occur, finding that although vocatives can indeed occur in a variety of 
positions, the overwhelmingly favoured position is clause-final. 4.4 goes beyond the 
questions of form, function and location to explore the question of whether the incidence 
of vocatives correlates in any way with the overall speech function of the clause in which 
they occur. The investigation, conducted on a corpus of more than 9,500 individual speech 
function (speech act) choices, concludes that there is a cline or hierarchy of interactiveness 
of speech function choices, and that vocatives are more likely to be included in - or even 
constitute the sole realisation of - speech function choices which are more inherenty 
interactive. 4.4 concludes with some observations and speculative comments on the use of 
vocatives as, or in conjunction with, boundary markers in the organisation of discourse.  
 
4.1 The identification of vocatives 
Quirk et al (1985: 773-4) note that in form vocatives are usually what they call 'noun 
phrases'. They include examples of what they call 'adjective phrases' and 'nominal clauses' 
in their listing of forms of vocatives. The terminology that will be adopted here is that of 
Halliday's functional grammar (1985), in which the term 'nominal group' is used to refer to 
Quirk et al's 'noun phrase' and 'adjective phrase', and their 'nominal clause' would be a 
rank-shifted clause functioning as a nominal or a 'nominalisation'.  
Halliday's functional description of the nominal group accounts for it in terms of (i) logical 
structure, i.e. Head + Modifier(s), so that an 'adjective phrase' is simply a nominal group 
with an adjective as Head, and (ii) experiential structure, i.e. a potential structure 
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consisting maximally of Deictic + Numerative + Epithet + Classifier + Thing + Qualifier. 
These functional elements are defined and their typical realisations in terms of  word 
classes are listed below. (All quotations from Halliday 1985):  
Deictic: 'indicates whether or not some specific subset of the Thing is intended; and if so, 
which.' (p. 160).   
Realised by : determiner or possessive. 
    
Numerative: 'indicates some numerical feature of the subset' (p. 163). 
Realised by: cardinal or ordinal number.  
Epithet: 'indicates some quality of the subset' (p. 163).  
Realised by: adjective.  
Classifier: 'indicates a particular subclass of the thing in question' (p. 164). Realised by: 
adjective, noun.  
Thing: 'the semantic core of the nominal group' (p. 167).  
Realised by: noun.   
Qualifier: post-head modifier characterising the thing in question.  
Realised by: embedded prepositional phrase or clause. 
From the experiential point of view, Thing is the 'semantic core' (p. 167) of the nominal 
group  and the other functional categories provide specific kinds of extra information with 
respect to that core. This element may be realised by a common noun, a proper noun or a 
(personal) pronoun. From the logical point of view, the Head is the core of the structure, 
but this may or may not be Thing. Halliday notes that it is quite normal for Deictic or 
Numerative to be Head, as in those two , and (Look at) those , but that Epithet (with the 
exception of superlatives) and Classifier normally do not function as Head (p. 173). Some 
vocatives do have Epithet as their Head, but no potential for modification other than by 
Deictic: my beautiful , my handsome . These forms seem only to occur with positive 
attitude/ evaluation. Forms like  
    *you stupid   
    *you greedy   
    *you selfish   
do not seem to occur, although you silly  does. What do occur, however, are attitudinal 
nominal groups which insert a pro Thing, using the word thing  itself:  
      you stupid thing  
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      you greedy thing   
      you beautiful thing   
      you scrumptious thing  
An alternative way in which the meanings usually coded in adjectives functioning as 
Epithets end up as Head is when they are nominalised by the addition of the suffix -y  
(spelled -y or -ie), as in littly , biggy , softie , toughie , sweetie .   
All vocatives in this study, then, will be characterised as nominal groups, using the 
functional categories outlined above. Let us now turn to the question of the various types 
actually occurring as vocatives. Quirk et al. (1985: 773-4) identify the following 
categories:  
(a) Names: first name, last name, full name, with or without a title, or a nickname or pet 
name: David  , Caldwell , Sarah Peterson , Mrs Johnson , Dr Turner , Ginger  
(b) Standard appellatives, usually withour modification: 
 (i) terms for family relationships: mother, father, son ; or more familiar    forms like 
mom(my)  (AmE), mum(my)  (BrE), auntie , grandpa . 
 (ii) titles of respect: madam, sir, your Honour, your Majesty. 
 (iii) markers of status (may be used at all times - cf terms for  occupations): Mr President, 
Father  (for priest), professor, doctor, general,  vicar. 
 Items in (bi) & (bii), unless the terms have unique reference (as in  
 mother 1 or Mr President ), may be combined with names in (a): Uncle  David, 
 grandma Peterson, Professor Johnson.  
(c) Terms for occupations (normally used as vocatives only when the person addressed is 
functioning in that role): waiter, driver, cabbie (informal), attendant, conductor, nurse, 
officer  (for a member of the police force). 
(d) Epithets (noun or adjective phrases) expressing an evaluation: 
 (i) favourable (some also preceded by my ): (my) darling, (my) dear, honey   (esp AmE), 
handsome, sweetie-pie  (esp AmE). 
 (ii) unfavourable (also preceded by you  in noun phrases): bastard, fatty,  idiot, rotter  
(BrE), slowcoach  (BrE), slowpoke  (AmE), swine . 
(e) General nouns, but which are often used in more specialized senses: brother, buddy  
(AmE), girl, lady, ladies and gentlemen, mate  (BrE). 2    
                                                 
1 Mummy Susan  is attested for a stepmother, after a child's divorced father has remarried, i.e. the role of 
'mother' is seen as less biological than social and hence can be duplicated.  
2  For an Australian audience, there is considerable irony in this item being labelled British, since it is regarded as 
the basic term of solidary male address in Australia. 
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(f) The personal pronoun you  or an indefinite pronoun, e.g. somebody . 
(g) Nominal clauses (very occasionally): whoever said that, what's your name  
(h) Items from (a), (d), (e) and (f) may be expanded by the addition of modifiers or 
appositive elements of various kinds: 
 (a) my dear Mrs Johnson ; young David  
 (d) my very dearest ; you silly bastard ; you filthy liar  
 (e) young man ; old boy  (BrE); my dear fellow  (BrE) 
 (f) you over there ; you with the red hair . Less impolite and more jocular  in tone are 
the appositives like you boys , you chaps  (BrE). You -all   (Southern AmE) and you 
 guys  (esp AmE) are not impolite.   
Various points of difference in analysis and/or terminology will emerge in more detail in 
the course of the analysis provided in this and the two subsequent descriptive chapters. For 
instance, Quirk et al. analyse you guys  as an appositive structure, where the systemic-
functional analysis proposed in Chapter 6 would view this as a nominal group structure 
consisting of Deictic + Thing. Others forms which Quirk et al. term appositive structures 
would be termed noun (or nominal group) complexes in a systemic-functional analysis. 
(See Chapter 6).  
Some differences in terminology will be noted here. The term 'appellative' is not used in 
the systemic-functional account of nominal group structure, and the term Epithet as used 
in that model is used as a functional label referring to the class of modifiers within the 
nominal group which specify quality, whether 'an objective property of the thing itself; or 
… an expression of the speaker's subjective attitude towards it' (p. 163). The systemic-
functional account generally prefers the term 'attitude' to 'evaluation'  - I certainly do use 
the term 'evaluation' but tend to use it with reference to ideological position or judgment 
rather than to feelings or emotions.  
Using Quirk et al.'s categories as a starting point, one can distinguish the following types 
of vocatives in terms of their structure:  
single item forms with no (apparent) internal structure:  
pronouns: personal you , indefinite somebody ; 
names, first or last: Sophie , Wayne , Sabatini ; 
deference or respect titles: Ma'am , Madam , Sir ; 
occupational identifiers:waiter , cabbie , officer ; 
unmodified general nouns: mate , buddy  (AmE), son , girl , boy  (racial put-down 
in US), woman , comrade . 
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compound/word complex /appositive structures:  
full name: Anna Russo, Damien Wright ;  
title (ordinary, family relationship or occupational) + name: Mr Sams,  Auntie Meg 
, Professor Chan , Nurse Preston ; 
endearment + name: Sally darling , John dear ;  
general noun complexes: ladies & gentlemen , boys & girls . 
modifier + head structures of varying levels of complexity (note that the function 
Epithet can be recursive), including:   
Deictic + Thing: you darling , my friend ; 
Epithetn + Thing: young Susan, stupid silly twit ; 
D + E + T: my dearest love , you filthy swine , you lucky thing ; 
D + E + C + T: my sweetest darling love, you rotten commie bastard .  
 
Some of these forms of vocatives are entirely unproblematic and do not call for any 
extended grammatical description. Such items include pronouns, respect or deferential 
titles, occupational identifiers and those general nouns which occur without modification 
of any kind. Others, mainly the appositional or word complex forms, call for a minimal 
grammatical description. These include full name and title + name structures, whether 
courtesy titles attached to family names, occupational titles attached to family names, or 
kin titles attached to personal names. These will be dealt with in Chapter 6, along with 
other compound or word complex structures used as vocatives such as name + endearment 
(John dear ) and solidarity term + name (Comrade Tyson ). Two types of vocative 
structures do call for an extended grammatical description, however, and significantly 
neither of them are included among Quirk et al's categories.  
Names may appear to have no internal structure, but as soon as one looks at pet or 
diminutive (hypocoristic) forms then considerable morphological complexity needs to be 
accounted for.  The term 'pet name' is mentioned by Quirk et al,, referred to in a 
disjunctive structure along with the term 'nickname', but it would seem that a distinction is 
not being made between these terms because the only example given that is possibly 
relevant to either is Ginger , which in my categorisation is a nickname, not a pet name. 
The kinds of pet or diminutive name-forms that need to be identified as significant 
vocative items and then to be described are forms like Tom, Cathy  and Johnno  as well as 
the more exotic Suse , Bobbles, Shazza, Megsikins  and Mikeypoodles . Chapter 5 provides 
a detailed description of these forms.  
The other type of structure commonly functioning as a vocative that needs to be further 
described is the nominal group consisting of Head + Modifier(s). Further potential of the 
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nominal group structure than that illustrated so far can be realised in vocatives. This 
potential seems primarily mobilised for the expression of attitude/evaluation, particularly 
negative attitude (i.e. insults), but positive attitude is also coded in such structures. The 
structures at issue are those involving the choice of Classifier as well as Thing (as in you 
filthy mongrel cur , my gorgeous darling girl ), and the iterative amplification of attitude 
by piling up Epithets, as in you rotten filthy lousy swine , my gorgeous itty-bitty little 
darling , you great big silly ). These can of course combine and be further intensified by 
the insertion of intensifiers such as bloody , as in you rotten lousy mongrel bloody bastard 
. Such structures demonstrate that the full potential of nominal group structure has not yet 
been described, particularly as far as what will be called attitudinal nominal groups are 
concerned.   
Having identified a range of nominal forms that vocatives can take, the next question is the 
identification of particular nominals as vocatives.  Consider the following set of examples 
which include a range of elements that have the potential to function as vocatives, in a 
range of contexts, grammatical and situational. (All examples are taken from written 
sources as indicated in the Introduction to Part II: titles and page numbers are given). The 
first eight examples all involve names used in interaction between the speaker and the 
named addressee: 
 
i. Simon. Jody. Long time no see.  (Don's Party, p.18) 
ii Mal. Jenny. I'd like you to meet Simon and Jody.  (Don's Party, 23) 
iii Hardy?  This is Bryn Gutteridge.  (on phone) (Dying Trade, 36) 
iv. Look, Miss …? 
 Steiner, Mrs. 
 Mrs Steiner, this is a serious business.   (Dying Trade, 119) 
v 'This concerns your stepson and stepdaughter, Mrs Gutteridge.' 
 'Sleeman!' she rapped out. 
 'Mrs Sleeman,' I said quickly. 
 'Miss!' 
 'All right, Miss, but i'm still here to talk about the Gutteridges.'(Dying Trade, 17) 
vi OLIVE:  I suppose you two have met by now - uh? 
 BARNEY:  Well, we've got as far as Barney and Missus Cunningham. 
 OLIVE:  Ah, Pearl it is.  Don't let's have any of that Mister and Missus stuff. 
Pearl! 
 BARNEY:  Pearl!  (He smiles, then swings jovially up to OLIVE). (The Doll, 25-
6) 
vii. That's a lovely dress … Jody wasn't it?  (Don's Party, 24) 
viii. DON:  I don't think you know the other people here do you? 
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 (KERRY and EVAN shake their heads.) 
 Kerry and Evan … Simon, Mack, and Jenny over there in the chair. (Don's 
Party, 31) 
The first three examples are clearly vocatives, with a different speech function realised in 
each case: (i) Greeting, (ii) Call, (iii) Question. 3  Note that a secondary function of the 
Calls in (ii) is to make known to others the names of the new arrivals who are being 
addressed and then introduced to others. (iv) also clearly contains a vocative, separated 
into two components, with the second involving a correction of the title form originally 
used plus the previously unknown family name that was asked for (implicitly) and 
supplied by the addressee.  Contrast this with (v), where the first speaker (Hardy) uses 
three name or title forms designating the addressee, only the first of which is a vocative.  
From Miss Sleeman's initial correction down to Hardy's All right, Miss  constitutes a kind 
of information-clarifying side-sequence and the return to the main conversation is 
signalled by Hardy's use of but  at the beginning of the last clause. (vi)  involves a similar 
clarification of how one of the characters is to be addressed, concluding with Barney using 
to Pearl the address form that Olive has decreed is the form to be used, but it is unclear 
whether this use of Pearl  is a vocative or a Statement equivalent to OK then, Pearl it is  or 
something of the kind.  Another kind of clarification is found in (vii), where the speaker 
presumably intended to conclude the compliment being paid to Jody with a vocative (the 
intonation, as indicated with dots by Williamson, would seem to signal that the utterance 
was unfinished) but decided instead to check that she had got the name right, having just 
met the addressee.  In (viii), performing introductions, all the people being introduced are 
named but this is by way of identification rather than address. A more extended, and 
slightly more formal, form for introductions is to preface the mention of the names of 
those being introduced with a vocative addressed to those to whom they are being 
introduced, i.e. Don could have said something like: Kerry , Evan , this is  … (naming the 
others present).   
On the basis of these examples, then, for a name to be a vocative it is necessary but not 
sufficient that the person designated by the name be the addressee in an instance of the use 
of that name.  Such use must go beyond mere reference and involve some kind of actual 
interaction with the addressee, where the name (or other nominal element for that matter) 
is in some sense deictic (see 4.2 below) rather than purely referential.  
                                                 
3  The categorisation of speech function used is that of Martin (1981 and in press), based on Halliday 1985. 
Martin originally identified thirteen categories of speech function (later fourteen), on the basis of (i) grammatical 
differences with respect to MOOD and (ii) type of response to initiating moves. The system will be presented in 
detail below in 4.4, investigating the correlation of speech function choice with vocative incidence.   
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A test that works for names and for some titles or name + title forms, to distinguish 
vocatives from other nominals naming addressees, is to see whether an item such as dear , 
love , pet  etc. can be added to form a vocative compound such as Jane pet , John dear , 
Mummy darling . Such additions in actual address will not always be situationally 
appropriate, of course, although they can be used ironically in confrontation situations. In 
this case, such forms will have a different stress pattern, the second element of the 
compound receiving the extra strong stress that otherwise would appear on the stressed 
syllable of the title or name, and with the voice quality becoming much tighter/tenser, in 
contrast with its greater relaxation in intimate situations.  
Intonation, as Quirk et al. point out, is of crucial importance for the identification of 
vocatives. 4   
In the final turn of example (v), the nature of the exchange (and Corris' punctuation) 
indicates that All right, Miss  would be uttered as two feet, tonic on Miss , on a wide Tone 
1.  If the Miss  were a vocative the tonic would not be on it but on all  (the whole produced 
on a neutral Tone 1) or possibly on right , for emphasis, in which case the tone would be a 
wide Tone 1. Halliday (1970: 37) includes vocatives among a set of elements which 
'cannot themselves carry tonic prominence' and which 'therefore if in final position always 
occur after the tonic syllable, as tails' , i.e. continuing the pitch movement of the tonic 
segment or, in some cases, actually initiating the change of direction. For example, Tone 4 
would be normal in All right, Miss , uttered as a threat to a female child or adolescent, with 
the Miss  starting at the bottom of the fall and rising to mid position. That the vocative 
here is a tail is very clear when one listens to the All right  produced with the same force 
but without the vocative: here the fall-rise occurs on the right  since it is the Tone 4 
contour which carries the meaning 'threat'.  
Since clause final position is the unmarked position for vocatives (see 4.4  below), most 
instances of real vocatives are readily identifiable not merely because of their form but 
because they constitute intonational 'tails'.  Most of the problematic cases occur in minor 
clauses where the potentially vocative nominal element constitutes the entire utterance, i.e. 
they contain a tonic. There are very few instances such as (xv) and (xx) below, where the 
element in question certainly may occur as a 'tail' but where even so its status as vocative 
is dubious.  
                                                 
4  The account of intonation used here is that of Halliday 1970 (a brief account is contained in 1985, Ch. 8), which 
identifies five basic pitch contours, or tones: Tone 1, falling; Tone 2, rising; Tone 3, low rising; Tone 4, falling-
rising; Tone 5, rising-falling. The scope of these contours is the TONE GROUP, consisting of one or more feet, one 
of which 'carries the main pitch movement: the main fall, or rise, or the change of direction. This feature is known 
as TONIC PROMINENCE, and the element having this prominence is the TONIC element (tonic foot, tonic syllable).' 
(1985: 275)  
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Turning now to the nominal group type of vocative, the actual or potential Deictic element 
in the nominal group structure functions as a useful grammatical test. The vocative is 
inherently second person, hence the use of the second person pronoun you  as a realisation 
of Deictic, as in you darling  or you so-and-so , in nominal group type vocatives.  Where 
you  is, or could be, used as Deictic then generally the item in question will be a vocative.  
Consider the following examples: 
 
ix. Liar! Filthy upjumped rotten liar!  (The Doll, 97) 
 x. Bristly blackbearded bastard.  (The Dying Trade, 72) 
xi. Pair of flamin' larrikins.  (The Doll, 99) 
xii. Bunch of croaking amachers!  (The Doll, 71) 
xiii. (EVAN leaves.  COOLEY waits until he is out of earshot and bellows. Don't show 
your face in here again you shit!  (Don's Party, 69) 
xiv. Yeh - you , the great lover that's never had a knock back.  (The Doll, 101) 
xv. You got no sense a property, yous bloody kids.  (This Old Man, 44) 
xvi. Some protector.  (The Dying Trade, 89) 
xvii. 'Hardy,'  she said, 'the great protector.'  (The Dying Trade, 115) 
xviii. The two great bruisers.  (The Doll, 120) 
xix. Men your age, you ought to have more sense.  (The Doll, 99) 
xx. Tarred with the same brush,  the lot of yer.  (The Doll, 89) 
xxi. COOLEY:  I don't have to deny it. I'm not posing as the champion of the 
oppressed.  (He walks out to the bathroom.) 
 MAL: Cunt. At least I have a social conscience.  (Don's Party, 77) 
The first four examples can all be prefaced by you , (ix) and (x) addressed to a single 
individual, (xi) and (xii) to more than one person.  None of them is necessarily vocative, 
however. They may be Exclamations, equivalent to What a  … , not directed to an 
addressee at all, though they may well be intended to be overheard by the person or 
persons to whom the utterance refers. Intonation will not always help in deciding whether 
these are addressed to someone or not. More useful indicators will be voice quality 
features such as the use of whispering or sotto voce techniques which will indicate fairly 
unambiguously that the utterance is not directed to an addressee.  Deliberate (albeit 
temporary) avoidance of eye-contact, or even averting one's gaze from the person(s) being 
referred to, may also be clear indicators that a vocative is not being used.  Deliberately 
ensuring that the person  being referred to cannot hear what you say is no guarantee, 
however, that a vocative is not being used. In (xiii) Cooley's whole utterance, including the 
final vocative, is still addressed to the now-out-of-earshot Evan despite the fact that he 
hears none of it. That Cooley is staging (at Evan's expense) a performance for the benefit 
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of the others present, using the form of direct address as a dramatic device, must remain a 
fact several orders of analysis removed from the grammatical and speech functional 
considerations I am concerned with here. 
Whether one can appropropriately preface a nominal group with you  rather than what a  is 
one test, then, for vocative versus non-vocative. Other nominal groups which are clearly 
addressed directly to their referents but are nevertheless not vocatives are examples such 
as (xvi) - (xix). These are not vocative because they are third-person, as is Mal's use of 
cunt  in (xxi). This is a comment made about Cooley, which could very well have been 
made to him (or at him in his absence, as in Cooley's insult to the departed Evan in xiii). 
(Here I am reading Williamson's use of full stops rather than exclamation marks, together 
with the absence of appropriate stage directions, as indicating that Mal's line was not 
shouted after the departed Cooley).  The choice of item to realise Deictic is a clear 
indication that (xvi), (xvii) and (xviii) are third person, this oblique mode of utterance 
producing an ironic effect.  Even the name Hardy  in (xvii) is third not second person, 
despite being addressed to Hardy, because it is in apposition with the clearly third-person 
the great protector , the whole being functionally equivalent to an information-giving 
Statement such as Here's Hardy the great protector . 
Despite the Deictic the  in (xx), which should automatically rule it out as a vocative, the 
lot of yer  still retains a vocative flavour and seems similar in its effect to (xv) which 
contains yous  as Deictic and therefore ought to be clearly vocative. In both cases the sense 
(and the punctuation) indicates that the questionable item constitutes an intonational 'tail', 
rather than a separate tone group, since it is co-referential with the subject you  present in 
(xv) and ellipted in (xx).  It is clear in context  however, that the you  and yous  of (xv) are 
not second person but third person, a kind of generic roughly equivalent to all .  Laurie is 
addressing her son Don, who is reading with his feet on the sofa, the relevant lines being:  
Get your feet orf me good Genoa.  You got no sense a property, yous bloody 
kids . 
Likewise (xx) turns out to be third person not second. A fuller context is: 
 
PEARL: I know what he did, don't you tell me. Propositionin',  
 that's what he was. 
DOWD: I didn't hear nothin' about no propositions . . .  
PEARL: That's what you say.  Making her way upstairs. Tarred  
 with the same brush, the lot of yer. 
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Pearl is in effect making a comment about men in general, realised as a comment about the 
particular males in this situation. 
Finally, example (xiv) includes both the second person pronoun and the definite article, 
i.e. it seems to be both second and third person.  The context is as follows:
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BARNEY:  You damned fool - do you think I would have told them? 
ROO:         Well, it's about time they knew what they was dealin'          
with, anyway, a coupla lousy no-hopers. BARNEY'S           head 
jerks around and ROO'S eyes glint as he sees a           weapon for 
revenge.  
        Yeh - you, the great lover that's never had a knock          
back. Tell 'em how lucky you've been lately -  
BARNEY almost pleading .  Don't, Roo.  
There is no doubt that the you  of you, the great lover that's never had a knock back  is 
second person and that it is addressed to Barney. The same kind of ironic distancing effect 
is created by the third person nominal group which follows as was noted in example (xvii) 
Hardy , the great protector . In the latter case, however, the name itself was treated as 
third person. There are three options for analysis here: (i) a vocative pronoun in apposition 
with a co-referential non-vocative nominal group, (ii) the whole thing as vocative, (iii) the 
whole thing as referential - this last option being the least satisfactory.  
Though all vocatives are inherently second person (including vocatives addressed to 
oneself), you  is not the only possibility as Deictic. If one changes one's perspective from 
orientation towards addressee-as-other to orientation towards addressee-in-relation-to-
speaker, then one finds that first person possessive forms used as Deictic make perfect 
sense. The predominant first person possessive form used in Australian English is my , 
with our  used in other varieties of English where speaker and addressee share 
membership of a tightly-knit group such as a family. When adults are speaking to young 
children, another possessive form (equivalent in function to a first person pronoun) that 
can occur is the possessive form of the name that the child would normally use in 
addressing that adult, eg. Mummy's/ Grandpa's little darling . 
There seem to be no instances of vocatives which may only be prefaced by these third-
person-functioning-as-first-person possessives, but there are certainly items which may be 
preceded by my  but not by you : solidary words such as mate , friend , pal ;  general nouns 
referring to people, such as girl  and son ; and attitudinally-positive Epithets used as Heads 
in nominal groups, such as gorgeous  and  beautiful.  (See 6.3.1 for a discussion of these 
forms of Deictic). Thus the possibility of my  occurring as Deictic provides another test for 
the identification of vocatives. Since some vocatives can have either my  or you  as Deictic 
(e.g. most endearments), it is better to characterise this test as a single test involving the 
possible realisation of Deictic as either of the pronouns my  or you .  
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4.2 Functions of vocatives  
Quirk et al. characterise the vocative as 
an optional element, usually a noun phrase, denoting the one or more persons to whom the 
sentence is addressed. It is either a CALL, drawing the attention of the person or persons 
addressed, singling them out from others in hearing, … , or an ADDRESS, expressing the 
speaker's relationship or attitude to the person or persons addressed.  (Quirk et al. 1985: 
773).  
This account makes use of Zwicky's distinction between vocatives as calls, 'designed to 
catch the addressee's attention,' and as addresses, to 'maintain or emphasise the contact 
between speaker and addressee' (Zwicky 1974: 787). Essentially the same distinction is 
made by Schegloff, who distinguishes between 'terms of address' and 'summons items', 
used 'to summon, to seek to get attention' (Schegloff 1968: 383). This distinction is a 
useful starting point for a discussion of vocative function.  The summons or attention-
getting function of vocatives has sometimes been the only function recognised (e.g. 
Fawcett 1980: 235), but the addressing function is in fact the more general function. 5 
Vocatives as addresses have both a larger repertoire of forms and a wider range of 
locations of occurrence in discourse. Levinson notes both these features:  
Summonses are naturally utterance-initial, indeed conversation-initial … Addresses are 
parenthetical and can occur in the sorts of locations that other parentheticals can occupy. 
Not all summons forms can be used as addresses … although it may be that all addresses 
can be used as summonses … (Levinson 1983: 71).  
At a more general level, vocatives can be seen as forms of deixis. Levinson characterises 
deixis as follows: 
… deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the 
context of utterance or speech event, and thus also concerns ways in which the 
interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance. Thus the 
pronoun this  does not name or refer to any particular entity on all occasions of use; rather it 
is a variable or place-holder for some particular entity given by the context (e.g. by a 
                                                 
5  Interestingly, an assumption that the summons or attention-getting function would predominate in talk between 
adults and children, especially young children, proved to be unfounded in a small preliminary survey of some of 
the material in a corpus collected for an ongoing study of child language, kindly made available by Associate-
Professor Ruqaiya Hasan, School of English and Linguistics, Macquarie University. Of the set of five interactions 
between mothers and their four-year-old children examined, attention-getting vocatives ranged between 
approximately 3% to approximately 15% of those clauses containing vocatives. The fact that this data consisted 
of taped face-to-face interaction is undoubtedly relevant to such a finding, as is the age of the children: younger 
children may require more calls/summonses to get them to come or to maintain attention.  
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gesture). The facts of deixis should act as a constant reminder to theoretical linguists of the 
simple but immensely important fact that natural languages are primarily designed, so to 
speak, for use in face-to-face interaction, and thus there are limits to the extent to which 
they can be analysed without taking this into account … (Levinson 1983: 54).  
Levinson sees the distinction between vocative calls or summonses, on the one hand, and 
addresses, on the other, in terms of a distinction between gestural and symbolic usage with 
respect to deixis. He presents the distinction as follows:  
Terms used in a gestural deictic way can only be interpreted with reference to an audio-
visual-tactile, and in general a physical monitoring, of the speech event. … In contrast, 
symbolic usages of deictic terms require for their interpretation only knowledge of (in 
particular) the basic spatio-temporal parameters of the speech event (but also, on occasion, 
participant-role and discourse and social parameters). … We could formulate the distinction 
thus: gestural usages require a moment by moment physical monitoring of the speech event 
for their interpretation, while symbolic usages make reference only to contextual co-
ordinates available to participants antecedent to the utterance. (Levinson 1983: 65-6).  
The vocative examples he cites (p. 71) exemplify this distinction:  
summons: Hey you, you just scratched my car with your frisbee  
address: The truth is, Madam, nothing is as good nowadays 
Deixis is not just a matter of pointing or distinguishing with respect to 'the spatio-temporal 
co-ordinates of the act of utterance' (Lyons 1977: 636), however, but can also involve a 
different kind of location of speakers within the situation of utterance. Levinson notes that:  
… titles of address and all vocative forms seem invariably marked for speaker-referent 
relationship: there is no such thing, it seems, as a socially-neutral summons or address … 
(Levinson 1983: 92).   
Levinson calls this kind of location 'social deixis', distinguishing it from the other kind of 
deixis relevant to vocatives, 'person deixis':  
Person deixis concerns the encoding of the role of participants in the speech event in which 
the utterance in question is delivered: the category first person is the grammaticalization of 
the speaker's reference to himself [sic], second person the encoding of the speaker's 
reference to one or more addressees, and third person the encoding of reference to persons 
and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in question. Familiar 
ways in which such participant roles are encoded in language are of course the pronouns 
and their associated predicate agreements.   
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… social deixis concerns the encoding of social distinctions that are relative to participant-
roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship holding between speakers and 
addressee(s) or speaker and some referent. In many languages, distinctions of fine gradation 
between the relative ranks of speaker and addressee are systematically encoded throughout, 
for example, the morphological system, in which case we talk of honorifics; but such 
distinctions are also regularly encoded in choices between pronouns, summons forms of 
vocatives, and titles of address in familiar languages. (Levinson 1983: 62 & 63, emphases in 
original).  
Note that the use of the term 'role' in the two quotations does not distinguish between 
'conversational role' and 'social role'. In discussing person deixis, role means the former, 
whereas in discussing social deixis, role means the latter. Conversational role, as speaker 
or addressee, initiator or responder, is not entirely unrelated to considerations of social 
role, however that is conceptualised; but they should not be confused. On the question of 
social role, Levinson makes clear in his discussion of social deixis that he views roles as 
existing independently of those who occupy them by referring to 'the social identities of 
participants (properly, the incumbents of participant-roles)' (p. 89). A more satisfactory 
view of role in terms of the position adopted in this work is to see it not in terms of 
available slots that people fill but rather as a product of human semiotic work: people act 
in situations in ways they see as appropriate, such ways including the reproduction of 
(stereotypical notions of) appropriate forms of interaction. Social relations are very much 
an achieved social phenomenon, however much a society purports to be organised on the 
basis of ascribed roles. In any case, role is interpreted in this work as a matter of field not 
tenor - v. 3.1.3 above. 
Levinson sets up a set of categories which distinguish between four types of relational 
social deixis:  
 (i)  speaker and referent (e.g. referent honorifics) 
 (ii) speaker and addressee (e.g. addressee honorifics)  
 (iii) speaker and bystander (e.g. bystander or audience honorifics)  
 (iv) speaker and setting (e.g. formality levels) (Levinson 1983: 90).  
noting that the relevant category for terms of address is in fact the first, not the second, 
category. He credits Comrie (1976b) with distinguishing (i)-(iii) above, pointing out that  
traditional descriptions have often confused (i) and (ii): the distinction is that in (i) respect 
can only be conveyed by referring to the 'target' of the respect, whereas in (ii) it can be 
conveyed without necessarily referring to the target. (ibid.).   
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Pronominal systems of address, such as the T/V systems discussed by Brown & Gilman, 
are thus systems of referent honorifics, as are titles and vocative forms generally. It should 
be noted, however, that respect is not the only attitude that can be adopted towards an 
addressee: insult, whether serious or joking, is a ubiquitous phenomenon (e.g. Algeo 1977, 
Douglas 1975b, Huang & Warren 1981, Labov 1972b, Noland & Warren 1981) and one 
with considerable implications for the ideological underpinnings of the social order. 
Douglas notes (1975a: 12) that 'In any culture insulting terms are the most illuminating 
indication of accepted values.' This issue provides a nice exemplification of a more general 
point concerning deixis made by Lyons: 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that person deixis in any language that manifests it 
(and, as far as we know, all natural languages do) is something that cannot be analysed 
away in terms of anything else. Deixis, in general, sets limits on the possibility of 
decontextualization; and person-deixis, like certain kinds of modality, introduces an 
ineradicable subjectivity into the semantic structure of natural languages (cf. Benveniste, 
1958). (Lyons 1977: 646)  
Vocatives constitute a particularly telling instance of such subjectivity, from the 
perspective not only of person deixis but also of social deixis:  simultaneously locating self 
and other(s), not only in terms of the immediate communicative event, both experientially 
and interpersonally, but within a broader cultural framework. Before developing this issue 
further, however, and using it as a basis for proposing a subcategorisation of the vocative 
function address, one final general issue concerning deixis should be noted. Levinson 
refers to the 'essential assumption of that basic face-to-face conversational context in 
which all humans acquire language' (p. 63),  going on to cite Lyons:  
The grammaticalization and lexicalization of deixis is best understood in relation to what 
may be termed the canonical situation of utterance: this involves one-one, or one-many, 
signalling in the phonic medium along the vocal-auditory channel, with all the participants 
present in the same actual situation able to see one another and to perceive the associated 
non-vocal paralinguistic features of their utterances, and each assuming the role of sender 
and receiver in turn … There is much in the structure of languages that can only be 
explained on the assumption that they have developed for communication in face-to-face 
interaction. This is clearly so as far as deixis is concerned. (Lyons 1977: 637-8)  
Vocatives undoubtedly derive from this 'canonical situation of utterance' and have their 
greatest force in constructing social relations in such interactive contexts, but are not 
restricted to face-to-face interaction between a speaker and an addressee both of whom are 
co-present and able both to hear and to respond to what is being said. Vocatives can be 
addressed to those who are:   
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(i)  not visible or even physically present, as in conversations from one room to another 
or on the telephone; 
(ii) not within hearing of the addressee, as in abuse of other drivers on the road or of 
umpires of sporting contests. In the former case, the target of the abuse is not necessarily 
meant to hear the abuse, while in the latter case, the abusive vocatives may constitute a 
performance for one's fellow-barrackers, with the possibility of getting under the skin of 
supporters of the rival team as a secondary consideration. In both cases one should perhaps 
say that the vocatives are addressed at rather than to the addressee. Such items can be seen 
as realisations of the speech function category Exclamation (see 4.4 below);   
(iii) not human, as in address to pets, which can involve as much proliferation of types as 
to any human intimate;   
(iv) not even animate, as in 'address' to cars, which not uncommonly have names, but 
also to other objects - usually when proving recalcitrant.  Generic names such as Fred  or 
Bruce   may be used to 'address' objects; or thing  preceded by appropriate Epithet, 
especially attitudinals, e.g. you stupid bloody thing ; or the headword may be a 
metaphorical use of an item normally used only to refer humans, eg. you silly poof was 
overheard addressed by a workman to a set of metal shelving that was proving 
troublesome to put together.   
In the case of (i) & (iii), vocatives can clearly have the function of either call or address - 
for the purposes of vocation, at least, pets are to be regarded as human. In the case of (ii) 
& (iv), call is not a relevant category. One might also want to develop a more elaborated 
set of what Levinson refers to as 'participant roles', i.e. the roles of those participating in a 
speech situation,6  e.g. distinguishing between addressee, hearer and target, with respect to 
at least the umpire abuse kind of example in (ii). But it will be no help with respect to 
abuse (or praise) when either no audience is present or when an object rather than a person 
is apostrophised.  
What the kinds of vocative in (ii) and (iv) have in common, together with more direct 
instances of abuse (or praise) referred to above, is a strong attitudinal component. If any of 
these are to be categorised as instances of vocative address, then a distinction would seem 
to be appropriate between these attitudinal forms and other forms which may socially 
locate people but do not so clearly involve an expressive, personal or 'subjective' meaning. 
In relation to tenor, all vocative usage can be seen as relevant to the systems of POWER and 
DISTANCE, but only the attitudinal ones will also realise the AFFECT system.    
                                                 
6  Not to be confused with grammatical participants, or arguments, in a systemic-functional analysis of 
experiential meaning at clause rank.  
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Finally, one might suggest the possibility of a category intermediate between gestural and 
symbolic deixis, at least with respect to attitudinal vocatives, particularly abuse based on 
race/ethnicity, gender, or (presumed) sexuality. Gratuitous public insult can be seen as 
simultaneously gestural and symbolic: not only does visual information within the context 
of situation give rise to the insult in the first place, but the use of the insult functions both 
to reinforce and to create anew social relations of a particular kind between speaker and 
addressee. It certainly is the case that no vocatives are neutral - a fundamental function 
seems to be to identify and place people with respect to significant social categories. This 
issue will be taken up again in Chapter 6, which will specify what the relevant categories 
seem to be on the basis of the lexis for praise and abuse.   
4.3 Vocative position in clause structure 
Vocatives certainly do occur in a variety of positions within clauses, but their location is 
firstly constrained by the disposition of the elements of the principal clause rank 
interpersonal structure, MOOD. In noting that vocatives can 'take initial, medial, or final 
position in the sentence', Quirk et al. (1985: 773) fail to take sufficient account of their 
precise locations, particularly with respect to what they call medial position. Secondly, 
although it is certainly the case that vocatives can occur in a variety of positions in the 
clause, the overwhelming probability is that they will occur in final position.   
A caveat is necessary, however. The strong likelihood of vocatives occurring in clause-
final position is undeniable in adult-to-adult talk but does not necessarily hold for adult-to-
child talk, which seems to be characterised by a much higher proportion of initial 
vocatives (see 4.4 below). This could be interpreted as a higher proportion of calls 
compared to addresses in vocatives to children compared with vocatives to adults (but note 
footnote 5).     
The data on which the claims in this section are based consists primarily of written 
material, all by Australian authors: three contemporary naturalistic plays: Ray Lawler's 
Summer of the Seventeenth Doll (1957), David Williamson's Don's Party (1973) and 
Dorothy Hewett's This Old Man Comes Rolling Home (1976); two contemporary 
thrillers by Peter Corris, containing a high proportion of naturalistic conversation: The 
Dying Trade (1980) and White Meat (1981); and a comic book designed for teenagers 
with reading problems, consisting solely of naturalistic conversation: Rick and Tina 
Amor's Sylvia (1976). This material contains nearly 1500 instances of vocatives of all 
kinds, occurring in different positions in clauses, and occurring in a variety of dyadic 
interactions in clauses realising the whole gamut of speech function choices.  
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Because vocatives in natural conversation occur with fluctuating (but rarely high) 
frequency, it was decided to use written material for the quantitative analysis in this, and 
the following, section of this chapter in order to obtain sufficient vocative tokens without 
having to handle unmanageable amounts of natural data. The kinds of spoken corpora 
available in Australia are largely based on the classic sociolinguistic interview. However 
useful such data may be for other purposes, it is unlikely to yield many vocative tokens, 
much less types, because much of the interaction is taking place between strangers and on 
relatively neutral topics. Other bodies of data, such as the dinner-party conversation data 
collected by Elaine Daisley for Dr Barbara Horvath and by Suzanne Eggins for her 
doctoral thesis (Department of Linguistics, University of Sydney), were still in the process 
of collection and transcription when the quantitative aspect of this study was being 
undertaken.    
No claims will be advanced that the frequencies of occurrence of vocatives in the written 
texts investigated reflect actual frequencies in natural conversation.7 What can be 
reasonably claimed, however, is that two basic patterns, if they exist in natural 
conversation, ought to be accurately reflected in written texts: firstly, the pattern of 
vocative placement in clauses and secondly the incidence of vocatives in clauses realising 
different speech functions. The analysis of the written texts reveals clear patterns of both 
types which it seems not unreasonable to extrapolate to natural conversation, since such 
patterns may be presumed to derive from conversation in the first place and are not matters 
likely to be under any significant degree of conscious control, unlike vocative selection. 
(See Burton 1980 for a comparison of dramatic and conversational interaction). Table 4.1 
sets out the findings on vocative placement, using a three-way distinction of initial, medial 
and final position:  
 TEXT          VOCATIVE WITHIN CLAUSE - POSITION    VOC AS       Total       
      CLAUSE        VOC 
         Initial    Medial    Final    Total                
  N  % N  % N % N  % N %  
 PLAYS 
 The Doll 48   39.02 - 0.00 75     60.98 123  73.65 44 26.35       167 
 Don's Party 10 8.62 1 0.86 105 90.52 116  76.80 35 24.20       151 
 This Old Man 65 11.02 11 1.86 514 87.12 590  94.55 34 5.45       624 
 
 NOVELS 
 Dying Trade 16 6.4 - 0.00 234 93.60 250  90.58 26 9.42       276 
 White Meat 26 13.27 - 0.00 170 86.73 196  89.50 23 10.50       219 
 
 COMIC 
 Sylvia 5 10.64 - 0.00 42 89.36 47  94.00 3 6.00         50 
   
 
 TOTALS 170 12.86 12 0.91 1140 86.23 1322  88.90 165 11.10      1487 
Table 4.1 Vocative position in clause 
                                                 
7  My impression is that in general written texts, especially plays, do in fact use more vocatives, and do so by a 
factor of possibly five or more, but I do not have enough natural data of sufficient variety to demonstrate this.  
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Note that for each text, a certain number of vocatives occur as complete minor clauses 
realising independent speech functions - in particular Call and Greeting.  Since the 
question of position in clause is not relevant for these tokens, they have been excluded 
from the tallies relating to this issue.  They appear in Table 4.1 in a separate column.  
The pattern of vocative placement in clauses revealed in this table is quite clear-cut: 
vocatives favour final position over initial or medial position, and do so for five of the six 
texts in a ratio of approximately 9:1, thereby providing another instance of the unbalanced 
system, whose terms always seem to be in this particular ratio, in contrast with the 
balanced system whose terms have equal probabilities of occurrence, i.e. are in a ratio of 
approximately 1:1. (See Plum 1981, Nesbitt & Plum 1988 for an extended discussion of 
this phenomenon and a demonstration of its operation in relation to the verbal group and to 
logical structure in the clause complex).    
Further, those vocatives which did occur in non-final position in the written texts strongly 
favoured initial rather than medial position - in fact, five out of the six texts did not contain 
a single instance of a clause-medial vocative and there was no instance in the natural data 
examined.  (I have no explanation to offer of why the ratio of final to non-final vocatives 
should be of the order of 3:2 in Summer of the Seventeenth Doll, i.e. very much closer to 
a balanced system.  Since this text does not contain significantly different proportions of 
types of speech function choices compared with the other texts, one possible explanation 
for the discrepancy, the answer must lie either in some difference in the nature of the 
interaction portrayed in this play compared with the other material - an issue which has not 
been taken up - or else it is due to Lawler: either his awareness of a real difference in 
vocative placement by the kinds of people he depicts in his play (which, if it were the case, 
would be a further dimension of the question of coding orientation in relation to vocatives 
raised in Chapter 7 below) or his defective 'ear' as far as this aspect of usage is concerned. 
What has been regarded as constituting an occurrence of initial, medial or final vocative 
requires elaboration, however. The functional organisation of the clause from the 
interpersonal perspective, i.e. with respect to mood, distinguishes in the first instance 
between the functional components Mood and Residue (the ordering of these, and of the 
elements which constitute them being what differentiates the different mood choices, e.g. 
declarative, interrogative, imperative etc.). The unmarked order in a declarative clause is 
Mood ^ Residue, with the functional elements of the Mood occurring in the order Subject 
^ Finite and those of the Residue in the order Predicator ^ Complement(s) ^ Adjunct(s). 
This position for Adjuncts applies particularly to circumstantial Adjuncts, 'those that 
express some circumstance attendant on the process represented in the clause.' (Halliday 
1985: 81). Other kinds of Adjunct, textual or interpersonal in their function, tend to occur 
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in different locations. The two types of Modal Adjunct, interpersonal in orientation, are 
likely to prove most relevant to vocatives. The type of Adjunct most relevant to the 
vocative is the Comment Adjunct, expressing a more overt intrusion of the speaker's point 
of view. The kinds of meanings involved include admissive (e.g. frankly, to tell you the 
truth ), desiderative (e.g. luckily, regrettably ), validative (e.g. broadly speaking, 
objectively ), evaluative (e.g. wisely, understandably ). (A more comprehensive list is to be 
found in Table 3(3), Halliday 1985: 50). Comment Adjuncts 'tend to occur thematically, 
finally, between Theme and Rheme, or between Mood and Residue; and when medial, 
they are typically associated with a boundary between information units.' (op. cit. 83). The 
pattern for vocatives is remarkably similar. In tabulating the results presented in Table 4.1, 
vocatives occurring thematically were classified as initial and  those occurring between 
Theme and Rheme, or between Mood and Residue were classified as medial. There was no 
problem with identifying final position 
Initial vocatives are those which occur as part of the Theme, but preceding the topical 
theme.  They may themselves initiate a clause or they may be preceded by an attention-
getter such as Look , Listen , Hey , Here  etc., e.g. 
Barney, maybe it'd be better if we left it the way it was. (The Doll, 88) 
Hey, missus, where's your rubbish heap?  (The Doll, 23) 
Other interpersonal thematic elements may also precede the vocative, e.g. 
Honest, Ol, that's one thing just seemed to happen. (The Doll, 110) 
While a combination of attention-getting and interpersonal thematic elements, plus textual 
elements, is clearly possible, e.g. Halliday's example of a maximally extended theme, 
including a vocative: 
Well    but               then           Ann      surely wouldn't the best idea be to join the group 
continuative structural  conjunctive vocative modal  finite topical 
textual   interpersonal      
Theme       Rheme   
Figure 4.1 Thematic structure, including vocative (Halliday 1985: 55. Figure 3-13) 
nothing of this degree of thematic complexity occurs in any of the data examined.  
Medial vocatives occurred in two positions, either preceding an adjunct, as in 
What's on the stove, love, for a hungry workin' man?  (This Old Man, 10) 
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You put Berrigan up to it, Noni, at  Ricky's suggestion .  (White Meat, 177) 
or immediately following a thematic equative, as in 
One thing that really shits me about you, boy, is your compulsive politeness   
(Don's Party, 51) 
Best thing you c'n do, Ede, is settle down 'ere till yous get your Housin' 
Commission place . (This Old Man, 49) 
The former position was considerably more common than the latter, the two post thematic 
equative vocatives cited above being the only two examples of this type. The nature of the 
structure involved, an embedded clause functioning as a nominalised Subject, presumably 
explains the lack of any effect of markedness of the vocative occurring between Subject 
and Finite, i.e. breaking the unity of the Mood element of the clause. Contrast the effect of 
the examples above with the following invented but entirely plausible, if marked, 
example: 
This investigation, Sir, will be pursued with the utmost rigour 
In both paratactic and hypotactic clause complexes the vocative normally seems to occur 
after the first element so it seems reasonable to suggest that by analogy this pattern might 
be extended to include embedded clauses in subject position. If this explanation is correct, 
it would also explain the oddity of a vocative occurring between Subject and Finite, i.e. 
breaking the unity of the Mood element of the clause.  
Rhythmic considerations may be involved, but deictic factors are probably the deciding 
ones for many instances of medial vocatives: in all the cited examples, and in a number of 
other examples found, the vocative is appended to that part of the clause which refers 
explicitly or by implication to the addressee or actions of the addressee.  One other 
interesting example does not involve such reference but the vocative does immediately 
follow the first non-self deictic element, in this case a locative: 
I've come to have a discussion 'ere, Mrs Dockerty, about your son and my 
daughter … (This Old Man, 25) 
In other instances the adjunct would seem to be more of an afterthought, so that it is 
understandable that the vocative appears in what would have been a perfectly acceptable 
clause-final position but turns out not to be, e.g. 
My husband c'n do all that's necessary, Mrs Keeler, with my help .  (This 
Old Man, 29) 
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This example demonstrates one of the difficulties involved in dealing with written texts, in 
that it is perfectly possible for this sentence to be spoken as a major clause with a vocative 
in final position, followed by a minor clause (the genuine afterthought). Only intonation 
would differentiate between the two.  In cases like this, punctuation has been used as a 
guide to intonation, a not unreasonable decision in dealing with works intended for stage 
performance, and the comma after the vocative has been interpreted as an indication that 
the final prepositional phrase is indeed an adjunct. In another set of instances, however, 
involving repetition after the vocative of some or all of what immediately precedes it, the 
use of the comma cannot be taken as an accurate guide to intonation.  In utterances like: 
… and therefore you represent no problem at all Mr Hardy, none at all .  
(The Dying Trade, 33) 
You get your beauty sleep and don't worry about nothin', Pet,  nothin', d'ya 
hear?  (This Old Man, 31) 
the repeated element would have to duplicate the intonation of its original occurrence, 
which could not be the case if the repetition formed part of a single clause, i.e. the contour 
containing the vocative is in no way incomplete or unfinished without the repetition. 
Finally, clause final vocatives, though by far the most frequent, were the most 
straightforward to deal with - there are no ifs or buts about 'final' meaning the last element 
in a clause.  There are two points of interest, however. Firstly, vocatives seem to occur 
fairly commonly at the end of the first clause in both paratactic and hypotactic clause 
complexes. I have not carried out a detailed analysis of these to see whether any deictic 
factor seems to be involved, as seemed to be the case with a number of the clause-medial 
vocatives. This may be the explanation, or it may be that the need for reminding one's 
addressee that this utterance is indeed addressed to them is greater in complex clauses (i.e.  
deixis in another guise, of course). This is one issue that would be of considerable interest 
to investigate in natural data. 
The second issue of some interest is the non-occurrence of tagged declaratives with the 
vocative preceding rather than following the tag.  This sequence is clearly possible but 
even in the text with the highest incidence of tagged clauses (This Old Man) it is not to be 
found. The last example above comes closest, insofar as the appended d'ya hear  certainly 
has the same function as a tag while not being strictly classifiable as such.  The repetition 
of an element after the vocative, however, indicates that two clauses are involved here, 
with the vocative appended to the first. A clause like 
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We seen enough apples ter last us a lifetime, 'aven't we, Fay?  (This Old 
Man, 48) 
could have taken the form  
We seen enough apples … Fay,  'aven't we? 
Where the tag pronoun is second-person or first-person plural, then deictic considerations 
will probably draw the vocative next to the pronoun: of twelve instances of tagged 
declarative + vocative, only three have third-person pronouns all of which involve 
reference to the situation (present or past): in other words, deixis in another guise. 
That'll do fine, real fine, won't it Ede?  (This Old Man, 28) 
Just like ol' times, ain't it, love?  (This Old Man, 32) 
Never let 'em forget it!  That's the drill, ain't it, Tommy. (This Old Man, 64) 
The other two tagged clauses with vocative following the tag are both imperative, where 
one would hardly expect the vocative in any position other than next to the co-referential 
pronoun: 
Well, don't make a welter of it, will you, love?  (This Old Man, 51) 
Remind me ter get you a new 'at with me next pay packet, will you, love?  
(This Old Man, 52) 
Hence, though it is undoubtedly the case that the vocative is a the 'floating element' 
Halliday characterises it as, insofar as its position is not fixed, its likely position within the 
clause is highly predictable. Clause final position is the unmarked position for the 
vocative, with non-final options (the principal one being locating the vocative somewhere 
within the Theme) presumably realising more emphatic variants of its fundamental deictic 
function. Where clause-final vocatives function simply as reiterated acknowledgments of 
the presence and identity of one's addressee, i.e. as addresses, thematic vocatives seem to 
function more as calls or summonses.    
Clearly the occurrence of vocatives in different positions will be influenced by a number 
of factors. The nature of the interaction will be particularly important, e.g. instruction or 
control should generate more initial vocatives than casual conversation. Role shifts within 
an interaction should also be significant, e.g. one interactant moving out of equal-co-
participant role in a discussion into the more power-oriented role of solver-of-problem is 
likely to signal this shift with a vocative. This is likely to be an initial one. And finally 
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schematic structure seems relevant to the question of the likely occurrence of vocatives. 
This issue will be taken up at the end of 4.4.  
In what has been said so far, nothing has been said about the possibility of more than one 
vocative occurring in a single clause or clause complex. Clauses containing more than one 
vocative certainly occur, as in 
Catherine darling, put this on the table would you dear  
where three vocative items are used at two points in the clause, the first two appearing 
together in a nominal group complex while the third appears on its own (see Chapter 6 
below on nominal group complexes as vocatives). This particular kind of example is likely 
to be used by an adult to a child, as in this instance, and so involve some special discourse 
considerations.  
The occurrence of vocatives at different positions in the same clause is, in fact, predictable 
in an interpersonal system, such systems being realised prosodically rather than in terms of 
constituency. The interpersonal structure of the clause can be seen as consisting of a 
number of places in structure, each of which can potentially contain realisations of 
interpersonal systems such as VOCATION and MODALITY. A simplified version of clause 
rank interpersonal systems is presented below as Figure 4.2.     
      
  -negative    
    -declarative  
 POLARITY    -wh 
  -positive  -interrogative  
   -indicative    
     -polar 
    -modalised   
  
   -imperative  
  -major  -  - 
CLAUSE MOOD  -residue ellipsis   
  -minor  
   -  - 
 
   
  -vocative 
 
 VOCATION  
   
  -  - 
Figure 4.2 Clause rank, interpersonal metafunction, grammatical stratum (after Martin 1981: 
52)  
 
The primary interpersonal system at clause rank is that of MOOD, with POLARITY as a 
second obligatory system and VOCATION as a grammatically optional system. These 
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three systems constitute simultaneous choices available from the interpersonal 
metafunction at clause rank.  
4.4 Vocative incidence in relation to SPEECH FUNCTION choice 
The issue that will be explored now is the question of the interaction between the system 
of VOCATION and that of SPEECH FUNCTION, the system on the discourse stratum lying 
most immediately behind the lexicogrammatical system of MOOD, from the perspective of 
the clause viewed as a mode of exchange. The account presented here is based on Martin 
(1981, & in press c), which in turn builds on that of Halliday (v. 1985, Chapter 4, 'The 
clause as exchange'). Halliday's functional account of MOOD in the English clause sees the 
options available in terms of a resource for negotiation in interaction. The two relevant 
considerations are what it is that is being negotiated and what role is adopted by the 
initiator of the interaction. Each of these dimensions involves a binary choice: what is 
being negotiated is either information or goods and services (knowledge or action, in 
accounts of exchange structure - see below), while the role adopted by the initiator of the 
exchange is either giving or demanding. These distinctions give rise to a set of four 
fundamental speech function categories as follows:   
 
 
 Commodity       
 exchanged (a) goods-&-services (b) information 
Role in 
exchange        
(i)   giving Offer  Statement 
  Would you like this teapot? He's giving her the teapot 
(ii) demanding Command  Question 
  Give me that teapot What is he giving her? 
Figure 4.3 Basic speech function categories (after Halliday 1985: 69).   
 
The information-oriented categories, Statement and Question, are grouped together as 
'propositions', while the goods-&-services-oriented categories, Offer and Command, are 
called 'proposals'. Martin notes that: 
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Semantically oriented labels of this kind highlight the meaning of the grammatical terms (in this 
case their typical function in dialogue) and are used throughout Halliday 1985 to focus on the 
grammar as a functionally organised meaning making resource (rather than as a syntax or set of 
forms). (Martin in press c: Chapter 2) 
Each of these categories, with the exception of Offer, is congruently realised by a major 
option from the MOOD network:  
 Statement by [declarative] 
 Question by [interrogative] 
 Command by [imperative] 
The category Offer (give goods-&-services) is not associated with a specific mood choice 
in English, nor in most other languages, but is realised (incongruently) through choices 
which congruently realise other speech functions: in Australian English, usually by either 
an interrogative (Would you like some? ) or an imperative (Have some more ). (The use of 
thank you  or thanks  in response to such initiating moves indicates that they are Offers: 
Martin notes these as indexical markers of proposals, i.e. moves negotiating goods-&-
services). This is one of the factors, along with the well-recognised fact that 'the relation 
between grammatical form and illocutionary force is not bi-unique' (Martin 1981: 52), 
which has led to systemicists setting up of a stratified model of MOOD and SPEECH 
FUNCTION, with a SPEECH FUNCTION network on the stratum of discourse semantics 
underlying the MOOD network on the lexicogrammatical stratum.  
Halliday (ibid.) identifies expected responses to the four initiating moves identified above 
and what he refers to as 'discretionary alternatives' to these four basic speech function 
categories as follows:  
 
   initiation expected  discretionary 
    response alternative 
give information statement acknowledgement contradiction  
demand information question answer disclaimer 
give  goods & services offer acceptance rejection 
demand goods & services command undertaking refusal   
Figure 4.4 Speech functions and responses (after Halliday 1985: 69).  
 
135 
 
Martin's current formalisation of the SPEECH FUNCTION network underlying these, and a 
further set of choices (listed below), is set out in Figure 4.5. The network differs somewhat 
from earlier versions, having progressively taken account of work done by Ventola (1987), 
Poynton (earlier versions of this chapter, especially concerning the potential role of 
Exclamations in initiating exchanges) and other honours and research students working on 
exchange structure.   
 
   -calling 
                                   -attending  
  -greeting 
  
   
  -reacting 
      -giving 
                          
       -demanding 
 -negotiating                    
SPEECH FUNCTION  -exchanging  
                         -goods & services 
                           
      -information 
      
 -initiating     
 -responding to 
 
 
                                            
  
Figure 4.5 SPEECH FUNCTION: basic adjacency pairs (Martin in press, Chapter 2 [1992: 44, Fig. 2.8]). 
This network gives rise to seven adjacency pairs, exemplified below (from Martin, in 
press). A dash indicates a change of speaker):  
Call [attending: calling/initiating]  
John.  
Response to Call [attending: calling/responding to] 
-Huh? 
Greeting [attending: greeting/initiating]  
See you.  
Response to Greeting [attending: greeting/responding to] 
-Bye-bye. 
Exclamation [negotiating: reacting/initiating] 
Utter rubbish!  
Response to Exclamation [negotiating: reacting/responding to]  
-Absolutely.  
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Offer [negotiating: exchanging: giving/goods & services//initiating] 
Let me get you a beer.  
Acknowledge Offer [negotiating: exchanging: giving/goods & services//responding to] 
-Please do.  
Command [negotiating: exchanging: demanding/goods & services//initiating]  
Get me a beer.  
Response Offer to Command [negotiating: exchanging: demanding/goods & services//responding to]  
-I'd love to.  
Statement [negotiating: exchanging: giving/information//initiating]  
He's won.  
Acknowledge Statement  
[negotiating: exchanging: giving/ information//responding to]  
-Oh, has he?  
Question [negotiating: exchanging: demanding/information//initiating]  
Has he won?  
Response Statement to Question  
[negotiating: exchanging: giving/information//responding to] 
-Certainly.  
Martin notes that 'Both MOOD and SPEECH FUNCTION classify individual interacts, not 
sequences' (p.17), and goes on to present the exchange network which will generate 
exchanges or 'interacts'. This network will not be of further direct relevance to this section, 
since questions concerning the occurrence and role of vocatives in interacts will not be 
pursued here, but is presented for the sake of completeness in a grammatically-based 
approach to interaction. It is the account assumed in remarks in Chapter 3 above on the 
taking up by speakers of particular exchange roles, but it seemed more appropriate to 
present details here, in the context of a discussion of interaction, than to introduce it out of 
context earlier.  
Berry's work on the exchange (1981 a, b, c) built on earlier work on the shape of 
interaction, e.g. Sinclair & Coulthard 1975 (v. Stubbs 1983 for an overview of work on 
exchanges). Berry's original formula for the basic exchange was as follows:  
  ((DX1) X2) X1 (X2f) 
where  
 X = either a knowledge-oriented (K) or an action-oriented (A) move.   
 1  = primary knower or actor (the one authoritatively in control of the knowledge or the 
one who is to perform the action being negotiated).  
 2  = secondary knower or actor (interactants other than the one authoritatively in 
control of the knowledge or the one who is to act).  
 D  =  delayed primary move, i.e. an initiating move which does not declare itself that of 
a primary knower/actor.  
137 
 
This formula generates the following possible set of exchanges:  
(i) DX1 + X2 + X1 + X2f 
(ii) Dx1 + X2 + X1 
(iii)     X2 + X1 + X2f 
(iv)    X2 + X1 
(v)      X1 + X2f 
(vi)     X1 
Taking into account both knowledge-oriented and action-oriented exchanges, and adding 
in Martin's suggested X1f move (optionally occurring after an X2f move), this accounts 
for a sizeable number of basic exchanges. What it does not do, and nor does Martin's 
EXCHANGE network (Figure 4.6 below), based on Berry's work and taking into account 
modifications suggested by Ventola (1987), is take account of dynamic moves concerned 
with interruptions and suspensions of exchanges. (See Ventola 1987; Martin, in press, 2.6; 
Eggins, forthcoming; Thwaite, forthcoming).   
 
 
Figure 4.6 Exchange structure: extending Berry 1981c (Martin in press, Ch. 2 [1992: 49, 
Fig.2.10]) 
 
Finally, to complete this account of MOOD, SPEECH FUNCTION and EXCHANGE, Figure 4.7 
presents Ventola's stratified account of a knowledge-oriented exchange:  
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FIGURE 4.7 A stratified analysis of a knowledge-orientated exchange (Ventola 1987: 104, Fig. 
4.4). 
In the analysis below of vocative incidence in relation to speech function, there has been 
no investigation of the actual MOOD choices of clauses containing vocatives. Only the least 
delicate MOOD option, the choice between [major] and [minor] clause is relevant to what 
follows. It may well be the case that the configuration {speech function realised by 
particular MOOD choice} is of particular interest as far as the incidence of vocatives is 
concerned. But since limits had to be set for the total analysis, this was one of the points 
where an arbitrary decision was made not to go beyond a certain stage in delicacy. In the 
light of the looseness of the purely grammatical ties of VOCATION with the other 
interpersonal systems of MOOD and POLARITY, it seemed of more immediate importance 
to take up the question of whether certain speech function choices (which will be realised 
by those MOOD choices) predisposed more to the choice of VOCATION than others. It 
became clear that there is indeed a relationship between SPEECH FUNCTION choice and the 
likelihood of a vocative occurring in the clause realising that choice. 
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Three of the six written texts used earlier for an analysis of vocative placement in clauses 
were further analysed for speech function choices: two of the plays, Ray Lawler's 
Summer of the Seventeenth Doll and Dorothy Hewett's This Old Man Comes Rolling 
Home; and one of the Peter Corris thrillers, The Dying Trade. As noted in the preceding 
section, no claims are being advanced that the frequencies of occurrence of vocatives in 
these texts reflect the actual frequencies in naturally-occurring conversation across a range 
of situations. The use of written texts merely enables larger numbers of utterances 
containing vocatives to be investigated.  
A total in excess of 9,500 clauses was distributed among Martin's original thirteen speech 
function categories (Martin 1981). No instances of the fourteenth category, Response to 
Exclamation, occurred in the data examined, although observation and personal experience 
suggested that this category existed. (Criteria for assigning conversational moves to speech 
function categories are as set out in Martin 1981, & in press a).  
Offers occurred in only two of the three texts, constituting an extremely small percentage 
of the total speech function choices in those two texts, and though vocatives did appear in 
a third of these utterances, in each text the numbers were too small for anything other than 
the most tenuous conclusions to be drawn.  It would make sense, however, if Offers did 
contain a relatively high incidence of vocatives in the light of what will be discussed 
below as a cline of interactiveness of speech function choices, those choices more 
interpersonally-oriented than others (including Offers) being more likely to contain 
vocatives.   
The pair parts to the speech function choices Statement, Question, Command and Offer will 
also be excluded from further consideration because of their low rate of occurrence in this 
data (though a small number of Acknowledge Statement utterances did contain a vocative).  
Thus, six speech function choices are considered, all initiating: Statement, Question, 
Command, Exclamation, Call  Greeting. 
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The findings are summarised in Table 4.2. 
 
TEXT: The Doll                The Dying Trade         This Old Man 
 Speech fn Vocative      Speech fn    Vocative       Speech fn   Vocative  incidence
 incidence      incidence    incidence       incidence   incidence 
Statement 65.0% 2.7% 69.1%       4.1%  72.1% 13.4% 
 
Question 15.9 4.0 15.6             7.2 10.3  23.8  
Command 7.0 19.7 4.8  26.0 9.3  39.2 
Exclamation 1.4 38.0 0.7  25.0 2.4  33.3 
Call 1.9 60.7 0.5  100.0 2.0  90.2 
 
Greeting 0.6 44.4 0.3  72.7 0.9  87.5 
 
Other 8.1 0.4 9.1  1.3 3.0  18.2 
TOTAL VOC %  5.8%   6.1%   20.1% 
Table 4.2 Speech function and vocative incidence in three texts 
 
Each relevant speech function choice is expressed as a percentage of the total speech 
function choices for the text, and for each speech function type the percentage of tokens 
actually containing a vocative is indicated. The first procedure was necessary since speech 
function types occur with very different frequencies and this overall rate of incidence is 
important for gaining a clear understanding of the incidence of vocatives. Though the 
actual figures vary somewhat, the rank orders of speech function types are virtually 
identical in all three texts and the orders of magnitude are very similar.  
Statements comprise around two thirds of each text, Questions 10-15%, Commands 5-10% 
and none of the other speech function options occurs more than 3% of the time in any text, 
the rank order being Exclamation, Call and Greeting.  The two plays (The Doll and This 
Old Man) are roughly comparable in terms of the type of interaction presented, both 
dealing with working-class people in domestic settings.  Though two generations are 
present in Hewett's play, the considerably higher incidence of vocatives compared with 
The Doll does not seem to be related to this factor: all  characters make considerable use 
of vocatives to all other characters (with the exception of the poor waif, Fay, who is 
'adopted' by one family member and destroyed by another but never becomes part of the 
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Dockerty clan). It may be that Hewett is more accurately reflecting a generally higher rate 
of usage of vocatives among working-class people than does Lawler. (See Chapter 9 
below on rate of vocative usage as a possible coding difference in relation to class). As for 
the third text, though a wider range of types and contexts of interaction is dealt with in 
Corris' novel, the overall rates of usage of different speech functions and the incidence of 
vocatives does not differ significantly from those obtaining in Lawler's play, suggesting 
strongly the possibility that for all his use of colourful Australian idiom, Lawler may be 
employing middle-class modes of vocative usage for his working-class characters. 
Returning to the findings tabulated in Table 4.2, two findings are of particular relevance to 
the suggestion above, positing a cline of interactiveness of speech function choices. Of the 
six speech function categories which occur in significant numbers, and which contain 
significant numbers of vocatives, all but Statement can be realised by a minor clause 
consisting only of a vocative (i.e. with all MOOD functions, and POLARITY, ellipsed). And 
of all speech functions which contain significant numbers of vocatives, it is the Statement 
which is in fact least likely to do so. The reason for both these facts would seem to be the 
same: the Statement is the least interactively oriented of all speech functions. A vocative 
can certainly be attached to a Statement as a kind of memo to the effect 'Addressee, please 
take note',  but one cannot produce a Statement by means of a vocative alone: one either 
realises some other speech function or else there is no vocative, even if an addressee's 
name is used to that addressee. The closest one comes to the possibility of a vocative 
functioning as a realisation of Statement is in utterances like: 
The two great bruisers.  You can bear to be together in the same room again, can you?  
(The Doll, 120: addressed to Roo and Barney after a fight) 
'Hardy,' she said, 'the great protector.'  (The Dying Trade, 115: addressed to the 
private detective, Cliff Hardy, by a client who has been tortured and is now in 
hospital). 
In both cases the Deictic the  in the nominal group makes it plain that there is no vocative, 
yet clearly such utterances derive their ironic effect from the tension involved in saying 
something to someone's face using a form which one would expect only to be used in 
saying something about them in the third person.  This same oblique approach can be used 
to go beyond irony to downright insult, as in: 
Well, well, well.  Little Penny the La Perouse picaninny.  I always said you'd end up 
with a nice white man.  (White Meat, 172: addressed by a white girl to an Aboriginal 
girl) 
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Such utterances tread a fine line between Statement and Exclamation. The presence of 
attitude, indicative of the feature [reacting], suggests more strongly an interpretation as 
Exclamation; but the tendency of such forms to consist of a minor clause in the form of a 
nominal group, i.e. a form with the potential to function as a participant in the 
representational structure of the clause, suggests that these have a different status from 
[negotiating: reacting] moves which consist of adjective, expletive or exclamative forms 
such as What a pity!   
The rank order of SPEECH FUNCTION choices ordered with respect to incidence of 
vocatives is very different from that obtaining for the overall rank order of SPEECH 
FUNCTION choices. Calls and Greetings are the choices most likely to contain, or be 
realised entirely by, a minor clause (all functions other than vocation being ellipsed), the 
likelihood ranging from around 50% to categoricality. The incidence of vocatives steadily 
decreases as one considers Exclamations, Commands, Questions and finally Statements, 
which contained the smallest percentage of vocatives while constituting the most frequent 
speech function choice. Further decreasing the percentage of vocatives occurring in 
ordinary Statements is the fact that in each text a number of utterances classed as 
Statements involve thanking or apologising, the incidence of vocatives in such utterances 
being around 50%.  The Dying Trade has a much higher proportion of such utterances 
than the other two texts (11.8% of such Statements containing vocatives as against 3.9% 
for The Doll and 3.3% for This Old Man) so it is a little difficult to see where to place 
thanking and apologising in a rank order of likelihood of containing a vocative. What is 
clear, however, is that the category Statement is too broad and needs to be subcategorised 
for an adequate analysis of the interaction of SPEECH FUNCTION with VOCATION.    
One should note, however, the occurrence of Statements with (attention-getting) 
continuative and vocative elements thematised, functioning like a kind of fused Call + 
Statement, e.g. 
Listen Hardy, I've been looking into this Brave.  (Dying Trade, 91) 
Barney, look, it's time me and Pearl left for the pub.  (The Doll, 51) 
Here, you, if you want any breakfast, you'd better get a move on. (The Doll, 48) 
While the same Call elements can precede Commands and Questions, e.g. 
Hey, missus, where's your rubbish heap?  (The Doll, 23) 
I say Simon old chap, where's your pornographic object?  (Don's Party, 22, a joking 
transformation of phonograph ) 
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Come on Ol, finish your hand.  (The Doll, 68) 
Listen love, just answer in one word or shake your head, understand?  (The Dying 
Trade, 89) 
they do not seem to constitute such a separate component within the total structure, 
suggesting the possibility that the interactive hierarchy is partly dependent on the 
distinction between proposals and propositions, with the former being inherently more 
interactive, or interpersonally oriented, than the latter.  
Finally, the question of a scale or cline of interactiveness of speech function choices needs 
to be addressed. Halliday's position with respect to seeing Statements as inherently less 
interactive than other speech function choices is that, from the point of view of the 
grammar, the mood element of the clause makes the propositional content of declaratives 
as negotiable or arguable as any other major clause type. While this is certainly the case as 
far as individual choices are concerned, it is also the case that Statements, typically in the 
form of declaratives, are more likely to be chained together to constitute - from the 
perspective of mode - monologue rather than dialogue, i.e. to be inherently less interactive. 
One can, of course, find instances of long sets of other single speech function choices, e.g. 
an examination paper consisting of a set of Questions and a recipe of a set of Commands. 
But the incidence of such genres is much lower than the incidence of monologic genres 
consisting wholly of Statements.  
The lower incidence of vocatives in Statements would seem in itself to be further evidence 
of a lower level of interactiveness, as would the requirements for appropriate responding 
moves: acknowledgement of individual Statements and ongoing tracking or 
backchannelling of longer stretches of connected discourse are deemed adequate. What a 
listener is called on to do in response to Statement is to attend, whereas they are called on 
to play a somewhat more active role with respect to other speech function choices: to 
accept, to undertake, to respond, to greet, to support. Taking experiential issues into 
account, while it does seem to be the case that everyday casual conversation is very 
strongly focussed on speaker and addressee, I  and you  being the most common Subjects 
in clauses (Halliday 1985: 45), suggesting a strong interpersonal focus, it may well be the 
case that Questions, Offers and Commands can be considered more strongly 
interpersonally-oriented since their focus on speaker and addressee is as participants in the 
immediate situation as well as on situations in the past and in the future: Statements may 
well be more common with respect to the past and the future than with respect to the 
present. So we are back to the deictic function of vocatives again, the anchoring of the 
interaction itself, as an interaction between this specific speaker and this/these specific 
addressee(s). This suggests the possible relevance of the second mode dimension, the scale 
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of language-as-action to language-as-reflection. Statements seem much more inherently 
concerned with language as reflection, less with language as action.8   
Such reflection, when coding ideological positions of various kinds as a proposition 
(rather than as attitude which is not as directly arguable), may very well be tagged, as a 
means of inviting the addressee, in acknowledging it, to collude with the position being 
adopted. But the very strategy of including the tag, thus turning the move into something 
commonly regarded by those not familiar with forms of linguistic analysis as a question, is 
an indication of the interactive difference between the two forms.  
All of which gives rise to some interesting reflections on the use of the declarative as the 
base form in transformational models of syntax, as well as the implications of Berry's 
formula for exchange structure, in which the only obligatory move is the single voice 
speaking or the single actor doing or proposing to do. There is still a way to go before the 
ramifications of viewing language as inherently dialogic are extended to all domains of 
linguistic analysis. It is, of course, true that after centuries of literacy, contemporary 
western societies are thoroughly accustomed to the monologic voice (though note the 
ubiquitousness of talk-back radio and the television interview in the contemporary 
experience of the electronic media). This may be part of the explanation for the 
pervasiveness of the Statement in what purports to be interaction.  
The final stage in pursuing the incidence and function of vocatives in interactive discourse 
would be to investigate their occurrence either accompanying or constituting discourse or 
boundary markers. Continuatives such as well, now, OK, right  etc. are recognised as 
having a role in the organisation of discourse into stages or elements of schematic 
structure (Schiffrin 1987; Ventola 1982, 1987). Such markers are often accompanied by 
vocatives; more rarely the use of a vocative in itself constitutes such a marker. Two 
examples from the Film Australia film, Talking Shop: demands on language (1978), will 
illustrate. This film is an unscripted record of the experiences of two teenagers applying 
for and working in their first jobs in a department store. In the first example, the 
preliminaries of greeting, references etc. in a job interview have been dealt with, and the 
interview proper is initiated with the following move by one of the two interviewers:  
Stephen, this job which you're applying for is through a very busy period, immediately 
before Christmas. 
                                                 
8  To the extent that this is true, it may be an effect of the status of statements as propositions, 'something that 
can be argued about - something that can be affirmed or denied, and also doubted, contradicted, insisted on, 
accepted with reservation, qualified, tempered, regretted and so on', as distinct from proposals, which use 
language 'simply as a means towards achieving what are essentially non-linguistic ends', and 'cannot be affirmed 
or denied' (Halliday 1985: 70).  
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Two further examples involve Anne, the other subject of the film. In the first example, the 
continuative  right  is followed by the vocative Anne  at a similar stage in the job 
interview, the continuative seeming to mark the end of the preceding stage in the 
schematic structure and the vocative to initiate the next stage:  
Right, Anne, it's going to be a very busy period that you're working in this department 
store …   
In the second example, the manageress of the silverware department where Anne has been 
initially located is inducting her into the job and begins her instruction with:  
In this job, Anne, we're working with silver  
The initial marked topical theme (in this job ) alerts listeners to the fact that what she is 
about to say is concerned with the job, while the vocative makes quite explicit that Anne 
in this context is to be seen (and hence, presumably, to see herself) as a key participant in 
the job of selling.  
Wootton (1981) notes a similar phenomenon in her discussion of children's use of address 
terms in discourse. She suggests that children use vocatives to signal the initiation of 'new 
lines of development within what might be considered to be topically tied conversation' 
(p.157). Clearly, much work remains to be done on the functions of vocatives in discourse.  
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Five 
The grammar of names  
 
This chapter presents an account of the grammar of English proper nouns or 
names, the most obvious choice of vocative. The chapter begins by noting the 
traditionally marginal status of names as a linguistic category, a factor relevant to 
the paucity of available linguistic descriptions. The approach adopted here for 
providing a comprehensive and coherent description is to map the various 
operative distinctions paradigmatically, building up a systemic network. After a 
general introduction distinguishing between major categories of names and 
establishing terminology, the chapter is divided into two major sections. The first, 
and most extensive, focuses on personal names (also known as first or Christian 
names) and explores the grammatical resources utilised in producing the wide 
variety of forms that personal names take. These resources include truncation, 
suffixation (single and multiple) and reduplication. This section discusses the 
massively redundant gender-marking of personal names and deals also with 
nicknames, to be distinguished from hypocoristic or diminutive forms of personal 
names. The second section focuses on family names (also known as last names or 
surnames). Many, but by no means all, of the same resources are utilised in 
producing variant forms of family names.  
Much of what little discussion of names exists in the linguistic literature focuses on 
how they differ from other types of linguistic items in terms of meaning, linguistic 
properties and ultimately linguistic status. Features commented on include the 
following: 
i.  Names are claimed to have reference but not sense (Lyons 1977: 219-22) or 
to have sense only contingently (Markey 1982). 
ii. Personal names are not ordinarily translated, so seem to be outside the 
language, though they are usually accommodated to the phonological system of the 
language in which they are being used and to that extent can be seen as part of that 
language (Lyons 1977: 222).  
iii. Flouting conventions of personal name assignment on the basis of gender, 
e.g. by naming a girl John, may occasion comment, even severe disapproval, but 
can hardly be said to be ungrammatical (Lyons 1977: 221, who suggests that a 
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clause like John has just cut herself is probably not semantically problematic 
either).  
iv. Names are less likely to appear in plural form or with modification of any 
kind than are common nouns (Long 1969; Quirk et al. 1972; Halliday 1985).  
As a consequence of such characteristics, names are commonly regarded as 
linguistically marginal. Two comments, already cited in Chapter 1, are worth 
repeating. Hudson (1980: 125) suggests that names as the main markers of power 
and solidarity in English  
might fairly be described as peripheral to the system of English as a whole, in the 
sense that proper names used as vocatives … could be handled in a separate section 
of the grammar with little or no consequence for any other parts of it.  
while Markey (1982: 141) questions whether names ought even to be regarded as 
linguistic items insofar as they  
do not share the developmental properties of 'normal' grammatical items … (and) 
are peripheral to concerns which lie at the core of the theoretical investigation of 
language.  
Hudson's comment, in particular, calls for comment. It may be the case that choices 
elsewhere in the grammar of English do not depend on choices made with respect 
to names, the most obvious interpretation of Hudson's remark (where 'depend on' is 
to be understood in terms of the organisation of networks in terms of multiple entry 
conditions to more delicate options). That remains to be demonstrated. What seems 
clear, on the basis of the system described below, however, is that the 
morphological options deployed in the formation of variant forms of names 
constitute a considerable linguistic resource for interpersonal meaning in the 
English language. One obvious question is why this resource has not been 
adequately described: the range of options for constructing diminutives has 
certainly been described in other languages (e.g. Gooch 1967 for Spanish). Why 
has this not been done for English?  
Three factors are relevant. The most obvious is the marginalising of interpersonal 
meaning, not only within linguistics but within English-speaking culture generally 
discussed in Chapter 1. A second factor is that while there are many hypocoristic, 
diminutive or 'pet' forms of names in English, the use of the morphological options 
involved in their formation does not always extend beyond the construction of 
names. Where it does, such items are commonly regarded as baby- or nursery-talk 
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(v. Mühlhäusler 1983). Further, multiply-suffixed diminutive names, such as 
Franglekins and Mikeypoodles (two of Mühlhäusler's examples), have a restricted 
distribution. They are by no means used by all speakers of English (age, class and 
gender seem relevant - see Chapter 7). When they are used, they tend to be 
restricted in terms of both the nature of the relationship between speaker and 
addressee and the situation of appropriate use. The unmarked or 'straight' use is by 
intimates, in private. The use of such a name by a non-intimate constitutes either a 
claim to intimacy or an implicit assertion that the addressee is behaving childishly. 
Before dealing with the details of such hypocoristic or diminutive names, however, 
some clarification of basics with respect to names is needed.  
 
5.1 Fundamental name distinctions  
For most speakers of Australian English (though not for the immigrant who 
changed his name by deed poll to Lord Bloody Wog Rollo as a provocative and 
ironic comment on Australian attitudes towards immigrants), the full name consists 
of two parts, made up of two different kinds of names. One part generally identifies 
the individual as the offspring of a particular parent or parents. Parents may have 
little or no choice in determining this part of a child's name, e.g. in many parts of 
the English-speaking world it has been mandatory for a child to be given the 
surname of the person registered as the father or, if no father is registered, of the 
mother. In the Australian state of Victoria, for example, it was only in the 1980s 
that it became legally possible for parents to 'agree on and specify the surname of a 
child, so long as it is the father's surname or the mother's surname or a combination 
of both.'  (The Age, 29.12.1982). (See Ashley 1971 for range of information on 
rights concerning names). People from non-English-speaking backgrounds may 
choose to Anglicise their names or to adopt an English name unrelated to their 
original surname, so that their children may automatically acquire the new name. 
For example, Hungarian immigrant Sandor Buchalter changed his name to 
Alexander Barton  and, with his son Thomas Barton, became a houshold name in 
Australia because of failed financial dealings. This part of the full name in English 
comes last in the sequence of names that make up the full name. It is variously 
known as the surname, family name or last name. It will be referred to in this study 
as family name.    
The other part of the full name consists of one or more items chosen with greater 
freedom, particularly in the case of names for females. The first of these names has 
a special status and is commonly (but by no means universally) the name by which 
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the person is usually known. Everyone is expected to have one such name, 
variously known as the Christian name, personal name or first name. Many 
(perhaps most) people have two or more, in which case they will be said to have 
both a first, or Christian, name and one or more middle names. Not everyone has a 
middle name but, though this is unusual in Australia, its absence is not marked as it 
would be in the United States. Such names will be referred to in this study as 
personal names, distinguished from family name, which will always be the last in 
the sequence of names.  
Personal names occur in a variety of forms. They may be traditional English 
personal names such as Elizabeth and James or personal names borrowed from 
other languages such as the French Danielle,  the Swedish Axel,  the Finnish Tarja, 
the (biblical) Hebrew Jesse. They may be unmistakeably  female or male names 
such as Amy or Andrew, Zachary or Zoe, or 'sexually ambiguous' names (the term 
used by Leslie Dunkling (1977: 268), himself the bearer of such a name) such as 
Leslie, Robin, Kim or Kerry. They may be spelt in a standardised orthography or 
varied, either to indicate the sex of the possessor (Robin/Robyn, Kerry/Kerrie), or 
simply according to fancy, either by choosing among traditional variants (e.g. 
Clare/Claire, Geoffrey/Jeffrey, Catherine/Katharine/Kathryn,  Stephen/Steven) or 
by orthographic variants such as Traecey, Dene, Sharyn, Kevern, Valarie, Marrion, 
Dayne, Ginette. Such orthographic variation is more common in the names of 
females than of males. (See 5.2.2 below for a detailed discussion of gender-
marking in personal names).  
Also more common with respect to females is the use of items from the general 
lexicon. Certain semantic domains are particularly favoured, e.g. flowers and 
plants (Heather, Ivy, Jasmine, Primrose, Violet, Willow) or precious stones (Ruby, 
Amber, Crystal, Pearl). More common with respect to males is the use of family 
names as personal names. In this case, only their position in the sequence of names 
distinguishes them from family names.  
Withycombe, in his introduction to The Oxford Dictionary of English Christian 
Names notes that in Britain  
… though family names are still very generally given as a second or middle name, 
they are less frequent as first names. The use of surnames as christian names is now 
much more common in the U.S.A. than in England.  It has been calculated that 
three out of four eldest sons of American families of any pretensions bear their 
mothers' maiden names either as first or middle names. … Many surnames for 
various historical reasons, have  also become generally used in America as 
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christian names, e.g. Calvin, Chauncey, Dwight, … Grant, Lee, Jefferson, Lincoln 
… Washington, Wesley.  (Withycombe 1950: xlii)  
In contemporary Australia, currently fashionable names such as Brooke, Kelly, 
Ryan, Todd  are on the way to becoming conventional personal names, as has 
already happened with names such as Cecil, Shirley, Sidney and Kimberley, at one 
stage exclusively family names (Withycombe 1950: xliii).  
These two name elements, family name and personal name, correspond basically 
with last name and first name in other studies (e.g. Brown and Ford, 1964). It 
should be noted, however, that the personal name an individual is known and 
addressed by is by no means always the first of the series of personal names or 
even one of them at all, e.g. Christina Marion Louise is known as Louise, former 
Australian Prime Minister John Malcolm Fraser is known as Malcolm and Joseph 
Horace Harold Jarman, now deceased, was apparently addressed as Ted (death 
notices, Sydney Morning Herald, 7.4.1983).  
For certain immigrant groups, e.g. Hungarians, Chinese and Vietnamese, the 
family name is the first element in a full name in their native languages, but this 
pattern rapidly changes once settled in Australia. Since second and subsequent 
generation children are commonly, though by no means universally, given personal 
names which identify them as members rather than non-members of the dominant 
Anglo-Australian culture, their full names tend to be very different from those of 
their parents and grand-parents. For first generation individuals, there can 
sometimes be difficulties, especially when the original names are not easy for 
English-speakers to pronounce. For example, one naturalised Vietnamese-born 
male chose as legal family name that part of his Vietnamese personal name which 
was comparatively easy for English-speakers to pronounce. There is no problem 
for his Anglo-Australian wife and their Australian-born children, all of whom have 
Anglo personal names preceding the man's legal surname; but there is certainly a 
problem for the man himself, since the name he adopted as legal family name is 
also the name he was usually addressed by as personal name. He has now himself 
adopted an Anglo personal name, so as to conform to English-speaking practice: 
the alternative, having only one name, proved too socially awkward.  
Many people, of course, are always addressed by a nickname rather than by any  
form of any of their actual names. (The term 'nickname' is used in a variety of ways 
in everyday discourse, and will be defined precisely in 5.2.1 below). Such items 
are best handled as a type of personal name, since they can combine with the 
surname to give an alternative full name, though they may originate as epithets 
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(Curly), comparisons (Matchstick, Doll), acronyms (especially from initials) or be 
pure inventions.   
Although an individual's full name2 can provide much information about gender, 
kin group membership, ethnic ancestry, religious affiliation, generational and 
social status, when names are used as vocatives most of such information is rarely 
foregrounded (one exception would be when a male is implicitly accused of being 
effeminate or homosexual by being addressed with a female equivalent of his 
personal name). If attention is being focussed on any specific social characteristic 
of an individual then the vocatives will generally be explicit and often affectively 
loaded, e.g. slut, animal, lady, lass, mister, son, Jew-boy, wog (any non-English 
speaking immigrant, especially from a Mediterranean background),  Salvo 
(member of the Salvation Army),  Mick (Catholic), snob, westie (coming from the 
western, suburbs of Sydney, 'below' the northern, eastern and southern suburbs on 
the socioeconomic scale). It is not the case, however, that social characteristics are 
irrelevant in determining appropriate usage of names: sex and age of interactants 
are particularly important in determining the choice not only of the type of name 
(personal name, nickname, full name) but also of the form of the name (short form, 
suffixed form, reduplicated form etc.). These social variables interact with the 
tenor features [power], [distance] and [affect] in a complex pattern not all of the 
details of which are yet clear. See Part III for a preliminary investigation of the use 
of vocatives in address in terms of the tenor dimensions.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter provide a comprehensive overview of the 
various types and forms of names used in Australian English, and of the 
relationship of such types and forms to general word-formation processes in 
English.      
5.2 Personal Name  
The first distinction that will be made in dealing with personal names in Australian 
English is between nicknames and other kinds of personal name. The distinction is 
made very clearly in the following exchange from Lawler's Summer of the 
Seventeenth Doll:  
                                                 
2  The inclusion of name, along with age and place of residence, for all persons referred to in news 
reports, functions as a most convenient and economical way of locating people socially in relation 
to four critical dimensions: place of residence roughly locates in terms of class, age in terms of 
generation, personal name in terms of gender, and personal and/or family name in terms of 
ethnicity.   
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Dowd: What did you say your name was again?  
Bubba: Bubba Ryan. 
Dowd: Bubba? Is that what they call you?  … What's your real name? 
Bubba (softly):  Kathie. 
Dowd: Kathie?  Well, that's what I'll call you. Okay?  
(Lawler 1957: 93) 
The terms [real name] and [nickname] will be used as the names of features in one 
system, at primary delicacy, of the systemic network PERSONAL NAME. The least 
delicate options in this network are presented in Figure 5.1. PERSONAL NAME is 
initially cross-classified in terms of type and form, the choice of types being 
between [nickname] and [real name], and the choice of forms being between [full 
form] and [hypocorism].  
 
 
  -real name … 
 TYPE 
  -nickname  … 
 
 PERSONAL NAME 
  -hypocorism … 
 FORM 
  -full form  
 
Figure 5.1  PERSONAL NAME (primary delicacy).  
(Word rank, lexicogrammatical stratum)  
 
The distinction between [full form] and [hypocorism] is exemplified in the contrast 
between full forms of names, such as Alexander or Elizabeth, and hypocoristic (pet 
or diminutive) forms, such as Al/Alec/Alex/Lex/Sandy etc. or 
Liz/Lizzie/Beth/Bet/Betty/Eliza  etc. Nicknames can also appear in hypocoristic 
form, e.g. Curl from Curly, though generally the full range of choices opened up 
by this initial choice is not utilised with respect to nicknames. There are 
restrictions also on the applicability of some options with respect to real names 
also, which will be discussed below.  
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5.2.1 Real name and nickname   
[Real name] is realised by any legally bestowed or conventionally used given name 
that is accepted as a personal name. (v. Dunkling 1977 and especially Pyles (1947, 
1959) for some truly extraordinary choices). Such names can be regarded as 
constituting a lexical class with the following characteristics: 
i. It overlaps the class of family names, to the extent that some items regularly 
occur in both sets, e.g. Kimberly,  Dean, Kelly, Todd) and many family names may 
be used as personal names, though they will be marked as unusual (e.g. Blake, 
Manning).  
ii. It readily admits personal names from languages other than English, e.g. 
Aboriginal Kylie, Bindi. French Simone, Nicole, Danielle, Jaqueline;  Scandinavian 
Astrid, Axel, Halvard, Inge; Russian Natasha, Sasha; Finnish Tarja; Greek Cheris; 
ubiquitous European names such as Maria and Anna. Note that such borrowings 
are usually Anglicised in prounciation and are more common as names for females 
than for males: 'exotic' can be synonymous with 'pretty' in a female name but more 
like 'sissy' or 'pansy' in a male name.  
iii. It has some tolerance for additions, either invented (e.g. Jiann, from parents 
Jim and Fran) or taken from the general lexicon (e.g. Tuesday, April, Sunshine, 
Willow, Fern). Such names, as noted above, are almost invariably given to females 
rather than to males.  
iv. Orthography can be quite variable, compared with the rigid standardisation of 
the general lexicon. Some people react quite negatively to this but clearly many 
others make use of the potential for such variation in order to make their own or 
their children's names more distinctive. Common orthographic variants include 
Catherine/Katharine/Kathryn, Leslie/Lesley (by no means always used to 
distinguish between female and male bearers of the name), Kelly/Kellie, 
Jonathan/Jonothon, Anne/Ann, Gillian/Jillian.  
Realisations of [nickname], by contrast, are only identifiable as such from their 
actual use as terms of address: the set is open and does not form a lexical class in 
the same way as do the realisations of [real name]. Nicknames can be:  
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- standard words not conventionally regarded as names but regularly used as names 
for particular individuals (e.g. Scruff, Curley, Doll, Tup (from twopence ), 
Matchstick, Sosh (from sausage), Wicks);  
- what  Partridge 1937 calls 'inseparables', or 'inevitable nicknames', based on 
nationality (eg Frog, Taffy) or one's last name eg Tug Wilson;  
- acronyms or letter pronunciations of initials ( e.g.  Cappy from initials C.A.P., 
O.C. from O'Connor);  
- forms which originate as corruptions produced by small children either of 
ordinary words ( e.g. Boosey based on a child's attempts to imitate the word 
beautiful in the vocative you beautiful boy regularly addressed to him by his 
mother) or of their own or other people's names (e.g. Bissy or Wizzy used to 
address someone with the given name Elizabeth). This last type seems potentially 
to merge with immature pronunciations of personal names such as Andoo for 
Andrew and Saiwah for Sarah, but where the general phonological shape of the 
name is recognisable it tends to be treated as a realisation of  [real name],  rather 
than of [nickname].  
The use of the term nickname as a technical term here is in contrast with a common 
use of the term in everyday English where it is used to refer to any name other than 
full name, any modification of a given name ( or of a surname) counting as a 
nickname. Truman Capote, in his novel The Glass Harp, uses 'nickname' in this 
way, using an account of vocative usage to one of his characters, Elizabeth, as an 
economical but telling means of indicating how her manner discouraged the use of 
more expressive hypocoristic forms: 
 
For Elizabeth no one used a nickname; you might begin by calling her Betty, but in 
a week it would be Elizabeth again: that was her effect. Languid, banana-boned, 
she had dour black hair and an apathetic, at moments saintly face - in an enamel 
locket worn around her lily-stalk neck she preserved a miniature of her missionary 
father. (Capote 1951: 65) 
It may be the existence of this opposition which has given rise to the somewhat 
curious fact that though the system as presented in Figure 5.1 above is functional 
for many speakers, many other speakers are bitterly opposed to the use of anything 
other than real (i.e. full) name, especially for their children. Not all such speakers 
would regard forms such as Kathie etc. as nicknames, though some do, but the 
generally used terms 'shortening' or 'shortened name' (to cover forms that include 
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not merely truncations of given names, such as Sue for Susan and Jeff for Jeffrey, 
but also instances of what will be discussed below as -y suffixation such as Andy 
from Andrew  and Patsy from Patricia) are commonly used pejoratively. Objectors 
to the use of 'shortened' forms not uncommonly feel besieged, since not all active 
resistance to such a widespread practice is effective, and some consciously adopt 
avoidance strategies by giving their children monosyllabic or not easily altered 
names or even by enrolling them in school by whichever of their personal names is 
regarded as least liable to alteration.2 The strategy of parents using the name least 
liable to alteration, however, can lead to another problem since 'real name' for 
many speakers is not only that which contrasts with 'shortened' name (or nickname) 
but is also the first personal name. It is not uncommon to hear as a response to 
'What's your name?' something like 'I'm called Y but my real name is X. My full 
name is X + Y + family name.' This distinction can also be used to reclaim some 
personal space when encroached on by pushy used car salespeople or real estate 
agents who insist on using a client's personal name. If the name they are given is 
indeed one's first name, but not the name habitually used, then as far as the client is 
concerned, such sales people might as well be addressing someone who is not 
present.  
There is yet another way in which a name that is neither a shortened form of a 
given name nor a nickname may nevertheless not be a real name.  Some 
individuals are called by a name other than any of their own given names.  There is 
in many instances a practical case to be made for treating these as a kind of 
nickname, e.g. in one family, the name Bill derived from a fondness for playing the 
role of Bill the Burglar in childhood games of cops and robbers. Presumably for 
this individual, and for his immediate family, Bill is functionally a nickname, as is 
indicated by family members regularly addressing him and referring to him among 
themselves as Bill but also referring to him, and certainly introducing him to 
outsiders, by his real name ('real' on three counts: first given name in full form). 
For outsiders, however, Bill  is perfectly adequate as a real name, as is Peter  
                                                 
2  It should be noted that currently many children's names do not seem to be being altered either by 
adults (parents or teachers) or, apparently, by peers. Many children named Elizabeth and James 
(perennially popular middle class names) are addressed by those full forms, never by Cathy, Jim/my  
etc.  It may be the case that this is largely a middle-class phenomenon (see comments in 3.5),  not 
unrelated to the current popularity of such old-fashioned names as Emma, Sarah, Emily, Lucy, etc., 
which lose their special 'old-fashioned' flavour if altered), or that the overall balance of the system 
presented above is in the process of change, or simply that I have not had enough access to 
information about address practices in middle class peer groups.  Note as further evidence for the 
system-change hypothesis the frequent contrast between generational sets of names in death notices: 
older generation names will tend to be hypocoristic (particularly  truncated) while younger 
generation names will be full form.   
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(whose 'real' [real name] is Dale !) Since such apparent real names are only 
identifiable as such on the basis of inside knowledge, they cannot be distinguished 
in a grammatical network.   
Figure 5.2 below represents a typology of nicknames, based largely on the 
categories identified by Morgan et al. (1979) and Partridge (1937), and formalised 
in a system network. Nicknames may be either traditional (what Partridge (1937: 
221), calls 'inevitable' nicknames, i.e. the user simply makes an appropriate choice 
from items already in use), or they may be individual, in which case they are new 
inventions. All traditional nicknames were once individual and may have a long or 
short history. Partridge cites a number of examples which derived from the British 
navy in the 1860's, spread subsequently to the British army and hence widely 
among  'the lower classes' and even some few among the 'upper classes' during the 
course of World War 1. Morgan et al. found some of these  (e.g. Nobby Clark and 
Tug Wilson) still in use among British primary school children in the 1970's.  On 
Australian usage, Sydney Baker, writing in the 60s, claimed that  
… any male possessing the name Kelly is invariably nicknamed Ned. In the same 
way a Paterson or Patterson earns the nickname Banjo from the popular Australian 
poet, A.B. Patterson, who styled himself The Banjo. (1966: 275)  
but my impression is that traditional nicknames, whether characteristically 
Australian or not, are no longer widely used among young people in Australia. 
Certainly none of them turned up in data obtained from teachers on address 
practices among school-children.  
Nicknames can be classified according to type and according to source or origin. 
Type is the simpler categorisation, distinguishing between traditional or generic 
nicknames and individual nicknames. Source or origin is the more complex 
categorisation. In the first instance one can distinguish between nicknames based 
(justifiably or not) on characteristics attributed to the addressee (addressee-based), 
those based on the name of the addressee (name-based), and those derived from an 
incident in the addressee's personal history (event-based). In this last case, the 
choice of traditional type of nickname will be precluded and the range of ways in 
which an incident may give rise to a nickname are so various that no further sub-
classification is possible. Examples include:  
 Mooch (from smooch): used for a particularly affectionate child.  
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 Tup (from twopence): mother's comment on small size of child: 'as big as 
twopence'.    
 Kodak: always begins a speech with: 'Let me put you in the picture'. 
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 Feathers: to an ex-poultry farmer.  
 Beirut: who got bombed every night.  
 Minerals: 'has silver in his hair, gold in his teeth and lead in his bottom'.  
 Carburetta: 'never worked unless he was full'.  
 Sputnik: is always circling a particular hotel.  
(Last four examples from the Back Chat column of The Advertiser).  
Addressee-based nicknames are sub-classified into three types: those based on 
nationality or ethnicity (which are always traditional), those based on a physical 
trait (e.g. size, shape, hair-colour, physical deformity) and a third residual category. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates.  
 Traditional/Generic Individual 
 
  Nationality Frogg(y), Fritz, Taffy (not applicable) 
 
  Physical trait: 
 hair colour Ginger, Snow(y), Blue(y),  
  Red, Carrots 
 hair type Curly 
 size Porky, Fatty, Skinny Hippo, Oxfam, Rosetub, Chubs, 
 height  Tiny (tall), Titch (small) Legs (tall), Matchstick, 
   Doll (small as a child) 
 deformity/ 
 abnormality Gimpy (limps) Duckarse (one leg shorter  
   than the other makes bottom  
   stick out when walking); 
  Oddball (born with only   
 one testicle); Spot (acne) 
 
  Other Brains, Prof(essor); Fudge (loves it); Tiger(bites); 
 Roxby (used in SA for Smudge (messy worker); 
 supporters of uranium Gusty ('because   
 mining at Roxby Downs) she's so disgusting').  
  
 
Figure 5.2 Nicknames based on characteristics attributed to addressee 
 
Name-based nIcknames can be sub-classified firstly in terms of those based on the 
actual form of the name contrasted with those that involve some kind of association 
of meaning, i.e phonetic contrasted with semantic. Each of these categories can be 
further sub-categorised. Since the systems that each of these terms provides entry 
to are moderately complex, I shall summarise the categorisation to this point in the 
form of a system network as follows:   
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  -provenance 
 
 -addressee-based  -physical trait 
     
  -other  
   
  -phonetic …   
 SOURCE -name-based    
  -semantic …  
…nickname    
 
 
 -event-based*   
    
 
 
 -traditional  
 TYPE 
 -individual* 
 
Figure 5.3  NAME: nickname (* features do not combine) 
 
Phonetic name-based nicknames are of four kinds: rhymes, forms involving 
phonetic similarity (with children, to a 'suitably obnoxious word' if possible, 
Morgan et al. (1979: 38)), acronyms and corruptions. Attested examples of each 
type are listed below (the name from which the nickname derives appears in 
brackets).  
Rhyme: Cabbage (Babbage), Paris (Harris), Flea (Leigh), Pills, Hills (Mills).  
Phonetic similarity: Sewers (Suresh), Alligator (Ali(son)), Underwear 
(Underwood), Gladys (Gladstone), Beef (Keith), Hiccups (Hickox),  Ridiculous  
(Nicholas), Garrulous (Gareth - used of Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
in the Australian Federal Government), Loogoobrious (Louisa - Stead 1940); Toad 
(Thodey), Britches (Britchford), Smelly (Samele), Freezer (Fraser). Even religious 
names can be subjected to this process: Sister Antoninus became Sister 
Antirrhinum  by means of phonetic similarity and then Sister Snapdragon  by 
synonymy.  
Acronyms: CP (initials personal + family name), OC (family name O'Connor), 
Cappy  (initials C.A.P.), Snap (initials S.N.A.P.), Harpy  (initials R.P.), Jaws  
(anagram of initials A.J.W.S.).  
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Corruptions:  Wizzy, Bissy (Elizabeth), Om (John, later extended to Omlette by 
phonetic similarity).  
Semantic name-based nicknames can be distinguished firstly in relation to whether 
the nature of the connection between name and nickname is one of taxonomic or of 
collocational relations. Taxonomically-related nicknames are related to first or last 
name of addressee by one of three processes:  synonomy, antonymy or hyponomy. 
I have no attested instances of meronomy, but there is no a priori reason why this 
should not occur.   
The options are presented below in Figure 5.4.  
 
  -rhyme 
 
  -phon. similarity 
 -phonetic   
  -acronym 
 
  -corruption 
… name-based   -synonymy  
      
  -taxonomic  -antonymy  
    
   -hyponymy  
 -semantic 
    -phrase 
   -linguistic  
     -transitivity 
  -collocational 
    -person 
   -cultural 
    -product 
Figure 5.4 Name-based nicknames 
Figure 5.5 displays attested [name-based: semantic: taxonomic] nicknames: 
 
  Traditional Individual 
 
 Synonymy Shiner  (Bright) Coldarse  (Winterbottom) 
  Timber, Lackery  (Wood) Phys  (initials PT), Chic (Smart),  
   Tin Bum  (via Nickel Arse from  
   Nicholas).  
 
 Antonymy Darky  (White) Bluntles  (Sharples), Queen(y)   
   (King), Summerdrought  (Winter- 
   flood) 
  
 Hyponymy  Y-front  (Underwood via Under- 
   wear), FE (=iron, from Steele,   
  co-hyponyms).  
Figure 5.5 [Name-based: semantic: taxonomic] nicknames 
161 
 
Collocationally-derived nicknames are either linguistic or cultural (though the 
boundary is a bit blurry). [Collocation: linguistic] nicknames are further sub-
categorised into [phrase], i.e. a more literal sense of collocation as words that 
habitually go together, and a second category labelled [transitivity], since the 
relation of nickname to original name bears some similarity to the relation of 
participants to process in transitivity structure, hence is referred to as transitivity. 
[Collocation: cultural] nicknames are further sub-categorised into [person] and 
[product], where the former is usually a figure from popular culture and the latter a 
consumer product, especially one widely advertised.  
Figure 5.6 displays attested [name-based: semantic: collocational] nicknames: 
 
 Traditional Individual 
 Linguistic   
    phrase Happy  Day, Dusty  Rhodes Christmas  Carroll, Broad  Bean 
   
   transitivity Weed  Gardner, Shotty (shot-gun)   Snowy  /Doughy  Baker, Chippy   
 Sherif Carpenter  
   
 Cultural: 
   person Ned  Kelly , Spike  Sullivan, Flash  Gordon , Donald  Duck ,  
  Tug  Wilson Speedy  Gonsuales (v. tennis  
   player Speedy Gonzales) 
 
   product Blanco  White, Johnny  Walker, Sauce (for Kerren tomato sauce:  
   first name Karen) 
 
Figure 5.6  [Name-based: semantic: collocational] nicknames 
Again most such nicknames are individual rather than traditional, but the fact that 
some at least of such forms do recur in different contexts (see Morgan et al. pp. 43-
5) suggests that the distinction between traditional and individual nicknames is not 
simply a matter of an either/or choice but rather is a matter of a cline ranging from 
totally predictable to totally unpredictable. The total range of linguistic processes 
involved in the formation of 'new' nicknames is moderately extensive, but certainly 
specifiable, so that it is hardly surprising if some items recur.  Two facts make it 
harder to see that this is unsurprising. The iterative potential (which I have not 
attempted to map) that operates in this part of the network to such an extent that it 
is normal to choose a second and even a third time from the derivational options 
available in order to form new nicknames. For example, Meadowcroft  becomes 
Meadowlea  by partial phonetic identification, and then Margie , a hypocoristic ( -y 
suffixed)  form of  margarine  which is in a hyponymous relationship with 
Meadowlea  (a well-known local brand of margarine).  
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The total effect of such a series of changes, especially if combined with a strong 
ideological predisposition to regard derivational inventiveness as deriving from the 
individual rather than the linguistic system, is to create the illusion of unfettered 
linguistic creativity. It is certainly true that some individuals display greater facility 
in manipulating the available linguistic options than do others, e.g. Sam Pollitt, in 
The Man Who Loved Children (Stead, 1940),  Christina Stead's fictional but 
entirely plausible arch-manipulator of the vocative system, and Morgan et al's 
account of the range of creations of an Australian father (Morgan et al. 1979: 35). 
It is also true that while the processes involved in nicknaming are describable, the 
outcomes are not only not entirely predictable but frequently involve a blurring of 
distinctions between the category of names and the general lexicon and between 
established and newly-coined words, the net effect of all of which is to emphasise 
the open-ended play nature of nicknaming as a linguistic activity. Linguistic play 
ought not to be underestimated as an interpersonal phenomenon (v. Kirschenblatt-
Gimblett 1976), particularly when it focusses on that most personal possession, 
one's name. This is one interpersonal area where men seem to excel, presumably 
for somewhat the same reasons that they are more commonly the joke tellers and 
the story tellers of the culture (Poynton 1985/90). Such monologic, performance-
oriented genres provide opportunities for competitive display. Given the propensity 
of nicknames not only to 'mark' the recipient but to provide entertainment for 
others, versatility in creating new nicknames seems to belong in the same category.  
 
5.2.2 Real name: gender-marked      
A basic distinction between personal and family name is in terms of gender-
marking. At first glance, the situation would appear to be clearcut, with the bulk of 
[personal: real] names being gender-marked and family names not so marked. The 
discussion below will demonstrate that the distinction is not quite so clearcut. 
Figure 5.7 presents the basic options with respect to [personal: real] names.  
   -female 
 -gender-marked 
  -male 
… real name  
  
 -non gender-marked 
Figure 5.7 [Personal:real name]  
(Lexicogrammatical stratum, word rank) 
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Three sets of names can be identified, realising the features [non-gender-marked], 
[gender-marked: female] and [gender-marked: male]. Each of these sets has some 
degree of overlap with at least one other set (and in the case of two of the three 
types with what will be referred to as the general lexicon), but the extent of the 
overlap and the degree of tension at the point of overlap vary. The facts regarding 
overlaps of name categories (where an item can be a member of more than one 
category) can be represented diagramatically as in Figure 5.8 below. (Note that no 
attempt has been made to represent possible quantitative differences in the sizes of 
the three sets of names nor the extent of the overlaps between them. Likewise, the 
incomplete circle representing the general lexicon of English is to be understood 
merely as larger than any of the other sets).  
 
Other than 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General lexicon of English 
 
Figure 5.8 Co-membership of name categories in English 
Starting with female names, there is a very small amount of overlap with, i.e. co-
membership of, the classes of both male and non-gender-marked names. The 
absence of significant overlap with the set of male names is readily interpretable 
culturally in terms of a premium placed on the ability to readily identify 
individuals as belonging to one gender or the other in a culture with a powerful 
ideological commitment to maintaining as clearcut a gender distinction as possible. 
The basis of the gender distinction in names is partly conventional (i.e. certain 
names become known as female or male names on the basis of usage as such) but it 
 
names♀ 
names♂ 
non 
gender 
marked 
names 
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is also phonological. Gender-marking is achieved by means of distinctions with 
respect to: 
i. Syllabicity: While the majority of gender-marked names in English are bi-
syllabic (slightly under two-thirds of both female and male names in the 
contemporary lists in Dunkling 1977), over a third of female names are longer than 
this and nearly a third of male names are monosyllabic. When one takes into 
account that the form of male name most likely to be chosen is the truncated, i.e. 
monosyllabic, form (see Lawson 1973, on preference for this form by both males 
and females, and Part III below) and also notes that female names are less likely to 
be truncated but more likely to be suffixed forms ending in -y, i.e. bisyllabic forms, 
then the difference in syllabicity becomes more marked.  
ii. Phonotactics:  Female names typically end vocalically, while male names 
end consonantally and there are differences in the choice of and frequency of use 
of final consonants in female and male names. Approximately two-thirds of female 
names in contemporary use end vocalically, while three-quarters of male names 
end consonantally; and while final -n is the most favoured consonant in final 
position for both female and male names, more than twice as many male as female 
names end thus.   
Where a name can be used for either gender (e.g. Leslie/Lesley, Ashley, 
Kerrie/Kerry, Kim, Shannon, Noel, Lee/Leigh, Robyn(ne)/Robin - see below on 
orthographic gender-marking), there is a strong tendency for such items to become 
'feminised': either in the sense that they are regarded as inadequately masculine 
names for males or in the sense that they come to be used exclusively for females. 
A nice example of the first kind was provided some time ago in the state of New 
South Wales when the then Premier, known generally as Bob Askin, was to be 
knighted. He chose to become Sir Robert Askin rather than to use his actual given 
name of Robin. If Askin had been of the newer generation of Australian political 
leaders, he may very well not have seen his name as an issue but he was of the 
older iron-hand-and-not-much-velvet-glove school and presumably felt that being 
publically known as Robin would not go with this image.  
Instances of the second kind of feminisation are not hard to find. The name Shirley 
was originally used as a family name, came to be used as a male name (see below) 
and then as a female name - no doubt helped by Charlotte Bronte's 1849 novel of 
that name, where the heroine was given the name Shirley by parents who would 
have used it for a son if they had had one, and later by the enormous popularity of 
film star Shirley Temple in the 1930s. More than a century after Bronte's highly 
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marked choice, it would be inconceivable for a male to be named Shirley. A very 
recent example of the same feminisation process involves the name Ashley. This 
has until very recently been a male name (as listed in Dunkling 1974: 32, 'The 
central stock of boys' names') but appears among the most popular choices for girls 
in the 1980s (e.g. Sydney Morning Herald 3.1.1984). In both these cases the final -
y sound is likely to have been a significant factor in the switch, both because it is 
vocalic but also because it has the same shape as the hypocoristic suffix -y which is 
more widely used to females than to males.  
iii. Borrowing from general lexicon: Traditionally there has been significant 
borrowing of items from the general lexicon as names for females, but very little 
for males. There are no instances of such male names in Dunkling's main or 
supplementary lists of the basic name stock, for example (Dunkling 1974). Among 
'alternative lifestyle' people, however, whether the hippies of the 60s and 70s or the 
new age people of the 80s and 90s, such borrowing is more common, with names 
such as Sunshine, Zephyr, Peace, Halcyon, Phoenix, Azure and Dream used, many 
for both boys and girls. Unusual borrowings from the general lexicon by 
entertainers are also reported, e.g. Charlene Tilton's daughter Cherish  (Woman's 
Day, 21.3.1989). It is almost impossible, however, to get accurate information 
about the incidence of such names: many of the people who choose such names are 
the least likely to record the birth of their children in newspaper birth columns and 
access to registers of births for such research is not available in Australia.  
Certain semantic domains are particularly favoured in the adoption of words from 
the general lexicon as names, as was pointed out above. Categories mentioned 
there were flowers/plants and precious stones. These are the perennially popular 
categories, with new items displacing those regarded as old-fashioned, e.g. newer 
names such as Fern and Willow have currently replaced the older Hazel, Iris and 
Ivy, and Amber and Topaz the older Pearl and Ruby. Other, usually less extensive, 
categories include:  
seasons/months/days: Summer, Autumn, April, Tuesday 
ideals: Destiny, Liberty , Harmony  (The -y ending of such names is assumed to be 
a significant factor in their use as female names. Cf. Melody, Memory).  
iv. Borrowings from other languages: Items from languages other than English 
(including some general lexical items and endearments as well as names) are 
readily borrowed into the set of female names, appropriate adjustments being made 
to the original phonology. Examples include:  
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 French: Aimee, Blanche, Cherie, Desiree, Fleur, Mignon, Nicole … 
 German/Scandinavian: Anneliese, Astrid, Freya, Gerda, Heidi, Ingrid … 
 Russian/Slavonic: Anika, Lara, Natasha, Olga, Tania, Tamara … 
 Italian: Bianca, Cara, Donna, Gemma, Mia … 
 Spanish: Anita, Elena, Dolores, Ines, Juanita … 
 Hebrew (biblical): Hannah, Leah, Naomi, Rachel, Rebecca, Ruth, Tamar …  
Male names are borrowed from other languages but much less frequently. Probably 
the largest set would be borrowings from (biblical) Hebrew, e.g. Aaron, Adam, 
Daniel, Jesse, Joel, Joshua, Nathan, Tobias, Zachary . (Most of these names, of 
course, have a long history as English names, and would be regarded as 'biblical' 
rather than 'Hebrew'). In many cases the phonotactics of non-English name forms 
would inhibit the borrowing of male names: English gender-marks by a word-final 
opposition between vocalic and consonantal sounds, whereas in many languages 
both female and male names end vocalically and it is the choice of vowel that is 
significant for gender-marking. This factor probably explains why borrowings 
from Germanic languages (including Carl, Conrad, Eric, Kurt) and some Russian 
names (e.g. Boris, Ivan) are acceptable as English male names but Italian and 
Spanish male names if they ending in a vowel are largely not.  
v. Orthographic variation: Orthographic variation occurs in both female and 
male names but is more widespread for female names. Not only are there more sets 
of conventional orthographic variants of female names (the set including 
Catherine/Katharine/Kathryn being one of the best known examples), but female 
names are much more likely than male to appear in idiosyncratic spellings. For 
example, of the 43 most popular female names for 1983, no less than 17 appeared 
in variant spellings, some of them decidedly idiosyncratic, e.g. Amie, Leesa, 
Rachelle, Anabel, Ashlea, Jacalyne. Only eight from the parallel list of 46 most 
popular male names appeared in variant orthographic form, however, and only one 
of these could be regarded as in any way unusual, by virtue of using French rather 
than English spelling, i.e. Marc rather than Mark. (Name lists from Sydney 
Morning Herald, 3.1. 1984). Orthographic variation is used in attempting to 
identify 'sexually ambiguous' names as female or male, but is not to be relied on. 
One might fairly reasonably assume that Keri and perhaps Kerrie were female, for 
example, but Kerry could be either.  
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vi. Invented names: Invented names, including items combining elements of 
other names, may readily enter the set of female names as long as they are 
phonotactically appropriate: e.g. Jiann, from the names of parents Jim and Fran, is 
perfectly acceptable as a female name, while the other possible combination of 
these parental names, Frim, is not possible as a female name but perfectly 
acceptable as a nickname and is so used. Other invented names include Frusannah 
(from Frances and Susannah) 'occasionally used in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries' (Withycombe 1950: 117) and Kahlia, invented for her second daughter 
by Lindy Chamberlain, convicted of the murder of her first daughter, Azaria, later 
pardoned and exonerated, in one of the most sensational series of trials, appeals 
and acquittal in Australian criminal history. Male invented names are rare, if they 
occur at all.  
vii. Parallel forms: Many variants, including borrowings and hypocoristic forms, 
of female names become independent names, but this is much less common for 
male names. Dunkling includes numerous examples among 'The central stock of 
girls' names' (Dunkling 1974: 36-9), including Ann/Anne/ Anna/Annette, 
Catherine/Karen/Karina/Kate/Katie/Kathleen/Katrina, Mary/ 
Marie/Maria/Miriam, but very few instances are to be found among the 
comparable lists for boys: Robert/Robin, Carl/Charles, John/Ian/Ivan/Sean, 
Mark/Marcus, Tobias/Toby  is the complete list from this source. (op. cit. 32-3).  
The identification of these seven aspects of the gender-marking of English names 
gives rise to an obvious question: why so many? Why does gender need to be 
marked over and over again? Gender-marking of names is not uncommon in 
various languages, including Anglo-Saxon, where the elements which made up 
personal names appeared in different positions depending on whether the name was 
female or male (Barley 1974). This is a long way away from the situation with 
respect to contemporary English. Such a combination of features suggests that 
gender difference is a particularly salient cultural and ideological category. (See 
Ch. 8 below for discussion of gender and address). It is notable that despite what 
one might refer to as redundancy overkill with respect to gender-marking, one does 
find individuals with names that are normally assigned to the opposite gender. This 
happens rarely with males, but somewhat more commonly with females. 'A boy 
named Sue' was the subject of a popular song some years ago, and Judy Patching 
was well-known in Australia as Chair of the Australian Olympic Committee. 
Women with male personal names include Quentin Bryce, former Convenor of the 
National Women's Advisory Council, and Neville Membery, whose son is designer 
168 
 
Stuart Membery. Other male names known to be used for females include Michael, 
Rowan and Vaughn.  
Turning now to the relationship between gender-marked (in particular male) and 
non-gender-marked names, there is considerable overlap which needs to be looked 
at from several points of view. Diachronically, many names which are now non-
gender-marked were derived from gender-marked items. Names such as the 
following derive from male personal names: Dawkins, Johnson, Lucas, Pritchard, 
Aitken, Ransome, Garrett, Elliott, Robertson. Family names originally derived 
from female names are also to be found, e.g. Annison, Empson, Maudling, 
Tillotson. Any gender-marking such items may once have had seems to have 
entirely disappeared, however. Many items which, as personal names, are currently 
gender-marked (predominantly as male) seem synchronically to have lost their 
gender-marking when used as family names, e.g. Meredith, Leonard, Martin, 
James, Douglas, Joyce. A further set of items that can occur as either personal or 
family name are gender-marked when used a personal names but are regarded as 
borrowings from the set of family names: e.g. Mitchell, Todd, Seymour, Wade, 
Ryan  (from a very large set of male names); Brooke, Kelly, Courtney (from an 
extremely small set of female names. I also have evidence of Brooke and Kelly 
being used as names for males, as well as females). And finally, there are non-
gender-marked names which can be used a personal names but which have no 
overt gender-marking, e.g. Manning Clark  (doyen of historians of Australia), 
Harlean Carpenter (original name of actress Jean Harlow), Spangler Arlington 
Brough  (original name of actor Robert Taylor).  
It is likely that these last three groups represent three stages in a diachronic process 
which begins with the use of a non-gender-marked name as a personal name, a 
phenomenon with a long history in English (v. Langenfelt 1940; Withycombe 
1950: xl-xlii). Such items are presumably initially interpreted as family-names-
used-as-personal-names, as is Manning  today, but where they become more 
widely used (rather than merely being an idiosyncratic choice or confined to a 
single family as a family name) then they may begin to acquire gender-marking (as 
have Courtney, Mitchell, Ryan today). Where such names become commonly used, 
then the gender-marking presumably becomes fixed (although phonotactic and 
historical considerations may lead to a subsequent change in the marking) and a 
gender-marked item exists side by side with a non-gender-marked item with the 
same phonological shape. The names Cecil and Shirley are instances of names 
which were originally non-gender-marked family names and which subsequently 
acquired gender-marking through use as personal names, in the case of Shirley 
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(whose history is outlined above) the gender-marking changing from male to 
female.  
The practice of borrowing a family name for use as a personal name is, and seems 
always to have been, largely restricted to males, however, and it is still a minority 
practice: the vast majority of full names consist of one or more gender-marked 
items as personal name(s) and one non-gender-marked item as family name. 
Particularly in the United States, and now starting to occur more frequently in 
Australia where it has not been a widespread practice, one does find a family name 
(particularly the mother's family name) used as a middle name.   
The relationship between male names and non-gender-marked names would seem 
then to be different again from that obtaining between either female names and the 
general lexicon or female and male names. It would seem that any Anglo non-
gender-marked name is potentially available for borrowing for use as a personal 
name by males and consequently may come to be included in the set of male 
names. The implication is of an implicit maleness associated with the apparently 
non-gender-marked set of names, which is reflected in the fact that use of a non-
gender-marked name with reference to an unknown individual will be assumed to 
be reference to a male, whether such an item is in fact a family name (widely used 
in address or reference to males but seldom to females) or a personal name. In 
other words, another instance of maleness being the grammatically unmarked 
choice (Baron 1986, Martyna 1980).  
5.2.3 Hypocorism and full form 
Returning to the network presented originally in Figure 5.1, PERSONAL NAME  is 
sub-categorised in terms of form into [hypocorism] or [full form], the feature 
[hypocorism] constituting the entry condition to further systems. Figure 5.1 is re-
presented below as Figure 5.9.  
  -real name … 
 TYPE 
  -nickname  … 
 
PERSONAL NAME 
  -hypocorism … 
 FORM 
  -full form  
Figure 5.9 PERSONAL NAME (primary delicacy). (Word rank, lexicogrammatical stratum) 
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Formally, the distinction involves a contrast between those names which have been 
subjected to the operation of some word-formation process such as truncation 
(clipping), suffixation or reduplication and those names which have not been so 
subjected. Functionally, the contrast is one between a range of derived forms used 
principally to decrease social distance and indicate positive affect and a more 
neutral base form used principally as a marker of increased social distance and the 
absence of affect. Because of the ubiquitous usage of hypocoristic forms in 
Australian English, the full form comes to have a negative expressive function, i.e. 
as a marker either of withdrawal of intimacy/affection etc. (especially in the case of 
adult/child interaction, but note children's alternation of Mum(my) and Mother for a 
similar effect) or as signalling reluctance or even refusal to enter into a closer 
relationship.  
Some of the derivational processes used to produce hypocoristic name forms, e.g. 
truncation, seem to be widespread in English-speaking communities, while others 
either have restricted distribution (e.g. baby-talk or nursery forms) or may occur 
with different frequencies in different communities. For example, many informants 
have claimed that such forms as  Kaz and Baz from Karen and Barry only occur in 
Australian English. While they are certainly not exclusively Australian, it may well 
be the case that they occur more commonly here. What is notable about 
hypocorisms in general is that they not only apply all of the relatively limited 
number of derivational processes generally available in Modern English but make 
productive use of others that are either no longer generally productive or that seem 
unique to hypocoristic forms, whether names or other items (see especially the 
suffix -s, dealt with in detail below). Stankiewicz (1964: 256) suggests that such 
high productivity of 'expressive derivation' of proper names, which he notes are 
'formally more variegated than the derivations of other lexical domains', is the 
norm. 
What follows in this section on hypocoristic name forms mainly applies to real 
names. Hypocoristic forms of nicknames are certainly to be found but they tend to 
be somewhat restricted in type, e.g. mostly truncated forms (Curl from Curly) or 
suffixed forms, principally involving  -y suffixation (Dolly from Doll, Wicksie 
from Wicks). This is to some extent predictable, since in functional terms 
nicknames can be regarded as equivalent to hypocoristic rather than to full forms, 
both being markers of less than maximal distance. It should also be pointed out that 
not all real names allow one unrestricted entry to the systems for which 
[hypocorism] is the entry condition: some names have multitudinous hypocoristic 
variants and others very few. In some cases the restrictions are phonological (e.g. a 
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velar stop in final position  of the base name form seems to preclude the addition of  
-kin(s)), while in other cases the identification of a name as foreign seems to make 
some (or all) hypocoristic forms unavailable or their use marked. Marchand (1969: 
216) notes that for native (English) suffixes, 'the derivative basis is always native'. 
Note however, the existence of forms like Deek or Deke (truncation of Di 
Castella), Campo  (suffixed form of Campese), Gunty  (suffixed form of Guenter), 
Albertipoo  (from Alberto).  
 
5.2.4. Truncation and addition 
Figure 5.10 below specifies that portion of the personal name network for which 
hypocorism is the entry condition.  
  
 
 -truncation 
   
hypocorism  -suffixation …  
  -  - 
 -addition  
      
  -reduplication   
  -  - 
   
Figure 5.10  PERSONAL NAME: [hypocorism]  
 
[Hypocorism] can be subcategorised initially in terms of [truncation] and 
[addition], the latter feature being the entry condition for a further more delicate 
system, consisting of the features [suffixation] and [reduplication]. Each of these 
may be individually selected, in the case of [suffixation] this being a potentially 
iterative selection (see 5.2.5 below), or both features may be selected 
simultaneously, producing multiply-hypocoristic forms such as Jimmy-Jimkins 
from James.  
The feature [truncation] is realised by truncated forms produced by shortening 
and/or phonological alteration of a full form. Such forms are almost invariably 
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monosyllabic. The few exceptions being bisyllabic, e.g. Alex from Alexandra  or 
Alexander, Tony from Antony,  Cilla from Priscilla.  Shortened forms such as 
Sandra from  Alexandra and Celia from Cecilia, which also exist as independent 
names, i.e. as full forms, appear to present a problem in that the realisation of [full 
form] will be identical with that of [hypocorism: truncation]. Functionally the 
problem may not exist, however: Sandra to someone whose full name is Alexandra 
may be generally understood to be hypocoristic, paralleled by some form such as 
Sandy as a hypocoristic form of Sandra.  
Most truncated forms involve the selection of  one syllable from a full name (bi- or 
poly-syllabic). There are, however, quite a number of common names whose 
truncated forms exhibit various degrees of phonological difference from the 
corresponding syllable in full name:  Meg from Megan or Margaret,   Jim from 
James, Dot from Dorothy,  Bob from Robert , alter a consonant;  Kate from 
Catherine and Peg from Margaret exhibit both vocalic and consonantal alteration. 
Where pairs of truncated forms exist, usually with one closer to the contemporary 
phonology of the full name, the contrast may be functional, marking, for  example, 
ethnicity (e.g. Peg rather than Marg, from Margaret, and Din rather than Den, 
from Denis, are Irish forms) or being up-to-date or trendy as opposed to old-
fashioned  (e.g. Kate rather than Kath, from Catherine/Kathleen, and Rick rather 
than Dick, from Richard). Where a full form is monosyllabic, the only possible 
truncated forms necessitate phonological change, e.g. James to Jim, or else the use 
of a form that is largely unrelated to contemporary phonology but is conventionally 
regarded as a 'short', i.e. truncated, form e.g. John to Jack (from an old diminutive). 
There do not seem to be many such forms.  
In selecting one syllable from a full form to realise [truncation], generally the 
initial syllable will be chosen unless it is unstressed, in which case a subsequent 
syllable (usually the first stressed) will be chosen, e.g. Liz  from Elizabeth and  Baz 
from Sebastian. (An elided form of this latter name, Spaz, has also been noted, 
which retains the characteristic sibilant opening consonant and likewise voices the 
closing syllable).  
A large number of names do have truncated forms formed from an initial syllable 
which does not have primary stress, e.g. Lou/ise, Chris/tine, Di/ane, Lyn/ette, 
Pen/elope, Fi/ona, Pat/tricia, Vic/toria. This is relatively frequent with female 
names, but relatively infrequent with male names. Note also that alternate 
truncated forms sometimes exist, e.g. Tina for Christina, Nettie for Lynette or 
Antoinette. Interestingly, one does hear pronunciations of some of the bisyllabic 
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full names which reverse the usual stress pattern. I have heard  Louise , Christine , 
Dianne .  This may be be an indication that speakers  perceive a relationship 
between stress placement in the full form and the choice of a truncated form. 
Jesperson claimed that although  stress played some role in 'deciding what to leave 
out and what to retain' in clipped (i.e. truncated) forms, that  'on the whole its role 
... is surprisingly small' (Jesperson 1942: 559) and, more specifically with respect 
to shortened forms of names, that they were formed 'with practically no regard to 
the place of the stress in the prototype' (p. 540).  Certainly the preference for initial 
syllable is very strong. Jesperson sees the retention of the beginning of a word as 
'the natural way of shortening' (1942: 534) (amplified in his paper on 
monosyllabism, where he notes that much of the substance of polysyllabic words is 
redundant. Jesperson 1928/33). There are quite a number of truncated forms which 
use the last syllable of a name (again, to some extent regardless of stress placement 
in the full form). Jesperson's list includes Belle for Christabel and Isabel, Bert  for 
Albert, Herbert  or Hubert, Drew  for Andrew, Bet  for Elizabeth. These are still in 
fairly common use but there are also many others where either the full name is no 
longer in regular use or where the currently used truncated form has changed, 
generally to a form based on the initial syllable, e.g. Etta for Henrietta, Gar for 
Edgar, Tory for Victoria (although used by one of my current students), Val for 
Percival, Totty for Charlotte, Mun  for Edmund. It may be that a strong preference 
for initial syllable as the source of truncated forms is influencing name choice: 
certainly the majority of the most frequently chosen names for babies born in 1982, 
as appearing in birth notices in the Sydney Morning Herald (8.1.83), have stress on 
the first syllable and nearly half of those do not use the initial syllable to form a 
truncated form.  
If the relevant syllable is open it may sometimes be left open if the vowel is long or 
a diphthong (e.g. Fee, Stew, Ro, How, from Fiona, Stewart, Rosemary and 
Howard). Otherwise it will be closed, generally by the initial consonant of the 
subsequent syllable ( e.g. Pat, Greg, Jude, Steve, Kyle, Jase   from Patricia, 
Gregory, Judith, Steven, Kylie and Jason.   
A set of monosyllabic forms does exist, however, with [z] as the final consonant, 
where this sound is not the initial consonant of the subsequent syllable, which is 
most commonly (though not always) [r]. Such forms include Caz from Carol, 
Caroline  or Karen, Baz from Barry, Tez from Teresa  or Terence, Viz from 
Vivienne  and Oz from  Oliver.  Such forms are not at all unusual in Australian 
English, and some at least seem to occur in both British or American English. Two 
very small sets of data indicate that such forms do exist in British English but with 
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no indication of their distribution.  Morgan, O'Neill and Harre (1979) note a small 
number of such forms, including Cas  [sic] for Karen  (p. 66) and a set of three 
such forms Caz, Saz, Diz (p. 61, no information provided on the full form of the 
relevant names, which do however have the appropriate initial consonant) used by 
members of a solidary group of school girls in a London school. The second set of 
data provides two such forms, where the full forms of the personal names are 
known: two of the three members of British pop group Bananarama are known as 
Kez (Karen) and Sez (Sarah),  (Australian Women's Weekly, January 1983). It may, 
of course, be the case that Australian hypocoristic forms of this type have provided 
the model (e.g. Barry Humphries' creation of the quintessential ocker, Bazza 
McKenzie, was well known in London through the original cartoons and later a 
film). 
Whatever the actual distribution of this phenomenon, an explanation is clearly 
called for.  Figure 5.11 sets out a range of these forms, arranged according to the 
vowel nucleus:  
 
  i e a o other 
  Viz (Vivienne) Kez (Kerry,  Az (Andrew) Oz (Oliver) Daze (David) 
 Kerin, Kevin Baz (Barry) Moz (Maurice) Morz (Maureen) 
 Mez (Meryl) Caz (Carol/ine) Toz (Thomas) Mairz (Mary) 
 Nez (Neroli) Chas (Charles) 
 Jez (Jeremy) Daz (Darren,  
  Darius, Darryl) 
  Gaz (Garry) 
  Jaz (James) 
  Maz (Marion) 
  Raz (Rachel) 
  Saz (Sarah) 
  Shaz (Sharon) 
  
Figure 5.11  Monosyllabic personal name forms ending in [z]  
As well as these personal name tokens, there are a small number of similar forms 
derived from surnames or from names of pets (the addition of a further  -a suffix to 
such forms is quite regular : see 5.2.5 below): 
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 e a u 
  Family name Jez (Jellet) Kazza (Carroll) Duzza (Durham) 
  Pez (Perrin) Faz (Farrer) 
 Pet name Fez (Pharoah) Paz (Paddington) 
Figure 5.12  Family names & pet names ending in [z] 
  
Two facts are immediately obvious. Almost all such forms have short vowel 
nuclei, and the vast majority are derived from full forms whose second syllable 
begins with /r/. A short vowel is normally not possible in syllable final position in 
English (though one linguist-informant attested /g  / for Garry  as a vocative form) 
but the normal syllable-closing procedure of taking the initial consonant of the 
subsequent syllable is not available in Australian English where that syllable 
begins with /r/. The most obvious explanation for the use of /z/ to close the syllable 
is a phonological explanation in terms of some kind of de-rhoticisation.  
Rhoticisation and de-rhoticisation phenomena are attested for a number of Indo-
European languages, including Classical Greek, Classical Latin, eighteenth century 
French (Jesperson 1942: 244), Germanic (Verner's Law), Czech and contemporay 
Guatamalan Spanish; but not for Modern English. In any case, where such 
phenomena occur, the /r/ involved is generally trilled not tapped. If such a de-
rhoticisation phenomenon were to occur in Modern English, one would expect it to 
occur in forms other than vocatives - though a possible counter-argument would 
point to the fact that truncated (monosyllabic) hypocoristic vocative forms are 
highly functional, particularly in Australian English, so that the need to have such 
forms for as many names as possible may well have led to a specialised response 
peculiar to vocatives.  Despite a degree of phonological/phonetic similarity 
between /r/ and /z/ in Modern English, native speaker intuitions seem to keep them 
well apart. Alternations between them are not as far as I know found in child 
language (suggesting that they are naturally perceived as more different than 
similar) and historically the attested consonant to close a syllable when the 
subsequent syllable began with /r/ was /l/ - another liquid, e.g. Sal from Sarah and 
Hal from Harry. Jesperson (1928/33: 394-5, 1942: 541) cites also Dol from 
Dorothy and Mal for Mary and explains these in terms of children's difficulties in 
pronunciation, citing various other substitutions in the latter source, including 
Biddy for Bridget. and Dick for Ricard (the old form of Richard). Withycombe 
(1950) interprets this last as a rhymed form (cf. Peg for Meg) but offers only 
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further examples of what he claims, without explanation, is 'the same process of 
formation' for deriving Biddy from Bridget, e.g. Fanny from Frances, Kit  or 
Kester  from Christopher. He cites all the short forms with /l/ with no explanation.  
An alternative explanation is morphological rather than phonological and not only 
accounts for the data but does so in a way which treats these forms not as a 
vocative oddity but as merely one manifestaion, albeit somewhat unusual, of a 
much more general hypocoristic process in English.  There is a hypocoristic suffix 
-s (most commonly realised as /z/ which occurs in a variety of vocative and non-
vocative forms (Thielke 1938/9, Langenfelt 1941/42, Mühlhäusler 1983).  This 
suffix can be added to truncated forms, to produce forms such as Jules  from Julie  
or Julian, Madz from Madeline, Dinz from Denis, Wenz  from Wendy, and also  
kin-title forms such as Gramps, Pops, Mums.  By virtue of its use in such 
monosyllabic forms and its general productivity (see 5.2.5.5 below for a detailed 
account), it would seem an appropriate choice to close an open syllable where this 
cannot be done from within the full name, i.e. where the following syllable begins 
with /r/.   
A range of hypocoristic suffixes is utilised in vocative forms but -s would seem to 
be the only suitable one to use to close open syllables since it is the only one which 
is neither vocalic nor syllabic, hence the only one which will produce monosyllabic 
forms.  Furthermore, it is the only suffix which cannot be treated as a diminutive or 
augmentative, nor as 'baby-talk'. While clearly hypocoristic, it is general enough in 
function for forms produced by merely using it as a convenient phonological 
choice (as I am proposing) to be closer in their effect to more straightforward 
truncated froms than to any other possible derived forms. That is, Caz and Baz as  
truncated forms of Carol and Barry are closer to Pam and Bob (from Pamela and  
Robert) than to derived forms of these latter names such as Pammy, Pamble, 
Bobbles, Bobbikins.  
If this explanation for monosyllabic vocalic forms ending in  /z/ is sound, one is 
finally left with a categorisation problem. Should forms like  Caz and Baz be 
treated as truncated forms or as suffixed forms?  There seem to be two grounds for 
regarding them simply as truncated forms: 
i.  No ordinary speaker of Australian English would  see such forms as composed 
of two elements -  the explanation proposed is not at all self evident; 
ii.  if the  /z/  does derive from the  -s suffix, then it is being used more as a 
phonological than a morphological item. 
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A partial counter argument, on functional rather than grammatical grounds, 
suggests that these forms are not perceived  in quite the same way as more 
conventional truncated forms, insofar as they would not generally be used unless 
speakers and addressee were known to one another and on reasonably good terms, 
i.e. their use is much less neutral in terms of tenor. It may be that they should be 
classified as a special sub-type of [truncation], i.e. that greater delicacy is needed in 
the network. 
Another aspect of the formal behaviour of these names that may be relevant to the 
problem of classification is that most of them do not appear in any of the more 
common suffixed forms, not even the ubiquitous -y form. Terry  from Teresa or 
Terence and Maurie from Maurice seem to be sole exceptions. Carrie from 
Caroline used to be a common derived form which has now largely gone out of 
fashion (but note Carrie Fisher, best known for her role as Princess Leia in the Star 
Wars films) and one source attested not only  Sair  as a truncated form of Sarah  
but both Sairdie and Sairsair as further derived forms. Further investigation may 
well throw up a variety of such forms for this and other names whose second 
syllable begins with /r/  which would help to clarify their status in terms of 
availability for the operation of any or all of the possible addition processes. 
Several other matters need to be dealt with in relation to these /z/ items. Firstly 
there are three items appearing in Figure 5.11 which are best explained simply as 
spelling pronunciations of conventional short written form,  i.e. Chas for Charles, 
Jas for James and Thos for Thomas.  These seem to be used largely among older 
speakers; if they were derived from the same linguistic process, one might expect 
that younger speakers would use them along with  Caz, Baz etc. All three names 
appear among the Sydney Morning Herald's top boys' names for 1982 so it is not 
the case that rarity of the name makes it less likely that such hypocoristic forms 
will be noticed. Given that a number of the forms cited in Figure 5.11 seem best 
explained in terms of analogy, however, it is a little surprising that parallel forms 
of whatever origin should appear to have gone out of use.  
Secondly, the above account may provide a satisfactory explanation of /z/  forms 
for names whose second syllable begins with /r/ but hardly for others where there 
is no reason why the initial consonant of the subsequent syllable should not be used 
: where it is in fact so used in alternative, more common, truncated forms. For 
example Viv and Ol, as well as Viz and  Oz,  exist for Vivienne and Oliver. The 
simplest explanation is in  terms of analogy where the short vowel in the initial 
syllable, but without the following /r/, suggests the possibility of closing the 
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syllable with /z/.   Kez  and  Az for Kevin  and Andrew are similar except one does 
not usually hear  *An  or *And  for the latter, presumably for reasons of  
homophony (in the former case with a girl's name - though I do have one attested 
user), a possible motivation in itself for the creation of a truncated form. In the case 
of Raz for Rachel, the process of analogising seems to be going further in that the 
vowel is shortened in order to produce a truncated form of appropriate shape. The 
three instances involving non-short vowels are probably best explained in terms of 
analogy with full forms containing  /r/ in the case of Maurz for Maureen and Mairz 
for Mary (note that in writing the /r/ is explicitly present), combined with analogy 
with -s suffixed forms, since alternative truncated forms  Maur and Mare are 
possible and do occur. In the case of  Dares for David,  I suspect that we are 
dealing with a case of truncation of an elaborated form, i.e. David to Davie to 
Daisy to Dares (cf. the process of forming nicknames on the basis of phonetic 
similarities). 
The third issue involves a small set of now hardly heard monosyllabic hypocoristic 
forms of names whose first syllable contains a short vowel and whose second 
begins with  /r/, but  where /s/ not /z/ is used in syllable-final position. Examples 
include Doss from Dorothy, Floss from Florence and Hoss from Horace. In the 
latter two, presumably the existence of the unvoiced sibilant in the full form has 
influenced the unvoiced form of the syllable-closing consonant. These are 
interesting in that a number of other truncated forms have existed, not all in current 
usage  (e.g. Doll and  Dot for Dorothy,  Flo for Florence),   and  -y suffixed  forms 
where the  /r/   reappears are also known.  Dorrie parallels Dossie, Dolly and Dotty, 
Florrie   parallels Flossy and Horry parallels Hossy. The forms with /s/ appear to 
be rather old-fashioned now (though one Hossy was called this as a teenager in the 
early to mid fifties),  but it may  simply be that the names they are hypocoristic 
versions of have gone out of fashion.  If and when such names are used it would be 
of interest to see what truncated versions were produced, in particular whether new 
forms in  /z/ would appear given that the basis for analogy with what seems to be 
the current normative version is strong (short vowel plus /r/ commencing the 
subsequent syllable). 
The importance of analogy in the formation of hypocoristic forms is further 
underlined by the existence of a number of  sets of phonologically  similar forms 
used within solidary groups. I have already cited two examples above (Morgan et 
al.'s schoolgirl peer group and the Bananarama pop group). Further examples 
involving more 'play' with the original phonetic material include siblings Warren  
and Louise  known as Wozza and Weezy, sisters Pam and Judy known as Pamble 
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and Joozle, and adolescent friendship group members Darren, Sharon and Gillian 
known to one another as Dazza, Shazza  and Gillezza. What is happening in such 
cases is that the principle of reciprocity which governs relationships between 
equals is being invoked with phonological consequences involving greater or less 
distortion away from the original phonetic material, producing greater and greater 
similarity between the shape of the address forms actually used. The final stage in 
the operation of this reciprocal principle is reached when intimates, particularly 
lovers, address each other by the same name. This will usually be a pet-name of 
some kind, however, rather than any kind of hypocoristic version of either 
individual's name, e.g. one couple use a reciprocal Womz (from wombat).    
Finally there is another set of hypocoristic forms, in status somewhere in between 
truncated and expanded forms, like the /z/ forms, and in some cases alternating 
with those forms. These include Ekka from Eric, Mokka  from Maurice, Wokka or 
Wakka from Warwick, Chicka from Charles (cf. Chilla, and Chuck in American 
English), Okka from Oscar and Wakka from Wally. (Orthography of these items 
varies: the newspaper spelling of this version of newspaper proprietor Warwick 
Fairfax' name is usually Wokka, but a similar version of financier Robert Holmes 
a'Court's middle and last name is spelt Hacca).   
These do seem to be characteristically Australian. I have found no hint of these or 
similar forms either in written sources or in questioning informants who are native 
speakers of other varieties of English. I do not know how to account for them. Two 
things can be said, however. Firstly, however the first of them originated, the 
pattern must have been repeated partly on the basis of analogy rather than 
phonological rule and secondly the neutral-vowel second syllable (frequently 
realised as a more emphatic sound rather than simply schwa) seems to be 
characteristic of these atypical hypocoristic forms and likewise seems to be 
restricted to Australia. It poses another classification problem which will be dealt 
with in the subsequent section on suffixes.  
 
5.2.5  Suffixation   
Suffixed forms, particularly those with  -y, are, together with truncated forms, by 
far the most ubiquitous hypocorisms. They can be formed from the bulk of 
personal names, including many names which have no truncated form, and hence 
provide a more reliable contrast with [full form] than is provided by [truncation]. 
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For many names, of course, a three-way contrast is made: [full name] contrasts 
with both [truncation] and [suffixation], and the latter two contrast with each other.   
English has often been regarded as a language with few diminutive resources 
(Jesperson 1905/1982: 9; Marchand 1969: 326; Quirk et al. 1972: 994; Wierzbicka 
1980: 55), Wierzbicka even going so far as to state categorically that 'English … 
does not have the morphological category of diminutives'. It is undoubtedly the 
case that English has fewer resources in terms of suffixation than, say, Spanish (v. 
Gooch 1967 for a comprehensive account of expressive suffixation processes in 
modern Spanish). It may well be true that English-speakers deploy what resources 
they have for forming diminutives more narrowly than do speakers of languages 
with morphologically distinct diminutive forms, confining such usage to certain 
domains (e.g. intimate talk, talk to small children) and to certain word classes 
(especially proper names when used as vocatives). But the category undoubtedly 
exists.  
The only English suffix virtually universally identified as diminutive is -y 
(orthographically -y or -ie), though conflicting claims are made about its 
productivity.  Mention is made variously of -let  (Jesperson 1942, Marchand 1969, 
Quirk et al 1972),  -ling  (Jesperson, Marchand ), -ette (Marchand, Quirk et al ), -
kin (Jesperson, Marchand) and formatives more restricted in use such as  -een, -
erel/-rel, -et (Marchand). Jesperson seems to be the only authority who identifies 
truncation as a diminutive forming process (see above). A range of other 
diminutive suffix resources seem to have been rarely, if at all, identified - and not 
by those who have specialised in derivational processes. -s is such a suffix that 
seems to have been dealt with seldom in the literature (v. Sunden 1904; Thielke 
1938/9 - in German; Langenfelt 1941/42; Mühlhäusler 1983). At least one other 
suffix that certainly occurs in vocatives, -le, does not seem to have been identified 
at all as a productive diminutive suffix in contemporary use. (It seems a likely 
candidate, in fact, for what Wescott (1976) refers to as 'de-fossilisation' with 
respect to slang. Jesperson (1942: 395) deals with it as a diminutive formative 
element derived from Old English suffixes and Marchand 1969: 324, giving 
essentially the same information, says that productivity ceased around 1400). A 
further formative element, -poo, in morphological status right on the boundary 
between suffixes and bound morphemes used only for forming compounds, does 
not seem to have been identified at all. Just over such a boundary would seem to be 
items like -pops and -pie.  
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In what follows, a set of seven morphological elements which are used with 
varying degrees of productivity to form hypocoristic forms of personal names and 
which will be referred to as hypocoristic suffixes will be identifed and discussed. 
This set of suffixes is presented as the most delicate system in the PERSONAL 
NAME network. The seven suffixes, with sample realisations, are displayed in 
Figure 5.13.  
 
 -truncation  - -y 
   - -o 
   - -a 
…hypocorism  - suffixation - -s 
  - - - -kin 
   - -le 
 -addition  - -poo 
 
  -reduplication 
  - - 
 
Figure 5.13 PERSONAL NAME: hypocorism 
  
Suffix Examples 
  -y  Annie , Johnny , Susie , Ronnie   
  -o  Anno , Johnno , Nello , Danno  
  -a  Bazza , Kezza , Ekka  
  -s  Babs (Barbara), Jules (Julie/Julian), Neils (Neil )  
  -kin Samkin , Foxkin  (LN), Pusskin  (to cat)). This more commonly occurs in 
combination with -s suffix (Tomkins (Tom ) 
  -le Pamble  (from Pam )). This more commonly occurs in combination with -s 
suffix (Meggles  (Megan ), Wimbles  (Wimsey )  
  -poo Inipoo  (from Ian ). Always with -s if in final position (Braddipoos (from 
Bradley ), but may occur independently or with -y suffix as a kind of 
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endearment, in which case it also has -s suffix (Pooze , Poozy-Pots ). It 
does occur independently in compounds/chains - see below.  
  -pops Jupops (?Julie  or Judith - Mühlhäusler's data), Rosypops  (for Roselands, 
a suburban shopping centre in Sydney). These are the only examples I 
have, other than compounds/chains - discussed below). This may, when 
further data is available, be analysable as -pop + -s, as has been the case 
with -le(s), -kin(s), -poo(s). 
Figure 5.14 Productive hypocoristic suffixes in contemporary English 
 
5.2.5.1  The base 
Suffixed forms are produced by attaching a suffix to a monosyllabic base, which is 
either:  
i. Full name, if monosyllabic: Anne, John, Ruth, Wayne …  
ii. A truncated version of the full name: Kate or Kath (Catherine/ Kathleen), 
Rob or Bob  (Robert) …  
iii. An appropriate monosyllabic segment from a full form, which is either rare 
or does not exist as an independent truncated form, e.g.:  
Lainie (Elaine),  but ?Lain    
Andy (Andrew) but *And  (though Sunden 1904 cites Dand, particularly in 
Scotland, and An is attested, though rare).   
or which may be slightly different from the normal truncated form:   
Susie  (Susan),  where Sue is the usual truncated form. (Suse can be treated 
either as truncation or -s suffixation).  
Paddy (Patrick), where Pat is the only truncated form.  
A variety of consonant insertion processes seem to occur. In some cases, such 
insertion is necessary for the attachment of suffixes:   
Dizie  or Didie  (Diana/Dianne), where the attachment of -y to the base 
form Di  would be homophonous.     
Lindles (Lynn(ette)), where the -le suffix requires a preceding stop. 
(Lyndall, of course exists as an independent name).    
In other cases, such insertion seems purely arbitrary:  
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Sairdy (Sarah). (where Sairy  is possible and attested).   
Jonty (John or Jonathan)  (inserted /t/).  
Timbo (Timothy), Jimbo (James)  (inserted homoganic stop).   
More detailed accounts of restrictions on the occurrence of particular suffixes will 
be found below in the sections devoted to individual suffixes.  There are 
phonological constraints (e.g. -le requires a preceding stop), distributional 
constraints (especially for -a ) and less well defined types of restriction limiting 
either the formation or the frequency of occurrence of individual suffixes with 
individual names. The overall effect of these restrictions is that many possible 
derived forms seem to occur rarely or not at all, or to be somehow marked even 
when the suffix involved is the everyday -y suffix. Petey from Peter is a good 
example: there is no phonological oddity about this form, (unless the repeated 
vowel sound is an oddity), it is not homophonous with any lexical item in ordinary 
use (v. Dermody 1980 on the question of homophony as a constraint on the 
formation of certain derived forms in Australian English) and yet native speakers 
tend to agree that it is marked in comparison with other -y  forms, and that this is 
not simply a matter of the kinds of gender or generational constraints on usage 
discussed in Part III. There seems to be a certain amount of arbitrariness, in other 
words, about suffixed forms.   
5.2.5.2    -y   
This is the suffix generally acknowledged as a diminutive suffix in English. It 
generally appears added to a truncated or clipped base (see below for details) of 
either proper or common nouns. It has been a productive suffix in English for some 
500 years, first used apparently as a hypocoristic ending in Scottish proper names, 
spreading from there both linguistically (to common nouns) and geographically 
(Jespersen 1942: 216-7). It is consistently identified as a hypocoristic suffix, 
particularly in talk by and to children. Some commentators suggest that it is largely 
confined to child-language and baby talk (Jespersen 1982: 9; Marchand 1964: 
299), and that its use may be decreasing, along with that of other diminutive 
suffixes (Quirk et al 1972: 994). 
Whatever its status may be in British or American English, however, these claims 
are demonstrably untrue for Australian English, where the use of this suffix 
attached to both proper and common nouns is widespread (Baker 1945, 1966;  
Turner 1966;  Gunn 1970;  Dabke 1976;  McAndrew 1977;  Dermody 1980;  
Wierzbicka 1986 & 1989). It seems unlikely that any single interpretation of -y 
forms in Australian English will prove adequate. Compare familiar everyday words 
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such as ciggie, mossie, bicky, footie, pokies(cigarette, mosquito, biscuit, football, 
pokermachines) with 'nursery' forms such as tooties, doggie, googie (feet, dog, 
egg),  with nominalisations of adjectives such as sickie, littlies (unauthorised day 
on sickleave, little ones), with forms specifying an occupation such as wharfie, 
bookie, postie  (wharf labourer, bookmaker, person delivering mail), none of which 
are pejorative but which contrast yet again with pejorative items such as commie, 
greenie, trendy, leftie.  But perhaps Baker's apt observation on the 'relentless 
familiarity' of Australian slang (Baker 1966: 366) identifies not merely a formal 
characteristic of much Australian English colloquial usage (i.e. its preference for 
forms which assume a certain closeness or familiarity  between speaker and 
addressee) but also, implicitly, the source of such preference in Australian 
egalitarian ideology. Wiezbicka's account of Australian English -y forms is more 
explicit in its recognition of the relationship between the Australian ethos, which 
she interprets as valuing 'toughness, informality, jocular cynicism and knocking 
things down to size', and 'an interesting morphological category which while akin 
to the diminutive differs from it … in a revealing way'. This category is labelled 
'depreciative', but Wiezbicka's detailed characterisation of its force is worth 
quoting in full, to ensure that the term is not simply interpreted as pejorative:  
We sent you a prezzie  (we are having a barbie). 
 I don't think of it as a big thing 
 I assume you think of it in the same way 
 talking about it I am in a good mood (as people are when talking about small 
 things towards which they have good feelings)  (Wierzbicka: 1989) 
It might be more accurate to refer to the -y suffix as a familiarity marker, 
rather than using the somewhat misleading term depreciative, which would 
certainly account for the  majority of the items cited above. But not for all, 
and certainly not for all -y forms of proper names: there do seem to be 
genuine diminutives in -y (e.g. hypocoristic forms of personal names used to 
small children) as well as pseudo-diminutives/depreciatives/familiaritives, 
e.g. one can hardly interpret as diminutives the following instances, 
addressed by the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, to Alan Bond, chairman of the 
syndicate that financed the winning America's Cup yacht, Australia 2, in 
1983: 
I just want to say to Bondy, to Jones, to Bertrand, the crew, … that there's not 
many occasions when a Prime Minister knows he can speak for every Australian, 
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but on this occasion Bondy and all of you there, we say well done, congratulations 
… (The National Times, September 30-Oct 6, 1983: 7)  
This non-diminutive -y suffix seems to have become a marker of Australianness 
(and how ironically fortunate for Prime Minister Bob Hawke, who plays the role of 
populist politico to the hilt, that his last name readily becomes the 'ocker' Hawkie, a 
form which is regularly used, of him at least, in conversation and in print).  
 
5.2.5.3   -o     
-o is well-attested as a diminutive/familiar suffix in Australian English (Baker 
1947, 1966; Gunn 1970; Dabke 1976; McAndrew 1977; Dermody 1980; 
Wierzbicka 1989) but is hardly mentioned outside this literature, though it does 
seem to exist both in British English (Jespersen 1942; Partridge 1961) and in 
American English (Berger 1963; Wescott 1976). Both Jespersen  (p.223) and 
Partridge  (p.576) suggest the metre-tag found in verse as a possible source, at least 
for some examples; but Jespersen's principle suggestion of an origin in 'Keltic' 
'where the interjection o is often used enclitically' could make more sense of the 
frequency of use of this suffix by Australians, given the extent of Irish immigration 
from the earliest days of European settlement while Australian English was in the 
process of formation. Trudgill (1986: 139-141) indicates a range of features 
(grammatical, lexical and phonological) indicating the extent of Irish influence on 
Australian English, though not this particular feature.  
Jespersen merely refers to this suffix as 'an independent suffix of a slangy, often 
also a  hypocoristic character which does not really change the sense of the root 
word itself' (1942: 224) and Dabke suggests that 'with few exceptions  - /ou/  
fulfills the same functions in Australian English as does the formative - /i/ ' (1976: 
44). Other commentators contrast it with -y from a number of points of view.  
McAndrew (1977: 272) sees Australian English forms in -o not as diminutives (as 
he sees -y forms) but as 'augmentatives and pejoratives denoting clumsiness, 
ugliness and roughness'. Dermody (1980: 14-15) contrasts -o with -y in terms of 
sound symbolism, suggesting that the former 'symbolises something bigger, 
stronger, more mature' than the latter which he notes 'is accorded by most writers 
… the symbolic qualities of smallness, and/or lightness, and/or fragility'. (He cites 
Jakobson & Waugh 1978 and Ullan 1970; see also Jespersen's seminal paper, 
'Symbolic value of the vowel I', originally published in 1922). Wierzbicka  
contrasts 'depreciative' -y forms, used when a speaker 'is trying to minimise the 
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thing he is talking about', with -o forms which simply show the speaker's 
familiarity with them: thus anthro, journo, demo rather than anthropologist, 
journalist, demonstration.   
Few commentators, however, include -o forms of proper names among their 
examples and only two comment on these. McAndrew (1977: 174) and Dermody 
(1980: 16)  restrict -o forms largely to family name, Dermody noting 'the 
pronounced tendency of Australian males to use surnames as the basic form of 
address' and concluding (p.24)  from the paucity of -o forms which his female 
informants claimed to use that, 'It would therefore seem that  [ao]  [=-o] is simply 
not a real part of Australian females' speech'. Though Baker (1966: 367) cites -o 
forms of female personal name (Daiso, Maiso, Sallo) and I have further examples 
(eg. Janeo, Lizzo, Anno), all my informants noted that such forms were used almost 
exclusively by males, commonly family members (especially brothers), suggesting 
that Dermody is probably right in his conclusions if not in his suggested reason that 
the sound symbolism he suggests for the suffix is responsible for this restricted 
distribution. Westcott (1976: 401) notes more succinctly that the -o suffix is  
'diagnostic of slang' so that, given the well-attested tendency of women to adhere 
more to standard forms than do men (v. Kramer et al. 1978), one might expect 
forms using it to be more frequent among males and perhaps as a consequence the 
suffix to be used as a marker of maleness in much the same way as swearing has 
been used. Despite the various claims made about the derogatory or pejorative 
force of this suffix (e.g. Wescott 1976: 401; McAndrew 1977: 272 and 277), there 
is no reason to suggest that -o forms of family name used among males are 
anything other than an alternative to the -y suffix in its familiar but not in its 
diminutive use. Though pejorative -o forms do occur, the pejorative effect is likely 
to have already been present in the base, the suffix merely intensifying this effect 
(v. Wescott ibid., who says that the suffix 'has a generally intensive force with 
strongly derogatory undertones').  
In addressing someone as Thingo one is compounding the insult of referring to 
them as an object by a suffix which says 'we're all familiar with you in this role and 
think nothing of it' but in using Singo (for John Singleton, entertainment 
entrepeneur), Thommo (for Jack Thompson, top cricketer) or Campo (for David 
Campese, top Sydney footballer) one is saying to them, 'I am familiar with you and 
your achievements and I think you're a great guy'. Like the familiar -y , -o seems to 
have become a marker of Australianness, currently in a phase of assertiveness 
about the validity of things Australian ( including the so long-derided Australian 
accent  - see Poynton 1979) after close on two centuries of what A.A. Phillips so 
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aptly called  'the cultural cringe' (Phillips 1958: 89-95). A sharp increase in the use 
of such forms by various authors in the weekend magazine of 'quality' newspaper 
The Sydney Morning Herald appearing in the week that Australia won the 
America's Cup is but one indication of this function. 
 
5.2.5.4     -a  
-a as a vocative suffix is much more restricted than the two suffixes already dealt 
with.  It occurs: 
i.  after FN or LN monosyllabic forms ending in /z/ where  this sound is not in the 
full name:   
 
Cheryl  can become Chez  and ultimately Chezza.   
Barry  can become Baz  and ultimately Bazza.    
Desmond  can become Des  /dez/, but not *Dezza .   
(But Jesaulenko, star Victorian football player, does become Jezza, a bisyllabic 
clipped form presumably modelled on -za forms, and an interesting example of the 
'naturalisation' of non-Anglo names in Australia).  
ii  In the second syllable -ka of a small set of rather old-fashioned personal names, 
including Ekka for Eric, Mokka for Maurice, Okka for Oscar, Chicka  for Charles 
(cf. also Chilla for  Charles, with the final -a, and the American Chuck, with -k but 
no final vowel). 
iii.  After the truncated  form Mack of family names beginning with Mc or Mac, to 
produce  Macka (presumably by analogy with group ii).  
iv. After kin terms Mum, Dad, Pop, to produce Mumma, Dadda. Unka appears to 
occur in American E (at least on the evidence of Walt Disney films and cartoons of 
Donald Duck),  but I am not aware of it in Australian English. Bubba occurs as a 
term of both address and reference for a baby and sometimes as a continuing 
nickname (v. Bubba Ryan, a character in Ray Lawler's Summer of the Seventeenth 
Doll ). 
Many of these forms are written with final -a, but final -er also occurs for some, 
suggesting that for some speakers a connection is perceived between these forms 
and the very large class of English nominals ending in -er. Such a connection is by 
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no means fanciful, relying on the apparent accident of phonetic identity. Both 
Jespersen (1942: 232) and Marchand (1969: 275, 280) refer to the profusion of 
slang words in -er. Marchand gives an extremely general characterisation of the 
suffix in terms of  'he who or that which is connected with or characterised by his 
or its appurtenance to _'  and pointing out that it can be 'tacked onto almost any 
basis: a simple or composite substantive or adjective, a numeral, all kinds of 
phrases' (1969: 279).  Slang substantives in -er occur frequently as vocatives, not 
only as items in an available pool for use as required, i.e when an addressee 
behaves in a particular way  (eg. whinger, smoocher, piker, bludger, crawler), but 
also as items which begin as words referring to particular characteristics of 
individuals but which stick as nicknames (Davies 1977 and 1978 cite a number of 
examples, including Biter for the man who hangs around for a hand-out; Boxer for 
the man whose father was an undertaker; Cruncher, who's been without teeth for 
years; Digger for the plumber who orders his men to 'dig 'er 'ere'; Mossie Gobbler 
who swallowed a live mosquito; and Plopper, who plops his glass eye in his beer 
so no-one will drink it while he goes to the toilet). 
There are also a small number of colloquial words in Australian English ending in 
a neutral vowel which seems more purely a slang marker, e.g. plakka (or placker) 
for plasticine (Baker), lakka-band (The Macquarie Dictionary has lacker) (for 
elastic band), yakka (work, an Aboriginal borrowing but probably perceived more 
as a colloquial item like the others). It may be the case that once forms like Kaz 
and Baz have been produced, whether by the process suggested above or however, 
they are perceived as being more like nicknames than real names. Nicknames tend 
not to take -y and -o suffixes, as do real names, but are perceived as more slangy 
than real names, thus making a neutral vowel ending a not unreasonable choice 
(whether -er as characterised by Marchand or not), creating bisyllabic forms 
parallel to other colloquial address terms, both nicknames and non-names.  
Whatever their origin, such forms ending in a neutral vowel are undoubtedly more 
familiar or intimate than the full names from which they are derived. They are 
comparable to the familiar -y and -o suffixed forms dealt with above, insofar as 
they both express and create a relationship of amicable familiarity between 
interlocuters, with no diminutive overtones. It is worth pointing out here that 
though the -ka type seems to be exclusively male (with the possible exception of 
Macka), the -za type is used for both males and females and, apparently, 
increasingly: a form that is marked as Australian and that has none of the belittling 
or pejorative implications of -y or -o is presumably perceived as useful by very 
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many people, especially women, and may account for the extension of these forms 
to names not containing inter-vocalic -r-, e.g. Viz from Vivienne.    
 
5.2.5.5   -s 
-s has been identified and commented on as a hypocoristic suffix, though 
invariably by non-native speakers of English. Sunden (1904: 221-2) is the earliest 
commentator I am aware of, pointing out that 'This ending has evidently assumed 
an incipient hypochoristic function' and citing examples such as: 
 
personal name Babs from Barbara, Nobs from Obadiah   
family name  Bobs from Roberts 
kin-name  Dads from Dad, Nunks from Uncle  
Thielke (1938/39) notes the suffix in colloquial name-forms, generally (though not 
exclusively ) in address.  He cites further types of example, e.g.  
 
nickname Clumps, Boots, Bugs 
endearment ducks 
family name Wedders (from Wedderburn), Bodders (from 
 Bodsham),  Wimbles  (from Wimsey ).  
(The -er in the first two family name examples is undoubtedly what Jesperson 
(1942: 233) and Partridge (1961: 596) call the 'Oxford -er' . This does occur in 
Australian English in address forms and other colloquial word choices, e.g. 
champers  for champagne , and may be related to the AE -a suffix. See below on -
le as a hypocoristic suffix and on multiple suffixation).  
Thielke characterises the meaning of the suffix as expressing a certain warmth of 
feeling ('gewisse befuhlswarme'), familiarity or positive affect ('Vertraulichkeit'), 
intimacy or frequency ('Familiaritat'). Langenfelt (1942/42:210-11) refers to it as 
'The English slangy, endearing and derisive suffix -s …' and dates its origin to the 
seventeenth century when the -s occurring in many slangy words such as Carrots, 
lazy -bones and mulligrums (low spirits, 1599; stomach ache, 1619) 'developed into 
an independent suffix and could be added  to pet-names … but this development 
was intensified only in the 19th century.'   He also refers (p.202) to forms ending in 
-sy,  -sie, -sey (like Mopsy and Betsy), which are also dealt with by both Jesperson 
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(1942: 220) and Marchand (1969: 299), as 'by-forms' of hypocoristic -y. This 
account conflates two distinct suffixes, -s and -y, however.  
Mühlhäusler (1983) refers to this suffix as 'The nursery "-s"'. In an empirical 
investigation, however, he had suggested the interpretation  'diminutive' and points 
out the parallels between this ending and the German diminutive ending -chen , 
e.g.  
 
English German (-chen varieties) 
beddie-byes (ins) Bettchen 
Cuddles (term of address) Kuschelchen 
Goldilocks Goldlockchen 
Mühlhäusler's data includes many contemporary examples of intimate personal 
names, real and nickname, in many cases involving the choice of more than one 
hypocoristic suffix (pp. 78-79):    
 
Nickname  Wooz  Poozie Pots, Ploopy loops, Flossy Chops   
Real name  Franglekins, Mikeypoodles, Janepoons   
He also includes non-name examples, principally from adult baby-talk to children  
(e.g. stinkie-poos, beddie-byes , dindins, weewees, milkies), thus demonstrating that 
the suffix is by no means restricted to names but is a more generally productive 
morphological process in English. Much of Mühlhäusler's data consists of items 
used by adults to children or between adult intimates, making his observation that 
'The use of the nursery -s would seem to create, rather than depend on, a situation 
of intimacy and emotional security' (p. 87), on the face of it a not unreasonable 
interpretation. The nickname examples he cites from Davies 1977 (see also Davies 
1978), together with personal real name examples from my own data such as 
 
Mads from Madeleine 
Nicks from Nicholas 
Wens from Wendy 
Roles from Roland 
and family name forms (used especially between males) such as  
Loges from Logan 
Turps from Turpie 
Wheels from Wheeler 
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suggest, however, that -s is by no means always a marker of intimacy but rather 
that it too (like -y) can mark any number of points on a relational cline that ranges 
from friendly familiarity to the intimacy of lovers (dealing only with congruent 
uses), i.e. that it realises the tenor dimension DISTANCE. As to whether such items 
create or depend on situations characterised by a particular configuration of 
DISTANCE and AFFECT values, it seems that they do both rather than one or the 
other: the language used will reinforce non-linguistic aspects of the situation which 
characterise it in a certain way (as well as pre-suppositions based on prior 
experience which interactants will bring to that situation), as well as signalling 
independently  messages like 'Come home.  All is forgiven', i.e. creating the 
interpersonal dynamics of the situation.  
 
5.2.5.6   -kin  
The three other suffixes to be dealt with differ from the first four in a number of 
respects. Where the suffixes discussed so far are readily identifiable as suffixes 
and/or function as markers of national identity and/ or are highly productive, the 
others tend to be less readily identifiable as suffixes and/or are less productive. The 
whole set of suffixes can be arranged along a cline (or possibly overlapping clines), 
the relevant aspects being   
morphological status: affix … clitic/bound lexeme … free lexeme, compounded;  
productivity: more … less;    
perceptibility: greater… lesser, and related to this  
acceptability: acceptance as a linguistic phenomenon … disbelief and/or laughter 
at the very idea of such forms, even when familiar with them. (One of the minor 
irritants of working with such data is that many linguists seem indistinguishable 
from the general population in terms of their attitudes). 
The suffixes dealt with so far could not be restricted to the left hand end of all 
these scales but do tend to be at that end, whereas the ones to be dealt with next 
tend to be at the right hand end: i.e. to be less readily perceptible (by trained or 
untrained ears), less productive, taken less seriously as linguistic phenomena, with 
a morphological status that is frequently unclear. 
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-kin is the most recognisable of this group, with a history as a diminutive suffix 
going back to around 1300 for personal names and around 1400 for common 
nouns.  Many personal names, e.g. Dawkin (from David), Perkin (from (Peter) 
,Wilekin  (from William) have only survived as surnames either with the addition 
of -son or in elliptical genitive forms (e.g. Wilkinson, Perkins, Dickins(on) ) 
(Jesperson 1942: 426; Marchand 1969: 321-2). Jesperson, supporting the NED 
view, which he cites, sees the suffix as only marginally productive in English (his 
comment 'on the whole the suffix has not been very much used in England' implies 
that its Flemish and Dutch cognate forms, from which it derives, are more widely 
used), where Marchand sees it as somewhat more productive, citing not only a 
range of lexical items from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century and a number of 
idiosyncratic uses (e.g. Thackeray's essaykin, grudgekin) but also noting the use of 
the suffix in slang, principally in vocatives (e.g. babykins, boykins, Janeykins, 
sonnikins). Jesperson's account is disappointingly thin, though he does quote from 
Henry Bradley's The Making of English to the effect that 'we can, at least in 
jocular speech , add  -kin to almost any noun to form a diminutive', which seems to 
potentially extend the scope of Marchand's account (but no examples are given). 
Marchand characterises the suffix as one with 'diminutive or endearing force, today 
used only as a jocular formative with a depreciative tinge' (p.321), which I suspect 
is conflating the basic diminutive meaning of the suffix with a quasi-inverted use 
of it, i.e. using it to say to someone not 'I use this form because I feel affectionate 
towards you, as one does towards a child or someone little' but rather 'I use a form 
appropriate for a child in order to point out to you that you are not acting like an 
adult'. I have too few examples involving this suffix to be absolutely clear about its 
force but it does seem to be an intimacy marker, rather than a familiarity marker, in 
its congruent (or non-inverted) uses which, like the other three suffixes of this 
second group, is particularly susceptible to being used to mock, put down, tease but 
also to ingratiate oneself with an addressee. Presumably Anglo-Saxon cultural 
discomfort at publicly expressing emotion or affection has something to do with 
this particular constellation of uses, as with the fact that such forms of names will 
almost inevitably give rise to teasing and mocking if they become known to 
persons other than those for whom they function as intimacy markers.  
Two further points need to be raised concerning Marchand's account of the suffix.  
Firstly, on form, he heads the relevant section  -kin , –ikin  and includes examples 
in -kins, not distinguishing between the three separate suffixes involved in such 
forms as Janeykins, viz -y ,-kin ,-s . The -kin suffix can occur alone (e.g. Samkin, 
Foxkin, catkin, pusskin) but it most commonly does occur in combination with 
other hypocoristic suffixes, especially  -y and -s.  These need to be distinguished as 
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separate suffixes.  Secondly, Marchand characterises address terms in -kins as 
slang (suggesting that this may be on the analogy of surnames  in  -kins, which I 
think is incorrect since the surname -s is a genitive, while the personal name -s 
makes more sense analysed as the hypocoristic -s, analogous with personal name 
forms such as Meggles, Braddipoos etc.).  The term 'slang' is a little odd here 
because it implies grouping together, in opposition to non-slang (=standard?), a 
range of forms functioning as markers of a range of relations and though 
familiarity markers might be acceptably seen as slang, it does not seem entirely 
appropriate to locate intimacy markers in the same category.  
5.2.5.7    -le  
-le, is probably the least perceptible of all the suffixes dealt with: it took quite some 
time to collect enough examples to make clear that it was indeed a hypocoristic 
suffix. It is not highly productive (partly for phonological reasons, in that it is 
generally attached to a preceding stop, though I have several instances of 
homorganic plosive release of a preceding nasal with subsequent attachment of this 
suffix). Items incorporating it tend to be taken less seriously by third parties 
compared with any other suffix dealt with so far, and though it has historical 
analogs as a diminutive suffix, it is not at all transparent to contemporary speakers.  
The suffix most commonly appears in combination with the -s suffix in the order -
le + -s, in hypocoristic forms of personal name (real name and nickname), and of 
surname. Several of the nicknames may be used as endearments (presumably have 
become nicknames from that source):  
 
real name Meggles  (from Megan ), Bobbles  (from Bob ), 
 Lyndles  (from Lynne  - there is also Lyndall  as an 
 independent  FN), Kimbles  from Kimberley  (note 
 that the truncated form is Kim , but the initial b of 
 the subsequent syllable is retained when suffixing 
with  -le). 
endearment/nickname   Nibbles , Cuddles , Bubbles  
surname Braddles (from Bradley ),  Wiggles (from Wigg ). 
 (Davies 1977).  
 
There is also the commonly used (in Australian English at least) name for a pet cat, 
Tiddles, which is clearly the same suffix combination. The suffix does appear on its 
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own, however, both as a single suffix (e.g. Pamble  from Pam and Greggle from 
Greg) and in compound suffixation such as Franglekins  (Mühlhäusler 1983). 
Both Jesperson (1942: 395) and Marchand (1969: 324) mention an earlier  English 
diminutive suffix  -le or -el found in such words as bramble, speckle, nozzle. 
Jesperson says that it 'has been little used as an independent formative in English' 
and Marchand that it ceased to be productive around 1400. As all my name 
examples are twentieth century, there are three possible explanations for the use of 
-le as a contemporary hypocoristic suffix. One is simply that the suffix has been 
reinvented: I regard this as the least likely hypothesis. A second explanation is in 
terms of what Wescott (1980: 400), dealing with the morphological processes 
characteristic of American slang, calls 'productive use of affixes which . . . are 
functionally fossilised in standard speech' or 'defossilisation' (p.401). This, given 
the set of 'slangy' verbs cited by Marchand (p.323), whose ending in -le is 
characterised as 'probably a playful element', e.g. wheedle, argle, bamboozle, 
footle, foozle, is probably the most reasonable explanation.  (The third alternative is 
that there is in fact a continuous history of such forms but no-one has collected the 
data or commented: nothing can be said about this suggestion without an 
exhaustive culling of historical sources).    
 
5.2.5.8   -poo  etc.  
The final suffix -poo is not mentioned by any commentators I am aware of.  There 
is no entry for it in Partridge, the Shorter Oxford or the Macquarie Dictionary, 
though one does find examples of it in use, both attached to personal names and 
apparently functioning as an independent nickname base, such as Pooze, Poozie 
Pots (cited Muhlhauser 1983). The fact that it can appear independently in this way 
does raise questions about its precise morphological status.  
Two similar items, with questionable status, are -pops (which may yet turn out to 
consist of a suffix sequence  -pop  + -s), and -pie .  Partridge (1961: 650) has an 
entry for popsy  (an endearment for a girl: nursery colloquial) and popsy-wopsy ('A 
foolish endearment: (mostly nursery) coll.), both from the archaic pop, darling, 
short for poppet.'  Presumably this is its origin.  -pie  does not seem to appear with 
names, but only in endearments such as sweetie-pie, cutie-pie, petty-pie (also 
pussy-pie to cats). One family uses pie  independently as a clipped form of sweetie-
pie : I have no idea how widespread this practice may be.  
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These last three items seem to form an intermediate category between true suffixes, 
on the one hand, and on the other, lexical items found either in appositional or 
nominal complex forms (e.g. John dear) or in compounds such as those in -wit, -
head, -features etc. which appear as the second element of pejorative vocative 
compounds such as dim-wit, dick-head, cunt-features (see Chapter 6 for an account 
of such compounds). The occurrence of items such as Lubaby (to a child called 
Lucy) and E-baby and R-baby (used by siblings whose names begin with the 
initials E and R), indicates that one is dealing with a cline here, rather than with 
discrete types of phenomena.   
Neither -poo nor -pops seems to be highly productive, both are highly visible (and 
risible) and they tend to appear as part of suffix sequences (particularly in final 
position , where -poo is always followed by -s ). -poo can appear elsewhere, 
however, whereas my only examples of -pops are all in final position (a pair of 
fascinating possible exceptions will be dealt with below). Both suffixes seem to 
occur only with personal names, not with surnames (though the Sydney suburban 
shopping centre Roselands is affectionately known to devotees as Rosypops). 
Attested examples are listed below (M = Mühlhäusler 1983).  
-poo 
real name Janepoons,  Mikeypoodles (M); 
 Braddipoos, Inipoo (from Ian), 
 Albertipoo  
nickname/endearment Pooze, Poozie Pots, Corks Poos (all M)  
 
-pops 
real name Jupops (M); Greglipops  
 
5.2.5.9  Iteration of suffixes 
Though all of the suffixes dealt with in the preceding sections are capable of 
appearing independently, attached directly to a base, many of them can and do 
occur in combination with other suffixes, up to a maximum of five choices being 
possible, e.g. Gregsiekindles  (-s , -y , -kin , -le , -s) . 
For purposes of this iteration, the suffixes seem to fall into three groups.  The  first 
group consists of the only two suffixes which can occur twice in a suffix sequence: 
-le and -s.  These can occur either immediately attached to the base and/or at the 
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very end of a suffix sequence. Either or both suffixes may be chosen in either 
position, but not both in both positions (only one initially if more than two 
choices), though in final position the choice of both is only available when 
preceded by -kin or -poo.  When both occur the order is always -le followed by -s.  
The available combinations involving -le and -s seem to be : 
Choosing twice 
  -s Meggles  (Megan ) 
 -le +  
  -y Greggly  (Gregory ) 
 
 -o  Mellows  (Melanie ) 
 
 -kin  Tomkins  (Thomas ) 
  + -s 
 -poo  Janepoons 
 
 -pop  Jupops 
 
 -s + -y  Mumsie 
 
Choosing three times 
 -le + -kin + -s Franglekins 
 
 
  -kin Johnikins 
 
 -y +  -poo  + -s   Annipoos 
  
  -pop Rosypops 
 
Choosing four times 
 
-le   -kin Greglykins    
 + -y +  -poo (+ (C) -le) + -s Gregsypoos 
-s   -pop Greglypops  
    Mikeypoodles  etc. 
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Choosing five times 
 
-le   -kin Greglykindles 
 + -y +  + (C) le  + -s  
-s   -poo Gregsypoodles etc.  
These choices represent most of the iterative sequences available, principally 
because of the very high frequency of occurrence of  -s (mainly in final position). 
The only suffixes to which it cannot be attached are -a (which has highly restricted 
distribution) and -y  (where it seems to retain an inflectional plural or possessive 
rather than a hypocoristic meaning.  Compare Melzy and Mellies as hypocoristic 
forms of Melanie ). 
The second group of suffixes consists simply of  -y.  This suffix normally appears 
first in a sequence: it can only be preceded by  -le or -s, the latter because of the 
inflectional effect of final  -s as explained above, the former because -le requires a 
preceding consonant (preferably a stop). Suffix sequences involving  -y  but 
excluding  -le  or -s are as follows: 
Choosing twice 
   -o   Cathio 
-y +-kin   Suzykin 
   -poo    Albertipoo 
This exhausts the total range of combinatory possibilities identified so far, but 
there does not seem to be any reason why certain other combinations should not 
occur, e.g.  [-le or -s]  + -o.  
The third group of suffixes consists of all suffixes other than  -y, but there are 
internal constraints on possible sequences:  -pops only seems to occur in final 
position, with no other suffix between it and preceding (optional)    -y ; -o likewise 
occurs directly attached to  -y, or to the base, in which case it may be followed by  
-s;  -poo or -kin may be followed by either or both  -le and  -s , in that order (the -le 
in both cases being preceded by an inserted stop, homorganic /d/ in the case of  -
kin + -le and /d/ again (possibly by analogy) in the one instance so far of  -poo + -le 
, represented in the notation below as an archiphoneme D); -poo may also be 
followed by either or both  -kin and  -s, in that order. 
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Devising some notation to represent this set of facts in a way that is relatively 
transparent has been a problem. The neatest strategy, which is less redundant than 
the consolodated network suggested by Robin Fawcett but which needs more 
glossing in order to make clear the circumstances under which elements are 
optional or obligatory, is represented as Figure 5.15: 
 
  le    O (only preceded by y)  
Base     (y)  kin    (s) 
  s    poo  (C le) 
      pops 
(only two of these three) 
( ) =optional; { } = a or b; {[  ]} = a or b, OR a and b 
Figure 5.15 Iterated suffixation in personal names 
Not all choices which are not yet attested are blocked using this notation (e.g. -s + 
-y + -o ), but no totally implausible sequences seem to be produced and the format 
could be readily amended to include plausible but as-yet-unattested sequences such 
as  -kin  +  -le +  -s. 
 
5.2.6   Reduplication 
Jesperson 1942:174) notes three types of reduplicated compounds in English:  
 
(1) The kernel repeated unchanged; sometimes with an extension of one of 
the kernels.  
(2) The kernel repeated with change of vowel.  
(3) The kernel repeated with change of consonant. 
as well as reduplicative words deriving from babies' production of 'long strings of 
identical syllables', e.g. papa, mama, geegee(horse),tata (goodbye). 
Reduplicated forms of names of Jesperson's second type do not seem to occur but 
straight repetition of a base with or without change of consonant is not uncommon.  
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The base form is generally the same base as is used for suffixation: i.e. many bases 
will be identical with a truncated form of the full name, but others will have no 
independent truncated form, e.g. 
Bet-bet from Elizabeth, where Bet is (one possible) truncated form;  
Lulu from Louise, where Lou is truncated form;  
Mimi from Naomi, where *Mi is not truncated form.  
Some monosyllabic full names can also be reduplicated, e.g. John-John . 
Jesperson comments on his third type of reduplication that  
the second part … is felt as a playful appendix to the first. These formations have as a rule a 
less serious charaacter [than the second type]' (Jesperson 1942:180).  
He notes the nursery associations of these forms with, as a consequence 'the 
universal tendency to have an initial consonant in the repeated syllable'.  He goes 
on to list numerous examples, including many reduplicated forms of names, whose 
second element begins with p, w (thus always if the first word begins with p, 
p.181), b, m, f:    
p:  Georgy-Porgy, Charlie-Parlie (to which can be added Henny-Penny, a 
character in a well known children's story, and Annie-Pannie)   
w:  Andy-Wandy (to which can be added Pammy-Wammy and Stevie-Weave). 
Andy-Pandy  is more common now, however.  
m: Clydie-Mydie, Hogen-Mogen ('a Dutchman, from Hoogmogendheiden', p182).  
(The only reduplicated example I have which does not involve one of these sounds 
is Becka-Decka for Rebecca, which is also interesting because it has a bisyllabic 
base).  
Most of these forms involve -y suffixation as well as reduplication, i.e. one can 
choose both, but apparently only in the order suffixation followed by reduplication. 
(Stevie-Weave could possibly be analysed as choosing reduplication first, followed 
by -y suffixation of the first element, but it is probably best analysed as an instance 
of incomplete reduplication. A second similar example is Loobyloo, used to the 
character Louisa in Christina Stead's, The Man Who Loved Children.  
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Choosing suffixation second would seem likely to produce suffixed forms of the 
whole reduplicated form, e.g. *Steve-Weavie, *Loolooby, which seem decidedly 
unacceptable). 
 
5.3  Family name 
The terms family name and surname are used synonymously in everyday language. 
I have preferred the former as a technical term here because it makes a more 
transparent contrast with the term personal name.  Given the fact that individuals 
may change this element of their name, however, for reasons other than indicating 
membership of a new family group (as in the case of adoption and women 
choosing or being obliged to adopt their husband's family name upon marriage), 
one could argue for retention of the more traditional term.   
Identification of family name is principally in terms of distribution. For English 
speakers, and for those of many other languages, it is that element of the entire 
name that follows personal name(s).  English speakers tend to have difficulty with 
entire name sequences where family name precedes personal name(s), e.g. 
Hungarian, Chinese. Such problems are common for teachers and academics 
dealing with Asian students in Australia: a combination of Australian unsureness 
about which element of a full name is in fact the personal name (partly due to the 
lack of recognisable phonological/morphological clues), together with Asian 
deferential behaviour towards teachers, and university teachers in particular, means 
that one is never sure on what basis a name has come to be used as the regular form 
of address for a particular individual, nor what element it really is: personal name 
or family name.  Has the first element (a common choice) been used because it 
conforms with Australian English patterns of address (which the individual has 
conformed with out of politeness), or because this would be the element used in 
comparable situations in the individual's home country, i.e. in situations assessed as 
friendly but non-intimate and requiring some deference?  
Apart from distribution, there are phonological and/or morphological clues to the 
identification of many family names. Family names originating as patronymics are 
readily identifiable from affixes, e.g. Celtic prefixes Mc - or Mac - and O' , 
Germanic suffixes -sen (Scandinavian)  and -son (English), also the English 
genitival -s found in such names as Roberts, Collins, Wilkins etc.  Many other 
formative elements are also recognised as being characteristic of family names, e.g. 
English  -on , -field , German  -mann , -berg , Slavic  -ski , Greek -os , -polis.  A 
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third factor in identification is that the lexical set of family names is much larger 
than that of personal names (presumably because of the diverse sources of such 
names) so family names will tend to be the lower frequency element in a full name.  
A fourth factor is that family names will often mark ethnic ancestry, even though 
the actual membership of that ethnic group may be many generations ago, to a 
much greater extent than is the case for personal names.  Hence one finds names 
such as  
Italian  Barassi, Santamaria, Campese , Toppano   
French  de Mestre, Le Mesurier    
German  Kramer, Hinze, Wiese  
Celtic McManus, Ryan , Walsh   
combined with Anglo personal names such as Ron, Bob, David, Peta, Leonie, 
Susan,  Frank,  Russell,  Barbara, Peter among well-known contemporary 
Australians in a variety of walks of life. It should be noted that the range of such 
family names in Australian public life is still small, despite the massive post-World 
War Two immigration program. The children and grandchildren of immigrants are 
increasingly making their names known in sport and popular entertainment and one 
can expect the number of non-Anglo names in the public domain to increase as the 
children of the immigrants increasingly move into the professions, the arts, 
business and politics.  
 
5.3.1  Hypocorism and full form (family name) 
Basically the same set of paradigmatic contrasts operates with family name as does 
for personal name.  The two differences are that there do not seem to be 
reduplicated forms of family name as there are for personal name (presumably  
reflecting the origin of such forms in vocatives addressed to small children) and 
that the set of suffixes available for use with family names differs somewhat from 
that detailed above for personal names: some personal name options do not occur 
with family name, but some further suffixes or formative elements are available, 
particularly in children's address. 
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At this stage a separate system network for family name is presented in Figure 5.16 
below, but this network does need to be amalgamated with the system network 
already presented for personal names. 
 
   -y 
  -truncated -o 
 -hypocorism   -a 
FAMILY NAME  -suffixed  -s 
 -full form  -kin 
   -le 
   -ers 
 
Figure 5.16  Family name 
 
5.3.2 Truncation (family name) 
The account given in 5.2.4. above of truncation with respect to personal name 
holds true also for family name.  Examples of truncated family name forms 
include:   
Initial syllable: Fish (Fischer); Fitz (Fitzgerald); Hutch (Hutchinson);  Nick 
(Nixon); Pete (Peterson); Simp (Simpson);  Wil (Wilson).   
Initial syllable + immediately following consonant: Newk (Newcombe); Deek (Di 
Castella). (These spellings often used in sporting journalism).  
Non-initial syllable: Gong (Goolagong).  
The characteristically Australian forms ending in -z (discussed  in 5.2.4 above) are 
also found with family names, e.g. Faz (Farrer), Pez (Perrin).  There are also 
bisyllabic truncated forms, e.g. Jezza from Jesaulenko.  In this case one suspects 
that the pure chance of the first two syllables of the name of this well known 
Melbourne footballer happening to have the shape of the Australian English 
familiaritive led to its adoption as a hypocoristic form.  Sydney footballer Tom 
Raudonikis, with no such segment in his name that could be readily assimilated to 
Australian English hypocoristic patterns, is known to team-mates as Ridiculous, 
not merely an excellent example of a nickname  based on phonetic similarity to the 
actual name but possibly to be interpreted as a comment by linguistically intolerant 
speakers of Australian English on difficult names. More than one speaker of 
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Australian English, particularly among older people, consistently uses the word 
Wheelbarrow as a pronouncable alternative to the real name of non-English 
immigrants and intends this use as a comment on such names (perhaps along the 
lines: 'Fancy having to lug around that load of noise'). 
Although some family names do have truncated forms, as has been indicated, the 
vast majority appear not to form them: the most favoured hypocoristic form of 
family name is suffixed rather than truncated.   
5.3.3 Suffixation (family name) 
Much of the account given above in 5.2.5. of suffixation with respect to personal 
names also holds for family names.  Of the seven suffixes dealt with in that section, 
all but -poo is also found with family names, built upon a monosyllabic base of the 
same kind.  One further suffix commonly found with family name forms is -ers , 
e.g. Blunders from Blundell, Throbbers from Throsby. (Cf. Oxford -er in 5.2.5). 
Where many of these suffixes are available as alternative suffixes to the same 
personal name stem and, further, can combine with one another in a quasi-iterative 
fashion, the choice of suffix seems to be much more restricted for any given family 
name and suffix combinations are extremely limited. Choosing twice seems to be 
the maximum number of choices, -s always being the second choice). -y seems the 
favoured suffix with monosyllabic names, e.g.  
 
Brown  to Brownie  King  to Kingie  
Crooks  to Crooksie  Loone  to Loonie  (irresistible!) 
Deex  to Deexie  Potts  to Pottsie  
Jones  to Jonesy  Smith  to Smithy  (also Smitty ) 
though the use of this suffix is not restricted to monosyllabic family names, e.g.  
 
Edwards  to Eddie Poulton   to Polly   
Fitzsimmons  to Fitzy Sullivan  to Sully 
Freudenberg  to Freudy 
In none of these cases does an alternative suffix seem possible.  Some names which 
can take an  -y suffix can also take -o , e.g. Robby or Robbo from Robinson or 
Roberts(on), and Ryan to either Ryany or Ryano (both forms used to a heavily-built 
footballing informant, so one suspects that the -o form may be deliberately 
homophonous with rhino , maybe simply in relation to size, but possibly also 
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because of football-playing style). Most family name forms in -o, however, seem to 
take only that suffix, e.g. Timperley to Timpo, Devlin to Devo, Pilkington to Pilko, 
Scheding to Schedo, Singleton to Singo, Campese to Campo, Dermott or Dermody 
to Dermo. 
In at least one instance , -o alternates with -a , e.g. Absalom to Abo /Abso or Abba, 
but it is the -a form which is apparently most regularly used to this informant (who 
is not in the age group where this form is likely to be connected to the Swedish 
pop-group Abba). 
As was the case with personal names, -a seems highly restricted: the only regular 
occurrence of it with family names seems to be in the form Macka or Macker, 
derived from any name beginning with Mc  or Mac .   
-s seems to occur mainly attached to monsyllabic truncated forms of bisyllabic 
family names, e.g. Hoges from Hogan, Rolls from Rowling, Shooms from 
Schumack, Turps from Turpie, Wheels from Wheeler.  Again, no other suffix seems 
possible.   
My only example of -kin is mystery-writer Ngaio Marsh's detective character, 
Roderick Alleyn, addressing his offsider affectionately as Foxkin.  Since this suffix 
does not seem to be common with personal names, one might expect it to be even 
rarer in family name form.  
Family name forms suffixed with -le always seem to have a final -s suffix as well, 
e.g. Begley to Beegles  (?vowel change or orthographic error? From written 
questionaire data); Bradley to Braddles; Wigg to Wiggles (Davies 1977); Wimsey 
to Wimbles (Dorothy Sayers' detective character. Note again the inserted 
homorganic stop commented on above). Wigg could also presumably  become 
Wiggy, but there seems no obvious alternative suffix for any of the other names 
listed here.   
The suffix not included in the list of suffixes available for personal name forms, -
ers  as in Throsby to Throbbers, Blundell to Blunders, seems to be used in these 
two instances to produce forms which, while being clearly deriveable from their 
respective full forms by a process of truncation followed by suffixation, 
nevertheless have something of the flavour of nicknames in that the derived form 
has a meaning not present in the original name.  In other cases, this flavour is 
absent. Thielke (1938/39: 316) cites Wedders from Wedderburn and Bodders from 
Bodsham (examples from British novels) 
205 
 
Morgan et al. (1979), in their study of nicknames among British school children, 
note a variety of forms which I would treat as suffixed forms of family name rather 
than as nicknames.  They cite as suffixes most of a set of 'standard endings' noted 
by the Opies as 'a distinctive feature of juvenile parlance ' (Opie & Opie 1959: 
155), viz  -ass, -bug, -cat, -dick, -gog, -sy, -ey, (the last two seen as variants of the 
same suffix) and add to these -oh and -rat  (Morgan et al., p. 39). Their work 
suggests then that a further set of suffixes, characteristic of children's language, 
exists and further that one can choose iteratively from both sets. For example, one 
of the derived forms of the family name Smith they cite is Smithkinsbug, with the 
suffix sequence  -y, -kin, -s, -bug.  (Note that in this kind of sequence a 'child' 
suffix can occur after -s, which is normally in final position in a suffix sequence). 
The morphological status of many of these elements seems more like that of free 
lexeme (used specifically for pejorative compound-formation) than suffix, 
however. Where Morgan et al. provide very few examples of the use of any of 
these elements, the Opies provide examples for all the endings they note. They do 
not, however, as claimed by Morgan et al., treat them as nicknames per se (though 
many are regularly used as vocatives, in appropriate circumstances, and could 
perhaps become regular nicknames for individuals).  Some examples will give the 
flavour:   
 
-ass creep-ass 
-bug newbug 
-cat copy-cat, stare-cat 
-dick clever-dick 
-gog wellygogs (Wellington boots) 
-guts* greedy-guts, grizzle-guts 
-pot* fuss-pot, stink-pot 
-puss* sour-puss 
-sides* sobersides 
(*omitted without explanation from Morgan et al's list of 'suffixes'). The high 
incidence of the use of hyphens is one indication that most of these are being 
treated as compounds rather than suffixed forms.  (See Chapter 6 for a more 
comprehensive account of compounding, especially in forms used for pejorative 
address).  
 
Six 
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The grammar of non-name vocatives 
 
 
This chapter will focus on items other than names used as vocatives, i.e. nominal 
groups consisting of Head only or of Modifier + Head. The multivariate analysis of 
types of modification proposed in Halliday (1985) is used as the basis for the 
account provided. It should be noted that a large proportion of the non-name 
vocatives commonly used in address consist of Head only, e.g. lass, son, dear, 
mate, boys and girls, ladies and gentlemen, kids, sweetheart, twit, slowcoach. Some 
of these will accept modification, but not all of the same kind or to the same extent. 
The chapter distinguishes between Heads usually used as vocatives either 
unmodified or minimally modified and those which are capable of considerable 
modification. Organisation of the set of nominals occurring as Head into semantic 
fields turns out to be culturally revealing. This is particularly the case for Heads 
which accept modification. Many of these are strongly attitudinal, identifying those 
to whom such items are addressed as insiders or as outsiders: as the people we love 
and care for (in which case, interestingly, words to some extent fail us) or as 
transgressors of some putative social norm (in which case we keep on reinventing 
new words, relexicalising to keep the attitudinal force from lessening). The 
considerable imbalance in size of the list of items with negative compared to 
positive attitudinal orientation, there being many fewer positive than negative 
items, raises important questions about the use of such items. particularly as terms 
of address, as a mechanism for enforcing social conformity.  
Modified attitudinal nominal groups as vocatives have structural peculiarities 
which call for an extension of the basic nominal group structure potential assumed 
in Halliday 1985: Deictic ^ Numerator ^ Epithet ^ Classifier ^ Thing ^ Qualifier. 
(Note that Qualifier seems to occur less commonly in attitudinal vocatives than in 
other attitudinal nominal groups). In order to adequately account for some of the 
kinds of nominal groups found as vocatives, this description needs to be 
supplemented, particularly with respect to sub-classification of the functional 
element Epithet. The key feature of the description to be presented below is the 
potential for iterative selection of sub-categories of Epithet (and to a limited extent 
Classifier), more selections from more categories realising stronger attitude. This 
form of amplification (see 3.3.3), 'selecting again' being the grammatical equivalent 
of the phonological 'saying it louder', can be supplemented by a range of 
grammatical and lexical forms of intensification and by various phonological 
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choices, including alliteration, assonance, and exaggerations of normal phonetic 
and intonational features, e.g. vowel lengthening, speeding up or slowing down of 
speech rate. I will also comment more briefly on special realisations of the 
categories Deictic and Numerative in nominal groups used as vocatives.  
The primary focus of the chapter is descriptive, with major sections devoted to 
Heads and to Modifiers. Before focussing on wordlists and the specification of 
structure potentials, however, some recapitulation of the way in which the term 
attitude is being used and some preliminary comment on the realisation of attitude 
within the nominal group are called for.   
The previous discussion of attitude (3.2.3 above) distinguished between attitude 
viewed as 'emotion' and as 'evaluation', the former focusing more on the personal, 
on internal affective states, and the latter on questions of judgement and of 
asssessment. The evaluative dimension was seen as 'less personal than social, 
deriving ultimately from attachment to particular ideologies.' Lexis was seen as the 
critical meeting point of the two perspectives, insofar as lexis looks two ways: 
'down' to the personal and 'up' to the social. It is now time to explore a little of that 
territory.  
The two obvious realisations of attitude in the nominal group involve the 
deployment of attitudinal lexis and of intensifiers of various kinds. Attitudinally-
marked choices realising the functional categories Epithet and Thing are 
particularly significant, e.g. a wonderful holiday, an awful mess, you stupid twit.  
The first indication of structural as well as lexical realisation is the observation that 
attitudinal Epithets, e.g. splendid, silly, fantastic, horrible … tend to precede non-
attitudinal (experiential) ones within nominal groups. (Halliday 1985: 163. Cf. 
Quirk et al. 1985: 1339). Halliday's observation to this effect is in fact the only 
structurally specific reference he makes to this interpersonal feature of the nominal 
group and the phenomenon is initially somewhat problematic, in terms of his 
functional grammar, since sequence can be seen as structurally more relevant to 
experiential or even textual rather than to interpersonal systems. There is a 
substantial parallel, however, between the sequence of types of modifiers within 
the nominal group (Deictic preceding attitudinal Epithet preceding non-attitudinal 
Epithet) and the sequencing of textual, interpersonal and experiential thematic 
elements within Theme at clause rank. This parallel indicates that the location of 
interpersonal phenomena after the textual and prior to the experiential is a more 
generalisable phenomenon and has implications for understanding one of the 
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mechanisms by which subject/reading positions are constructed by the use of 
language in discourse.  
Initial Epithet position is only one of a series of positions within nominal group 
structure in which attitude can be realised, however, and realisation through the 
Epithet function itself is only one of its manifestations. Attitude in the nominal 
group thus functions prosodically, as Halliday proposes for interpersonal systems 
(Halliday 1979, 1985), but because it is realised through the lexico-grammatical 
stratum rather than through the phonological stratum, its realisations are located 
discontinuously, however cumulative its effects. In investigating the realisation of 
attitude, one needs to take into account the location of potential realisation points, 
the forms of such realisations and the cumulative effect of the iterative potential 
available.  
The first realisation of attitude within the nominal group, as initial Epithet, does 
have particular significance: it is commonly, after all, the first content word of the 
structure. Like a key signature announcing the tonality of the music it precedes, an 
initial attitudinal Epithet announces the relevant attitudinal 'tone' whose scope or 
domain is, initially, the whole nominal group, but ultimately the entire utterance. 
The effect is to foreground attitudinally and/or ideologically-salient information 
and 'background' other experiential content. I have previously commented on this 
phenomenon in relation to gender, in terms of the particular example of a film 
review's characterisation of the two central characters in the film Cal as the 
unemployed 19-year-old Cal and a pretty Catholic librarian:   
 
… there is a curious effect in the second group whereby the very presence of the 
word pretty leaches out some of the experiential force of Catholic (important in 
that the film in which these two are characters is set in contemporary Northern 
Ireland) and librarian (a job for which a relatively high level of education is 
required and which consequently has a certain amount of prestige attached to it). It 
is hard to take seriously a Catholic librarian who is pretty - a 19-year-old Catholic 
librarian  would be someone a little more substantial. Age is a significant 
diminisher of potency but gender is more powerful, it would seem.  
The linguistic status of pretty in the example cited would seem to be the key to 
understanding what is going on: it is attitudinal as well as referential but probably 
more strongly the former, i.e. it is interpersonal. Interpersonal meanings habitually 
spread themselves through linguistic structures, and what seems to be happening 
here is that the interpersonal force of the word, bolstered by ideological 
considerations, is spreading into the more experientially oriented part of the group. 
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Further, the word pretty itself invokes those genres where all that is required of a 
woman is that she be young and attractive (and unattached), everything else being 
irrelevant background information, but where a man is expected to be someone of 
substance, both personally and in the public world of affairs. Women are always 
liable to be represented as if they're characters from a Mills and Boon romance, but 
one does have a choice with men. (Poynton 1985/90: 61-2) 
Part of my purpose in quoting this is to make the point that in talking about 
attitude, one is not simply talking about the transient and purely personal, as 
Halliday's term 'speaker's subjective attitude', with respect to attitudinal Epithets 
(1985: 163), and Quirk et al's reference to 'emotive, evaluative, or subjective 
adjectives' (1985: 1339) both imply. Except when one is talking about verbal 
responses to events like hitting your thumb instead of the nail, or missing the bus 
when it's raining and you haven't got an umbrella, attitude or evaluation is 
fundamentally ideological, i.e. it is cultural rather than purely personal. The 
'emotion' or 'feelings' that are associated with attitudinal language are undoubtedly 
experienced by the individual as personal - this is central to the mechanism of the 
transmission and sustaining of ideologies, committing the individual to the 
ideological by means of what is felt to be right and proper. This is part of why 
attitudinal meanings are so powerful, constituting force fields which run over the 
top of experiential meanings.  
Paradoxically, then, in one sense it is of no particular significance where the 
attitudinals come, either in the nominal group or in the entire utterance, since their 
effect, wherever they occur, is to treat the whole utterance as their domain. In 
another sense, however, it is indeed significant that attitudinal precede experiential 
Epithets, that the presence of attitude is established either prior to or 
simultaneously with the establishment of the exact nature of the experiential 
domain it is most immediately relevant to.    
Where insults or endearments are exchanged, by means of strongly attitudinal 
vocatives, it is understandable that the attitudinal loading is the focus of attention. 
To read this attitudinal loading purely in terms of personal emotion, however, is to 
fail to attend to the cultural significance of the semantic domains from which the 
specific lexis is drawn. Very few lexical items are purely attitudinal; even those 
which are closest to being such, e.g. in groups with iterated (attitudinal) Epithet 
such as you dirty filthy rotten so-and-so (see 6.2.3 below), retain some remnant of 
contact with the experiential meaning of such items elsewhere. An examination of 
the semantic domains of such attitudinal usage reveals that the regularly used 
vocative items draw extensively from domains which specify what is socially 
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un/acceptable in appearance, behaviour and identity. The use of such items 
constitutes, then, a mechanism for enforcing social conformity.  
The basic grammatical resources for attitudinal amplification within the nominal 
group are:  
1. The use of swearwords as intensifiers either of Epithet or of Thing. 
Swearwords are of varying taboo weighting (Taylor 1976), e.g. damn, bloody, 
fucking.  As intensifiers of Epithet, all these can be used with positive as well as 
negative Heads: damn nice/awful, bloody good/horrible, fucking 
marvellous/disgusting.  As intensifiers of Thing, swearwords seem to be more 
widely used with negative than with positive Heads, though  bloody  is used with 
some positive Heads (bloody bitch, bloody beauty, but*bloody darling). Other 
swearwords contributing to amplification, either by intensification (shitting ) or as 
Pre-Classifier (bastard/shit … of a …), seem to always accompany negative Heads. 
One should not assume, however, that the use of negatively-oriented lexis always 
means negative attitude. Among males, especially, apparently negative forms are 
used to convey positive attitude: you bloody mongrel can be a term of affection, in 
the right context and said in the right way.  Note also flaming and blithering, which 
for some speakers are virtual swearwords and function in similar ways. They too 
can intensify either Epithet or Thing: flaming stupid woman driver, flaming 
drongo, blithering idiot.  
2. The use of overt intensifiers such as very, really, total(ly), utter(ly), 
absolute(ly), complete(ly). These can be attached (in appropriate form) to either 
Epithet or Thing (really nice, utterly charming, complete idiot), and can occur 
iteratively (really really great, absolutely utterly devastating, completely utterly 
totally magnificant).  
3. Iterative selection of attitudinal Epithet, involving either simple repetition 
of the same item (e.g. you silly silly thing, a wonderful wonderful  day) or iteration 
of the category but not the item (e.g. you sweet darling wonderful child). Halliday 
(1985: 164)  refers to this phenomenon of iterated sequences of formally distinct 
but functionally equivalent items in terms of synonymy, but while some such 
sequences certainly involve experiential synonomy (e.g. great big; dirty filthy), 
others do not, e.g. dirty lousy rotten so-and-so). This last issue will receive more 
detailed attention in 6.2.3 below.  
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6.1  Heads 
A certain proportion of regularly used non-name vocatives seem not to be 
modifiable, or capable only of restricted modification. Most, however, can be 
modified. The modifiable nominals include a substantial array of 'attitudinal' 
nominals. The set of nominals that can be used as vocatives effectively constitutes 
an open set since, as well as productive compounding processes regularly used in 
attitudinal vocatives, a vast array of lexical items can be used as 'nonce' vocatives, 
i.e. coined for a particular occasion. Regularly used attitudinal vocatives draw 
particularly heavily from certain semantic domains. There is substantial 
overlexicalisation or proliferation in many of these domains, related both to the 
taboo status of many of the meanings involved and to their status as slang or 
colloquial speech (v. Halliday1976b; Wescott 1976/80, on proliferation of slang 
terms. See also Stanley 1977 on proliferation of pejorative lexis referring to 
women).  
Because of the essentially evanescent nature of slang, any attempt to make a 
complete inventory of vocative items in current use, even within a single social 
group, is doomed to failure. What is possible is to indicate the dimensions of the 
semantic space occupied by the set of widely-used vocatives, particularly those 
involving criticism or insult. This semantic space would appear to remain relatively 
stable over longer periods of time, and to be of considerable significance in 
identifying key values of a culture (mention has already been made 4.2 above of 
the significance of insult with respect to understanding the basic values of a 
culture). Attitudinal vocatives do not only display such values, of course, but use 
them as ways of indicating perceived problems in the social order and/or as means 
of enforcing social conformity.  
In many cases, such values are realised in both Modifier and Head. However, a 
large proportion of those items used as Heads where little or no modification 
occurs are general words which are non-gradable, i.e. which will not accept grading 
words such as absolute, utter, complete as modifiers. The categories of non-name 
vocatives which are either not modified at all or are only minimally modified 
include:  
i. Pronouns, definite and indefinite: you, everyone, everybody, somebody. 
These do not seem to accept pre-modification but do occur with Qualifier(s), e.g. 
you over there with the silly look on your face.  
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ii. Ordinary titles without a name attached: miss, mister, missus. These cannot 
be modified, other than by the diminutive little  in the case of miss addressed to a 
child.   
iii. Kin terms:Mother/Mum(my), Father/Dad(dy), Aunt(y), Uncle, Grand-
mother/Grandma/Gran(ny), Grandfather, sis(ter), bro(th(er) (also brer), son, 
daughter (much less commonly), etc. Some of these can be used by those with no 
actual kin relationship to the addressee, e.g. son is widely used in Australia to 
young males (if the speaker is sufficiently older than the addressee, it can also be 
used to older males); the 'immediate' kin terms, Mother, Father, sister, brother, 
son, daughter are used in religious settings, with my (dear) possible as pre-
modifiers of son, daughter. Sister and brother are also used in political contexts, 
e.g. trade unions, feminist groups. (Some of these items reappear in other 
categories below).     
Many kin terms function as proper names, as the initial capital letters would 
suggest. These, as is the case with personal and family proper names, are in general 
not modified, but can occur with restricted modification: Deictic my, Epithet dear, 
sweet (and other endearments) and the diminutive little or the augmentative big, 
e.g. dear little Mummy, my big son, my darling daughter, little brother.  Kin terms 
for aunts and uncles are commonly combined with (personal) proper names, e.g. 
Auntie Rose, Uncle Stan, forming nominal group complexes. Kin terms for 
grandparents also occur in nominal group complexes, more usually combined with 
family than personal name. e.g. Grandma Thompson. Such complexes are more 
likely, however, to be used as reference items than as terms of address. Less 
commonly, kin terms for parents can combine with personal names, especially in 
families where parents have divorced and remarried, e.g. Mummy Susan for a 
stepmother.  
iv. Solidarity/leadership nominals: e.g. mate, comrade(s), pal, partner, friend 
(s), sister(s), brother(s), boss, chief. These in general are not modified, other than 
by Deictic my and Epithet diminutive little or augmentative big, e.g. little mate, my 
pal, big boss.  
v. General nouns referring to people in terms of gender and/or age: woman, 
man, lady/ladies, gentlemen, ladies & gentlemen, boy/s, girl/s, boys & girls/girls & 
boys, son(ny), kid/s, child/ren, youngster/s, baby. These are generally not modified, 
but the singulars (with the exception of son(ny)) will accept my dear/good/little 
(the last mostly to children).  
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vi. Occupational terms: driver, teacher, waiter, officer. These are not common 
in Australian English, and always occur without modification.  
vii. Client terms: customers, contestants, viewers, listener(s), reader(s). These 
will accept Qualifiers as well as Deictics, e.g. (all) you customers looking for 
bargains, (all) you listeners out there.  
viii. Groups/collections: collectives gang, family, team, class etc. are not 
generally modified. You two…, you lot, (you) guys, (you) people will accept 
Qualifier, as well as Deictic you, e.g. you two over there in the corner, you people 
with your heads in the sand . Some Epithet modification is also possible with some 
of these items, e.g. you lovely people, you lazy lot.   
Gradable (attitudinal) nouns, on the other hand, can be modified. These are much 
more numerous as vocative types (though not necessarily as tokens) than non-
gradable nouns and fall into a number of semantic categories. Gradable nouns used 
as or in vocatives deal with a broad range of mostly negative meanings. These are 
used to criticise, insult, deride though the experiential meaning of the item used 
may or may not be relevant to the context in which it is used. Thus people can be 
insulted by being referred to in terms of their actual race/ethnicity, their known or 
assumed sexual preference, their sexual activity (only negative when referring to 
women), or a specific moral failing on a particular occasion; but some at least of 
such relevant items can also be used as general terms of abuse, e.g. poofter, 
bludger, moll. There are far fewer positive than negative attitudinals. The major 
positive category is that of  
(i) Endearments: dear, darling, sweetheart, pet, love(y) …   
Some positively-oriented gradable nouns are included among the following 
categories, but for the most part they are negatively-oriented: 
(ii) General abusive terms: bastard, bitch, so-and-so, wretch, stinker, mug, 
pain (in the arse/bum), nuisance … 
(iii) Specific morally undesirable attribute: bludger, wowser, liar, whinger, 
bully, smart-arse, blabbermouth, nerd, wimp … This set is constantly being 
extended. A sub-set of such terms applies to children: sook, cry-baby, teacher's pet, 
brat, sissy.   
(iv) Homosexuality, male & female: poof(ter), pansy, faggot, dyke, lezzo … 
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(v) Sexual activity/promiscuity (negative if female, positive if male): whore, 
tart, slut, moll … (V. Stanley 1977); stud, spunk … 
(vi) Intellectual deficit: dill, fuckwit, idiot, moron, lame-brain … 
(vii) Race/ethnicity: wog, Chink, Pom, boong, Pom(my), kiwi, eye-tye, kike, 
dago, nip …  
(viii) Physical characteristics:  
 height: squirt, titch, pipsqueak, shorty, lofty …  
 size: fatso, skinny …  
 physical disability: gimpy  (=lame; ?still in use), spazzo  (=spastic), four-
eyes (wears glasses) … 
 hair type/colour: red, blue (for redheads), blondie, curly).  
Note that many of these become permanent nicknames. Some of them also involve 
the phenomenon of inversion, whereby a word with the opposite meaning from 
what one would expect is used, e.g. a red-headed person is called blue(y) and a tall 
person shorty. The use of such nominalised adjectival forms is common in 
vocatives.  
(ix) Animal:  
 positive or negative: creature .   
 positive: lamb, possum, duck/y, kitten …  
 negative: animal, beast, galah, pig, donkey, dingo, crow …  
(x) Supernatural/monstrous being 
 positive: angel, cherub … 
 negative: devil, imp, fiend, monster…  
(xi) Inanimate object (food and non-food):  
 positive: honey, sugar, sausage, pumpkin, pie, dumpling … ; button, 
 doll, poppet, petal, blossom …  
 negative: peanut, fruitcake … ; clod, log, lump; bag …  
(xii) Body products/genitalia: turd, (dead)shit, fart, prick, cunt, arsehole …  
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As well as this extensive repertoire of nominals, there is also a productive system 
for forming abusive compounds. Many such compounds are formed by combining 
body-part words such as 
 -head ,  
 -face   
 -features   
as the second element of the compound with words for human sexual parts or body-
products, producing compounds such as dickhead, shitface, cuntfeatures.  These 
and other body-part words such as  
 -mouth ,  
 -guts   
 -beak/nose   
can also combine with less taboo items to produce compounds such as pie-face, 
nuisance-face, smartarse, butterfingers, faceache, blabbermouth, stickybeak/nose, 
sleepyhead, loudmouth, grizzleguts, gobbleguts. These vocatives are in regular use 
in Australian English, but the compounding process can also be used to create new 
and nonce forms, e.g. slobberchops (to a baby eating messily), miseryguts, 
spunkybum, and fish-face, fur-face, whiskers-face (to a cat). This process is also 
used to produce new items referring to people in terms of ethnic/racial identity, e.g. 
pizza-face (Italian) and plate-face (Korean).  
As indicated above, the use of nominalised adjectival forms such as shorty  and 
bluey is common. The Head in a vocative can also consist of an adjective, usually 
positive e.g. sexy, spunky, handsome, gorgeous, beautiful … (As explained in 
Chapter 4, these items are analysed as nominal groups, with the Head realised by 
Epithet rather than Thing). Epithet as Head is unusual: Halliday (1985: 173) notes 
that 'Epithets and Classifiers do not normally function as Head, the exception being 
the superlative…' Halliday goes on to note that the superlative 'resembles a 
Numerative of the ordering kind rather than an Epithet' and that 'With other 
Epithets … if Thing is not made explicit it is realized as a substitute one/ones … 
The substitute is then both Head and Thing.' O beautiful one may have once been a 
possible English vocative, but is no longer so: the use of the substitution item one 
would now be regarded as archaic. One possible reason for this uncommon choice 
of Epithet as Head in vocatives may be by analogy with the superlative, itself used 
to convey attitude.  
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6.2  Modifiers 
The overall structure potential of non-name vocatives can be characterised as: 
D ^ N ^ Ea ^ E ^ C ^ T ^ Q  
where Ea = attitudinal Epithet, preceding non-attitudinal Epithet.   
There are differences not only in terms of the actual lexical realisations, but also 
structurally, between those vocatives involving positive and those involving 
negative attitude. Epithet is the functional category most elaborated in relation to 
attitudinal loading. A double description of Epithet is needed, the structure 
potential differing substantially for negatively-oriented compared with positively-
oriented attitude. This parallels the more extensive range of negative compared 
with positive items realising Head. In what follows, special features of each 
functional category in relation to their use in vocatives will be discussed.  
 
6.2.1 Deictic 
Many nominal vocatives are used without any modification, some or all of the 
time. Vocatives are inherently second person, so it is hardly surprising that the 
second-person pronoun form you  should commonly appear as the initial item in 
nominal group vocatives. Quirk et al. (1985) see such forms as appositional, but 
there are good reasons for proposing that the you  in items such as you darling and 
you bastard is Deictic. There are two arguments for such an interpretation, the first 
on the grounds of the nature of the deixis involved in using you in such structures, 
the second because of the parallelism between such instances and the use of my, 
which is clearly Deictic (e.g. my  dear, my friend). You  would seem to be the 
oppropriate form for making explicit that the person being spoken to is the one 
being referred to. If a vocative will accept modification at all, then you is always a 
possible element in that modification, this possibility (as proposed in Chapter 4) 
constituting a useful grammatical test for deciding whether or not a vocative is 
present. You used in this way is paralleled by my, which occupies the same position 
in structure and is clearly Deictic because it is possessive.  
All attitudinal vocatives make reference to the addressee from the point of view of 
the speaker rather than from the point of view of the addressee, but the choice 
between you  and my  involves a choice between a form which emphasises the 
otherness of the addressee and one which makes explicit the fact that speaker's 
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point of view is indeed being expressed by incorporating the first-person pronoun 
into the structure. (This is the same difference Halliday (1985: 333) refers to as 
'subjective' vs 'objective' orientation in relation to modality, i.e. overtly rather than 
covertly coding speaker's point of view). It is a difference that makes sense in 
relation to the different distribution of the two forms depending on whether the 
attitude involved is positive or negative. My is restricted in its occurrence to 
vocatives involving positive attitude, whereas you can be used in vocatives 
involving either positive or negative attitude. Ascribing negatively-valued 
attributes to an addressee, therefore, produces structures which distance the speaker 
from the speech act, whereas acts ascribing positively-valued attributes offer the 
option of distancing or including the speaker.  
In address to children, apparently third person possessive forms such as Mummy's, 
Grandpa's can appear as Deictic. Such forms derive from the use of names or kin 
titles rather than the pronoun I in talk to young children, presumably in order to 
decrease the problem potentially posed for small children by the two pronoun 
forms denoting speaker and hearer depending on who is adopting which speech 
role at any particular point. Such forms are properly regarded as first person, 
equivalent to my. There is also a small number of fixed vocative forms using the 
possessive your as Deictic (Your 
Eminence/Highness/Holiness/Honour/Ladyship/Lordship/Majesty/ 
Grace/Worship), but this use no longer seems productive.   
More noteworthy are uses of my in forms which are not obviously or necessarily 
positive in attitudinal orientation apart from the use of the word my itself, e.g. the 
condescending my dear/good lady/fellow/man/woman, my friend  used sarcastically 
in debate and the somewhat patronising my son used by Christian clergy. In the 
case of clergy laying claim to non-existent family relationships, there seems to be 
both a not-too-inaccessible metaphor involved (the church constituting a family) 
and an assumption of benevolent intent in the relationship of clergy to laity, both 
together justifying the use of the positively-associated my. The other cases seem 
more ironic. In the case of the aggressive or sarcastic use of my friend the 
phenomenon of inversion would seem to be involved, i.e. the use of terms in ways 
which reverse their usual attitudinal loading. Inversion involving the use of 
otherwise negatively-loaded terms such as bastard and mongrel as 'affectionate' 
terms of address is frequently commented on in relation to Australian address 
practices. The negative use of otherwise positively-oriented terms seems less 
common.  
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Numeratives are not common in vocatives, but duals (you two, you pair of …) as 
well as larger numbers (you three/four … )do occur. Larger numbers still are 
generally dealt with either by means of collectives or plural general nouns. There is 
also a small set of items (e.g. bunch of, mob of, pack of) which function as a similar 
kind of complex Numerative to the measure words pack, slice, yard. Halliday 
provides a dual analysis of a pack of cards, with the measure word as Head and 
Thing being what is measured (1985: 174). You pack of drongos would seem to be 
precisely parallel, with pack as Head in the univariate analysis and drongos Thing 
in the multivariate analysis.  
 
6.2.3 Epithet 
Halliday's account of the functional element Epithet in nominal group structure 
sees Epithet as indicating  
some quality of the subset, e.g. old , long , blue , fast . This may be an objective 
property of the thing itself; or it may be an expression of the speaker's subjective 
attitude towards it, e.g. splendid , silly , fantastic . There is no hard and fast line 
between these two; but the former are experiential in function, whereas the latter, 
expressing the speaker's attitude, represent an interpersonal element in the meaning 
of the nominal group. (Halliday 1985: 163) 
Halliday's discussion treads an interesting path between seeing this as a clear-cut 
distinction 'reflected in the grammar in various ways' (the principal grammatical 
distinction being that experiential Epithets are potentially defining whereas 
interpersonal ones are not), and acknowledging that 'There is no hard and fast line 
between these two', that 'in general, the same word may act as either experiential or 
interpersonal Epithet' and that 'there are very few words that serve only an 
attitudinal function.' (ibid).  
Halliday does not, however, deal with the question of possible sub-categories of 
Epithet. There are various accounts of this issue, in the form of discussions of 
adjective sequence in nominal groups (e.g. Fries 1970, Sussex 1974, Dixon 1977, 
Bache 1978), but almost all of them concentrate exclusively on experientially-
oriented meanings and, even when potentially attitudinal items are included, their 
iterative potential and its amplificatory effect are not discussed. Quirk et al. (1985: 
1337-41) provide the most satisfactory account: their grammar is eclectic, they are 
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aware of attitude and take it seriously in relation to modifier sequence, and, perhaps 
most importantly, their work is corpus-based. Their schema for the sub-
classification of modifiers in nominal groups certainly recognises that iteration of 
the function Epithet occurs, but does not allow for the possibility of iteration of 
certain sub-categories of Epithet involving particular kinds of lexical choices. Their 
description will not adequately account for something like you lousy rotten filthy 
bastard .  
The Epithet categories identified from the address data require a double 
description, because the potential differs for negatively-oriented items compared 
with positively-oriented ones. Paralleling the more extensive range of negative 
compared with positive lexis which can function as Head, the potential for negative 
structures is considerably more extensive than that for positive structures.  
The specific structure potentials for positively and negatively attitudinal nominal 
groups can then be characterised as follows:  
 
  +ve D  N E C  T  Q 
 evaluative^size^age^participial 
  -ve D  N E C    T  Q 
  eval^experiential(a)^size^age^colour^part'cpl prov(a)^eval 
 Figure 6.1 Structure potential: attitudinal nominal group 
Key: 
eval(uative): inherently attitudinal, e.g. good, bad, nice, horrible … 
experiential (a): some experiential meaning retained, but strongly attitudinal, e.g. 
filthy, miserable …   
size (small or large): implicitly attitudinal - effectively lexicalised diminutive 
(usually positive) or augmentative (usually negative);  
age (young or old): implicitly attitudinal (or functions as Classifier - see below);  
colour: used to people, refers to race, i.e. is attitudinal;  
participial: commonly combine attitudinal and experiential meanings;  
prov(enance): ethnic/racial/national origin; usually attitudinal, commonly 
pejorative.  
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These structure potentials, and the discussion which follows, are largely derived 
from my data on address forms. Qualifiers are relatively uncommon in such 
nominal groups (as indeed are Modifiers of any kind other than Deictic), though 
seemingly not in other attitudinal nominal groups: see for example the extensive 
range to be found in such a strongly attitudinally-marked text as Christina Stead's 
The Man Who Loved Children (1940). They will not be discussed further.    
   
6.2.3.1 Iterated  Epithet: positive attitude 
Figure 6.2 sets out sample realisations from the address data, for positively-
oriented Epithet (items are arranged in semantic sets where appropriate). Specific 
observations on the categories and examples follow.   
   evaluative   size   age   participial (attitudinal/experiential) 
 dear little young smiling 
 darling tiny   laughing 
 sweet weeny    
 cute itty-bitty old  bouncing 
  teensy-   
 pretty (weensy)  smooching 
 lovely    
 handsome    
 beautiful   NB the use in this position 
 gorgeous   of items such as: 
    
 precious big  blue-eyed 
 wonderful great  curly-headed 
 scrumptious      
    (items analogous in form to 
 good   past participles) 
Figure 6.2 Epithet sequence: positive attitude 
 
Evaluative Epithet:  
1.  Many of the items listed here clearly have some experiential content as well 
as the overt attitudinal meaning: compare beautiful with sweet or good. Iteration 
within this category decreases the experiential and increases the interpersonal 
focus.  
2. Selection within this category is iterative, two or three choices constituting a 
moderate degree of amplification and four or five a high degree. There are three 
kinds of iteration:  
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(i)  repetition of the same item, e.g. you dear dear (Thing);  
(ii) iteration within a semantic field, e.g. you dear darling (Thing), you handsome 
gorgeous (Thing);  
(iii) iteration across semantic fields, e.g. you gorgeous darling good little   (Thing).  
Size Epithet: 
1. Items within either sub-set are likewise iterative, e.g. you little tiny itty-bitty 
(Thing), you great big (Thing), but there is no iteration across sub-sets.  
2. The items little, tiny, big, great clearly do have experiential meaning in 
appropriate contexts, and probably never entirely lose this when used as Epithets. It 
is hard to imagine circumstances in which one would include the Epithet little in a 
vocative addressed to a hulking 6-foot-plus male, though he might well be referred 
to in appropriate circumstances as nothing but a little boy and even given the 
nickname Tiny by his mates. A baby, especially a male baby, can certainly be 
addressed as you great big beautiful (Thing), so largeness may be seen as more 
relative than smallness. Such items do seem to function much more interpersonally 
than experientially, however. The little set seem to be effectively lexicalised 
diminutives, with an inherently positive orientation, and the big set lexicalised 
augmentatives, usually with a negative orientation (e.g. great lump, big boofhead). 
'Big'  words, despite their overt meaning of largeness, do not necessarily amplify to 
a greater extent than other attitudinal items, however. They can have a mitigating 
effect: compare big boofhead or great idiot with stupid fool, where the selection of 
Epithet and Thing from the same semantic field has a stronger amplifying effect 
than the use of big words.    
Age Epithet:  
1. The two items in this category seem to function rather differently. Young  
seems in fact to occur far more frequently as sole Epithet (e.g. you young scamp, 
young lady) than as part of an Epithet sequence (e.g. you dear sweet young thing). 
And while old certainly appears regularly in Epithet sequences, there is some doubt 
about its status as Epithet. Old will not accept intensification with very (one of the 
grammatical tests for distinguishing Classifier from Epithet) in a sequence such as 
you horrible nasty little old man, which suggests that it is a Classifier rather than an 
Epithet. The fact that young is commonly used to children or young people, and 
likewise will not accept very, suggests that it too functions as a Classifier within 
attitudinal nominal groups.  
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2. There is also the use of both words in such forms as you old bastard  and you 
young dog in friendly address between males, where neither may have literal 
application in terms of the addressee's actual age. Old in such usage functions more 
as a marker of solidarity (= 'Our friendship is old, which is part of what gives me 
the licence to call you bastard'), while young  may identify the addressee as 
belonging in terms of behaviour to a category that s/he does not belong to 
chronologically, especially in relation to sexual activity.  
Participial Epithet:  
1. Realisations are clearly experiential but the meanings involved are those that 
have positive value in English-speaking cultures, i.e. are also attitudinal. The items 
included in the list above would mostly be used in address to babies or small 
children, and a large range of participials can be used that refer to actions initiated 
even involuntarily by the child, but not seen as negative by the speaker, e.g. Henny 
Pollitt addresses one of her children as you kissing bug in Stead'sThe Man Who 
Loved Children (1940).  
 
6.2.3.2 Iterated Epithet: negative attitude 
Figure 6.3 sets out sample realisations from the address data, for negatively-
oriented Epithet (items are arranged in semantic sets where appropriate):  
 evaluative experiential/eval size age colour participial 
 dirty fat little old black bludging 
 filthy    brown whinging 
 rotten ugly big young yellow whining 
 lousy  great   moaning 
 stinking lazy    loafing 
      crawling 
 horrible selfish    sticky- 
 nasty     beaking 
 awful stuckup    … 
 revolting      
  messy     
 silly      
 dumb NB participial forms     
 stupid such as whinging ,      
  snivelling  etc. can     
 naughty also be used in this .      
 bad position     
 wicked 
Figure 6.3 Epithet sequence: negative attitude 
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Evaluative Epithet:  
Both observations made above for positive evaluative Epithets apply also to 
negative ones:  
1. Most items listed here potentially have some experiential as well as 
attitudinal meaning, with the attitudinal predominating, especially when iterative 
selections are made from this category.  
2. Iteration is possible both within a single semantic domain and across 
domains, e.g. you filthy rotten lousy (Thing), you bad wicked (Thing), you nasty 
horrible wicked (Thing). There do seem to be some limits on iterative combinations 
across domains, but I do not have sufficient data to be able to specify these 
precisely.  
Experiential/Evaluative Epithet:  
1. Items realising this sub-category clearly have attitudinal force but are much 
more overtly experiential in meaning than items in the first category.  
2. Particular choices made would generally have some relation to features of the 
appearance or behaviour of the addressee:  skinny to the slim or even average-
sized; fat to anyone not slim; messy to someone who doesn't maintain the speaker's 
standards of tidiness; selfish to someone who won't do what the speaker wants them 
to do. Ugly can be used to virtually anyone, however, suggesting that it is more like 
a purely evaluative Epithet.  
Size Epithet:  
1. The word little itself is available but not any of the more overtly diminutive 
alternatives that are available in positively-oriented attitudinal vocatives. This 
seems consistent with a reading of little forms as diminutives, i.e. inherently 
positively-oriented.  
2. Great and big are both available and can be used iteratively, which is what 
one would expect from their basically augmentative function.  
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Age Epithet:  
Much the same observations apply as for positive vocatives, but old may occur 
with items intervening between it and the Head, e.g. you lousy old bludging Pommy 
bastard. The solution may be to include old in the experiential/evaluative category 
as well as in the age category.   
Colour Epithet:  
The examples I am aware of from address to people all have racial connotations 
(black, brown, yellow) so could be regarded as Classifiers, along with the age 
Epithets, except that further Epithets can follow them, e.g. you black bludging 
bastard (bludging black bastard is also possible). Dabke (1977: 82) notes the use 
ofwhite in pejorative address to a football umpire (you white mongrel), the 
reference here being not to skin colour but to identifying clothing.  
Participial Epithet:  
The same kind of observations apply as for positive vocatives, except that the 
orientation is now negative rather than positive.  
 
6.2.4 Classifier 
As for Epithet, the potential differs somewhat for positive and negative attitude, 
with negative structures having a slightly larger set of categories. For positive 
vocatives, there seem to be a small set of items realising this function, including 
darling, angel, baby, and selection is iterative. Thus a form like Mummy's precious 
little darling angel baby boy is possible. There are two categories of Classifier in 
negative vocatives: a provenance category, which includes usually derogatory 
terms referring to an addressee's race or place of origin, e.g. wog, abo, Pommy; and 
a small more general abusive set, selection within which is iterative, including such 
items as mug, mongrel, dingo. Mug copper is attested and forms like mongrel dingo 
abo bastard are possible.  
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Coda 
 
One further aspect of vocative structure, the question of compounds or complexes 
has not yet been addressed. These are certainly used in address, and include 
combinations such as:  
personal name + family name,  
iterated personal name,  
title + family name,  
iterated personal name + family name,  
personal name + other nominal (especially endearment) 
The nature of the relation between the elements comprising the complex does vary, 
basically involving the question of whether the relation between the elements is 
one of equal status (parataxis) or dependence (hypotaxis). Not a great deal depends 
on this issue in terms of address practice, however, but it is of considerable interest 
as far as the operation of the logical metafunction with respect to interpersonal 
systems is concerned.  
Of special interest are several interconnected issues arising from the material 
presented in both Chapters 5 & 6, involving the slang/colloquial status of much of 
the data and the question of overlexicalisation or proliferation, where lexical 
proliferation can be interpreted as a cultural form of amplification. A further issue, 
possibly related, is the fact that negatively compared with positively oriented 
attitudinal vocatives display a greater number of lexical types and more extensive 
scope for amplification. The question of the distribution of such items in actual use 
in relation to age, gender, class etc. will be the focus of attention in Part III.   
The question of proliferation will be taken a little further in this coda than simply 
itsobvious relevance to multiply-suffixed personal names and attitudinal niminal 
groups with iterated Epithets. Dealing first with hypocoristic name forms, the 
progressive piling-up of suffixes has not merely a cumulative or intensifying 
function but correlates in a very specific way with situation. There would seem to 
be an inverse relationship between the degree of recursion and the range of 
situations within which such forms may be used appropriately, such that maximally 
recursive forms are only used to an extremely small number of addressees with 
whom one has an ongoing intimate relationship (probably only spouse/lover, 
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children and possibly siblings and a few extremely close friends) and even then 
only in interactions not accessible to outsiders.  
Parallel to this use of recursive name-forms is the use of endearments, the use of 
pet-names and the creation of nicknames. In all of these the same phenomenon 
recurs: the use of a number of parallel means of expressing the same meaning. And 
the existence of four methods of doing this is the same phenomenon at a higher 
level, where the expressive techniques range from lexicalisation of affect (seen in 
endearments such as dear, sweetheart, darling, etc.), though the formation of 
diminutive forms of names, to an implicit metaphorical technique in the case of 
pet-names, i.e. calling someone angel, baby, possum, even wombat, is saying 
something like 'I think of you as one thinks of something that is little and 
human/little and furry' etc (v. Wierzbicka 1980). All of these techniques make use 
of the general linguistic code that is available to all speakers of English, while the 
fourth technique for expressing intimacy by means of vocatives does something a 
little different: it involves the creation of elements of a new code, unique to a 
particular relationship, by means of which familiar terms are given new semantic 
values and new terms will be invented - most characteristically, new names for the 
people involved in that special relationship.  
At this point, two notions seem potentially relevant. Halliday noted the 
phenomenon of over-lexicalisation, the proliferation of synonymous expressions, in 
what he referred to as anti-languages (Halliday 1976: 571) and Wescott coined the 
terms hyperpolysemy and hypersynonymy to refer to two kinds of one-to-many 
form/meaning relationships characteristic of slang (Wescott 1976/1980). The 
question of the relationship of name forms and other intimate forms of address to 
situation needs to be formalised, however, before such notions can be profitably 
employed as explanatory tools.  
By the term hyperpolymorphy Wescott refer to the occurrence of a plurality of 
alternants for most slang items and he sees this as one of the salient grammatical 
characteristics of slang. (Wescott 1976/1980: 402). Though he attempts no 
explanation of the phenomenon he describes, Wescott's paper is important because 
it focusses attention clearly on a set of linguistic characteristics which are 
describeable, and which are presented as characteristics of slang which is treated 
seriously as a type or variety of language rather than as an arbitrary set of lexical 
items invented willy-nilly in the 'never-ending search for originality' which is the 
kind of explanation often provided by students of slang. Halliday refers to such 
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explanations and proceeds to offer his own explanations of what is essentially the 
same phenomenon, with respect to anti-languages, in the following terms: 
If we consider underworld languages in terms of a general comparison with the 
languages of the overworld, we find in them a characteristic functional orientation, 
away from the experiential mode of meaning toward the interpersonal and the 
textual modes. Both the textual orientation (the "set" toward the message, in 
Jakobsen's terms) and the interpersonal (the "set" toward addresser/addressee …) 
tend to produce this overlexicalization: the former because it takes the form of 
verbal competition and display, in which kennings of all kinds are at a premium; 
the latter because sets of words which are denotatively synonymous are clearly 
distinguished by their attitudinal components . . . 
Both of these are normal features of everyday language, in which textual and 
interpersonal meanings are interwoven with experiential meanings into a single 
fabric of discourse. What characterizes what we are calling anti-languages is their 
relatively greater orientation in this direction. (Halliday 1976: 571-2, emphasis in 
original).  
To the extent that slang, the language of any in-group, and intimate language, 
characteristic of an in-group that is perhaps most typically a dyad, can be said to be 
anti-languages insofar as each 'creates an alternative reality' and 'is to be defined … 
as a systematic pattern of tendencies in the selection of meanings to be exchanged', 
then Halliday's account holds for them too. As distance decreases towards intimacy 
then a new balance needs to be established between metafunctions, establishing 
priority for interpersonal meanings, and a variety of linguistic techniques will be 
used which serve both to create and maintain the strong affective bonds which 
characterise the relationship, to constantly reinforce its reality by saying in as many 
ways as possible that things are indeed so in this tiny world.  
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PART III: TOWARDS AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF ADDRESS IN 
AUSTRALIA 
229 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Part III is where the model developed in Part I and the descriptions of the resources 
for vocation presented in Part II are intended to come together, in an account of 
address practice in a late twentieth-century, technologically-advanced, 
multicultural, democratic, capitalist, patriarchal Australian society. Needless to say, 
to essay such a task demands another thesis to itself. What is presented here merely 
suggests the kind of ethnography originally envisaged, an ethnography informed by 
a model of language as social semiotic and by contemporary social theory, 
especially feminist theory and what one might broadly call the politics of 
difference.  
One problem with attempting to provide the kind of description presented in Part 
II, one bit of the system of the English language as a resource for people to make a 
particular kind of meaning, is that it is too easy to assume that everyone has the 
same access to that system. And 'same access' means not merely knowing that that 
resource exists, but having a reason for wanting to use it. Ironically, it is 
experiential meaning that can be seen as constituting more of a shared resource, in 
some ways, than interpersonal meaning. Field is about knowledge and about 
experience, and in theory societies such as contemporary Australia have 
institutionalised access to knowledge through education. (Practice, of course, is 
considerably more problematic). Tenor, however, is not about knowledge as such 
but about people, who they are. In a society which relentlessly individualises 
people, so as to make inaccessible an understanding of the dialectic of person and 
culture in the production of both, 'the way people are' is all too often taken as a 
given, seen as 'personality' in the most meagre sense of that word. (Firth used it 
altogether differently, but that is another story).  
The last thing I want to do is to imply the autonomy of either field or tenor, of 
knowledge or person, however. They are profoundly interconnected, politically. 
Who people come to be involves their experience of all the kinds of meanings 
made by the language(s) they speak, but that experience is always mediated by 
social practices concerned with the formation of people as gendered, classed, aged, 
raced social beings. The linguistic system is always accessed partially, 
differentially, then. But that does not render meaningless the task of attempting to 
map the system as system, even though no person draws on the whole resource. In 
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order to understand the possibility of difference, we need to understand the 
existence of different meanings.  
Part III, then, is two things. It suggests the thesis I would like to have written if all 
the work that needed to be done for Parts I and II had already been done. And it is a 
demonstration of good faith - a kind of 'renewal of connection'. Ideally, it would 
have consisted of substantial chapters on address practice with respect to gender, 
generation, class, and ethnicity/race (this last a revealingly blurred category in 
multiracial/multicultural/multi-ethnic Australia). In fact, it consists of three short 
chapters, with some degree of overlap between them.  
The first chapter is the more general, and comments on address practice in relation 
to a range of dimensions of social life. The second chapter focuses specifically on 
address in relation to gender. It should be noted that feminist critiques of 
disciplinary epistemology and methodology have indirectly, but very clearly, 
informed this whole work, not merely those sections dealing explicitly with gender 
identities and gender relations. The third chapter takes up an aspect of the grammar 
of vocation that has been a significant factor in seeing it as a relatively insignificant 
part of the linguistic system. Vocation may be grammatically optional, from a 
particular perspective on grammaticality, but its social optionality is another 
matter.   
Ideally, Part III would have been called 'An Ethnography of Address in Australia'. 
It gradually became 'Towards an Ethnography of Address in Australia'. In its final 
form, it can only be referred to as 'Notes Towards an Ethnography of Address in 
Australia'. It offers only glimpses of what it might be possible to do. I hope that 
some other brave soul will venture further into this territory, to explore both the 
minutiae of everyday address practice in the negotiation of everyday interpersonal 
relations and the relation between this mico level of analysis of language in social 
life and the grander questions of language as social semiotic with respect to the 
institutional organisation of society.  
Bernstein has been much misrepresented, and much maligned, but understands 
something about the relationship between the micro and macro dimensions of 
human social life that others, in thrall to liberal individualism, have not wanted to 
know about. Contemporary feminism has done a little better in putting together the 
micro and the macro, understanding (in what has now unfortunately become a 
somewhat hackneyed phrase) that the personal is political. But much contemporary 
feminist thought of any rigour has been waylaid by inadequate or incomplete 
models of language, which put too much emphasis on the representational in the 
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formation of feminine subjectivity and not enough on the constitutive role of the 
cumulative experience of gendered interaction in a patriarchal society (i.e. one in 
which men have more power than women). Ideally, one wants both. I see my work 
as a contribution to such an endeavour.    
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Seven 
Address practices and the conduct of social relations  
 
 
Turning now to a consideration of how available grammatical resources for 
vocation are actually employed in negotiating social relations, two sorts of factors 
need to be taken into account. On the one hand, one needs to take into account 
aspects of social identity such as gender, class, age, ethnicity. Simultaneously one 
needs to consider the dynamics of the particular interaction in which speakers are 
engaged, specifically in terms of power and social distance. The relationships 
between these two kinds of factor are to a considerable extent predictable: 
interaction between females and males, between children and adults, and probably 
between those of lower and higher status/class, are culturally defined as interaction 
between non-equals. 
In the case of gender- and age-based inequality, the superior party may manifest 
that superiority in part by acting as if social distance was minimal, even when 
interacting with total strangers: women and children are approachable, even 
touchable, in ways that men are not. They are certainly addressable in ways that 
men are not, in public contexts. Hence, the widespread use of diminutive forms of 
names to women (by men) and children (by adults), virtually institutionalised with 
respect to gender so that the most commonly used type of name used by and to 
females and males differs. The most common male name-form is monosyllabic, 
either full form or truncated, where the most common female name-form is 
bisyllabic, consisting of either the full name or a -y  suffixed form.  -y  suffixes do 
occur with male names but, with a few exceptions (e.g. Terry from Terence and 
Tony from Anthony), such forms are seen as appropriate only for children and/or in 
intimate contexts. A Judy can be so addressed all her life, under all circumstances 
where personal name address is appropriate, but a Johnny will only be addressed 
thus when he is pre-adolescent or, when older, by his mother or girl-friend (and 
then probably only in private) or by friends kidding or trying to get a rise out of 
him.  A middle-class Johnny, that is: the situation may be different for a working 
class Johnny. (See 7.2 below).  
In families and social groups where the full form is the preferred form of personal 
name, such gender differentiation merely takes a different form, since English 
233 
 
personal names are multiply gender-marked, identifying them, and hence the 
bearers of those names, as having not merely different relationships with the 
language that both speak and the society both live in,  but differently evaluated 
relationships. 
While it may be the case that the most delicate choices in the name network are 
'different but equal' (grammatically distinct but functionally equivalent), 
constraints on speakers in interaction which result in non-reciprocal choices of the 
kind detailed above can only be seen as manifestations of unequal power: equals 
can always make reciprocal choices. In the case of children, it is easy to see that 
non-reciprocity means inequality: nobody troubles to mask the phenomenon 
because it is culturally acceptable for adults to be seen to be exercising authority 
over children. In adult interaction, where it is no longer as socially acceptable to be 
seen exercising power as it once was (the shift from the 'power semantic' to the 
'solidarity semantic', in Brown & Gilman's terms), the markers will be less evident 
and the significance of the reciprocity/non-reciprocity of grammatical and 
discourse choices will sometimes be blurred. In the case of gendered address, the 
power issue is somewhat obscured because the forms addressed to the 
(subordinate) female are also the forms used to indicate minimal social distance 
and positive affect. Males using these forms can (and do) defend themselves by 
saying that they were 'only being friendly' and the question of whether it was 
appropriate to be that friendly - to say nothing  of how a female responding with 
equivalent 'friendly' forms would be likely to be interpreted - is somehow seldom 
asked. 
The same 'friendly' forms are of course used to children, equally non-reciprocally 
(though one could argue that Mummy and Daddy are just as much diminutive forms 
of names, when used by a child, as are a parent's Susie and Johnny). But adults 
make use of a strategy in interacting with children that is not generally available in 
adult interaction: they can deliberately increase the social distance, i.e. 
withdrawing intimacy and affection, by progressively retreating from everyday 
address usage in a totally predictable sequence of choices from diminutive form, to 
full form, to first name plus other given names, to full name. Four-year-old Robert, 
who explained that 'Wobert means cwoss ' understood this strategy very well. Not 
only choice of name-form but changes in stress, voice quality and the steepness of 
the tone contours are used to convey the precise degree of authority (or 'crossness') 
intended, and it is these latter features that tend to be retained in adult usage but 
more as markers of negative affect than of authority or power.   
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Gender differences in address usage are also found, hardly surprisingly, within 
gender groups, particularly with choices used to realise varying degrees of 
closeness or intimacy. This is the realm of what Brown and Gilman (1960), and 
many subsequent investigators of address practices, have called solidarity.  In what 
follows I shall make use of this term but, as explained in Chapter 3, solidarity is 
not a unitary dimension of social relations but a cover term for two dimensions that 
need to be distinguished. In close or intimate relationships it is not always apparent 
that a social distance dimension can be distinguished from an affective dimension, 
since culturally the former presupposes the latter, and the realisations for address in 
particular blur the distinctive realisational patterns that occur elsewhere. Where 
social distance is greater, distinguishing the two dimensions is more 
straightforward.  
In address where social distance between interactants is small and feelings are 
positive, males seem to draw on a richer array of resources for realising solidarity 
than do females. Males make almost exclusive use of the o -suffix, both for 
personal names and particularly for family names. They make extensive use of 
family name, in both full and diminutive forms, of nicknames, and of a range of 
nominal group types of address ranging from heads that are explicitly solidary 
(such as mate or sport ) to a phenomenon that Baker (1966: 365) refers to as 
inversion, whereby you address your best mate as you old mongrel  or even cunt-
features  precisely because he is your best mate - a ritual testing of the strength of 
the solidary bond. By contrast, there do not seem to be any forms which are largely 
or exclusively used by females to realise solidarity. Truncated forms (especially 
when not the most usual diminutive form, e.g. Paul from Pauline, Suse from 
Susan, Bet from Betty) can certainly be used in this way, but are not exclusively 
female in usage.  Females tend to use nicknames less frequently than males, though 
they make greater use of endearments. Non-name (nominal group) vocatives with 
reversed attitudinal orientation also occur, involving lexis that explicitly denigrates 
women, e.g. you stupid slack bitch, but such items are restricted in occurrence and 
not only do not have the currency of the comparable male items but can provoke a 
somewhat different reaction. As American Blacks found when proclaiming that 
'Black is beautiful', an important step towards altering not only the perceptions of a 
denigrated  group about themselves  but those of the society at large, is to confront 
the denigration head on, thereby realising a solidarity that the denigrators had 
always denied was possible. Women have commonly been regarded (by men, and 
by women themselves) as incapable of forming solidary relationships and to the 
extent that the conditions of their lives have made this a self-fulfilling prophecy 
there has been little need to elaborate specific linguistic resources for realising this 
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kind of relationship. A permanent change in the status of women in Australian 
society, assuming such a change were to take place, could have interesting 
linguistic consequences.  
With respect to class and ethnicity, mentioned above as also relevant for address 
practices, not much investigation has yet taken place. There do seem to be class 
differences, for example in name form choices available for males (-y suffixed 
diminutives seem more common to adult speakers than is the case for middle class 
speakers) and in the use of what middle class speakers call endearments (love, 
dear, sweetheart etc.). The contrast between address styles involving such features 
can be readily observed in the major cities, in inner-urban areas in the process of 
gentrification, where the address practices of the new middle-class arrivals contrast 
markedly with those of the remnants of the non-ethnic working-class population 
who have not yet been displaced. Geographically more widespread are differences 
in address practices in service encounters involving 'endearments'. While by no 
means all middle class customers react negatively to being addressed with dear or 
lovie, regarding them as unduly familiar (i.e. inappropriately decreasing social 
distance), such a reaction is not uncommon and service-providers one might guess 
to be middle class seem to make less frequent use of such forms themselves in 
addressing customers. The kind of notion of class that seems relevant here is one 
based primarily on patterns of social organisation, with education and socio-
economic status as consequences of those patterns (cf. Bernstein 1971, 1973, 
1975). Much interesting ethnographic work clearly remains to be done with respect 
to class, not merely in relation to address practices per se but seeing these and other 
interpersonal linguistic practices as together realising possible different semiotic 
choices regarding social distance and perhaps even power in social relations.  
In terms of ethnicity, my impression is that many Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic 
origin, whose names reflect that origin, are excluded from the set of possibilities 
for address practices otherwise available. Such exclusion in the case of names with 
radically different phonotactic patterns from those of English names can seem 
perfectly reasonable but can also be seen as functioning symbolically as a sign of 
the marginalisation of such people in Australian society. In this light, it makes 
sense for immigrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds to give their 
children 'English' personal names, while retaining the family names of their ethnic 
origin. Where it is desired to claim those of non-Anglo origin as true-blue Aussies, 
however, appropriate name-forms will be found. Sporting heroes such as rugby 
player David Campese, marathon runner Robert Di Castella and Victorian Football 
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League player Alex Jesaulenko readily became Campo, Deek and Jezza - not 
merely on the lips of fans but in newspaper headlines.  
Sport and popular entertainment do seem to be domains where it is appropriate to 
make regular use of diminutive forms, forms which realise higher level semiotic 
choices decreasing social distance. Thus y -forms of male personal names are 
common, e.g. Tommy  Smith (top racehorse trainer), Tommy  Tycho (band leader), 
Billy  Field (song writer and singer), Richie  Benaud (former top cricketer), Molly  
Meldrum (compere of  popular TV rock music show).  Such forms are used 
regularly in both the quality press and on ABC radio and television.  
The adulation accorded sporting heroes and popular entertainers seems to indicate 
that part of the social motivation for diminutive name choices in these fields is to 
realise strong positive affect. Such fields are seen as entertainment, leisure, 
relaxation - part of the good things of life that you can feel good about, rather than 
having to worry about, and hence you can feel well-disposed to those 
professionally involved in such fields. Thus social distance is semiotically 
decreased: it is quite beside the point that speakers might very well not use such 
forms to directly address any of their heroes, on actually meeting them.   
Finally, despite all that has been said about the functionality of variant name-form 
choices, many people insist on the use of full forms of personal names and regard 
diminutive or hypocoristic forms as socially unacceptable. One would certainly 
need to know in more detail who such people were and what their expressed 
motivations were. (Not that this will necessarily be very revealing, since reasons 
are often couched largely in attitudinal terms, such as 'I can't stand my name being 
shortened'). My impression is that full-form-only users are middle class rather than 
working class and the social function would seem to be to maintain social distance 
in a world where first name is the norm for address in all but the most formal 
circumstances. Maintaining social distance would seem to be a perfectly 
appropriate goal for the individualist middle class. The upwardly mobile 
presumably identify this particular address practice initially simply as middle class, 
and hence desirable (for their children, at least, if it is too late to change their own 
practices). In the process of opting out of a network of linguistic choices, however, 
they may find themselves co-opted into a new way of relating to people, of being 
social beings. Address practices in and of themselves cannot achieve this 
transformation of personal and social identity, but they certainly play an important 
role.  
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Where names are used to address people as individuals and titles for occupants of 
statuses, nominal group terms of address are  a somewhat mixed bag as far as any 
general kind of relational function is concerned.  Many head-words refer to 
attributes objectively 'possessed' by addressees as occupants of social roles,  e.g. 
fellow -workers, girls and boys.  Others combine such reference with an attitudinal 
dimension, e.g. dyke, Pommy  = you are lesbian/English and that upsets/offends 
me.  Others again are largely or entirely attitudinal, e.g. no-hoper, slut, pig, idiot.  
Many apparently attitudinally neutral terms, however, especially those referring to 
human beings in terms of gender, do reveal an attitudinal dimension when patterns 
of usage are investigated. Where parallel terms exist, e.g. girls and boys, which are 
used in parallel ways, i.e. addressing children of the appropriate gender under 
identical circumstances, no problem arises. But these particular terms are also used 
to address adults in ways which are anything but parallel: women are addressed as 
girls very much more frequently than men are addressed as boys, and when men 
are so addressed it is usually in contexts where they are relaxing, not playing 
serious adult roles. Women, on the other hand, can be addressed as girls not only 
under similar circumstances but when they are actually playing a variety of real 
adult roles: women as wives, playing the multiple role of food preparer/child 
minder/household organiser are commonly girls to their husbands; women as 
potential consumers and actual shoppers are  girls; women choristers are frequently 
girls; even professional women at professional meetings can be girls, though 
nowadays hardly without comment. 
Examples like this, like the marked skewing towards largely exclusive male usage 
of such explicitly solidary terms of address as mate and sport, and like the 
selection of domains from which are drawn the lexical sets of items used for 
derogatory and approbatory address,  make it clear that what is being realised in 
the address system about patterns of social relations in Australia is multi-layered. 
Most immediately, address choices can be seen as realisations of an underlying set 
of options representing social relations conceived of as a semiotic system, 
involving the three dimensions of power, social distance, and affect discussed in 
Chapter 3.   
But underlying this level is a further set of ideological positions available in 
Australia which determine attitudes towards female and male, child and adult, 
insider and outsider (whether classified as such on the basis of ethnic origin, sexual 
orientation, religion etc.) by coding some things in the language and not others and 
by giving some terms positive value and others negative. What counts as a serious 
insult in a society is often particularly revealing of such underlying values or 
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ideological positions (v. Douglas 1975a) and their relative importance. Among the 
potentially most seriously insulting terms of address in Australian English are 
those impugning the heterosexual identity of males (poofter, fag etc.), those 
attributing promiscuous sexual behaviour to women (moll, tart etc.), and 
identifying males or females (but particularly insulting when directed at males) in 
terms of female genitalia (cunt). Sexuality and gender seem to be particularly 
ideologically loaded issues in Australian society, not only on the basis of linguistic 
evidence. It is hardly surprising, then, that Horvath  (1985) found gender to be such 
a crucial variable in her study of variation in Australian English.  
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Eight 
En-gendering social relations through address 
 
 
Gender relations, like all social relations, are negotiated through  interaction, 
through the manipulation of key interpersonal linguistic features such as speech 
function choices (and their realisations in terms of mood), vocative choices, 
modality and modulation. Such negotiation involves three kinds of patterning of 
linguistic choice, where each pattern primarily affects a different stratum of the 
linguistic system and can be seen as realising one dimension of an underlying 
semiotic system concerned with social relations. Whether (primarily discourse) 
choices are made reciprocally or non-reciprocally is a function of power: reciprocal 
choices can be made by those who regard themselves as equals, non-reciprocal 
choices by those who do not so consider themselves - with the choices themselves 
functioning not only to realise a power relationship already established and 
understood but also to create it anew on each occasion of interaction, to construct it 
in terms of power in the first instance and to render each occasion of interaction 
open to renegotiation. Whether the range of (primarily lexico-grammatical) choices 
is small or large is a function of social distance.   
The interpersonal function of language is concerned with the negotiation of social 
relations in ways such that culturally available choices from an underlying semiotic 
system of available positions in a particular society are both realised (i.e. the 
choices exist semiotically, though they are only accessible through the forms, 
including the linguistic forms, which realise them) but also ongoingly constructed 
by the linguistic choices that are made in particular contexts.  In a society such as 
Australia, my relations with any particular other are not in any simple way 
predetermined (as relations of equality or dominance/subordination, as relations of 
intimacy or social distance), though there are undoubtedly strong pressures to 
conform to social expectations about appropriate positions to adopt in terms of 
one's age, gender, class, ethnic or racial background. It is not the case that identities 
are so prescribed that we merely speak them: it is possible to take up various 
positions in relation to the tenor dimensions of power, distance and affect and have 
these become the starting point of new negotiations of  actual present relations. 
Address matters because the actual choices made by speakers are not mere 
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expressions of something else but are active and crucial contributors to the 
interpersonal dynamics of the situation. If I speak as if I am more powerful than 
you, or in an intimate relationship with you, then to the extent that you take up the 
appropriate reciprocal speaking position - even if the objective 'facts' are that you 
are not intimate or less powerful - you thereby identify yourself in those terms, you 
become less powerful or more intimate, thereby contributing to the semiotic 
construction of the relationship as one between intimates or unequals. 
Gendered address matters because, far from being merely expressive or symbolic 
of actual gender relations in a particular society, it constantly enacts the reality of 
those relations at a particular point in time. It does so in two ways. At a more 
general level, insofar as males share a cultural assumption that both dominance  
and intimacy are appropriate positions for them to adopt with respect to females, 
this complex position will be realised by address choices characterised by the lack 
of reciprocity indicative of unequal power relations and by the proliferation of 
choice on the part of the male indicative of intimacy (Poynton 1985/90, Ch 6). At a 
more specific level, the actual lexical choices will at the very least remind of and 
reinforce gender differentiation (e.g. by the multiple gender-marking of personal 
names) but will very frequently invoke that more comprehensive and affectively-
loaded 'map' of the terrain of gender in English-speaking societies provided by the 
lexis of the English language. The lexis of gender is thereby rendered dynamic, not 
only in the sense that lexis activated via transitivity structures and activity 
sequences serves the representational function of constructing an ongoing version 
of reality, but in the further and reciprocal sense that the cultural 'realities' of 
gender identity and of gendered social relations which such cultural mapping 
encodes are constantly being recreated and renewed in the very process of being 
invoked - 'real'-ised in the most literal sense. 
Let us turn now to specific questions of address practice, in relation to power, 
distance and affect. With respect to power, it has often been observed that address 
between males and females in public contexts is asymetrical: male bosses may be 
addresses as Mr O'Halloran, Mr Nguyen, etc. by their female secretaries or junior 
staff, but address them by their first name in return, even when the woman is 
considerably older than the man. Or, given the widespread (and even, in some 
companies, mandatory) use of first name as the basic unmarked address choice, 
women may address men who are their superiors or peers by first name, but be 
addressed in return by some conventional endearment such as dear, sweetheart or 
love. Wolfson and Manes (1980) found a related asymmetry in service encounters, 
with endearments used by both male and female shop assistants to women 
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customers but never to men, who were commonly addressed as Sir if any address 
term was used. In Australia, one finds the considerably less formal mate used 
between males in many kinds of service encounter, especially when the transaction 
involves a 'male' product such as petrol, auto parts, hardware, paint, and 
particularly alcohol (either in the bar of the bottle-shop). Mate is also used in more 
neutral contexts such as post offices, milk bars or delis and the local paper shop. 
Such public male usage is often reciprocal and is best seen as a conventionalised 
marker of Australian egalitarian ideology, which historically has been constructed 
as exclusively male (Ward 1958).  
Given that the vast majority of women work in lower status jobs and are more 
likely than not to have male superiors, the fact of non-reciprocal use in work 
contexts is not surprising. What is interesting is the nature of the asymmetry, 
particularly when the same choices to women occur in other settings. It would seem 
that women, like children, can be addressed in public with conventionalised 
intimate forms to a far greater extent than is permissible for men. (There would 
seem to be social dialect differences here, which permit some women to use 
endearments more freely to males at work or in service encounters. Such 
differences have not been investigated for class/socio-economic status, though 
Wolfson and Manes (1980) collected data from different geographical areas in the 
USA).  
The choice of endearments to women in public settings can be linked with the fact 
that even when reciprocal use of first names occurs between men and women (or 
girls and boys), the form of that choice tends to be different. If the full form of the 
name is not used (Robert, Tamara, Jason, Katharine, Christopher, Christine etc.) 
then adult males will generally be addressed with a monosyllabic truncated form of 
the full name (Rob/Bob, Jase, Chris  etc.) whereas the form usually used to 
females, adults as well as children, will be one with the diminutive suffix -y  
(sometimes spelt -ie): Tammy, Kathy, Chrissie etc. These suffixed forms, along 
with other diminutive suffixes such as -kin(s) and -poo(s), are commonly used to 
children of both sexes, but boys come to see them, sometimes at a very early age, 
as 'girls' names' and reject them. Thus four-year-old Robbie  at fourteen insists on 
Rob  and six-year-old Nicholas  has already rejected Nicky  (saying explicitly that it 
is a girls' name) in favour of Nick or the full form Nicholas.  
The relevant tenor dimension here is distance: the use of diminutive or hypocoristic 
forms of names is a matter of increases in intimacy. The process is most clearly 
seen in the progression of a couple falling in love from the most commonly used 
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forms of their respective names, when they first meet, through a variety of pet-
forms of those names (including quite elaborate constructions involving up to five 
suffixes, e.g. Anniekins, Mikeypoodles, plus private nicknames and a good selection 
of endearments as the relationship develops. The proliferation principle is clearly 
seen in operation here in opening up a morphological resource for forming 
diminutives in English that particular individuals may not previously have had 
much occasion to make use of, leading to the production of a variety of forms all 
having substantially the same meaning of marking intimacy.  
The relationship between name choices and distance can be seen very clearly also 
in the reverse direction, away from intimacy, in the set of name forms that are 
addressed to a child depending on how s/he stands in the favour of parents, from 
Katiekindlekins when she's being utterly sweet and adorable, to Katie K or just 
Katie for everyday affectionate usage, to Kate (for calling her or when doing jobs 
together) to Katharine(when someone isn't too happy with her) to Katharine 
Pirona (when she's done something pretty bad) to Katharine Luisa Pirona (for 
really bad news). (The example is an invented one, but the pattern is one that 
parents and teachers recognise, once it has been pointed out).   
If one now asks why women retain the more intimate forms into adulthood to a 
greater extent than is the case for men (think of all the women called Judy, Suzie, 
Jenny, Margie, Libby, Rosie, etc. compared with the number of men called Johnny, 
Tommy, Normie, Billy, etc.), the answer would seem to be that women are 
culturally defined as more contactable than men: it is assumed that relations 
between males and females will be on the basis of intimacy. Such an interpretation 
makes sense of the persistent tendency for English words referring to women to 
acquire sexual connotations (compare the present range of meaning of master and 
mistress, or madam and sir): contactable comes to mean sexually available. It 
makes sense of the fact that what resources English has for forming diminutives 
have come to be substantially gender-marked and in such a way that 'feminine' 
forms demean, belittle, and trivialise at the same time as they feminise. The process 
is very apparent with feminine words suffixed in -ess or -ette. It is less obvious 
with name forms, for two reasons. One is that, because in Western cultures 
intimacy is automatically associated with positive affect, the use of suffixed forms 
of personal names can be claimed to be an indication of friendliness, or affection: a 
matter of affect and not of distance, much less power. Many males believe this to 
be the case and are genuinely puzzled and even upset when accused of belittling or 
trivialising women by using diminutive forms. The only possible response would 
seem to be that some things, in this case the cultural functions of the linguistic 
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system, are 'larger than personal benevolence' (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with 
respect to history and the well-meaning individual).  
The second reason for diminutive name forms not always being seen as belittling is 
particularly relevant to speakers of Australian English, many of whom, particularly 
males, use a large number of words with the characteristic 'diminutive' -y  ending in 
everyday casual conversation: tinny (can of beer), barbie (barbecue), bookie 
(bookmaker), footy (football), carbie (carburettor of a car), trannie (transistor 
radio), mozzie (mosquito), pokies (poker-machines), prezzie (present), pozzie 
(position), wharfie ('wharf', i.e. waterside worker), etc. The use of such forms 
seems clearly related to social distance, occurring in and/or being used to create 
relatively relaxed informal interaction: the egalitarian mateship theme again, in 
fact. None of these forms have any hint of a trivialising or demeaning flavour, 
though other items seen as baby-talk or specifically associated with women may. 
For males, the -y suffix on everyday lexical items is probably best characterised 
along with the -o suffix, which is also widely used (rego for registration, compo for 
compensation, etc.), as a familiarity marker. In address between males, however, 
the -y  suffix, along with a number of other hypocoristic sauffixes used in name 
forms, commonly occurs with the last name rather than the first (Hawkie, Bondy, 
Lawsie, etc. alongside forms such as Thommo, Singo, Hoges, etc.). Such forms 
would seem to achieve a nice balance between friendly camaraderie on the one 
hand and maintaining a certain distance - standing well back from real intimacy - 
on the other: asserting at one and the same time mateship and freedom from any 
conceivable homosexual 'taint'. This is clearly yet another manifestation of the 
male tendency to interpret intimacy only in sexual terms, commented on earlier 
with respect to cultural attitudes towards women.  
It is not then the choice per se  of the -y suffix in address to females that is the 
problem: it is the lack of parallelism with its use to males and the cultural 
implications of the difference. Women may be addressed more intimately than is 
appropriate for males, not only with respect to name forms but in a variety of other 
ways. Endearments are commonly used publicly to women, who may also find 
themselves addressed by complete strangers in terms of their physical appearance 
(gorgeous, blondie, sexy-legs …) and addressed or referred to purely as sexual 
objects (either as people, albeit of little value: tart, slut, whore, moll …; or merely 
as their own sexual organs: pussy, cunt, and the metaphoric slut-box).  
In investigating the language of derogation in English - one lexical resource for 
realising affect (negative in this case) - one striking fact is that there is a quite 
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extensive lexis of derogatory terms for women as women that is not paralleled by a 
set denigrating men as men. Men can be castigated for their moral failings 
(bludger, no-hoper, piss-artist), their sexual preferences (faggot, fairy, poofter), 
their intellectual shortcomings (drongo, dope, fuckwit), their incompetence or 
uncouthness (yobbo, oaf, hoon), and in more generally negative terms by referring 
to them as animals (animal, mongrel, swine), as body products or genitalia (female 
being more offensive: shit, fart, prick, cunt), or simply as an all-purpose bastard, 
which has only recently largely lost its implied denigration of women, as the stigma 
attached to illegitimacy has lessened. It has taken the women's movement of the 
1960s and 1979s to invent terms such as (male) chauvinist (pig) or  MCP, in order 
to be able to refer negatively to males as males, particularly with respect to their 
attitudes and behaviour towards women.  
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Nine 
On the optionality of vocation, with particular reference to class 
 
 
Given the fact that English has only one second-person pronoun and that, as a 
consequence, any tenor features realised by terms of address will be realised by 
non-pronominal vocatives, the optionality of vocation would appear to differentiate 
English markedly from those many languages which force speakers into making a 
choice between alternate second-person pronouns (or between verbal forms which 
incorporate such a distinction). In practical terms, however, the optionality of 
vocation in English may be more illusory than real. 
From a purely grammatical perspective, no clause is ungrammatical simply because 
it does not contain a vocative. In practice, however, many utterances are certainly 
regarded as impolite (= socially unacceptable) or even insubordinate (= 
dangerously unacceptable) if they contain no vocative.  One suspects that it has 
been the over-awareness of the grammatical optionality of vocation, with its 
implications of linguistic marginality for the feature, together with an undervaluing 
of the characteristics of actual usage, which has led to the neglect by linguists of 
the whole phenomenon: Roger Brown, whose work, with various colleagues, set 
off a chain reaction of terms-of-address investigations, was after all a social 
psychologist, not a linguist.   
Three observations need to be made on the optionality of vocation.  The first is that 
from the perspective of treating it as central to the realisation of tenor, optionality 
of the system is highly functional. One may choose to mark the operative tenor by 
means of an appropriate address term, or one may choose to be less explicit by 
either (i) using a vocative that is minimally revealing of tenor without information 
from other linguistic choices (e.g. least marked form of personal name); or (ii) 
making no vocative choice at all, allowing other tenor markers to convey either the 
appropriate information or appropriately ambivalent or even downright misleading 
information.  
The second observation on optionality is that under certain circumstances, most 
typically in situations involving the exercise of authority, vocation can become 
virtually an obligatory rather than an optional feature.  A rigid formal hierarchy, 
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where position in the hierarchy is formalised by means of rank (such as in the 
armed services), is one context where vocation is certainly an obligatory choice for 
subordinates addressing superiors.  The obligation to choose from the vocation 
system seems to a large extent to be reciprocal but actual usage is never 
symmetrical, since subordinates address superiors with Sir  or Ma'am  and 
superiors use name (personal name or family name, depending on context) or rank 
(at certain levels of the hierarchy only).   
One might be tempted to regard such behaviour as anachronistic, or as some kind 
of sociolinguistic aberration peculiar to a formally-constituted hierarchy, obsessed 
with authority and order and with everyone needing to be consciously aware of the 
chain of command, particularly when one is aware of the prevalence of reciprocal 
personal name usage (with no kind of obligation apparently involved) which 
characterises much day to day adult interaction in other contexts. However, if one 
looks at another kind of context where the exercise of authority is unmistakeable 
and explicit, namely the control of children by adults, one finds again that there is a 
strong expectation - even, by some adults, an explicit requirement - that an 
appropriate address form will be used by the subordinate (child) to the superior 
(adult). Even in cases where no overt exercise of authority is involved, non-
symmetrical address largely characterises the interaction of children with adults: 
children are addressed by personal name or with endearments but by and large 
address adults with title + family name or kin title (+ personal name), e.g. Mum , 
Uncle Jim , Mrs Brown ). Even where children do address adults by their personal 
name, adults invariably have address options available which are not used by 
children (e.g. endearments, items such as son , missy  etc.) so that adult-child dyads 
are invariably asymmetrical as far as address is concerned. The most striking 
instances of such asymmetry involve adults insisting on multiple marking of their 
own superior status by children, as in the case of a teacher insisting that a child 
addresses him as Mr ___, Sir .   Neither the formal title + family name nor the 
deferential Sir  are sufficient by themselves, it would seem: only the use of both by 
the child constitutes an adequate acknowledgement of his/her subordinate status. 
Even in situations less explicitly marked by power than this, however, a child may 
still be required to use a vocative or reprimanded for failing to use one, even when 
the required vocative may be a personal name to a particular adult.  And in schools, 
where the authority structure is highly visible, insistence on children using address 
terms to adults as a mark of 'respect' is probably widespread: e.g. only two out of 
nine practising primary teachers responded to the question 'Do you try to insist on 
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children addressing you by name or title?' with a straight-out 'No' in a small survey 
of address and naming practices in schools. 
Since adults probably use vocatives to children with considerably greater frequency 
than they do to other adults, in part simply in order to get and hold the child's 
attention (a particular problem when children are young and easily distracted - 
though see note on interaction between mothers and their four-year-old children 
referred to in Chapter 4), it is a little hard to decide what proportion of such 
increased frequency is related to a degree of reciprocal obligation to use address 
terms operating where power relations are concerned and what proportion is due to 
purely practical considerations. These are of course difficult to separate in practice, 
since getting/holding attention are exercises of authority, though by no means 
necessarily involving unpleasant consequences for the child. Attention-getting by 
means of a vocative is found in adult address to other adults, of course, but there is 
some indication that the exercise of authority can be perceived as implicated in 
such usage, insofar as Calls are not infrequently prefaced by some softening 
element such as Excuse me  or even just Hey , or they are uttered with the rising 
intonation which, according to Halliday, basically indicates that the Polarity is in 
doubt - in this case, presumably, that the addressee's response to the Call is not a 
foregone conclusion.  (Halliday, 1970, 1985). 
The third relevant observation on the optionality of vocation involves 
considerations of code, in the sense in which this term is used by Bernstein and by 
others following him to mean 'the principle of semiotic organization governing the 
choice of meanings by a speaker and their interpretation by a hearer. The code 
controls the semantic styles of the culture.'  (Halliday 1978:111). There do seem to 
be differences in the use of vocatives by different social groups which are not to be 
explained purely in terms of tenor, and such differences encompass not only choice 
of vocatives but also frequency of use.  Females (and theatre people, especially if 
gay) have the reputation of making frequent use of endearments, especially darling; 
males are supposed to steer clear of endearments to other males but make frequent 
use of nicknames and 'inverted' address (i.e. otherwise pejorative lexis such as 
bastard, bugger  and even cunt  used among friends to indicate 
friendship/solidarity); children seem to be frequent users of vocatives, especially to 
other children, and will improvise nicknames or use generic names such as Joe  or 
Fred  in order to avoid the absence of a vocative; there is evidence that people 
occupying lower positions on the socio-economic scale make more frequent use of 
items such as love , dear  and mate  especially in service encounters. Because some 
addressees in service encounters find such usage offensive (middle-aged middle-
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class women, for example, not infrequently regard being called love and sweetheart  
by tradesmen and shopkeepers as uncalled-for familiarity), it seems likely that what 
is involved here is a coding difference with respect to the use of certain vocatives. 
The following letter to the Editor of a Sydney suburban newspaper illustrates one 
attitude to frequent use of such items:   
 
Sir - Recently I picked up a shoe from a bargain table and seeing it fitted asked the 
saleswoman for the other shoe.  'Of course, darling,' she chirped.  A few seconds 
later she was back and handed it to me with the words: 'Here you are, sweetheart.' 
As she brought the parcel and the change she threw in the third endearment:  
'Thank you, my love.' 
The whole transaction lasted about three minutes. 
I doubt her husband gets more gushing when he brings home the paypacket. 
Maybe just as well as such excessive use of endearments can never be sincere. 
(The Glebe and Western Weekly, August, 1982) 
The writer would seem to have two rules about the use of endearments, both of 
which were contravened by the speaker in the situation reported.  The first rule 
would appear to be that endearments should be restricted to situations where there 
is an intimate relationship between speaker and addressee, and the second rule that 
the use of endearments should be sparing and a reflection of genuine attachment to 
the addressee.  A far more interesting interpretation of the saleswoman's behaviour 
than the 'gushing' attributed to her (which, given the regularity with which 
'endearments' are used in service encounters, must surely be a rather determinedly 
perverse response on the part of the writer), is to see the speaker as simply 
operating with a different set of rules from the writer, a set of rules which 
presumably specifies not only that address terms generally classified as 
'endearments' are appropriate in service encounters but also that all stages in the 
encounter should be marked by the use of such term.  (See Ventola 1987 on the 
structure of service encounters). 
The really difficult question is to decide whether a different perception of the 
nature of the relationship between interlocutors in service encounters underlies the 
different rules, as well as a different value given to the address terms used.  The 
person who expects to be addressed as Madam  or Sir  in a service encounter 
clearly sees such an encounter as one between unequals, i.e. sees the situation as 
one involving power; whereas the person who prefers no address term to be used 
might perceive service encounters more as interactions between equals (or simply 
be more middle class, and prefer not to use terms of address to people not known 
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personally). Might the use then of 'endearments' by the provider of goods and 
services in such contexts to be explained in terms of an assumption of some kind of 
solidarity or mutuality between participants (meaning something like 'We're doing 
each other a favour, me by providing you with something you want and you by 
enabling me to earn a living') or is it that service encounters are seen as calling for 
overt phatic markers, indications of benevolent attitude, in a context which can 
otherwise be quite impersonal?  
Or is it that it is not so much the perception of the nature of service encounters 
which is at issue but some factor, such as social class, which is largely shared by 
those providing certain kinds of goods and services and which by its fostering of a 
certain kind of coding orientation predisposes to the use of certain address terms in 
ways that are rather different from the ways these terms are used by social groups 
with a different coding orientation?  If Bernstein is right in maintaining that the 
language that will be used by any group which "raises the 'we' above 'I' " will be 
different from the language of the social group which "emphasizes the 'I' over the 
'we' ", insofar as it stresses the creation of social solidarity at the expense of 'the 
verbal elaboration of individual experience' (Bernstein 1971: 146-7), then regular 
use by members of such a group of terms of address which neither individualise nor 
acknowledge status differences but rather assume the affective unanimity of both 
parties in a transaction makes perfect sense, even when such terms of address are 
used to people who are not in fact members of the solidary group. There seems 
good evidence that some such factor is operating, not only with respect to the 
address practices of such minority groups as women, theatre people and gay males 
('minority' being defined in terms of either literal numbers or of perceived social 
marginality), but also in such everyday service transactions as arise in the course of 
shopping for food, going to the post-office or service station, and using public 
transport.   
The nationalist rhetoric of egalitarianism to the contrary, Australia is not the model 
of the classless society (though a society where everyone seems to be on first name 
terms with everyone else fosters the illusion). Socioeconomic status is perhaps 
more relevant, though if one is noting differences in the utilisation of a part of the 
linguistic system relevant to employment, something more like the classic Marxist 
definition of class in terms of relation to the ownership of production  does seem 
appropriate.  
In the case of personnel providing goods and services in everyday service 
encounters, there is a clear range of socio-economic status involved, ranging from 
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skilled tradespeople (eg. motor mechanics, butchers, plumbers) to totally unskilled 
and largely inexperienced school-leavers working as juniors in supermarkets, and 
yet there is a great deal in common in the address patterns used by such personnel.   
Some observations.  A male bus driver addresses an elderly male passenger with a 
walking stick and is responded to as follows: 
 
Driver: You wanna get off now, mate? 
Passenger: Yes, mate. 
A male bus passenger calls the male driver's attention to the fact that the back door 
of the bus has not been opened for passengers to get out at a particular stop by 
calling: Back door, mate. (A woman under similar circumstances might use driver 
as the appropriate term of address and expect to get back love or dear, or nothing,  
rather than the symmetrical mate that would be used to a male). A female 
hairdresser greets a female client in her Italian-accented English with:  
'Hello darling.  What can we do for you today?'   
Her tertiary-educated client does not reciprocate with darling or dear but does use 
the woman's first name. A male delivery-van driver for a large department store 
greets a female customer expecting delivery  of a piece of furniture with:  
 'Myer here, love. Got your furniture on board'  
and punctuates further exchanges with frequent use of love.  The system of address 
options in Australian English provides no appropriate reciprocal term to be used by 
females to males in such circumstances, at least in the system as used by this 
particular speaker, so the woman uses no terms of address but does make a range of 
adjustments to her speech (including shifting to a slightly broader version of 
Australian English vowels and adopting a tone indicating some degree of 
camaraderie) indicative of a register shift appropriate for this sort of interaction. 
Perhaps the most interesting of these exchanges are those where mate is used by 
both provider and receiver of service (nearly always between males).  Since many 
instances of this symmetrical usage occur in exchanges between individuals who 
have never met before and who certainly do not know each other as individuals, 
there is no basis for solidarity other than their common maleness - and while 
Australian male solidarity is an extremely pervasive phenomenon, it seems a little 
excessive to invoke it for this kind of transient encounter. An alternative 
explanation is that vocatives, including mate, are used in service encounters as 
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deliberate ploys to minimise the effect of the status differences that are inherent in 
the situation.  If this interpretation is correct, the phenomenon presumably has its 
roots in the historical commitment of Australians to egalitarian principles - and the 
system fails in symmetry, or at least reciprocity, precisely when individuals refuse 
to pay this tribute to egalitarian ideology.  
While there seem to be grounds for treating address practices in service encounters 
as part of a special register with particular ideological overtones, the question of 
differences in coding orientation between people with different social 
characteristics remains.  Data from encounters other than service encounters would 
seem to indicate that there are wide differences among speakers of Australian 
English in the extent of usage of vocatives.  Such data ranges from mother-child 
interactions which involved rates of vocative usage ranging from less than 3% of 
clauses containing a vocative to nearly 15%, to overheard interactions such as the 
one quoted below where every turn by both participants contained a vocative. In 
the mother-child interactions, on the whole, it was those between mothers and their 
children classed as working class by the investigators in this study which had the 
higher incidence of vocatives - but the highest incidence of all was in a middle-
class interaction, where the rate was so much higher than that in any other 
interaction that it is hard to know how to account for it other than in terms of 
personal style. (Some individuals certainly do use many more vocatives than is 
regarded as usual in their social group and this can become a commented-upon 
feature of their idiolect, possibly causing some degree of discomfort to addressees 
who may feel that they are being condescended to or in some way treated as 
children).  
The overheard interaction referred to above took place between two 60ish males in 
a suburban supermarket in an inner suburb of Sydney, while they were waiting in 
line at the cash register: 
 
Speaker 1: Hello George. 
Speaker 2. Hello Bill. 
(Pause, while Speaker 2 gets to the head of the queue and puts his purchases on the 
counter. The conversation resumes, around an intervening person in the queue, 
while Bill's purchases are being dealt with). 
 
Speaker 1. Don't think we'll get a game today, George. 
Speaker 2. Doesn't look like it, Bill. 
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Several more largely phatic exchanges follow, all concluding with a vocative, the 
interaction concluding with: 
 
Speaker 1. Bye, George. 
Speaker 2. See you, Billy.  
It is tempting, though tricky, to assign some rough indication of socio-economic 
status to these speakers. Both were clearly locals and their age alone suggested that 
were not part of the gentrification process of the inner urban areas of the major 
Australian cities. Both men were fluent speakers of Australian English, using the 
General to Broad pronunciation (Mitchell & Delbridge 1965) that is most difficult 
to associate firmly with any particular class or socio-economic group, but which 
suggests the non-professional rather than the professional in men of this age group. 
Their mode of interaction was in no way atypical of observed interaction in a range 
of settings between people one would class as of lower rather than higher socio-
economic status.  
I believe that there are grounds for suggesting a real difference in the optionality of 
vocation  as a feature of a coding orientation related to social groups using different 
modes of social organization, neither 'class' nor 'socio-economic status' accurately 
characterizing the nature of such groups.  Much detailed interactional data would 
have to be available, however, before the validity of such a hypothesis could be 
convincingly demonstrated.  
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Coda 
 
 
The story does not end here, of course, but goes on. Students continue to find the 
exploration of address practice an accessible and illuminating way in to 
understanding something of the ways in which social relations are negotiated by 
means of the most apparently trivial linguistic items.  
In the end, the kind of ethnography that will illuminate the construction of persons 
in Australia in terms of gender, race, class, nationality etc. needs to go a long way 
further than address practice. But address remains one of the most sensitive 
realisations of tenor, relevant to all three dimensions.  
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